An Explanation of the Principal Causes which led to the Present War on the West Coast of New Zealand.

Thomas McDonnell

First published by Walter Taylor in 1869

Digitised and made available online by the University of Auckland Libraries and Learning Services.

Epub © 2013 Early New Zealand Books Collection

ISBN 978-1-927288-94-8

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AN EXPLANATION

OF THE PRINCIPAL CAUSES WHICH LED

TO THE PRESENT WAR

ON THE

WEST COAST OF NEW ZEALAND;

IN DEFENCE OF THE ACTION TAKEN

BY

LIEUT.-COL. THOS. McDONNELL ,

WHILST COMMANDING THE

PATEA FIELD FORCE,

WITH A

SUGGESTION AS TO FUTURE OPERATIONS.

WANGANUI: NEW ZEALAND,

PRINTED BY WALTER TAYLOR, 'TIMES' OFFICE, RIDGWAY-ST.

1869.

[MAP]

MAP OF WEST COAST.

BETWEEN

Wanganui and Taranaki,

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

ON retiring from active service I consider it a duty which I owe to myself and my fellow-colonists to publish a short statement of facts which occurred during my command upon the West and East Coasts of this Island, leaving those who read them to draw their own conclusions.

During the last six or seven years, the colony has unfortunately, been engaged in a conflict with the Native race in which I, as a subordinate officer, as commander of a division, and as commander of a Field Force, rendered, to my fellow-colonists services for which, I repeatedly received the thanks of our late Governor, Sir George Grey, General Cameron, Major-General Chute, and the Colonial Government, in documents a few of which I am now compelled to publish as an Appendix to my statement in self-defence.

This is a duty which I owe to myself on retiring from active service, because in a portion of the press of the colony I have been censured, and even accused of being in some measure the cause of disasters upon the West Coast which never would have occurred had my plans of operations been carried out in such a manner as my own common sense, experience in colonial warfare, and thorough knowledge of the language, habits, customs, and prejudices of the natives with whom I had to deal dictated, without the interference of the Native Department. I wish to show, in justice to myself, that if armed with the authority subsequently conferred upon mv successor, I could have crushed the disturbances in the Patea District in the bud, and thus prevented them assuming the shape of a formidable rebellion under the leadership of Titoko Waru.

In the second place, it may be of service to my fellow-colonists,

in the present crisis of affairs, to have placed before them some convincing proofs of the necessity of an entire change in our present system of dealing with the Native race; not only those of them in open rebellion against us, but also the neutral, as well as loyal Natives. Until there is a radical change in the entire system, our continuing the conflict as we have been doing for some years past, is – as I stated to the Hon. the Defence Minister in my letter of resignation: – "Simply useless, and only throwing away men's lives, and expending money for nought."

Having never interfered with politics, I refrain from publishing some official and semi-official correspondence, the publication of which might be imputed to motives which I repudiate, and therefore only publish such extracts as are necessary to elucidate the objects which I have in view.

Finally, I repeat that no temporising policy will ever succeed with the Native race. The disaffected must be taught to respect our authority, and nothing but the firm maintenance of that authority can firmly attach the loyal natives to our standard, and make those who remain neutral cautious before they risk the chance of joining those in rebellion.

How far I would have succeeded in carrying out my plans, based upon those sentiments, if free and unfettered whilst in command of the Field Force in the Patea district, I leave the readers of the following short statement of facts to judge.

THOS. McDONNELL,

Lieut.-Colonel.

Wanganui, 29th April, 1869.

CHAPTER I. ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

CHAPTER I.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

I'll do't; but it dislikes me.
But,

He who steals my purse, steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that, which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed. – SHAKESPEARE.

To take the field and encounter a savage foe; to face the rifle and the tomahawk of a portion of the infatuated natives of this colony, and fight them in their own fashion, whilst contending for the right of my fellow colonists, and the establishment of British supremacy in New Zealand, was to me a comparatively pleasant task, because accustomed to it from my youth upwards. But to repel the calumnies of men who ought to have supported me, instead of making use of me for political and other purposes, is a task that I never thought would be imposed upon me, and, as the sword and not the pen, has been my profession, I can fairly claim the indulgence of criticism whilst laying before my fellow-colonists the following statement of facts, every one of which can be borne out by official and semi-official documents, some of which, for the present, I shall refrain from publishing.

To enable those who are not acquainted with the district north of Wanganui (in which these disturbances last occurred) to understand what I am about to relate, I append a map of the district over which I had command, and of the country beyond as far as the town of Taranaki.

In June, 1866, I was appointed to the command of the Patea district, i.e., the district between the Patea and Kaupokonui rivers, to which was subsequently added the country between the Patea and Waitotara rivers,

That district was then held by the Imperial troops, in redoubts, near the mouths of the rivers Waitotara, Patea, Tangahoe (Manawapou), Ingahape, and Waingongoro; also inland on the Waitotara river at Weraroa, and on the Patea at Kakaramea. When I assumed the command, surveyors had commenced the survey of the country between the Patea and the Waingongoro rivers, but had confined their operations to the vicinity of redoubts, as the natives threatened them and were still hostile, although cowed by the defeats they had sustained and the losses they had suffered in General Chute's short but brilliant campaign in the months of December, January, and February of that year.

The force placed under my command consisted of: –

1 Company Patea Rangers ... ... ... 40

1 " Wanganui Rangers ... ... ... 70

2 " Taranaki Military Settlers ... ... 110

1 Troop Wanganui Cavalry ... ... ... 30

Total ... ... 250

Those companies who had previously been actively engaged in Taranaki, up the Wanganui river, and also at Opotiki on the East Coast, were to have their land in the Patea district, and to be located thereon. I established my Head Quarters at Manawapou, in the centre of the district, and employed the force in covering the surveyors who were then engaged in pushing on the surveys. Being convinced from information which I had received, that the natives would oppose the survey and settlement of the district, I was determined to leave nothing untried to prevent further fighting, and gave strict orders to every covering party not to fire except in self-defence, and not to interfere with any cattle, pigs, cultivations, or other property of the natives.

I lost no time in proceeding to Waingongoro, (25th June) and sent for Wiremu Hukanui, a native chief, residing at Kauae. I told him distinctly that the surveyors had commenced to survey the confiscated land and settlers to reside upon it, but that a fair proportion would, when surveyed, be given back to the natives and secured to them by a Crown grant: that I had no wish to fight, but to prosecute the surveys and settle the district peaceably. Wiremu, at my request, conveyed my message to the rebels; their

reply was an ambuscade which they laid for me next day, as I was returning from Waingongoro, in company with Mr. Carrington, the Government Surveyor, the Contract Surveyor, and others. I informed the Government of this and at their request proceeded to Wellington, and when there, informed them that it would be necessary to force the natives into submission before the district could be surveyed and settled, and that for this purpose I should require a force of 500 men. The Hon. Colonel Haultain informed me that the Government could not give me this number, and that I was to do the best I could with the force then in the district, but at my urgent request placed under my orders the Native Contingent, my old force, then stationed at Pipiriki, seventy miles up the Wanganui river, commanded by my brother, Captain McDonnell; and authorised me to increase its strength from twenty-five to seventy-five men. He told me that if the Hau-haus would not come to terms to waste no time but to attack them at once.

I returned to Wanganui, recruited the Native Contingent to the number authorised, and sent it to Patea in spite of determined opposition on the part of several influential chiefs in Wanganui; that opposition delayed me for upwards of a fortnight during which time the intelligence that I was about to take the field and commence fighting (if necessary,) brought in the natives occupying the bush inland of the Weraroa pa, who submitted, and took the oath of allegiance, which I knew, and subsequent events proved, they valued not a straw.

On the 25th July I returned to Patea, but before striking a blow determined to give the natives one more chance, and for a second time proceeded to Waingongoro and again sent for Wiremu; I told him that I had been to Wellington, and that the Government had instructed me, if the rebels did not submit, to attack and force them, to submission; and that I offered them the same terms as before. I then sent them by him a white handkerchief, and a ball cartridge, as emblems of peace or war; one of which they were to return by noon next day; after which, I returned to Patea. Late on the following day I received word that the cartridge was returned, and that the natives were anxious to speak with me. The next morning (28th July,) I started for Waingongoro, but on my arrival at Manawapou I received information that on the previous day a second

ambuscade had been laid for me between Manawapou and Waingongoro, under the impression that I should then have been on that road. Fearful of further treachery I took with me to Waingongoro a small escort. On arriving there a messenger informed me that some of the Hau-hau chiefs were waiting to see me at Kauae. I went to that village with twelve troopers, although the messenger told me not to take any escort, but my own natives on the other hand, implored me not to go at all. On entering the Kauae, not seeing any one, I proceeded to a large whare, thinking to find Wiremu and looking in, to my surprise, found about twenty armed natives; they seemed equally surprised to see me. My escort then came up, and I told them to remain outside and to stand to their horses. Had I not had the escort with me I should, in all probability, have fallen a victim to their treachery. I then had a talk with the chiefs and saw clearly, what I had not even doubted before, that they were determined not to submit; but to place matters beyond a doubt, I offered to suspend operations and the survey also, if one of their number, Natanahira, (then a high priest of the Hau-haus) would accompany me to Wellington to see the Government, and that I would wait for him at Waingongoro until noon next day. This they agreed to, but next morning Wiremu informed me that he would not come. I waited till noon, and then told Wiremu that I would commence fighting at once. I returned the same day (29th July,) to Manawapou where my small force was collected.

That night, and on the two following nights, it rained incessantly, but on the 1st August, the weather cleared and that night I surprised and burnt the village of Pokaikai, which I discovered after a long night march, killing five men and capturing some women and children; among the women was Martha, Natanahira's wife. On the night of the 3rd of August, I scoured the bush inland of Manutahi; found out and burnt two villages just vacated, and recaptured several of my cavalry horses which had been stolen. This brought the natives to their senses, and on the 4th August they sent me a message suing for peace. I gave them to the 7th to come in and submit. On that day I went into the bush with the Native Contingent, and met them at the site of a village named Ohangae, which had been burnt during General Chute's Campaign. There

we made peace, and agreed that there should be no more fighting from Taiporohenui to the Waitotara. That peace I could have firmly maintained, even with the small force then under my command, were it not for the suicidal course pursued by Mr. Commissioner Parris, to whose conduct must be attributed the subsequent hostility of the natives, and the frustration of all my plans.

Having made peace, and feeling that if left free and unfettered to carry out my own plans I was able to maintain it, I moved my force to Hawera, where I erected a redoubt to secure communication with Manawapou, and also to enable me, if necessary, to operate against the natives in that neighbourhood, and to push on the surveys. Everything promised a short and successful campaign, when circumstances supervened which, coupled with the strange action taken by the Government, effectually prevented me from carrying out my plans, and stopped me in the full tide of my success. These circumstances were the dismissal of nearly half my Europeans, and the suspension of hostilities to enable Mr. Parris to endeavour to persuade the rebels to submit!! Whilst he played out the farce let us see how

THE GOVERNMENT KEPT FAITH WITH THE EUROPEAN CONTINGENT.

The time of service of the two companies of Taranaki Military Settlers, Nos. 8 and 10. forming a portion of the Colonial Force in the district, expired on the 12th of August, on which day the men became entitled to their discharge, and to fifty acres of land each. So far back as 1865, these companies had embarked at New Plymouth, for Patea, to be, as they were informed, located on their land in that district. Being unable through stress of weather, to enter the Patea river, they landed at Wanganui, whence at a particular crisis they were sent up the Wanganui river to occupy Pipiriki, and from Pipiriki they were subsequently sent to the East Coast, where their pay was increased from 2s. 6d. to 3s. 6d. a day, apparently as compensation for serving out of their own province, and also to assimilate their pay to the rates of pay of the remainder of the East Coast Expeditionary Force.

When they were brought from the East Coast to Patea, in June, 1866, they were again informed that they would be placed on their land which was being surveyed for them, and as at Patea they were

in their own Province, their pay was again reduced to 2s. 6d. a day. As long as there was a prospect of their being placed upon their land they did not complain, and would cheerfully have served over their time; but when hostilities commenced, and a winter's campaign was before them, as their time of service had expired they considered that they were entitled to the extra shilling a day.

When I was about to commence operations, at the end of July, they through their Captain (Wilson) asked me what steps the Government intended to take with regard to them. Having no instructions on the subject, I sent Captain Wilson to Wellington, to lay their case before the Government. It may be as well to notice here that those two companies landed in Wanganui in June, 1865, en route from the East Coast to Patea, Colonel Gorton, commanding the Wanganui Militia District ordered them to march for Patea, the same day they landed. The men, through their officers, requested to be allowed to be left in Wanganui for one day. They represented, and with reason, that they had been on actual service in the field for upwards of fifteen months, and were desirous, before marching up the country, of replenishing their kits, and enjoying a day's relaxation. Colonel Gorton's orders however, were peremptory and imperative; they must march or be at once disarmed, disbanded, and lose their land. When the men were paraded and the order given to march, forty of them laid down their arms and were at once dismissed the service. The remainder marched for Patea. Colonel Gorton's action on this occasion was highly approved of by the Government, but by the Colonial Forces it was regarded as an unjust and arbitrary proceeding, and caused the men not only to lose all confidence in the Government, but also to determine not to serve over their time unless guaranteed some remuneration.

The answer of the Defence Minister to Captain. Wilson's personal application was – "that the men were entitled to their discharge, and if they claimed it they were to be marched to Wanganui, their arms taken from them, and then they were to be dismissed the service." Men so dismissed, or more properly discharged at their own request would, when the district was surveyed, receive their land two miles back in the bush. When this answer was communicated to the men on parade, fifty of them claimed

their discharge, were marched to Wanganui and disbanded.

The Patea Rangers whose time of service expired in March previous, and had only kept on in the hope of obtaining their land, alarmed at the way in which the Government had treated the Taranaki Military Settlers, requested me, through their Captain (Newland) to point out where their block of land was to be, and that they would be willing to serve until placed upon it. The Defence Minister's reply to Captain Newland, whom I sent to Wellington for instructions on the subject, was – that he could not point out where their land was to be, and that he did not know whether the Government had a single acre of land in the district until the Compensation Court (to assemble the following December) had decided upon the claims of the natives.

On receipt of this reply, all the company, with the exception of nine men, claimed their discharge, and consequently were marched to Wanganui and disbanded. Thus, at the very time that I most urgently required an efficient number of men, by the suicidal policy of the Government, or rather their unjust and arbitrary proceedings, I lost the services of over a hundred staunch and well tried men whose places could not be supplied by three times the number of raw and undisciplined recruits; but even these, or an equal number to what I had lost, were not forthcoming to supply the places of the brave fellows who had been driven from the service disgusted with the treatment which they had received at the hands of the Government.

At that time my position was most embarrassing, but still my ultimatum to the disaffected natives was – unconditional surrender, and unconditionally they had surrendered. Even with the small force at my disposal I still maintained a defiant attitude, and all went on well until, in an evil hour, Mr. Parris, who had been to Wellington to earwig the Government appeared amongst us.

This gentleman, who for many years had been the Agent of the Native Department in New Plymouth, had lately been appointed a Civil Commissioner, and was anxious to show to the Government that his influence with the rebel natives was so great that he could persuade them to submit, and thus establish peace in the district without the interference of an armed force.

CHAPTER II. THE RESULT OF A TEMPORISING POLICY.

CHAPTER II.

THE RESULT OF A TEMPORISING POLICY.

From my experience and knowledge of native character, I always have been, and ever will be of opinion that in dealing with the Maori race we must compel them to respect us as their superiors physically, before they submit to what they cannot understand – our philanthropy and system of coaxing and bribing them into submission. Acting upon my own personal knowledge and practical experience of the deeprooted prejudices of the enemy with whom I had to deal, and knowing that the most merciful course I could pursue in dealing with them was to demand "unconditional surrender," and show them by a few short, sharp, but severe proofs of my determination, that I was resolved to enforce it, and had enforced it, in spite of an interference which compelled me on the 31st July, 1866, to address a letter to the Hon. the Defence Minister, from which the following is an extract: –

"Since my arrival in these districts I have had considerable difficulty in dealing with the rebel natives in consequence of Mr. Parris. He has been, and still is, in communication with the rebel chiefs, asking them to come down and make peace through him. I am convinced that if this is allowed to continue, it will inevitably prolong the present state of affairs, and upset my arrangements.

"I therefore beg to request that you will cause Mr. Parris to be communicated with, and instructed to cease to communicate with the rebel natives, at least for the present."

In reply to that, I received a letter dated 8th August, enclosing copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Parris, and ordering me to attend to any instructions that I might receive from him with reference to the discontinuance of hostile operations, and also instructing me to render Mr. Parris every assistance in communicating with the natives, and endeavouring to induce them to "return to their allegiance," a thing which, by the way, those men never professed to owe to our government.

On the 12th of August – before that letter had reached me – I was obliged, to write to inform the Government that on the morning

of the previous day, myself and a small party whilst proceeding in the direction of Ketemarae, were fired upon by an ambuscade laid by Ahitana, in a rifle-pitted position which they tried to induce us to attack, but, having only a few men with me, I reserved for a more convenient opportunity, the punishment of his treacherous and cowardly conduct.

A few days afterwards I received from Mr. Parris the following letter: –

"I have just received a proposal from the insurgent natives of this district to meet me in a day or so. I therefore beg to request that you will not attack any of the natives in the Ngatiruanui district until you hear from me again."

In reply to Mr. Parris, I, of course, intimated that I would obey his instructions, but concluded my short letter thus: –

"The Ketemarae natives fired upon some of our men on Monday last, and yesterday they fired upon the survey party who returned to camp."

Having frustrated my designs, and encouraged the rebels to commit depredations which they knew I dare not punish them for, Mr. Parris continued, his negotiations with them until the 30th August, when he wrote me as follows: –

"SIR – The Warea natives have refused to surrender to the terms offered to them, and as there is no chance of the Ngaruahine section of Ngatiruanuis giving in without them, I intend to return to New Plymouth at once, as I consider I have done all I can do."

On receipt of that letter I at once determined, if possible, to undo the mischief that Mr. Parris had done, and for that purpose started the same evening with a party from Hawera to the bush at Ketemarae, laid an ambuscade for the enemy into which he fell, and thus resumed operations.

On the 4th September, Captain Newland returned from Wellington with the answer of the Defence Minister to the Memorial of the Patea Rangers when, as already stated, the whole of the company with the exception of nine men claimed their discharge. My force was thus reduced to: –

85 European Infantry.

35 European Cavalry, and

80 Native Infantry.

With this diminished force it was absolutely necessary that I should throw up a redoubt near the bush at Ketemarae, garrison two redoubts in close proximity to the enemy, find covering parties

for the surveyors, and escorts for the conveyance of supplies from Patea. Trusting that the Government would shortly reinforce me, I moved a part of my force to an old Maori pa nine hundred yards from the old native position of Ketemarae (destroyed by General Chute the previous January) and commenced the erection of a redoubt. On the 7th September, I detached twenty men to Kakaramea, which position was vacated by the Imperial troops on that day. I now occupied three positions: Ketemarae (Waihi,) with 130 men; Hawera, 50; and Kakaramea, 20. It will be seen from this that in addition to convoys, and the usual guards and fatigues those detachments, unless reinforced, could do little more than hold the positions they occupied, protect the surveyors at their work, and watch the enemy.

Owing, however, to the close proximity of my position to the enemy at Ketemarae (Waihi,) skirmishes were of daily occurrence, and emboldened by my comparative inaction, the Hau-haus advanced into the open, attacked our escort, and fired into the camp. Determined to punish their audacity, and show them that we could do more than hold our own, I collected a small force of 125 men, being all I could spare after providing for the safety of the redoubts, started on a night march, and at daylight made a sudden attack upon the village of Pungarehu, where we killed twenty-three of the enemy, took nine prisoners, and captured a quantity of guns and ammunition. Whilst burning the village we were surrounded and attacked by a numerically superior force, but we cut our way out with our prisoners and wounded. The loss on our side was three killed and five wounded.

On my return to Waihi I was delighted to find that on the evening before we attacked Pungarehu, a company of T.M.S. consisting of seventy-five men under Captain Morrison, had arrived at Patea. That reinforcement gave additional confidence to the small force under my command, and enabled me with a little more confidence to once more demand unconditional surrender or fight it out.

The result of the attack upon Pungarehu was that the enemy sued for peace. I at once accepted their overtures, and gave them to a certain date to come in and surrender. Before that date, however, Toi, one of their principal chiefs, came in and requested

me to meet them on the other side of the river at Ahipaipa. Whilst he was speaking to me upon this subject, a messenger arrived with, a native letter from Tukino, one of the chiefs who had surrendered at Ohangai, informing me that I was to be asked to a meeting where a trap was laid for the purpose of taking my life, and begging of me not to go. I at once, read the letter to Toi, and charged him with treachery, upon which he changed colour and remained silent. I then ordered him to go back to his people; and tell them that if they did not come in by the date named by me, I would haul down the white flag and re-commence fighting. He left, and, before that date several came in, tendered their submission, and I located them near our redoubt at Waihi.

The others who did not surrender I determined to attack, and therefore took a small force, and, guided by Katene, (who afterwards turned traitor,) attacked and burnt the village of Te Umu.

The next night I sent out another party under Captain Newland to burn the village of Popoia. The rebels being on the alert, discovered him before he reached the village and attacked him. A smart skirmish ensued in which the enemy lost one man shot dead, and had some wounded. On our side, my brother, Captain McDonnell, was severely wounded from the effects of which he has not since recovered.

Thus, notwithstanding the paucity of my force, I not only kept the enemy in check, but from time to time severely punished him, and compelled him to keep at a respectful distance in his villages, whilst we pushed on the surveys.

In this manner the survey was completed from Patea to Waingongoro, the promised large blocks of land given to those tribes who had surrendered, and the military settlers commenced to select their land.

I also selected my land in the district, and to set a good example to my force, as well as to encourage them in remaining in, and settling the district, as well as to convince the natives of the reality of the confiscation and settlement scheme, I purchased implements of husbandry, stock of sheep, some cattle and horses, and employed men who had been struck off pay to saw timber for a house, and

entered into an agreement for its erection; ploughing and sowing my land and otherwise of permanently settling down.

CHAPTER III. A SHORT CAMPAIGN ON THE EAST COAST.

CHAPTER III.

A SHORT CAMPAIGN ON THE EAST COAST.

When thus prepared to settle upon my land, and to encourage my fellow settlers to follow my example, I received an order from the Honourable J. C. Richmond, then Acting Defence Minister, to proceed at once to Tauranga, on the East Coast, where my services were required. Knowing the danger to which my departure would expose the Patea district, I remonstrated, and pointed out to Mr. Richmond that I had been appointed to this command with the understanding that myself and fellow-settlers, were to have our land in the district and settle there. That in spite of all opposition, and in the face of many difficulties, we had driven the enemy back, pushed on and nearly completed the surveys, and that now for me to leave the district would be to undo all that had been done. That my doing so would have a very bad effect upon the natives whom I had compelled to surrender.

Remonstrance was vain: Mr. Richmond insisted upon my going, and I had then no other alternative than that of throwing up my commission and becoming a private settler, or of selling off at a fearful sacrifice my agricultural implements, stock, &c., and proceed to Tauranga.

It would have been well for myself and fellow-settlers, and for the colony at large, if I had then thrown up my commission and remained in the Patea district, but in obedience to orders I left all, and proceeded to Tauranga, and took command of the Arawas.

At Tauranga, I met the Defence Minister, Colonel Haultain, who

was there on the sick list, laid up from his exertions in trying to hunt up the enemy. He promised me that I should have an independent command and not be interfered with by any one.

From my experience of Civil Commissioners upon the West Coast, I at first dreaded the interference of Mr. Clarke, Civil Commissioner of Tauranga, but unlike Mr. Parris and Mr. Booth, he rendered me most valuable assistance. Having collected the Arawas I marched to Rotorua lakes. An hour after my arrival, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John – then Major – arrived, and by virtue of his seniority, took command. For some days he led us over a great many hills, but could not find the enemy. He then, with most of his men, returned to Tauranga, and reported to Colonel Haultain that there was no enemy in the district.

The day that he left I assumed the command, and in the evening started with a small force, Europeans and Arawas, for a night's march. Early next morning, we came upon the enemy's camp, but not of the main body. We at once attacked the position, drove the enemy out, killed two men and captured a third, a young fellow whom the Arawas wanted to tomahawk, but I spared him for another purpose. In his terror, he told me where I should fall in with the enemy's main body, and as he knew that it was more than his life was worth to deceive me, I ordered him to lead on. Having divided my force into three divisions, we pushed forward, came upon the enemy's main position, surrounded and attacked before they were aware of our proximity, and killed a considerable number of them. The remainder fled, and we pursued until we drove them out of the district, leaving their killed and wounded behind. I halted to rest my force and get up supplies of provisions and ammunition, prepared (if necessary) to pursue the enemy to the Waikato.

Thus, whilst Lieut.-Colonel St. John, who had been two or three days on his return march to Tauranga, was reporting to Colonel Haultain that there was no enemy in the district, Mr. Clarke conveyed to him my despatch reporting our success. The following is a copy of Colonel Haultain's letter in reply to my despatch: –

"Tauranga, 29th March, 1867.

MY DEAR MCDONNELL,

I received your letter containing the account of yesterday's operations with much satisfaction. I have sent it on at once to Wellington. You have shown your usual skill and energy, and have given the Hau-haus a heavier blow than we managed to inflict in all our expeditions. I expect the rebels will now retreat; if so, we shall put the Arawas off pay shortly. Let me know what you would like to do yourself, &c., &c.

Yours very truly,

T. HAULTAIN."

"Colonial Defence Office,

"Wellington, 1st May, 1867."

"SIR – I have the honor by direction of the Defence Minister, to inform you that in consideration of your services in the Field on various occasions, both on the East and West Coasts, his Excellency the Governor has been pleased to promote you to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Auckland Militia. A copy of the New Zealand Gazette containing the notification is transmitted herewith.

I have &c.,

J. HOLT, Under Secretary.

Lieut.-Col. McDonnell,

Auckland Militia, Tauranga."

I strongly urged upon Colonel Haultain to allow me to follow up the enemy whilst the panic lasted, and my men were flushed with success. The Arawas were particularly anxious to follow up the pursuit, and every European in the force was eager to be led on, Mr. Clarke, the Civil Commissioner, a man thoroughly conversant with Native affairs, and the state of the district, strongly recommended my plan as the only way of effectively putting an end to the rebellion.

When Colonel Haultain refused to allow us to advance, the Arawa Chiefs became most indignant and said: – "The Government will never do any good until the tree itself is hewn down" – meaning the Waikato and the King movement. "Let us go to Waikato, destroy the trunk, and the branches will die of themselves." We could master a force able and willing to strike an effectual blow, but as usual, indecision, want of determination, and a muddling policy prevailed.

It is a lamentable fact that during the past few years, whilst pretending to carry out a self-reliant policy, at the very time that an effectual blow could have been struck, some evil Civil or Military genius has interposed his authority, and thus prolonged the con-

test. Thus it was at Tauranga, as well as at Patea and elsewhere, and thus it continues to be still. It is only sacrifice of life, and a waste of money to continue the contest upon that principle.

CHAPTER IV.

CHAPTER IV.

Affairs began to look bad again at Patea. The surveys between the Patea and the Waitotara rivers which had been commenced after the completion of the surveys north of Patea, had to be discontinued, the surveyors having been driven in, and the Hau-haus once more in possession.

Being again ordered to Patea, I left Tauranga, proceeded to Wellington, and reported my arrival to the Defence Minister. I assured Colonel Haultain that if not interfered with when I resumed the command, I would soon put matters right in the Patea district, push on the surveys, and encourage the settlers to settle upon their land, which would soon enable us to become strong enough to hold our own. To my surprise he expressed great doubts of my being able to do this, and pressed me take a few months' leave of absence, which I declined.

Just before leaving Wellington for Patea, I had another interview with Colonel Haultain, and again expressed myself confident of a speedy settlement of affairs in the Patea district. To this he replied (perhaps, with a view to encourage me to perform my duty) that as soon as peace was restored, the surveys completed, and the settlers located on their land, I should cease to draw the pay and allowances of Lieut,-Colonel, which was £630 a year, and after that my pay and allowance would be reduced to £400 a year, which left the impression upon my mind that high, pay and allowances were entirely dependent upon the prolongation of the contest.

Thus, I left Wellington for Patea, with the assurance that success would be followed, by reduction of salary, to the extent of £230 per annum, but still with a determination to achieve that success at all hazards.

On arriving at Patea I concentrated my small force, ordered the surveyors to be ready within a week, to recommence the surveys, and encouraged the settlers to occupy their land. When I sent out the surveyors they were driven in and returned to Patea the same evening.

Having my own men ready, I immediately crossed the Patea and Whenuakura rivers near the sea, made a detour, and marched on Oika, a village close to the bush inland on the Whenuakura river, the place from whence the surveyors had been driven back. I halted the force on the top of a hill, overlooking and commanding the village, but in a position that could not be seen from the village, and ordered them to keep perfectly silent and concealed. I then advanced to the village, accompanied by Mr. Booth, R.M., and one mounted orderly. On reaching the village, which belonged to a hapu of the Pakakohi tribe, I met not less a personage than Titoko Waru, who had just returned from Wanganui, where he had been, as he said, "upon a mission," and was then on his way back to Te Ngutu-o-te-manu. I at once told the Pakakohi that as they had driven in the surveyors I had come out; that their wisest plan was to submit and give no further trouble, as even my patience had a limit. They were bounceable; insisted that they would not let the surveys go on, and set me at defiance. I then gave the preconcerted signal, my men started to their feet, and instantly their glittering bayonets in the bright moonlight had a wonderful effect. I then told the Pakakohi that I had had quite enough of temporising with them, that I now demanded an immediate assurance of their future good, behaviour, and if this were not given, I would act accordingly. They commenced a long palaver to show that the land was theirs, but very prudently wound up by promising not to again molest the surveyors, and as a proof of their sincerity presented me with a fat goose, and requested me to return with my men to Patea. As a prognostication of coming events this unfortunate gander shortly afterwards, during my absence, committed suicide by tumbling over the Patea cliff, but subsequently had the honor of supplying my friend Mr. Booth and a few others with material for a hearty dinner.

I now pushed on the surveys without molestation, and whilst

doing so received a letter of thanks from my fellow-settlers, and in due course, when most of our difficulties were overcome, I must say that the Hon. the Defence Minister kept his word, thanked me on behalf of the Government, and informed me that my pay and allowances were reduced to £400 a year.

During my absence the Hau-haus south of New Plymouth, had adopted a system of levying black mail, and had forbidden Europeans to travel between Warea and Waimate, a distance of about 60 miles upon the main road between Waimate and New Plymouth. Two of our so called neutral chiefs, Wiremu and Hone Pihama, profited largely by thus having communication stopped. They generously undertook to provide a guide for any European who might venture to travel the tapued road by night, and pay most exorbitantly for his services. Frightful tales were told of how the Hau-haus would kill them if they caught them on the road, and broad hints as to the probability of there being a number of them a-head upon the look out. The first day's march invariably terminated at a half-way house, kept by Wiremu Kingi, where tales of horror were related, and the Pakeha traveller treated to accommodation for which he was fleeced most unmercifully.

Communication with New Plymouth being thus cut off, I received orders from the government, to charter the s.s. Waipara, and send by her 25 men and 1 officer, to relieve a detachment from New Plymouth, stationed at Warea, that they might return to town. Instead of chartering the Waipara I at once determined to march my men over the tapued road to Warea, relieve the detachment there, and put a stop to all this humbug of travelling by night and fleecing the Pakehas. When this determination became known to the natives, they became furious, and cried out, "Awe, who is this Pakeha that will break our Aukati, – our Aukati is to be broken, and he says if we stop him he will fight his way through. We will write to our friend Parati (Parris) we will write to the Kawanahanga (the Government.) Wiremu Kingi was highly indignant, the profits of his half-way house would, he no doubt thought, be in considerable danger if the road was opened.

Having collected a small force to accompany the detachment to Warea, I started and camped for the first might at Kauae, Wirema

Manaia's place, and the next day made a small village belonging to Hone Pihama the following morning we got to Wiremu Kingi's village. He was very civil, and even accommodating, but tried all his powers of persuasion to induce me to return to Patea. The "Hau-haus would be sure to kill us, thousands were on the road to meet us as we advanced. Ambuscades were laid, and we must fall into them." I quietly told him that he had better come with us and help us to avoid them. At this he gave a look of horror; said that he only lived where he did on sufferance, and that if he accompanied us the Hau-haus would avenge themselves on him. This, no doubt, he thought a clever piece of acting, but I knew that the Hau-haus were his firm friends and that he had daily intercourse with them.

We resumed our march, and having travelled a little over a mile came to small stream across which was a rope of flax with a letter attached. On reading it, I found that it warned us not to proceed any further, and was signed Hupita Paiti, which being interpreted means Fighting Jupiter. I at once felt convinced that our friend Wiremu Kingi had placed the rope and letter there, and afterwards had full proof such was the case. Pushing on with due precaution we reached Warea, without seeing a Hau-hau.

Having relieved the New Plymouth detachment, I left my 25 men to garrison Warea, and returned with my small escort to Opunaki. From there I wrote a letter to the Hau-hau chiefs, and assured them that if I ever heard of any European being prevented from travelling between Patea and New Plymouth, or of any traveller being murdered by them, I would punish them severely. I told them that from that day forward I declared the road open to all; it was the Queen's road now, and must be open to all her majesty's subjects.

To that letter, in due course I received a reply, and a promise that the road should be free to all, which promise the enemy strictly kept, and flocks of sheep and herds of cattle have been repeatedly driven overland. For this service I received the thanks of the Government.

At that time all with me was uphill work. Under the Armed Constabulary Act of 1867, I received the rank of Inspector, tanta-

mount to that of a Commissioner of Police, under the orders of the Resident Magistrate. The management of the district and the natives were absolutely taken out of my hands, and I was reduced to the position of a subordinate under the control of Mr. Parris and Mr. Booth.

CHAPTER V. THE POKAIKAI COMMISSION.

CHAPTER V.

THE POKAIKAI COMMISSION.

The cause of the attack upon the village of Pokaikai, the result, and the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry, may be briefly told.

The Ngatiruanui tribe in general have always resisted the influences of civilisation, and remained pre-eminently savage and hostile to our government. The localities occupied by them have ever been the refuge of the vilest malcontents from all parts of the surrounding country. Each village contains a number of fighting men, trained from their earliest childhood to bush fighting, ambuscades, the murder of European settlers, and the plunder of their property.

The Tangahoe hapu of this tribe occupied the village of Pokaikai and their leading chiefs were Aperahama, Tito Te Hanataua, Tukino and others.

Those chiefs and their followers were amongst the ablest and most determined men that had fought against General Chute upon the West Coast. They were amongst the first to attack and drive in the surveyors after I assumed the command, and laid several ambuscades to murder me, the most daring of which was that laid by those men a short time before my attack on Pokaikai. On my way from Waingongoro to Patea, accompanied by Messrs. Carrington, Percy Smith, Sergeant Gilling, two troopers, and the Chief Wirehana, we were fired upon by about twenty of them at forty yards distance. I allowed them to continue their attacks and depredations for some weeks after that, but finding forbearance and remonstrance of no use, warned them of my intention to attack their village, which I did on the night of the 1st August, 1866. We

were fired upon from a whare on the right, but after a short attack during which five of the enemy were killed, we captured a few prisoners and returned to Waihi.

The result of that attack was that shortly afterwards these people came in and made peace. For some time settlement was progressing favourably, and might continue to do so had not Mr. Parris returned to the district, held a meeting with the natives, heard all they had to say, and without either myself or any of my officers being questioned upon the subject, reported to the Government. From that and similar reports, resulted the Pokaikai Commission.

The Commissioners were not instructed to inquire into the reason why I attacked Pokaikai: Mr. Parris knew better than to go into that part of the subject, but contented himself as prosecutor, to rely upon a vague charge of "certain atrocities" having been perpetrated, but what those "atrocities" were, or by whom committed, did not appear upon the notice which I received to appear before the Commissioners, and therefore I had only to watch proceedings during the examination of the very chiefs and leading men whom I had compelled to surrender, and who were the principal witnesses, to find out from their evidence what "atrocities" were being trumped up, or whether it was myself, or some of my officers or men who would be accused!

This may appear incredible, therefore I here insert the following correspondence: –

"Office of the Pokaikai Commission,

Wellington, 9th March, 1868.

SIR – I have the honor to inform you that the Commissioners appointed by his Excellency the Governor, to conduct the enquiry into certain alleged acts of cruelty, stated to have been committed in the attack upon Pokaikai in August 1866, purpose arriving at Patea on or about the 13th instant.

The Commissioners request that you will attend with such witnesses and documents as you may deem necessary.

The witnesses who will be examined in the first instance will be: –

Mr. Robert Parris

Wi Hukanui, of Kawai

Tito Te Hanataua, Matangara

Aperaniko, of Wanganui.

I have the honor, &c.,

(Signed) J. CRACROFT WILSON, C.B., Chairman.

Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell,

Commanding at Patea.

[REPLY.]

"Wanganui, March 14th, 1868.

SIR – I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 5, of the 9th instant, informing me that the Commissioners appointed by his Excellency the Governor, to conduct the enquiry into certain alleged cruelty stated to have been committed in the attack upon Pokaikai, in August, 1866, purpose proceeding to Patea and requesting me to attend with such witnesses as I may deem necessary. Your letter does not express what alleged acts of cruelty are stated to have been committed, nor does it state into whose conduct the investigation is to take place. But from the fact that I am asked to attend with such witnesses and documents, I presume it is my own. Of course, I am only too willing to give every information in this matter, at the same time, it is most unfortunate that I was not informed before the receipt of your letter, under reply of the Commission having been appointed, as my principal witnesses are distributed all over the islands.

"Those I require to substantiate my defence, if such is necessary, are Captain E. Dawson, 2nd Bat. 18th Regt., R. I., at present in Auckland; D.A.C.G. Innes also in Auckland; Captain McDonnell, and Lieutenant Wirihana, (late N.C.,) who have lately gone to the Hot Springs, near Taupo, where they are likely to remain for some time. Lieutenant Gudgeon, (late N.C.), now in Wanganui, Mr. Thos. Wilson, (late Captain T.M.S., now in Canterbury; Captain Newlands, in command of detachment of Armed Constabulary, Taranaki; Captain Aperaniko, (late N.C.), at London, up the Wanganui river; Arapeta, (late N.C.,) and his wife, Mohi, and a woman named Martha, who is now living at Matangangara; the last are the only three witnesses I can procure without the necessary summonses.

"In conclusion, so many of my witnesses being away, I feel it may appear to the Commission that I am trying to throw difficulties in their way, but I can assure them that they are absolutely required to substantiate important points in the defence.

"I have the honor, &c.,

(Signed) THOS. McDONNELL,

Lieut.-Colonel Commanding Colonial Forces, Patea District.

J. Cracroft Wilson, Esq., C.B.,

Chairman Pokaikai Commission.

The Commission was opened on the 18th March, 1868, by Cracroft Wilson, Esq., C.B., as Chairman; Mr. Robert Parris, Civil Commissioner, appeared as prosecutor, and had all his native friends present as witnesses. During the investigation, the only act of "cruelty" went to show that a volunteer named Bezar, had, during or after the attack, attempted to drag a shark's tooth ornament out of the ear of a native woman. It subsequently turned

out that although the attempt was made (of course without my knowledge,) the ornament was not taken, but the following evidence of Sub-Inspector Newland will explain the affair: –

By the Court – "My attention was called to Martha, hearing her slightly screaming. I went up to her and saw a man named Bezar, trying to pull an ornament out of her ear; I laid hold of him and threatened to knock his brains out if he did not leave her alone, and told him that none but a coward would touch a woman. I then made a prisoner of him."

By the Commission – "The ornament was not taken out. I could not see whether her ear was injured or not, as it was night. Bezar certainly was not trying to cut it out."

By Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell – "The instructions you gave on that night were to take the village quietly, and take the natives prisoners; not to fire a shot if possible. The prisoners were treated with every kindness. The attack on Pokaikai had this effect on the natives – that they surrendered shortly afterwards."

Another witness sworn said: –

"I know Martha; she was made a prisoner on the night of the attack; one of the officers took charge of her; a man named Bezar attempted to pull an ornament from her ear: Captain Newland told him that no one but a coward would attempt such a thing, and immediately made him a prisoner; I do not think that the ornament was pulled from the ear, though he tried violently to do so; he did not belong to the force, but was a private servant of Dr. Walker's; he did not receive either pay or rations; he was in attendance on his master, and had a rifle given to him for his own protection; I did not see Martha, but was standing close by, and heard Bezar complain loudly of being placed under arrest, urging that he had not taken the ornament; I saw her the next morning; I cannot say whether her ear was torn; I never heard of it till now.

To show the absurdity of appointing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate this improper conduct of Bezar's, for which I had punished him, I may here mention that before the Commissioners had closed their proceedings, the woman Martha, in a most friendly manner, placed in my hands the shark's tooth ornament, which the man Bezar was said to have taken from her, and it is still in my possession!

On the 23rd March, the Commissioners met at Patea, when Samuel Walker, Esq., Surgeon to the Force, and present at the attack upon Pokaikai, gave evidence regarding the character of a certain private named Grey Spencer, who had, it appears, given "certain information," which principally led to Mr. Parris being able to get up this

Commission of Enquiry. Of this Grey Spencer, Dr. Walker on oath said: –

"I know Grey Spencer; he was present at the attack, but certainly was not sober; he was hospital orderly for a short time, but I dismissed him because I caught him taking brandy, part of the medical comforts; I certainly do not think him a truthful character."

The Commissioners adjourned to Wanganui, where they met on the 24th March, and the first witness examined, Samuel Austin, Quarter-master Sergeant in the Native Contingent, also said on oath, regarding this man Spencer: –

"I know a man named Grey Spencer, who served with the Native Contingent; he held the position, I considered, of a Volunteer private in the corps; he called himself an officer, and used to say he had been a Major in the East India Co's service, that Colonel Haultain had appointed him to the Contingent with the same rank that he had held in the Indian army. I can state from personal experience that he was both a liar and a rogue. Whenever he could get liquor he was drunk, and when he could not get it honestly he would steal it; I had charge of the rum for the use of the contingent, and when I drew the supply from the Commissariat store, I had to watch it to prevent him taking it; I caught him taking it several times."

The man Spencer, was not produced as a witness by Mr. Parris, and I only mention him to show that it was principally upon information communicated by him to Mr. George Graham, and the statements of the interested Pokaikai Chiefs taken by Mr. Parris in my absence, that led to the appointment of the Commission, the frustration of my plans and the recommencement of hostilities.

The last day that the Commissioners sat at Matangurara, Mr. Parris, having failed to prove even so much as that Dr. Walker's servant, a man of whom I knew nothing, had snatched a shark's tooth out of Martha's ear, suddenly left the Commissioner's tent, hurriedly talked to his native friends, mounted his horse, and took his departure tor New Plymouth, leaving myself or anybody else to conduct the prosecution. He left behind him, however, an impression upon the minds of the disaffected natives that my hands were tied, and that I would not in future be allowed to molest them. From that day my hands were tied, but I still tried to show that outrages committed upon the settlers would be punished, and the settlement of the district proceeded with.

The Commissioners returned to Wanganui, and on the 24th March resumed the enquiry without a prosecutor, but elicited nothing of importance that has not been stated. At the conclusion, the Court adjourned, to reassemble at Wellington a fortnight previous to the then approaching session of parliament, to take the evidence of witnesses for the defence.

That, it appears, was not considered expedient, and the Commissioners were obliged to send in their report without having examined the witnesses for the defence!

In August, 1868, a full report of the evidence taken by the Commissioners, was submitted to Parliament, from which I take the following, being

THE COMMISSIONERS REPORT.

1. That Lieut – Colonel McDonnell was ordered by the Defence Minister, in a letter, dated Wellington, 28th June, 1866, to collect the whole of the Colonial Forces in the district, at Patea or Waingongoro, and thence make such arrangements as he thought necessary for scouring the country, and for establishing two posts, one at Ketemarae, and the other further south, in the direction of Manutahi, where redoubts were directed to be thrown up.

2. That in consequence of these orders Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell did, up to the 1st August, 1866, exert himself to induce the different hapus of the Ngatiruanui tribe to come in and surrender.

3. That Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell went to Kauae, and there had an interview with Natanahira Ngahina, chief of the Tangahoe hapu of the Natiruanui tribe.

4. That Natanahira did promise to proceed the next morning to Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell's camp at Waingongoro, distant only five miles from Kauae, and there having made his submission, to proceed to Wellington to see the Governor.

5. That Natanahira instead of keeping his promise, induced thereto by some natives then present at Kauae, proceeded to Taranaki, a distance of sixty-five miles, to visit Mr. Parris.

6. That on the 31st July, 1866, Rangiamohia, the wife of Arapata, a private in the Native Contingent, was sent as a last resource – apparently at her own suggestion, she being related to the Tangahoe hapu, on her mother's side – by Lieutenant-Colonel McDonnell to Taiporohenui and Pokaikai to endeavour to induce the Tangahoe people to come in and surrender.

7. That Rangiamohia returned to the camp at Manawapo the same evening, and reported that she had been made to pay the Hau-hau toll and otherwise alarmed.

8. That the force would have started at once for Pokaikai, had not the heavy rain prevented the force moving from camp.

9. That the force did march at ten o'clock on the night of the 1st August, and that Pokaikai was attacked about one o'clock on the morning of the 2nd August.

10. That no wanton outrage was committed by any enrolled member of the force.

11. That medical aid was afforded to the only person wounded, and that the women and children who were taken prisoners were kindly treated.

12. And that the results of the attack upon Pokaikai, were the almost immediate surrender of the Tangahoe and Pakakohi hapus of the Ngatiruanui tribe, and the subsequent peace and order which prevailed for almost two years, until Titoko Waru of the Ngaruahine hapu of the Ngatiruanui tribe, commenced creating disturbances almost immediately after the close of this enquiry, which was conducted principally in the village of Matangarara, in the latter end of March, 1868.

J. CRACROFT WILSON, Chairman.

J. CARGILL, Member.

I protest against this report.

GEORGE GRAHAM, Member.

Wellington, 14th August, 1868.

On reading that report in the newspapers I at once addressed the following letter to the Hon. the Defence Minister: –

"Head Quarters, Patea,

August 20th, 1868.

To the Hon. T. Haultain,

Defence Minister, Wellington.

SIR – I have read with astonishment in the public papers that the proceedings of the Pokaikai Commissioners had been submitted to Parliament before the evidence for the defence had been taken, and that a report, based upon those ex parte proceedings has been signed by only two of the three Commissioners, the third objecting.

I now, Sir, on behalf of myself, and the brave men who fought under me at the attack upon and capture of Pokaikai, request that the Commissioners may be instructed to meet and take evidence for the defence; and that myself and my witnesses shall have due notice and sufficient time given us to be in attendance. To prevent the possibility of mistake the following are the witnesses whom I wish to be summoned and in attendance: –

[The names as on page 25.]

"I regret the necessity which compels me, in defence of myself and and the men who served under me, to be compelled to ask that which I think the Government, on our behalf, should have insisted upon; namely, that the proceedings of

the Commissioners should not be placed before parliament until the evidence for the defence was taken.

"In closing these remarks I beg to express my sincere thanks to Cracroft Wilson, Esq., C.B., and Colonel Cargill, for the courtesy and impartiality with which they conducted the proceedings, but at the same time respectfully and firmly hold that they should have been allowed to take the evidence for the defence. Until that has been done, I do not think that in justice to myself, and the men who served under me at the capture of Pokaikai, I would be justified in submitting to the proceedings of the Commissioners being placed upon the Records of the House of Representatives without the evidence for the defence, unless this my protest against it be also placed upon record.

"Under these circumstances, I have to request that you will be pleased to submit this letter for the consideration of His Excellency the Governor in Council, and advise me on their decision thereon.

"I have the honor, &c.,

THOS. McDONNELL,

Lieut.-Colonel Commanding, &c.,

To that letter I received no reply, and thus evidence which certain parties did not wish to make public was not taken.

CHAPTER VI.

CHAPTER VI.

From the previous chapter it will be observed that the attack upon Pokaikai took place in August 1866, and the Commission of inquiry did not meet until March, 1868. The immediate result of the attack, as has been proved in evidence, was, that those people who had so long resisted the powers of persuasion, came in and unconditionally surrendered.

Let those Honorable members of the House of Representatives who are of opinion that "the Civil and not the military power should direct the character of operations," under the circumstances in which I was then placed, observe the position in which a vigorous policy had then placed me, and the position in which I was placed by the civil authorities placed over me. The report of the Commissioners not only exonerates myself and my men, but also explicitly states that "the results of the attack upon Pokaikai, were the almost immediate surrender of the Tangahoe and Pokaikai hapus of

the Ngatiruanui tribe, and the subsequent peace and order which prevailed for almost two years, until Titoko Waru, of the Ngaruahine hapu, of the Ngatiruanui tribe, commenced disturbances almost immediately after the close of this inquiry."

Let those who have accused me of being the cause of provoking hostilities observe that, whilst Titoko Waru and other chiefs believed me to be free and unfettered he did not dare to commence hostilities. He, however, saw me placed upon my trial before Commissioners appointed to investigate my conduct, and believing, as was the case, that my hands were tied, readily persuaded those who had submitted to join his standard.

Before the Commissioners had closed their proceedings, a settler, named Bayley, residing on his own purchased land was ordered off, timber he had prepared to build a house was destroyed, but he escaped with his life. Thus commenced outrages which became of almost daily occurrence, whilst I had to attend the sittings of the Commission at Wanganui. Thus, whilst my prestige was being lowered in the eyes of the natives, that of Titoko Waru was in the ascendant.

Whilst the district was in this unsettled state, and before the Commissioners had left Wanganui, I was ordered to proceed to Hokotiki, on the West Coast of the Middle Island, to quell a Fenian rising there. This astonished the Natives, who again asked if I was the only fighting man the Government had, and the fact that I was now going to fight against Europeans had a very bad effect.

On the 31st March I embarked at Wanganui, on the Government steamer St. Kilda, with seventy-seven men of the Armed Constabulary, Inspector Cummin, and Sub-Inspector George McDonnell. At Hokitika we were received very kindly by all classes of the community, and remained until ordered to return to my own district.

I was in Hokitika about six weeks, and on my return to Patea found that the natives had been very troublesome; they had been committing petty thefts, such as stealing settler's horses, &c., and Mr. Booth had been arresting the wrong persons, and then releasing them again; this aggravated the natives and complicated matters very considerably.

Shortly after my return Mr. Booth ordered me to arrest Toi, Hahuwhenua, and Ihaka, three Hau-hau chiefs who had been concerned in stealing horses belonging to him, Mr Booth, Edward McDonnell, a Hawke's Bay Settler, who was then on a visit in the district, and a Mr. Smith. I refused to arrest them without a warrant, which he at once granted. I then collected a small force of constabulary and settlers, and went to the Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, where those men were with their tribes. I marched by night, intending to make my capture early next morning, but my plan was frustrated by the desertion of one of my guides, who left me and gave the alarm to the men whom I intended to arrest, and who of course, immediately made off to a place of safety. The other inmates of the pa however, invited us in, and provided us with sleeping accommodation and food. Next morning, I had a talk with the natives, and told them I was exceedingly sorry to hear of all these petty thefts and ingratitude on their part; that I had received a warrant to arrest the three men named in it, but they had been forewarned, and consequently got away. That I did not wish to punish the innocent for the guilty, but insisted upon one of them accompanying me to Waihi, to confer with the magistrate, and talk over matters to see if this state of things could not be put a stop to. I guaranteed that no harm should happen to this man, even if he was one of the thieves, but that in that case, I would let him return and then hunt him up afterwards. The result was that, Tauke, a chief, and also a lad to attend him, returned with me to Waihi. On my return, Mr. Booth told me that he was quite satisfied with what had taken place, but afterwards expressed himself in very different terms to several of my officers, and said that he could capture the thieves with a dozen men.

Next day, the chief Natanahira, on being told by Mr. Booth that he was going with a few men to get the horses, and capture the thieves, strongly advised him not to do anything of the kind, but offered to go himself and try what he could do. He went, and returned with a mare and foal belonging to Mr. Smith, and a mare of Mr. Edward McDonnell's, but not with Mr. Booth's horse. Mr. Booth then determined to go himself, with, a few mounted men, recover his horse and capture the thieves. I tried to dissuade him from

going, but of course said that I must give him the men if he insisted on it. At the same time, I determined to follow him up with another force rather than allow the lives of my men to be placed in jeopardy, as I was certain bloodshed would ensue from the manner in which he was proceeding. I also insisted on his taking with him the native chief Tauke, who had come with me, as if he (Booth) went to the village without Tauke, my word would be broken, and his (Booth's) life would be in danger. He faithfully promised to take him and provide him with a horse. He then left for the Ngutu-o-te-manu, accompanied, by Inspector Hunter, and Inspector Cummin, (my adjutant.) Shortly after their departure, I followed with my men, and to my surprise found the chief Tauke on the road on foot, making the best of his way to the Ngutu-o-te-manu. He said that Mr. Booth had deceived him in respect of the horse, and had left him behind. I at once dismounted, gave him my horse, and desired him to ride on quickly and prevent mischief, which I feared would arise should Booth's party resort to violence, and to tell his people that I was on the road in support. He started off and we followed up with all despatch. Mr. Davis Canning 1, who had accompanied Mr. Booth's party, as a volunteer, now galloped back to me, crying out "For God's sake come on quickly, the natives have taken to their arms, and Booth and his party will be killed." I hurried up, but before I got to the Ngutu-o-te-manu, met our people in full retreat with three prisoners they had taken, and a horse (not Mr. Booth's after all.) Inspector Cummin informed me that just before they reached the village, Tauke, to whom I had given my horse to push forward, joined their party, they entered the village, the natives collected together and Mr. Booth immediately ordered Kokiri, one of their principal and most influential chiefs, to be arrested. He was roughly laid hold of, but resisted and called his people to his assistance and rescue. A regular row now took place, the natives rushed to their arms, and it is impossible to say what the result would have been had not Tauke, and Katene, a native who had accompanied Booth's party, cried out, "Take care what you are about, McDonnell is is close by with a large force." Booth's party then managed to get

away with their prisoners, and Tauke gave one of the troopers my horse to return to me Mr. Booth, on meeting me, wished me to release the men he had taken, as he said they had had nothing to do with the thefts!! I thought it more prudent to keep them, as my party was not sufficiently strong to resist successfully the number of men Inspectors Hunter and Cumming told me were in the pa, if they should follow and attack us before we got out of the bush. On reaching Waihi, I had them placed in the guard tent, when Katene told me that one of them was the man Ihaka, named in the warrant I had received from Mr. Booth; he (Mr. Booth) was not aware of this circumstance until I informed him. I advised him to have this man removed to a safer place of keeping, as I felt convinced, from my knowledge of the natives, that they would seek revenge for the manner in which Kokiri and other chiefs had been handled by his orders. The two other natives whom he had apprehended, having nothing brought against them were released.

I then left for Wanganui, but before doing so cautioned Mr Booth and Inspector Hunter about Ihaka, but a day or two afterwards he made his escape, and, two days after that, (on the 9th June) Cahill, Squires, and Clarke, three settlers, were murdered by Hauwhenua, Ihaka, and others; two days later, trooper Smith was tomahawked close to the redoubt, cooked and eaten!

I immediately went to Wellington, to represent this state of affairs to the Government, and to ask for reinforcements. On the day I arrived, in Wellington I had an interview with the Hons. Messrs. Stafford, Haultain, and Hall. I told them how it had come about, and begged Mr. Stafford to reinforce me to enable me to proceed against the murderers. Mr. Stafford said, in rather an unpleasant manner, "I won't give you a man; you must abandon all your posts in advance of the Patea redoubt, and concentrate your force there." I was astonished and pointed out to him that such a step would be virtually to abandon the whole of the Patea district to the enemy; that the settlers would at once be obliged to leave their houses, farms, horses, cattle, and sheep, and in fact, that they would be ruined. Further, that all the natives in the district now friendly, would have no alternative but to join the enemy, whose ranks would thus be swelled, that the ruin of the district between

Patea and Wanganui would necessarily follow, and the disaffection spread to other districts. Mr. Stafford said, "The sooner the better; I don't care, the Assembly would not vote the money," I became indignant, and told him that rather than abandon the outposts I would throw up my commission and return to the Patea district as a settler; that I would then, in conjunction with my fellow-settlers, take the law into our own hands, and we could hold our own. It was arranged that I should call the following day. I did so, and saw Colonel Haultain, who told me I could increase my force to four hundred men, and enlist them for three months. I declined to have anything to do with this arrangement, and said I should require at least four hundred men in addition to the force then in the district, and that it was no use enlisting men for three months as I could not guarantee that the natives would be subdued in three or twelve months. Colonel Haultain pressed the point and said that I was "placing the Government in a fix," they had no money, and if I would only try my best for three months, they would increase the force if necessary, and extend the time of enlistment. Finding that I could get no better terms, I agreed to this arrangement, but insisted on having the sole control, and not to be interfered with and kept under the control of Mr. Booth as I hitherto had been. Colonel Haultain promised me carte blanche, which promise as usual, was not carried out.

I at once, commenced to carry out my arrangements, and with the assistance of Captain Page, a very intelligent and excellent officer, enlisted the next day in Wellington, 80 men, whom we selected out of scores who came forward, rejecting numbers of drunken useless vagabonds. I then returned to Wanganui, but after my departure from Wellington the Government enlisted about 100 more, many of whom were the men whom I had rejected, and that motley group were sent after me. They also reinforced me with a division of Constabulary under Major Von Tempskey, from the Waikato, and recruits from Nelson, Hokitika, and from Taranaki. With regard to Major Von Tempsky's men they were fine fellows, and almost the only men of the reinforcements upon whom I could depend.

Whilst getting my force collected in the district the enemy was not idle. They repeatedly attacked our escorts, and eventually

(on the 22th July, whilst I was at Patea) attacked the Turo-turo Mokai redoubt, killed Captain Ross and eight of his men, but a few of our brave fellows held the redoubt, and after a desperate conflict, during which the gallant Von Tempskey rushed to their assistance from Waihi, they drove off the enemy with a loss to them of several killed and wounded.

I now prepared to attack the enemy in his stronghold at Ngutu-o-te-manu, and on the 1st August, with 300 men and the able Von Tempskey, second in command, determined to take them right in front in broad daylight. My plan succeeded, and the pa which was then only partially fortified, we captured, driving the enemy from his position with considerable loss. I burnt the "Beak of the Bird," and destroyed the pa, but on my return march, the enemy who had received reinforcements, rallied and harrassed us, and many of the men of the new levies were "unsteady." This was noticed by many of my officers, but more especially by Major Von Tempskey and Captain Buck, and after consulting with them I determined not to attack the natives in the bush again, until the force could be trained to work together, but to lay ambuscades and make false attacks, so as to draw them out and harrass them in other ways. Somehow or other Captain Hirst, whom I had previously struck off pay, reported privately to Major Atkinson, misrepresenting my actions and movements, thereby constituting himself a spy, as he had done before at Pipiriki. Reports appear to have reached the Government of "want of energy," "inaction," unnecessary loss of time on my part.

On the 29th August, Colonel Haultain wrote to say that – "Mutterings of inaction, are beginning to be heard from those who are ready to attack the Government on any weak point. * * * Colonel Whitmore's expedition also makes people impatient; the hardships he endured, for want of sufficient food and shelter for several days, makes them fancy that such exertions may be made under all circumstances." As Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu was the only position in which the enemy was in force, and as we had decided not to attack him there but harass and draw him out, I wrote to the Defence Minister a letter, dated 5th September 1868, from which the following is an extract. –

[EXTRACT]

"Camp Waihi, September 5th, 1868.

* * * In a forest like the one round Mount Egmont, pursuit of a broken foe is no easy work, as, if the enemy is disheartened, he will scatter in all directions and little good can be done. In many districts (say Hawke's Bay, or Tauranga for instance) an enemy must retire in a body, he cannot scatter, and pursuit there might be of service. Here, only from suceession of unexpected blows can any good be expected to result from operations carried on over ground unmatched for difficulties to the assailant, and advantages to the defendant; and to hunt natives down in a bush like the one before us, and with which they are thoroughly acquainted, requires men who have been trained for the purpose. This country has never permitted any officer to have a number of men embodied for more than a trifling period for this very difficult mode of warfare. An officer, therefore, must shape bis tactics according to the material he has. I need not say that men of a few months training as mine are, cannot perform more than they have done (and we had no natives with us.) The inherent courage of my men and their willingness alone can be counted upon. Thus, scattered operations through a bush, cannot be engaged in with positive and certain hopes of success; and such are required for a relentless pursuit. Much must be risked and left to Providence, in any military operations, however well grounded on correct principles – but to overate the capabilities of the men under one's command and underrate the capabilities of the enemy is the worst mistake any commanding officer can commit, in my opinion.

There is one suggestion I would beg respectfully to offer, which, if approved of by the Government, would enable me to fight the rebels at much less disadvantage. I would propose making roads into the bush in the direction of the enemy's stronghold and clearings – the bush to be done by contract: the track felled ten chains wide and logged, and the workmen to be protected by strong covering parties. In this way we could steadily, but surely push our way into the forest and force the enemy to retire or fight us, and I feel confident, effectively subdue Titoko Waru or any other tribes in the district, without fear of further molestation from them, and with much less bloodshed than by going on by their own almost impregnable tracks. The numbers of the force could also be reduced, for though a new post would have to be taken up on the Waingongoro river, from which to supply the covering parties, still the attention of the enemy would principally be directed to the bush road, and the strength of the other posts could be considerably reduced, If you think this suggestion will meet the approval of the Government you can make use of this letter as an official document.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) THOS. McDONNELL.

The Hon. Colonel Haultain.

After my first successful attack upon Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, knowing that Titoko Waru had commenced exerting all his powers to render that position impregnable, and having decided upon not being led into his trap, but to draw him out, I commenced to burn down and destroy his villages, from the Ketemarae, clearing to the extremity of the bush. On one occasion we burnt a village so near to Te Ngutu-o-te-manu that the Hau-haus inside yelled and called for us to come on, but would not come out to attack us.

Whilst carrying out my own plans which I knew would eventually succeed, I was again urged by the Defence Minister to make a decisive blow. Irritated at repeated accusations of inaction, I wrote to say – "I intend to make an attack in a day or two, after which should God spare my life, I trust the Government will allow me to retire from the command of the Patea Field Force, &c." I then held a meeting with the whole of my officers, Europeans and Natives, at which we decided upon a plan of attack. Thus, I was forced into another attack on the Ngutu-o-te-manu much against my own wish, and the judgment of many of my officers, who, however, at the above meeting fully agreed with me as to the necessity for going in again after Colonel Haultain's last letter had been received, and especially as Colonel Whitmore, who had just then sustained a severe defeat on the East Coast, was held up as an example for me to copy. I left nothing undone that I could think of to ensure a victory, but a reverse unfortunately took place; the Ngutu-o-te-manu had been placed in a strong position of defence, and owing to this and the unsteadiness of many of the men, to say nothing of ninety who bolted into camp almost without firing a shot, after a well-directed attack, we could not take it.

I then made arrangements for a retreat; we were at the rear of the pa which we had reached after a long detour through the bush, I saw the best way to retreat would be to get round the left flank of the pa, into the main broad track leading from it. I got the men as well as it was possible, under cover, and putting the wounded on stretchers, formed a strong advanced guard in the centre of which I placed them. I then directed Major Von Tempskey, who had got his men under cover also, to follow on as I moved off, thus forming a rear guard. With him I left my brother, Captain McDonnell,

and about a dozen picked natives. I directed the Native Contingent, who were in our rear heavily engaged with Toi's and Hauwhenua's people who had hurried up from the village (I think Ruaamuru) back in the bush, to move off in a line parallel to us on our left flank; of this order I myself informed Major Von Tempskey and Captain Buck.

Having made these arrangements, I gave the word to move off, placing myself with the advance, to find the way round into the broad track, leading out to which we had to cut our way. Whilst doing this, the enemy's fire increased, and our casualties increased also. I had to contend with the enemy in my front and right flank, whilst the Native Contingent on my left were engaged with them on their left, and I presumed Major Von Tempskey was following in our rear, when some of his men rushed up crying out that he and the other officers, including Captain McDonnell were all killed. I was proceeding to the rear with Inspector Hunter to ascertain the truth of this, but when a short distance on we met Captain McDonnell and the few natives I had left with him. He informed me that when in the act of moving off, Major Von Tempskey was shot dead, and then Captain Buck; that Inspector Roberts had moved off with the greater part of the men, and that he (Captain McDonnell) had then followed on our track with what men he could collect. I would have gone further back to see if I could do any good, but the enemy still attacked our rear. I had ninety men, was carrying thirteen wounded, and might any moment expect more, and I knew that we should have as much as we, could do to get out of the bush before night. I accordingly pushed on, and we fought our way out, leaving one man who was shot dead, but carrying our thirteen wounded, including Dr. Best, with us, and reached camp an hour after the natives who had got back without any loss. Inspector Roberts and his party, who fortunately did not follow our track escaped the enemy, camped in the bush for the night, and reached Waihi the next morning without any casualty after he had commenced to march off. The men who had bolted into camp were for the most part drunk when I arrived; a few of them did not stop till they got to Rangitikei and Manawatu, and these being missing, I returned as killed. Those at Waihi before us reported that my-

self and the remainder of the force had been cut to pieces. Our actual loss was seventeen killed and two who afterwards died of their wounds in hospital.

The drunkenness which demoralised some men of my force after the defeat at Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, and for which I was censured, arose out of the recklessness of the men who had "bolted" and the action of the Taranaki Provincial Government. To raise a revenue they had passed a "Bottle Bill" under which every storekeeper in that province, on paying the license fee, could sell liquor by the bottle. Almost every shop and store in the Patea district at once became a "groggery," and when the men's money was spent gave them credit, sometimes receiving orders for their forthcoming pay. I wrote to the Defence Minister for power to close those grog-shops, seize the liquor, and place it in safety. Ministers refused to grant me that power, as each storekeeper had paid for his licence. Thus I was powerless, as the greatest punishment I could inflict on the militia portion of my force was seven days hard labour and no cells to put them into. One Government opened the floodgates of intemperance, the other refused me the power to shut them, and all held me responsible for the result.

I sent in my report of the action, and proposed cutting a broad track or way into the bush, in such a manner as to force the rebels to fight us on more equal terms. The Defence Minister came up and told me he had come to carry out the very plan I had proposed, and that he had brought up material in the p.s. Sturt, such as axes, &c., to commence operations. He also informed me that Colonel Whitmore had volunteered to come up and serve under me, and that I now had the power to seize all the grog in the district. This I ordered Colonel Whitmore to see done directly he arrived at Patea. When I found that Colonel Whitmore had offered to serve under me I very much doubted whether it was not a deep laid plan to oust me out of my district, and subsequent events have shown that I was correct.

A few days after Colonel Haultain had told me that he had come up to carry out my plans, and that he had not the slightest intention to abandon the outposts, I was suddenly ordered to abandon

every outpost north of Manawapo! Who advised him, or what induced him so suddenly to alter his mind? My interview with Mr. Stafford at once flashed across my mind, and I felt convinced that a retreat had commenced which could only end at Kai Iwi. Directly afterwards, all the posts north of Patea were abandoned, the settlers obliged to flee; their homes burned down; flocks, herds, everything – even Government property, left to the mercy of the enemy!! As a last effort I asked to be allowed, to take the Pokaikai prisoners but the Government would not consent to that, and in utter disgust I sent in my resignation, in which I said that which in a previous letter I had told the Defence Minister, that I could not see how I could be of any further service unless the management of affairs were left entirely in my own hands, and then added – "Those were my words, and that has been my opinion for a long time past. Hoping that I could prevail upon the Government to adopt a course that would at once and for ever put an end to rebellion in the Patea district, I did, more than once, say that I would resign if not allowed to do so. That, the Government refused to do, therefore I now leave them to assume the responsibility.

"At my request about 400 Wanganui Natives are again under arms; we have nearly completed a strong redoubt here (at Weraroa) this being the key to the whole of the Waitotara on to Wanganui. It now, Sir, remains with my successor to carry out the plans which I have matured. Under no circumstances will I again serve under the present Government. Anxiously awaiting the arrival of my successor, &c. THOS. McDONNELL."

As the Government did not wish to accept my resignation, although my successor was appointed, and after a long and tiresome correspondence I consented to withdraw it and accept two months leave of absence.

Thus Colonel Whitmore stepped into my shoes; I leave others to say how they fitted him. Out of more than twenty engagements I never lost but one, which I was urged to fight against may own better judgment. I wish for the sake of my fellow colonists, that my successor could say the same.

Whilst on leave at Wanganui, Colonel Whitmore fought a battle at Moturoa, near Okotuku, where our losses amounted to twenty-

three killed, fourteen left on the field, and nine who died of their wounds. Part of the burned bones of those left on the field were some months afterwards collected by Colonel Whitmore's orders and buried at the Wairoa.

Retreat after retreat followed, until the Head Quarters were within nine miles of Wanganui, Titoko Waru in possession of the Waitotara, the settlers driven in, their houses burned, and the town of Wanganui in danger.

I could stand that no longer, threw up my leave, and placed my services "unreservedly" at the disposal of the Government. I could then have mustered some hundreds of the loyal Wanganui Natives, who, without the aid of Europeans, with the exception of a few officers of their own choosing, would single handed, have attacked Titoko Waru. But it was not to be done in that way. I was only allowed to raise about a hundred Kupapas for the defence of the outskirts of the town, and for scouring the country round Kai Iwi, and for these services they were to have no pay.

It is useless to pursue the subject, Finding myself placed in a humiliating position where I could be of no service to my fellow-colonists, I once more resigned.

I attribute the disasters on the West Coast to the following causes: –

1st. To the mistaken economy of the Government (perhaps through being misinformed by the civil authorities) in keeping such a small force in that district which had never been thoroughly subjected to our rule.

2nd. To the Pokaikai Commission, and the influence and conduct of Messrs. Parris and Booth.

3rd. To the summary dismissal of the best men in my force; breaking faith with them, and afterwards replacing them by raw levies picked up off the streets of some of our large towns.

4th. To the Hon. the Defence Minister in urging me to a second attack upon Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, contrary to my own opinions, and the opinions of my best officers.

5th. To the suicidal course which the Government adopted in abandoning the Patea district, instead of holding it at all hazards.

Politicians may, perhaps, discover other reasons, but as my object is simply to defend my own reputation (more dear to me than life,) and to state facts which may benefit my fellow colonists, and not to discuss the political side of the question, or by any means impute improper motives, I now beg to offer an opinion based upon a thorough knowledge of the Maori race; long experience in colonial warfare and a full belief in what our native allies could and would do if judiciously made use of by our Colonial Government.

My opinion is, that it is only "throwing away men's lives, and spending money for naught," to continue a system of warfare under which in Maori phraseology, we fight the shadow, and evade the substance; and lopp off the branches whilst the trunk of the tree is not only left untouched, but actually nourished by absurd laws, under which it grows, flourishes, and expands.

There is but one effectual course open to us now, and that is, to put the East and West Coasts in a state of defence; then muster our European forces and Native allies and strike vigorously at the Ngatimaniapoto country, seizing Kawhia, and making it a basis of operations on the one side, and sending a strong force on the other side from Maketu and Tauranga through Patetere, advancing at the same time on the present Waikato frontier. Thus we would devastate the Ngatimaniapoto country, locate a force at Taupo, permanently cutting off the enemy's communications; and then, we could finish off upon the East and West Coasts.

When these and other vigorous measures are undertaken under a determined and resolute Administration, and a judicious change in the laws which now protect rebel natives is effected, then, and not until then may we hope to see this conflict finally ended, and the settlers all over this Island enjoying peace and prosperity.

1 Since killed on the East Coast.

CONCLUSION.

CONCLUSION.

A WORD FOR MY OLD COMRADES.

On my return to Patea from Hokitika, a letter was handed to me from Colonel Whitmore, who had in my absence, paid a visit to my district, for what purpose I know not, I am not going to inflict the whole letter on my readers, but will just give an extract, and

let it speak for itself: those who knew the men of my old force can judge. He says: – "Your men (such as I have seen) are quite unfit for service, being about twenty years on an average too old; chiefly soldiers who have been accustomed to have most things done for them, and quite unfit in my opinion for duties which will generally require the very strictest sobriety and perfect trustworthiness in all positions, however far from the eye of their officer." And so on.

In justice to my poor fellows who are most of them under the sod and are even now much spoken against by Colonel Whitmore, why, I do not know, unless it is because they belonged to my force, I must say I was proud of my men, who had stuck to me in many a fight with the enemy. As for their being "unfit for service, and twenty years too old" that was simply not the case. The fact that many of them had formerly belonged to Her Majesty's service is correct, and fine brave fellows they were, and not one of them but what had been honorably discharged from the regiment in which he had served. They certainly did not belong to a class that "had been accustomed to have everything done for them." I was not aware, and am not even now, after what Colonel Whitmore has said, that British soldiers were considered such helpless beings; and as for their being helpless, useless, unfit and too old, I will ask where are the majority of those men now? Many of them died at their post at Turu-turu mokai, and the gallant few who held that position were mostly those soldiers, whose sole reward is the knowledge that they did their duty like men, for though promised some reward by the Government, they got nothing. Others of these "useless men" fought bravely and died at Te Ngutu-o-te-manu at both attacks.

Others again fought and fell at Moturoa, near Okutuku, (under Colonel Whitmore) and in every skirmish where men have been killed or wounded, the men of my old force (I include all the old members T.M.S., W.Y.C., P.R., and W.R.) suffered most because they always bore the brunt of the day, and I am not far out in stating that of the men who comprised No. 2 and 3 Divisions nearly the whole of them have been either wounded or killed in action. I wish I had my old force as it once was. They knew their work, and I

could trust them anywhere; and they had, I am proud to say, confidence in me as their leader. If they had only been treated properly and fairly by the Government they would have remained in the Patea district and thus have settled it; but even supposing that disturbances had occurred, they would very soon, if not hampered by the Native Department, have settled Titoko Waru and the rest of them. Each man of my old force, soldier or settler, was worth a dozen useless rabble.

To put arms into the hands of raw recruits, and send them into the bush is simply providing the natives with arms ammunition, and fresh meat; one active Hau-hau or New Zealander would be only too happy to meet a dozen of such just to keep his hand in practice. Thus much for my brave old comrades.

In justice to the now maligned Wanganui Natives I may here state that when Sir George Grey says: – " McDonnell acted splendidly," I may say that it was to those men we principally owed our success in capturing the Weraroa pa.

Again, in all General Chute's despatches, the services of the Native Contingent are highly commended. One extract will suffice where he says: – "The Native Contingent has been a valuable auxiliary to the force. My thanks are due to Major McDonnell and his brother, Ensign McDonnell, who are active and zealous officers, and deserving your Excellency's favourable consideration."

Our thanks were due to the Native Contingent. During the many years that they served under me, not only in these districts but also on the East Coast, they fought cheerfully and bravely, and I never had cause to doubt either their courage or their loyalty. They would still take the field with me to a man.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Head Quarters, Queen's Redoubt,

October 20th, 1863.

SIR – I am directed by the Lieut.-General commanding, to request you will have the goodness to convey to Messrs. Von Tempskey and McDonnell, of the force under your command, his thanks for their exertions and zeal on the occasion of their recent hazardous visits to the neighbourhood of the enemy's position at Paparata, and his best thanks for the information they have given.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) L. J. GAMBLE,

Lieut.-Colonel, D.Q.M. General.

Lieut.-Colonel Nixon,

Commanding Moveable Column, Papakura.

Camp Papakura, 21st October, 1863.

SIR – I have great pleasure in forwarding a letter from the Deputy Quarter-Master General of the Forces, conveying the thanks of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, for the services recently rendered by yourself and Ensign Von Tempskey, in your reconnoissance of the enemy's position near Paparata. In transmitting the approval of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, I cannot refrain from expressing my own admiration at the courage and skill with which you carried out the duty for which you volunteered.

I have, &c.,

N. G. NIXON,

Lieut.-Colonel Commanding Moveable Column.

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR TO MAJOR ROOKES.

In front of Wereroa Pa,

21st July, 1865.

MY DEAR SIR – I hear from Captain Ross that you have another pa, on your side to take, to enable you to do this we shall make a sham attack on the main pa of Weraroa from this side to-morrow morning, at daylight, and seize a position ourselves; I wish you continued success. McDonnell has acted splendidly.

Yours truly,

G. GREY.

EXTRACT from Sir G. GREY'S Despatch to the SECRETARY of STATE for the Colonies.

Major Rookes informed me that the conduct of Captain McDonnell is especially deserving of notice, for distinguished gallantry and energy. * * * *

EXTRACT from MAJOR ROOKES' letter to LIEUT.-COLONEL TREVOR, 14th Regt.

Captain McDonnell, who commanded this force deserves the greatest credit for the very able manner in which he has performed this important duty. * * *

Colonial Defence Office,

Wellington, 13th November, 1865.

[EXTRACT FROM LETTER.]

The perseverance and courage displayed by Major McDonnell and the whole of the force under his command, during their march through a difficult country, for three days without rest, and almost without provisions, more than justify the confidence which the colony feels in both its European and Native Force, and I have to request you will convey to Major McDonnell, the officers and men, Europeans and Natives, who were engaged in this Expedition, the thanks of the Government for their services. * * *

And again, in the same letter –

The skill with which Major McDonnell carried out Major Stapp's instructions, and the self-reliance he showed in prosecuting his march, when on arriving at the Heads of Ohiwa, he found that the native chief who had reported he had surrounded Kereopa, had left without leaving any message, are deserving of the highest praise, and adds another to the many acts of daring and gallantry this officer has performed in the service of the colony during the present war. * * *

(Signed) T. M. HAULTAIN.

[EXTRACT.] Colonial Defence Office,

Wellington, 23rd February, 1866.

SIR – By direction of the Hon. the Defence Minister I have the honor to inform you that in recognition of your valuable services during the late engagements, under Major-General Chute, his Excellency the Governor has been pleased to promote you to be full Major in the New Zealand Militia, from the 8th January.

I have, &c.,

T. HOLT.

Major McDonnell.

[EXTRACT.] Colonial Defence Office,

Wellington, 10th October, 1866.

I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of the 4th instant, informing me of your attack on the rebel position at Pungarehu, which you surprised on the

morning of the 2nd instant, inflicting heavy loss on the enemy, and destroying their fortification, with a quantity of arms and ammunition.

Whilst regretting the loss of several brave men, the Government have received with much satisfaction, your report of the gallantry and good conduct of those who were engaged, and this I have to request you will communicate both to the Europeans and to the Native Contingent, and particularly to those whom you have named in your letter.

At the same time I wish to recognise the enterprise and ability you have displayed in planning and successfully carrying out a very difficult operation. * * *

(Signed) T. M. HAULTAIN.

EXTRACT from letter relating to the attack of Tirotiro Moana.

Colonial Defence Office,

Wellington, 1st November, 1866.

* * * In this as on former occasions, the Government fully recognise the intrepidity and perseverance shewed by the officers and men (Europeans and Native Contingent) engaged in the expedition, and your own skill and bravery in leading them through a difficult and almost unknown country.

I have, &c.,

(Signed by order) T. HOLT.

Major McDonnell.

[EXTRACT.] Colonial Defence Office,

Wellington, 26th July, 1867.

* * * You have by your promptitude, courage, and good judgment, obtained important results with very limited means, and I have to convey the thanks of the Government to you, Captain Cummin, and to the officers and men who so zealously supported you. * * *

I have, &c.,

T. M. HAULTAIN.

Major McDonnell.

There are many other testimonials I have, which I need not publish, I simply publish these few to show that I would, had the means been placed at my disposal, and had I been unfettered and left alone, have brought native affairs in the Patea district, to a proper and peaceful issue.

T. McDONNELL.

Printed by Walter Taylor, 'Times' Office, Wanganui, New Zealand.

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