Notes on New Zealand Affairs

Frederick Aloysius Weld

First published by Edward Stanford in 1869

Digitised and made available online by Auckland Libraries and the University of Auckland Libraries and Learning Services.

Epub © 2015 Early New Zealand Books Collection

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NOTES
ON
NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS:

COMPRISING
A SKETCH OF ITS POLITICAL HISTORY,
IN REFERENCE ESPECIALLY TO
THE NATIVE QUESTION;
ITS PRESENT POSITION – THE POLICY FOR THE FUTURE, WITH A FEW GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND TO HER COLONIES.

By FRED. A. WELD , ESQ.
LATE PRIME MINISTER OF THAT COLONY.

LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 6 & 7, CHARING CROSS, S. W.
1869.

"It is very desirable you should clearly understand, that no change of Ministry in New Zealand will affect the views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the policy embodied in the resolutions of the Assembly of New Zealand in December, 1864" (Mr. Weld's). "Having accepted with entire satisfaction that policy, Her Majesty's Government intend to adhere to it, and to be guided by it." – Extract from a despatch of H. M.'s Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of New Zealand on Mr. Weld's resignation: dated Dec. 26, 1865.

NOTES ON NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

NOTES ON NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

IN the present crisis of the affairs of New Zealand, it seems to me, that a few notes thrown together by one who has known the colony from its early days, who has taken part in the first struggles of colonial life, who has held the highest office that his fellow-colonists can bestow, and who throughout his career has to the best of his ability endeavoured to do justice alike to native and to colonist, may not be altogether without interest, or devoid of usefulness.

It is true, that under the present system, of colonial self-government, English statesmen and political thinkers exercise little immediate influence upon the polities and destinies of the Colony, but nevertheless we are alike subjects of the Queen, the same blood flows in our veins, the same aspirations run in our minds and quicken our pulses, and I trust that the day is yet far distant when Englishmen living or born in our colonial dependencies will cease to speak of the old country as "Home," or when Englishmen in these islands will have lost all sympathy for those who, to use Lord Bacon's well-known words, are engaged in "the heroic work of colonization" – a work still more difficult and still more heroic, when it is united, as in the case of

New Zealand, with the attempt to civilize and to preserve a native race.

New Zealand indeed has offered a study not unworthy of the attention of the statesman, of the political economist, and of the philanthropist; it has afforded a field upon which problems involving great principles, worthy of any man's attention, have been, and are being worked out with more or less success; and it differs from other colonies, because they are being worked out in the presence of a native race who are at once warriors and diplomatists, and who, if at times they display the ferocity and fanaticism of the savage, are also not destitute of savage virtues, and even of higher qualities.

I propose to give a very slight sketch of the history of the Colony, and to add some geographical and statistical information – to touch upon its political position – to point out the nature and causes of the present insurrection – and to conclude by offering a few remarks and suggestions.

The sagacious eye of the great navigator Captain Cook, first pointed out New Zealand as a desirable field for colonization. Its wonderful natural riches, its climate, its future political importance as a naval station, and as a nursery of seamen, could not escape him; but still many years had elapsed before a few missionaries, whalers, runaway sailors, many of whom acquired tracts of land from the natives, settled upon the islands. The presence or owner-

ship of a "pakeha" (European), now became almost an appanage of a chief of rank, and a brisk trade was carried on in gunpowder and guns. Cannibalism, immorality, and wars of the most cruel nature, of tribe against tribe, appear to have been long the normal state of the New Zealander; and many of his first visitors seem to have fallen into his habits, and adapted themselves to his morals, with remarkable facility. It is strange how soon a man may fall into barbarism; yet among these old "pakeha-maories," I have met many, who joined to the savage vices, the savage virtues; brave as lions, open-handed and hospitable, the old whalers were feared, respected, and often loved, by the tribes on whose shores they placed their fisheries.

That terrible epoch passed away. Still the New Zealander was supreme in New Zealand – still the land was his own, but it was whitened with the bones of those slain in intertribal conflicts. The wars of Hongi in the North, who had obtained a present of guns on a visit to Europe, rolled a wave of conquest from tribe to tribe to the South – till it reached the Southern and larger island, whose inhabitants having but few fire-arms, were almost utterly exterminated. But even whilst this was going on, the natives, with that intelligence which distinguishes them, were beginning to know something of European civilization – they began to acknowledge the superiority of the European in mechanical arts, and to see the advantages of peace

and religion. About this time the colonization of New Zealand commenced; England at first wished to make New Zealand an independent state, and even gave a flag to some of the chiefs, and sent a resident or representative to them, who was derided as "a man of war without guns," – but in 1839 the New Zealand Company having been formed with a view to systematic colonization under the auspices of several distinguished men, the English Government, aware of a design to seize the islands on the part of the French, sent out Captain Hobson with a Governor's commission in his pocket; he arrived soon after the Company's settlers had landed and located themselves on land bought from the natives; he took possession of the Northern Island in virtue of a treaty with certain Chiefs, (the treaty of Waitangi); and of the Southern (or middle) Island by proclamation, only one day before the arrival of the French expedition to its shores.

The next fourteen years were marked by disputes between the New Zealand Company and the Government, between the settlers and the Company, by its dissolution, by the formation of several settlements in both islands – and by the introduction of a considerable body of immigrants – many of them men of education and family – whilst the bulk of the labouring class were selected, and of a superior character, commissions sat to decide on land claims; the relations between settlers and natives were on the whole not unsatisfactory, the two races formed

ties of amity when brought together, they often fraternized and sometimes fought, but still the wonderful power of making to themselves friends, so remarkable in the native race, asserted itself, and it generally happened, as it does to this day, that the natives and the Europeans of any given settled district turned out together shoulder to shoulder against an attack. There were "wars" in this period, not however as a rule marked by bloodthirstiness or cruelty, there was the massacre of the Wairau, originating in a land question, when Captain Wakefield of the Royal Navy, and other gentlemen acting as they thought in support of law and order, mistaken, as I believe, as to the wisdom and even according to the native custom, correctness of their action, were defeated and afterwards barbarously tomahawked by a native chief who claimed certain lands by right of conquest. Amongst them perished some of the best friends of the Maoris, and there fell too the prestige of invincibility which had hitherto attached to the European race. This outrage was condoned by the Government. Then came Heki's war in the North; he cut down the flagstaff at Kororarika, the symbol of the Queen's power, he complained of no special grievance but the collection of customs duties; I believe his real desire was to exalt his name as a great chief, and to emulate the deeds of Hongi. He and Kawiti were defeated after a contest which convinced natives that soldiers were less formidable antagonists than they had an-

ticipated, no punishment was inflicted upon the insurgents – the same maybe said in regard to the "war" at the Hutt and Porirua, which arose from native claimants (and natives who were not claimants) having taken possession of lands which had been adjudicated upon and twice paid for, and to which the late native possessors maintained in arms the right of the Europeans – in this case too, no punishment was inflicted upon the insurgents. The Wanganui war was the last of this series, it arose from a pistol having accidentally gone off in the hands of a midshipman and wounded a chief. The chief was attended to and recovered, but two or three of his tribe committed an atrocious murder in revenge – they were taken and hung by the officer in command of the regiment stationed in the district, a war commenced and died out through inanition, no punishment was inflicted on the insurgents. Several years of peace followed these disturbances, which were always local, and even during them, I, and many others were living in native districts surrounded by natives and isolated from all support. Political subjects now occupied the minds of the colonists, and a strong desire for self-government was manifested, for up to this time the government of the Colony had been virtually autocratic under the direction of the Colonial Office.

I now come to the third period, that of self-government in all but native affairs. In 1852 the Imperial Legislature passed the New Zealand Constitution Act.

Of the merits and demerits of that Act I shall speak hereafter. It was received with great joy by the Colonists, and I think I am warranted in saying marked an era of progress. It was proclaimed by Governor Sir G. Grey, K. C. B. in 1853, but the first Session of the General Assembly or Parliament of New Zealand was not held till 1854. The Constitution Act established a general government and six provinces, with a common purse, and in many respects concurrent powers of legislation; the general design was good, and fitted to the requirements of the Colony; but the evils and conflicts likely to result from these two provisions, were at the times forcibly pointed out by Mr. Gladstone. Unfortunately at this moment so pregnant with the future of New Zealand, Governor Sir George Grey, who had taken a prominent part in framing the Constitution Act, was appointed to the Cape; and unfortunately too, as I think, before leaving, he called into existence the provincial governments, without summoning the General Assembly. The officer commanding the troops now nominally assumed the reins of government, the Attorney General, Mr. Swainson, a gentleman who is said to have declared that his great desire was "to avoid committing himself," was his adviser, and the result was, that the general government may be said to have ceased to exist. The provinces headed by active, earnest, and able men, legislated in different directions unchecked, and when at length the Parliament met, it found that they had

dealt with questions of real property, of militia, of dower of married women, and others of a similar nature. Six independent states had arisen pulling different ways, whilst the government proposed no policy whatsoever, and not a single representative of the government appeared to speak its mind, or sat on the benches of the House. The members met and looked at one another, and recovering from their surprise, passed the following resolution on the 5th of June, 1854.

"That amongst the objects which this House desires to see accomplished without delay, both as an essential means whereby the General Government may rightly exercise a due control oyer Provincial Governments, and as a no less indispensable means of obtaining for the General Government the confidence and attachment of the people, the most important is the establishment of ministerial responsibility in the conduct of the legislative and executive proceedings of the Governor."

The old officials, however, refused, either to take seats with a view to carrying on the public business, or to resign without reference to the Home Government, and the result was that Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Sewell, Mr. Bartley, and myself, and for a time Mr. Dillon Bell, took seats with them in the executive, and carried on business as a temporary expedient without office or salary. We proposed measures for giving the old officials retiring pensions, also for defining the powers of the general and provincial governments; whilst the independence of the Supreme Court of Judicature – the control of the

expenditure by an independent audit – and the conduct of native affairs, were subjects to which we anxiously devoted ourselves. We commanded a large majority in the legislature, but finding that instead of the "full and entire confidence" which had been promised to us, despatches had been written to England without our knowledge, that our "old official" colleagues did not co-operate with us, and that the House was getting uneasy; we informed the acting Governor that either the "old officials" must retire on the receipt of their pensions – or that we must resign, promising if they would themselves conduct the business of the assembly, to give them the utmost support and assistance we consistently could: They declined either alternative – the acting Governor proposed at first to request them to tender their resignations, but on the advice of Mr. E. Gibbon Wakefield he decided on accepting ours. The House of Representatives passed necessary supplies and petitioned the Queen – the decision of the Home Government was in our favour – but another year was lost to New Zealand; a year at such a crisis most important in the life of a young Colony. I have dwelt at some length upon this episode, because I have always thought that a great part of the difficulties which have since embarrassed New Zealand, are distinctly traceable to these delays, and to the fact that efforts made by a very able and a very honest Parliament to place the state engine on the right track were thwarted and the start so long delayed –

and when at length these extraneous impediments were removed, parties had been formed and interests grown up, which presented difficulties and complications of no ordinary magnitude. Let me here too, note, that one of the points to which we especially adverted in our memorandum to the acting Governor before our resignation, as menacing the future of the Colony, was a little cloud, even then growing bigger and darker – native complications at Taranaki – that cloud to which we then pointed with a warning hand grew larger and larger, and as we shall see afterwards darkened the whole country.

On the 6th September, 1855, the new Governor, Colonel Gore Browne, C. B., announced his intention "to continue the policy hitherto adopted towards the aborigines in maintaining inviolate their right to their land, and securing to them an impartial administration of justice;" he also declared that he would carry out in its integrity the principle of ministerial responsibility; and he dissolved the Parliament. The new Parliament met on the 15th of April, 1856, and not till then could parliamentary government in New Zealand be said to have commenced. Native affairs were still reserved to the Crown, Ministers were to be consulted, but the entire responsibility of the conduct of native matters was still left in the hands of the Governor, who of course acted under instructions from the Ministers of the Crown in England. Governor Gore Browne was always consistent and firm upon that point. Various

measures of colonial interest now occupied the mind of the assembly, parties were very nearly balanced, the provincialists and the centralists fought many a battle in the political arena; the ministry of Mr. Sewell was succeeded by that of Mr. Fox, and he in turn gave way to Mr. Stafford. Mr. Stafford's government was remarkable for containing in its ranks Mr. Christopher Richmond, (now Judge Richmond,) as native minister, a man of wide and philosophical views, a deep thinker, honest, able, and philanthropic. In a series of carefully considered bills, he brought down a policy for promoting the self-government, education, and advancement of the natives, for enabling them gradually to rise out of government tutelage, for giving them more extended powers to deal with their land restricted by the treaty of the Waitangi, and for individualizing and registering their titles to land. The Home Government however (see Lord Carnarvon's despatch of 28th May, 1859) preferred adhering to the old system under which the natives were allowed to sell land to the government only. All this time the little cloud at Taranaki was growing larger and larger, others were looming on the horizon, which shortly joined it, and burst forth in the Taranaki war. Even before the departure of Sir G. Grey native affairs at Taranaki were in a most unsatisfactory state, rival tribes and families or subdivisions of tribes disputed lands, and ultimately murder and acts of war were committed, even on European land within the

precincts of the settlement, between the natives themselves. The authorities were not sufficiently powerful to interfere, and dreaded a war. No European had however been touched. Such a state of things was fraught with danger and disgraceful to our government. It appeared to Governor Gore Browne that the best way to end it, was to buy the land, to define native reserves, and to settle the district. He went to Taranaki. He told the natives that he would allow no land to be bought without the consent of both claimants, should there be two claimants; that he would buy no land the ownership of which was disputed; that he would allow no man to interfere with another's right of selling his own; and that he would repress murder and outrage. Soon after this the Waitara block was offered for sale by Teira. The chief commissioner of lands reported that he was the owner, and the land was bought; but a reservation was made to the effect that the rights of any native who might substantiate a claim to the land or any part of it, were saved, and would be respected. The chief, "William King," (not 'the King,') took armed possession by building a pah on the land. He was driven off, and the Waitara war commenced.

I must now pause to call attention to the attitude of the natives at this time; for Waitara was but the spark, other clouds, too, were charged with thunder. The natives had not originally, in my opinion, so to speak, feelings of nationality. They had strong

feelings of tribal loyalty; the tribe was their nation, as the islands were their world. It could not have been otherwise. Many of them considered the Europeans settled side by side with them in the light of a portion of their tribe, or as an allied tribe. They consulted with them, and often made, as they do now, common cause with them as against a common enemy. When I lived in a native district, natives have come fifty miles to consult with me as to our action on such occasions. Many old settlers will remember the delight with which, on one occasion, old Te Puni rejoiced that the enemy had been defeated, "not by the soldiers," but by the settlers: – "By you, by you, my own white men." I have been told by New Zealand gold-diggers on their return from Australia that the Maori and the European New Zealander always held together in Australia. One man in particular told me that a Maori had walked a whole day to inform him of a rich find of gold. He said, "I wanted to find a European from the same place as myself; but, however, you also are from New Zealand." But side by side with this friendly and amicable feeling, and tending in an opposite direction, had grown up the sentiment of nationality. It manifested itself in two ways – in the King Movement and the Land League. The Land League was most powerful amongst tribes which had not sold land. They did not, as a rule, complain that land had been unfairly bought, but they felt that with the lands prestige and power

went, and that as Europeans increased in numbers the power of their race declined. Therefore, at a meeting at Manawapou, the representatives of the league decreed death to whosoever should sell his land or any part of it. The King movement was also distinctly a movement in favour of a separate nationality "As there was a king in Israel, as there is a queen in England, as there are emperors in France and Russia," said Tamihana (Thompson), "so shall there be a king in New Zealand for the natives." The king was to have his tribute, his flag, his army; he was to be distinctly an independent sovereign. Such aspirations, founded on a sentiment common to all mankind, were not to be lightly treated; nay, they evoked sympathy, and amongst colonists Tamihana was spoken of with respect. But when overtures by the Governor, in the direction of local self-government, under the authority of the Crown, were rejected, as I have heard them made and rejected, it was impossible not to see that two governments in the same country could not go on long without a collision, and that the sentiment of nationality must lead to the injury, not the benefit, of the native race. And so it happened. The king sent his flag to Waitara with a contingent from Waikato. At the same time the Ngatiruanui tribe, always ready to plunder and murder, took the opportunity of attacking Taranaki from the south. The officer commanding Her Majesty's forces in the district ordered the settlers

into the town, refused to allow them to protect their property, and the whole district was given up to plunder and ruin. Reinforcements were sent for, and after General Pratt, who arrived from Australia, had advanced by sap to within a hundred yards of what remained of Te Arei pah, a kind of pacification was agreed to. I was then Minister for native affairs, and I can state from my own personal knowledge that Governor Gore Browne, even then, offered William King (who must not be confounded with the native king) to return to him any portion of the Waitara block to which he could prove a claim. He made no reply, and drew his force off into the forests. Waiving the question of ownership, I think I have said enough to show that the issue in the Governor's mind was not a question of a paltry six hundred acres of land, but of permitting armed interference on the part of "William King" – of submitting to the forcible assertion of authority by the Maori king through his Waikato contingent. As to the Ngatiruanui horde, the same tribe that has since produced the prophets and the new fanaticism, I have never even heard the shadow of an excuse for their inroad into lands confessedly long the property of settlers. And so this war languished and died out, I may almost say. There was a kind of partial pacification; no punishment was inflicted upon the insurgents. Then came a short breathing time. General Cameron, who had arrived to take the command, was anxious

at once to fall upon Waikato, the head-quarters of the native king; but Governor Browne very properly resolved to offer an ultimatum before permitting him to do so. Governor Gore Browne's term of office having expired, he was appointed to Tasmania, and Sir G. Grey, at the special request of the Home Government, "as a great Proconsul," proceeded to New Zealand from the Cape (Oct. 1861). If personal influence, zeal, experience, and knowledge of the native character could have averted war, we might then have hoped for peace. Mr. Fox had come into power, aided by Mr. Sewell, as a peace ministry; most earnest endeavours were made to induce the natives to accept a system of institutions, which many believed might occupy and civilize them; large sums were voted for native purposes; the Opposition determined to give Sir George Grey's policy a fair trial. Mr. Fox nevertheless resigned after a year's tenure of office (1862), on a question arising out of an offer made by the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, to give the management of native affairs to the colonists. Mr. Fox's resolution on this subject was opposed, as not going far enough, by those who objected to a divided responsibility, and who wished the entire and absolute management of native affairs to be entrusted to the colony; and, on the other hand, by those who desired to leave Sir G. Grey unfettered, or who thought that native affairs should remain in the hands of the Home Government, at all events till

peace was restored and order established. The Opposition was led by the most prominent supporters of Governor Gore Browne's policy; but they did not take office themselves, fearing that to do so might embarrass the Governor, whom they regarded as a dictator sent out by England. They therefore placed in office Messrs. Domett and Dillon Bell, both men of great ability and knowledge of native affairs, both believed to be personally acceptable to his Excellency. They were supported on the express understanding that they were not to accept the responsibility of native policy. Scarcely had the new ministry been seated when a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle of the 26th May, 1862, was laid before the House, handing over the administration of native affairs to the colony, on the ground "that the endeavour to keep the management of the natives under the control of the Home Government had failed," and that it can "only be mischievous to retain the shadow of responsibility when the beneficial exercise of power has become impossible." Both Chambers of the Legislature in addresses to Her Majesty declined to accede to his Grace's views, and asked for an enquiry into the condition of the country, and the respective obligations of the mother country and the colony towards the native race.

When the Assembly next met in October, 1863, war had again commenced. Sir G. Grey had abandoned the Government claim to the Waitara

block; but in attempting to reoccupy the settler's land to the south of Taranaki, which, as I before mentioned, had been seized by the Ngatiruanui plunderers, an escort of Her Majesty's troops had been cut off. In the Waikato, the seat of the native king, affairs had taken an unfavourable turn, which had been aggravated by the well-meant but indiscreet efforts of a stipendiary magistrate, Mr. Gorst, which added to the irritation of the King party. War had commenced, and General Cameron, at the head of an imposing force, was marching into Waikato. At this juncture, a despatch from the Duke of Newcastle, of 26th February, 1863, was presented to the Assembly, in which he instructs the Governor as follows: – "Your constitutional position with regard to your advisers will (as desired by your late Ministry) be the same in regard to native as to ordinary colonial affairs; that is to say, you will be generally bound to give effect to the policy which they recommend for your adoption, and for which, therefore, they will be responsible." To this the House of Representatives replied by passing, without a division, a resolution to the effect that, recognizing "the thoroughly efficient aid which Her Majesty's Government is now affording for the suppression of the rebellion".... "and relying upon the cordial cooperation of the Imperial Government for the future, the House cheerfully accepts the responsibility thus placed on the colonists." A similar resolution was passed in the Legislative Council or Upper House.

Thus ended the second epoch of the colonial history of New Zealand, in which the colonists had exercised the powers of self-government with the exception of the control of native policy; but this period cannot be disconnected with the succeeding one, because at that very moment a policy was being carried out, a war was raging, and a large imperial and colonial force under a British General was actually in the field.

A new ministry was now formed under Messrs. Whitaker and Fox, vigorously to prosecute the war – a three millions loan was authorized – most stringent measures passed – and the Colony flattered itself that by putting forth all its strength, with a force of some fifteen thousand men under a distinguished British General, and a little fleet of steamers and gunboats, backed by the presence of British ships-of-war – and by carrying out a system of military colonization upon lands to be confiscated from the insurgents, a short and decisive campaign or two would finish the war for ever. Alas these anticipations were doomed to be miserably disappointed, difficulties and disputes arose, the war dragged its slow length along, a great part of the to us seemingly inexhaustible sum of three millions vanished into thin air; and when the Assembly met in November 1864, Ministers had resigned after an unseemly altercation with the Governor; the relations between the General commanding and Her Majesty's representative were on the worst possible footing. England

was naturally dissatisfied at the lavish expenditure of blood and money. The natives were defeated in Waikato but unsubdued; the settlement of Taranaki had not been restored; friendly or neutral natives were uneasy and alarmed – escaped prisoners occupied a fortified position within sight of the city of Auckland (the head-quarters of the Government and General). The colony had neither money nor credit, its debentures were unsaleable, its account largely overdrawn, large bodies of immigrants called from different parts of the world were encamped in tents in Auckland and its environs, and were receiving a pittance of government aid. The Southern island, free itself from native questions, having no selfish interest in common with the Northern one, supporting the war simply from a feeling of loyalty, but taking far less interest in it, than it would have done, in a war between England and Russia – the Southern island I say – naturally enough discontented at the loss of its money, at heavy taxation, and no prospect of finality, was tending towards a desire for separation. Parliament was disorganized by the retirement, before its meeting, of Ministers who had commanded a majority, and who in order to carry out a large scheme of military and agricultural colonization on confiscated lands with a view to ensuring a safe frontier to the threatened settlements (as originally suggested by the Domett government) had before their retirement introduced large bodies of immigrants and entered into enormous liabilities.

Public men naturally enough felt that to face such a complication of difficulties involved a loss of credit, that the safe side was to hang back, nor could any man be known to command a majority in the Assembly, the Ministry having resigned in the recess.

His Excellency the Governor sent for me, and asked me to undertake the formation of a Ministry – and as he said to assist him in saving the country under overwhelming difficulties. My health was not strong at the time, and I had other private and personal reasons which at any less urgent crisis would have led me to decline that "bad eminence." But I felt it to be my duty to go to work, and I did it. But before attempting to form a government I obtained from His Excellency a pledge that I should have his concurrence and support in carrying out my policy could I secure the approval of the Assembly; I determined to act strictly in accordance with the principles of responsible government, to take the full responsibility of every act, to consult with the Governor, to act loyally by him, but to resign without hesitation should I be prevented from carrying out my views.

I felt strongly that divided responsibility, or rather divided authority, (for all British subjects are responsible to the Queen and to our common country) was the root of half our misfortunes, political and military. More than that – as one who as a working colonist, as an explorer, as a traveller, as a

frequent visitor to England, had still thought and studied colonial questions – who had enjoyed the friendship of John Robert Godley, a man too little known, but second to none I am sure, in the minds and hearts of many of the leading men of England, a memory that must be as a light to guide the footsteps of colonial politicians at home and abroad, I could not have enjoyed these advantages, without having strong and formed opinions upon general colonial policy. I had foreshadowed them long before, here and there. I knew that far better men than myself in and out of the colony were imbued with the same spirit, and had advocated the same principles far more ably than I could do, but now I felt that the time was come, when that true old English colonial policy of self-reliance might be put into force, face to face with the greatest difficulties. I knew that I should be called Quixotic, I knew that the timid would fear, – that the lovers of military routine would be shocked and scandalized – that the interested would cry out – self-reliance meant of course self-exertion and self-sacrifice; I knew what that is to a people accustomed, in a great degree, to rely on others. I did not expect to succeed at once, especially in the face of such difficulties, but I hoped to help to plant a seed of life in the hearts of the people of New Zealand, which might grow in despite of rebuffs and adversity. Mr. Sewell, Mr. FitzHerbert, Major Atkinson, Major Richardson Mr. Mantell, (and at a later period Mr. Fitz-

Gerald and Mr. J. C. Richmond, brother of the judge,) came forward at my request, and a Ministry was constituted.

The original propositions made by me to the Governor, and to which the new cabinet adhered, were as follows: –

"1. Mr. Weld having received the Governor's commands to undertake the formation of a Ministry, and having at an interview stated the grounds upon which alone he should feel justified in placing his services at the Governor's disposal, now submits in writing the following propositions for His Excellency's consideration.

"2. Mr. Weld is of opinion that the system of double government by Governor and Ministers, has resulted in evil to both races of Her Majesty's subjects in New Zealand; – he recognises the right of the Home Government to insist upon the maintenance of this system, so long as the Colony is receiving the aid of British troops for the suppression of internal disturbances: he is prepared to accept the alternative, and will recommend the Assembly to request the Home Government to withdraw the whole of its land force from the Colony, and to issue such instructions to the Governor as may enable him to be guided entirely by the recommendations of his constitutional Advisers, excepting only upon such matters as may directly concern Imperial interests and the prerogatives of the Crown.

"3. Mr. Weld is aware that the Governor, before taking action upon a proposition which would change the whole aspect of the relations between the Mother Country and the Colony, may probably feel it his duty to ascertain the views of Her Majesty's Home Government; he would, therefore, pending their decision, recommend to the Colonial Parliament that the Colony should undertake a reasonable liability for the services of troops actively engaged in the field, at the especial recommendation of His Excellency's Ministers, and for such troops only.

"4. Mr. Weld would recommend that a small standing Colonial Force be kept on foot, armed and trained with special reference to the nature of the services required.

"5. It would be his duty to advise that at least one strong Military Post should be occupied about the centre of the coast line of the Ngatiruanui country, with such force as the Lieutenant-General may deem requisite; and that a road may be made from Wanganui to the Northern part of the Taranaki Province.

"6. The Colony having entered into arrangements with a large number of Military Settlers, Mr. Weld would propose that sufficient land, being part of the territory belonging to the insurgents and now in military occupation, should be taken to fulfil those engagements, and that the description of such confiscated lands, and proper plans thereof, should be made public without delay.

"7. In its last Session the General Assembly resolved that the Seat of Government should be removed to some place in Cook's Straits, to be determined by a Commission specially appointed for that purpose. In accordance with the recommendation of that Commission, Mr. Weld would propose that the Seat of the General Government be at once removed to Wellington.

"8. Mr. Weld thinks it right to state frankly that if the Governor should feel it his duty to differ on any material point with his Constitutional Advisers, Mr. Weld would, without hesitation, place his resignation in his Excellency's hands; he therefore considers it essential that in such a case, the Assembly should at once be called, or other advisers summoned.

"9. Should the Governor be pleased to concur in the above proposals, and authorise Mr. Weld to make that concurrence known, Mr. Weld would feel justified in attempting to fulfil the task imposed upon him by His Excellency.

"(Signed.) FRED. A. WELD.

"Auckland, November 22, 1864."

I will now sketch out as briefly as possible, the outline of the policy proposed by my Government,

1st. We believed that divided authority was ruinous, fully accepting the constitutional influence that the Governor might exercise on our counsels as Her Majesty's representative, we were of opinion that both the Duke of Newcastle's despatches, the state of public opinion in England, and the circumstances of the colony required a more complete adherence to the principle of responsible government than had hitherto existed, and we saw that whilst a large body of British troops were carrying on operations in the colony, it was ridiculous to suppose that the people of Great Britain would consent to give up a large control over colonial policy, a control which could be enforced by a sudden threat to withdraw the troops at a time of danger.

2nd. We believed that an army of troops trained especially for European warfare, acting in masses, with large trains of artillery, baggage, and supplies, and moved according to the requirements of war in settled countries as if against a similiarly organised enemy, were not adapted for bush work against a foe, few in numbers, active and skilled in guerilla warfare. We had the greatest respect for the British army, we were proud of it as all Englishmen are and must be; we knew that it contained in its ranks the bravest hearts, and added to that, amongst its officers many of tha ablest heads of any army in

the world, but we could not expect it to be reorganized for a special service which might unfit it for its own work, and we could not suppose that its heart would be in a service for which it was not adapted by its very constitution; we did not suppose we could have any influence over it, for we had not, and necessarily could not have over it, the power of punishment or reward, and lastly it was a most expensive machine, costing us according to the demands of the British Government £160,000 a year, and we could not afford to pay for it.

3rd. Nor did we desire war. We believed that war might easily drift into a war of races, a war of extermination. Our desire was not to confiscate land if we could possibly help it, and I must say, that was the desire of the colonists generally, even on the lowest commercial grounds – to confiscate land did not pay, it was far cheaper to buy it. The colonists of the inferior class even, knew that war meant stoppage of immigration, taxation, stagnation and stoppage of influx of capital and consequently of progress. When they had supported war they had supported it (especially the Southern islanders) mainly on grounds of loyalty and sentiment, and with few exceptions those who could gain the least and were the least personally interested in the question were its most strenuous supporters. But our views were simply to repress outrages, and to give what protection we could to life and property, without undertaking great military operations; to make any

operations we might be compelled to undertake, as local, and as much like police operations as possible. We trusted to time and to other means for the termination of our difficulties.

4th. We believed that a small force, especially trained for bush service, partaking of the nature of a constabulary force, would be the most efficient. In my Memorandum of the 20th March, 1865, I sketched out a rough plan for such a force, to consist of 1,500 men; I still am of opinion that a smaller force would have been sufficient. I should, had I remained in office, have gradually raised it as the military settlers were taken off pay and located on their land. I should have selected the best men, men accustomed to the bush, men confident in their own superiority in bush fighting over the Maories, men who could carry their own provisions (the best and most concentrated in form that could be obtained), who could hut themselves quickly and comfortably, as any bushman can, men armed with the best and most perfect appliances for bush war. Such men properly led (and there were men to lead them) would have been invincible in the bush, and with the prestige of race, British determination and superiority of appliances they could have moved in very small bodies, and thus have neutralised the rapidity of motion, which is the natural advantage of the savage, and it must be remembered that the New Zealander is not like the Ghoorka, or North American, a real bushman,

he is a fisherman and an agriculturalist, and in the bush he seldom leaves the path. When I explored in places unvisited by natives, where there were no paths, I never took natives with me, I always relied on the superior pluck and the superior bushmanship of Europeans. It will be remembered by some old colonists that when I explored through the mountains from Nelson to Canterbury in 1855, I with one European succeeded, whilst a body of natives sent out by the Provincial Government on the same errand failed and returned, though accompanied by a very energetic European – but I have allowed myself to digress.

5th. We proposed to use natives in war, we did not propose (if it possibly could be helped) to set tribe against tribe, but we considered that using natives in conjunction with Europeans, as a native militia, fighting side by side with their neighbours in defence of their land, families, and property, would lessen the chances of a war of extermination, and would strengthen the good feeling between the races, besides being a great assistance to the colony.

6th. We did not rely upon measures of repression alone to solve the native question, there are other and higher duties than mere repression of revolt which devolve upon a Government. Under an Act passed by the Domett and Dillon Bell ministry we had the power of constituting land courts, consisting of a European judge and native assessors, constituted

to try all land titles and cases of ownership by native custom, and to give individual, tribal, or family titles by grant or certificate from the Crown. We did not exclude from the benefits of the Court even natives who had been in insurrection, we hoped thereby to indulge the natives in their passion for litigation, if we did not indulge them in war, we hoped not only to occupy their minds, but to give them real and substantial justice, by means of a Court in which they were to a great extent themselves the judges; and to give them the means of raising themselves above that communism which was weighing them down, to enable them to make themselves individual landowners, able to sell their lands in the open market at a fair price, or to let them, and thus to become rich, and interested in the maintenance of law and order. The Court has worked well, and to a great extent our hopes have been realized.

The first day I was in office, I waited upon a gentleman in every way qualified for the task, and said, "Native land courts are the last straw to save the drowning race, will you accept the office of chief judge of that court?" My next act was to abolish the old system of land purchases by the Government, formerly upheld by the Home Government, from good, but as I think mistaken motives; and thus the Government ceased to appear in the eyes of the natives as a land jobber, and stood in its proper colours as an impartial arbiter of justice. Other acts of justice to the natives were carried out;

commissioners were sent to enquire into unfulfilled promises made to natives, and in the session of 1865, the Native Rights' Bill was introduced and carried by Mr. FitzGerald, a member of our ministry, and also a scheme was proposed for the establishment of native districts, which would have had, I believe, the effect of turning the minds of the natives to local self government under government auspices, and would ultimately have localised police charges and relieved the settlements and especially the Southern island from burdens of which they justly complained.

On the other hand we proceeded with measures of repression. To have retired from the Waikato which had been taken possession of, might have been followed by a general rising; we thought that the prestige of the King must be lowered, and we carried out the New Zealand Settlements Act, which had received the sanction of Her Majesty's representative and of the Home Government, by the confiscation of the conquered territory. All the rights of friendly natives were saved, and all hostile natives were invited to come in and receive grants of land for themselves and families, military settlers received land at various points. The conquered territory being in the form of a parallelogram, flanked on three sides by native territory, was not what we could have wished for defence, but we found it so, and had no alternative. The colony up to this date is out of pocket by this confiscation, politically however it

has gained, for though many of the military settlers left for the gold fields, and want of means has crippled the colonization of the district, since that confiscation the Waikato king's prestige has diminished, and Waikato has been quiet. To replace the ruined settlement of Taranaki on a firm and secure foundation, was another main point of our native policy, but of this hereafter.

7th. Another cardinal point of our policy was road making, the precursor of immigration and civilization: – common sense and the lessons of history might teach us this; and as it happened, Sir George Grey in the first epoch of New Zealand colonization had proved its efficacy in that country. We passed an act enabling us on payment to take land for road making. We proposed gradually to carry roads through the county, not necessarily expensive highly-finished roads, but passable open tracks; we proposed if possible to encourage natives to make them, either by votes in aid, or by employing them as labourers by contract or otherwise; we intended gradually to push them through the country, avoiding collision with hostile tribes as much as possible, but intending to protect our road parties on emergency by force, in such few cases as might occur, such as between Wanganui and Taranaki (the Ngatiruanui country,) where a passable road was a political necessity. Want of money of course prevented our doing much in that way during our

short tenure of office, but we did not leave office before the country was made passable through the above-mentioned district.

8th. I have alluded to the financial state of embarrassment in which we found the colony; it can hardly be exaggerated, it was only short of bankruptcy. In a colony numbering about 200,000 souls an annual war expenditure of close upon £700,000 was going on, to which should be added £160,000 a year claimed by the Home Government as a contribution towards the cost of the Imperial troops, besides heavy liabilities and contingent expenses. We set to work unsparingly to retrench, and as we felt the first thing to be done was to keep up our credit and meet our engagements, and as all retrenchments could not be effected in a day, we at once increased the taxation of a people, already more heavily taxed than England, by raising the customs duties to the utmost possible limit; and the next session we proposed a stamp duties tax. Had we remained in office we hoped to have completed the organization of our native force, and finished putting the military settlers on their land, out of a balance remaining of the loan, aided by a small vote on the estimates, and ultimately to have reduced the customs duties. We also passed an act confirming the contract for the Panama Mail Steam Company which completed the chain of steam communication round the globe; and though New Zealand was doubtless much benefited by this, we

did so mainly on the ground that by former transactions we were bound in honour to do so, and that the credit of the colony was already pledged to it. The British Parliament had offered us a guaranteed loan for a million, but coupled it with conditions which interfered with our engagements and the security given to previous creditors. Tantalizing as was the offer of a million upon such terms to a starving exchequer – to a government that was hardly able to make its weekly payments, we refused it, in a memorandum dated January 3, 1865, rather than break faith. Nay further, on the 23rd March of the same year we informed the Governor in another memorandum, that we had instructed the Crown agents to deliver to the Lords of the Treasury securities to the amount of £500,000, to which, for reasons stated in the memorandum, we considered England had an equitable claim – conduct which was no doubt, just, which raised the credit of the Colony, and which has since induced Her Majesty's Home Government to meet us in regard to other claims and counter-claims in a spirit of liberality, but which nevertheless was censured as "Quixotic," and even damaging to the stability of our ministry.

I will not here refer to propositions for consolidating the colonial debts general and provincial, the moment was not favourable for them, and they were never formally brought forward by us. In a memorandum by the colonial treasurer, dated 23rd March, 1865, we asked the Imperial guarantee for

the residue of our loan, which was refused. Before quitting office we ordered a submarine telegraph cable to unite the two islands, and turned our attention to other questions of improvement of local interest, and reform, such as the comptroller of revenues act, and other measures.

9th. A main feature of our policy was to preserve the unity of the Colony., The Southern Island, supplying the greater part of the revenue, and seeing that so large a part of it had been expended in apparently interminable war, talked of separation; Auckland, in the north, which had benefited commercially by the presence of the troops, and which had few sympathies in common with the south, was not altogether unwilling to place itself entirely in the hands of the Home Government, and, at all events, cried out for separation; but most of the leading and most thinking men of the Colony, irrespective of party, having regard to the future of New Zealand, feeling too, "that the division of the country into two or three small separate states would dwarf the political intellect of the Colony, confining it to the consideration of narrow and personal interests; whilst no slight security for the future of the native race is afforded in the fact that the questions affecting them and their relations with Europeans are influenced by men beyond the reach of local passions and interests" (words I take from my memorandum of 30th December, 1864) – opposed separation. With this view the Assembly

had, in a previous session, moved the Governor to appoint a commission of gentlemen, selected by the Governors of the Australian Colonies, to decide on a more central site of government than Auckland. This commission had fixed upon Wellington, on Cook's Strait, which divides the island. In accordance with that decision we removed the seat of Government to Wellington.

10th. I must now turn to the subject of Taranaki and Wanganui. It was at Taranaki that the little cloud first rose. The settlement had almost been wiped oft the map except as a military post, and every settler that remained was a volunteer or militiaman. Still they clung to their ruined homes and desolate fields with a tenacity very rare amongst new colonists, who are apt upon slight occasion to remove their household gods, and to seek elsewhere new hearths and homes. Not so the men of Taranaki. Sturdy west-countrymen as they were, they made it a point of honour to remain; they believed that if they had been allowed, unfettered by orders, to have defended themselves, that they could have held their own or regained it. We used to say, that they had imbibed something of the patriotic spirit of mountaineers from constantly looking at the snowy cone of Mount Egmont, which, rising to a height of over nine thousand feet, a solitary peak, towers in sublime beauty over their rich low lands and undulating forests, and is never mentioned by the "New Plymouth" or Taranaki man but with reve-

rence, and as "the mountain." Like the Greek islander who, placed in the vale of Tempe, asked, "But where is the sea?" so you may place the Taranaki man where you like, his question will still be, "But the mountain, where is the mountain?" Be that as it may, the little settlement of Taranaki would not die; but the existence it led was a warning, a menace, and an incentive to attack. On its north was the Waitara, and here lately "William King's" people had fired on some friendly native women and children gathering mussels, and committed other outrages. On its south lay the irrepressible Ngatiruanui, rejoicing in their plunder, already plotting new murders, steeped in the wildest and most diabolical fanaticism, under the leadership of the prophet Te Ua, carrying about with them the baked head of a British officer, performing hideous orgies round it, sending emissaries to other tribes inciting them to rise. Some of the upper Wanganui natives had already fraternized with them, and had attacked the friendly natives on that river. In the battle which had ensued victory at first inclined to the fanatics; the advanced party of the friendly natives was almost destroyed; amongst them perished brother Euloge, a French lay-brother, who was attending the wounded; but Haimona with the reserve restored the fight, and probably saved the Wanganui settlement from a great disaster.

At the time we came into office a road was being carried from Wanganui northwards in the direction

of Taranaki, parallel with the sea coast. It was opposed by the fanatical party, who also gave refuge to criminals and committed several murders. It was quite clear that there could be no peace in the Colony as long as this plague-spot remained, with its propaganda of all that can be conceived most horrible against laws human and divine. Even the Maori king party, even natives in arms against us, spoke of the excesses of these fanatics with horror. But the fanaticism was spreading. The fascination such wild doctrines have over the savage and half-savage mind is not easily explained, but it is not the less certain. They appealed to the spirit of nationality; they appealed, too, to the most brutal passions – to gross immorality, to cannibalism, to the love of plunder, to the love of murder, to the excitement of wild and horrible fanatic rites. They spread, and thousands of so-called Christian natives enrolled themselves under the prophet's flag. The missionary Volkner was murdered and butchered in cold blood by these men at the other end of the island; and to this day, under another prophet, the same unholy fire burns, and has led to new and still more horrible atrocities. It is not necessary to warn any well-informed New Zealand colonist, but it is necessary to warn English readers and writers, that the case of these plundering and fanatical tribes should be entirely disconnected with that of natives, loyal or disaffected, of the better class.

Now the centre of the fanatical propaganda, the root of the evil which was growing in all directions, was the country between Taranaki and Wanganui. We resolved to open the communication between these two settlements, to place them upon a sound footing. No punishment whatever had ever been inflicted upon the Ngatiruanui plunderers and murderers; we resolved to occupy a strong point or points on their coast, slightly to extend the Taranaki frontier, and place a military settlement on it. Every Governor, every government, and I may say, every commanding officer, who had gone before, had, I believe, held that the punishment of these tribes was a necessity for the future peace of the country; and the General had, before we came into office, contemplated such a campaign. If necessary before, it was doubly necessary now, that the new fanaticism was spreading from that source. We therefore recommended that action should be taken, and that pending the decision of the British government regarding our request for the removal of the troops, a part of them should be employed in the service; but we carefully guarded ourselves by saying, that should this service be considered likely to delay the departure of the troops, we were prepared to deal with the question ourselves, as our means would permit. Knowing however that the whole native force in the district could not exceed, as it never did exceed, eight hundred men, whilst there were nearly seven thousand armed men, chiefly

British soldiers, in the Taranaki and Wanganui country; we reasonably supposed, that a sharp, quick, and decisive campaign, would finish every thing in a few weeks. In this, from causes which we could not have foreseen or controlled, we were miserably disappointed; the General did move slowly along the coast, and Te Ua the prophet, who had promised invincibility to his followers, made a song, in which he attributed this to the effect of his incantations. The result of these delays was most detrimental to our position; our financial difficulties were aggravated beyond measure by them; and the Southern Island was naturally uneasy, and feared a new war. Months elapsed, and still Weraroa pah, the stronghold of the fanatics, stood, the key to the Wanganui country, barring the progress of our road, and threatening the settlement itself and the friendly natives. The General with a large force had marched past it in the night, but had not thereby got into its proper rear, or cut off its supplies: pressed to attack it, he spoke of "more men from England." We replied, in our memorandum of 20th March, 1865, that we advised the Governor to oppose any such demand, refused to recommend "any operations to be undertaken which might involve the retention of Imperial forces in the Colony;" and submitted "our opinion that a Colonial force of bushrangers and cavalry, united with the loyal natives, whose interests are identified with those

"of the colonists," would "be sufficient to undertake and execute all operations that are requisite." In this and many other memoranda we adhered steadily to our programme, and pressed the removal of the Imperial force on general grounds of policy, in reference to the hostile attitude assumed by the General towards the Governor and Ministry, on grounds of justice to the British taxpayer, and of expense to the Colony. I refrain from entering into controversial matter. The Colonial Government for sufficient reasons decided upon carrying on all future operations with its own force. In the absence of the Governor at Auckland, I planned an attack on Weraroa pah with colonial forces. It was frustrated at the moment the garrison had offered to capitulate, by the action of the Lieut.-Colonel commanding the district, who was also at the time agent for the Colonial Government; he was a zealous and good officer, and no doubt had done his duty, acting as he did under two masters; but I felt it my duty to accept the resignation of his post under the Colonial Government. At that time Sir G. Grey the Governor arrived from Auckland. He proceeded to the spot, and executed a masterly movement with colonial troops, which put us in the possession of the stronghold of the enemy. I should say that previously Piperiki, a post up the Wanganui river, had been occupied by colonial troops under the direction of Major Atkinson, the Defence Minister, with the concurrence of Sir G. Grey,

which had, to use the natives' own words, "shut the back door of Weraroa."

At this time an outbreak, taking the form of an attack upon friendly natives, occurred on the east coast, in connection with the vest coast or Ngatiruanui fanaticism. I objected to the employment of Imperial troops. It was in many respects a most formidable insurrection in regard to numbers, to the nature of the country, to the possible results. It was completely and thoroughly defeated, and the insurgents were followed into their fastnesses by an inferior number of men, and pursued day and night, till a large number surrendered, by Captain Biggs, with a small party of the colonial force. The defeat of this, and a later inroad, is chiefly due to the exertions and gallantry of Mr. McLean, the government agent, of Major Frazer, Major Whitmore, and Major Biggs, and the native chief "Morgan." The closing scene of these events did not take place till after our government had retired from office. At this time the London Times was able to write in a leading article, that "the volunteers were taking pah after pah, and making short work of the war;" and to advocate some honorary reward, (which they would have prized beyond anything,) being given to them.

The Assembly met in July 1865. We were able to congratulate the country upon a brighter state of affairs, upon a very great reduction of expenditure, upon the improved position of the settlement of

Taranaki, for which we were mainly indebted to the zeal and ability of Colonel Warre, C. B., who commanded the troops and acted as government agent in that district, upon the successes which had crowned our efforts in the field, upon the restoration of our credit in the money market, upon the improved tone of public feeling in England towards us, recognizing as it did, not only in both Houses of the British Parliament, but in the public press that we were helping ourselves and doing our duty. We the government, at least, felt, that the clouds had broken and that the way now lay clear before us – - the country generally I believe felt the same – one effort more and the haven of rest was gained. We were so confident in our position as regards the native question that we thought the time was come to issue a proclamation of peace and amnesty, and His Excellency the Governor accordingly did so, on the 25th of September, 1865; we felt however that no half measures would do with the fanatical tribes between Wanganui and Taranaki. We confiscated that territory, intending to put self-defending settlements upon it, and to induce as many as possible of the former owners to settle down between them on grants of land with individualized titles. We sent Mr. Parris, a gentleman distinguished by his love for, and his knowledge of the native race, to negotiate with them to this effect; we had reason to anticipate success from his efforts – though the worst section of the fanatics treacherously murdered

envoys bearing the proclamation of amnesty sent to them by General Waddy.

The Assembly was still sitting; we fought through the session almost to its close, but political combinations were working against us: we defeated the separationists, we carried several important measures, especially the Native Rights Bill, an act calculated to benefit the native race in several ways, more especially by removing certain legal difficulties which barred their ready access to the Supreme Court in questions of land title. The Outlying Districts Police Act, and an amendment of the Native Land Courts Act, were also carried. Still the waves were closing round us; my own health had broken down; abler men than myself sat on the ministerial benches, but still only the head of a government can hold all the strings in his hands. I was latterly seldom able to be in my place. Again, as sunshine came forth, with it came forth too all the old provincial jealousies; and all those springs of action were set to work, which, as I shall explain hereafter, must necessarily in such a constitution as that of New Zealand render it almost impossible for any government to remain in office, except by means to which it ought not to stoop. On the question of the Otago Native Reserves Bill (which I opposed as unfair to a small tribe of natives on the Southern Island) I lost for ever, as I was forewarned I should lose, several of my former supporters, and when; on a question of raising additional revenue by stamp

duties, which was needed to provide for the defence of the Colony, and to maintain its credit and fulfil liabilities incurred by my predecessors, I warned my party, that I called on them for support or would resign; I was only saved from actual defeat by the casting vote of the Speaker, and I resigned accordingly; satisfied that by such resignation I should best act in accordance with the spirit of constitutional government, and best ultimately secure the triumph of those principles I had advocated.

My successor, Mr. Stafford, took office on the ground that he could carry out my views with slight modifications, in a more economical manner than I was doing; he was strongly backed by the leaders of the provincial party. I assume, therefore, that it was expected that he would devote larger sums of money to provincial purposes, than I was prepared to do, consistently with my ideas of what was required for the defence of the country; he also advocated an income tax rather than stamp duties – a form of taxation, in my opinion, unfitted for a new country, as costly in collection, uncertain in such a country in its operation, very liable to be evaded, and which cannot induce to economy, as the incidence of taxation in a purely democratic community does not lie on the voters. This is a mere matter of opinion. Mr. Stafford, himself one of the most distinguished of our public men, took no other leading men into office with him. His Defence (or war office) minister was Colonel Haultain, a gentle-

man remarkable for his consistent opposition to the policy of self reliance. Still Mr. Stafford never in any way reversed my policy regarding the removal of the British troops. I understand that he differed from the ministry he succeeded in not actually pressing for their removal, and that he did not advise, as far as I am aware, in any way regarding them. A main point of difference was that he did not provide an efficient substitute for them. The mistaken ideas of short-sighted economy that prevailed, would not, perhaps, have allowed him to remain in office if he had carried out a sound policy in that respect.

Just before I embarked for England, on account of my health, I spoke to a public meeting at Christ Church as follows: – "I believe that this country may rise, and will rise, to greatness and prosperity; and there are two ways in which it may do so – it may rise through the gate of adversity, and it may rise through the gate of honour, by which we would have led it....... I dare say many gentlemen will say, this is all fine talk; but I ask you to remember my words in years to come, I ask you, if you should find that instead of reduction of taxation, by a false economy your taxation is doubled, and you come to prosperity, (as I am sure from the race from which you spring, you will ultimately), by the gate of misfortune, ruin almost, and adversity, then you will remember my words, and if you do not now, then

"do justice to the motives under which I am speaking." These were my last words spoken in public to the colonists of New Zealand, recent events will tell whether they were prophetic or not.

The first event of importance under Mr. Stafford's ministry, was the campaign of General Chute. Mr. Stafford has stated in the House of Representatives that he did not advise that campaign: I should have resigned rather than permitted it. It was quite true, that it was necessary to punish the treachery of those, who had almost within sight of General Waddy's camp, murdered his messengers, the bearers of the peace proclamation. As he did not attempt it, it should have been done with a bush force, and before leaving office we advised the Governor accordingly, and objected to a campaign with troops. General Chute, however, made a most gallant and dashing campaign, marching victoriously from one end of the district to the other; he entirely re-established the prestige of British troops if you will, but also entirely upset all Mr. Parris's negociations with the natives, destroyed at least one friendly village by mistake, shot a prisoner against the protest of the only colonial authorities present; and though his success in a military point of view was complete, nothing could possibly have been more unfortunate for the prospects of peace. Not that we could ever have expected much from the Ngatiruanui tribes, but there was a hope regarding many of them, and that hope was destroyed. In the session of 1866,

in a newly elected parliament, Mr. Stafford's ministry was defeated by an overwhelming majority. A new ministry was constituted, Mr. Stafford's official knowledge, administrative ability and standing, once more placed him at the head of the Government, and he was joined by several able and conscientious men who had formerly supported me; they considered that the circumstances of the Colony required a united government to work for it, and they wisely or unwisely, but certainly from the highest motives, formed what I must consider a coalition government, seeing that Colonel Haultain, the consistent opponent of the self-defence policy, retained his seat, and still retains it, as Minister for defence. That ministry remains in office. A Stamp Duties bill, similar to ours, was proposed and carried, the income-tax was not brought forward, separation resolutions were defeated. In the session of 1867 the Public Revenues Act was passed, and the Loans Consolidation Act, the latter a measure, which though right in its general aim, was, I think, liable to grave objections; the scheme agreed upon by the Colony, has however been most ably and successfully carried out by Mr, FitzHerbert, who was sent to England for that purpose. Measures having for their object to carry out the promotion of local self-government, and opposed (apparently) to the present provincial system, have also been proposed and carried, their success is a disputed point in the Colony. Parties appear very evenly balanced, or rather there

sems to be a want of confidence in any leader, and the ministry appear to have been frequently obliged to withdraw their political measures, and I may almost say to accept measures rather than to initiate them.

We now come to the period of the present outbreak, which took place after Sir G. Grey had been relieved by Sir G. Bowen as Governor. At present it is not a rising of the Maori race; once more the fanatics have risen at the bid of a prophet; the escape of the Chatham Island prisoners, and the unsuccessful attempts to recapture them on the East coast, unfortunately were coincident with the West coast rising. There had, after General Chute's campaign, been an attack by the fanatical party on Poverty Bay, but it had been suppressed by Colonel Macdonnell with colonial troops and the Arawa tribe; then the colonial force had been allowed to dwindle away, and some of its best officers had been neglected, and had taken to other pursuits. The esprit de corps was not kept up, and the prestige of its victories had been allowed to die out. When the prisoners escaped from the Chatham Islands, and Tito ko waru, the second prophet, again called the fanatics to arms, the insurgents were very few in number, and had the Government had even a small thoroughly efficient force, at once to have taken the field, there is no doubt whatsoever that the fire might have been at once stamped out; but a narrow economy had prevailed, reliance on chance had taken the place of self-reliance and self-exertion. Yet

New Zealand is not the only country where, in times of peace, readiness for war is neglected, and the lesson then learnt will not I trust be readily forgotten. The defeat of Colonel Macdonnell at the head of a body of raw and undisciplined recruits is not to be wondered at; a braver and more determined man than Colonel Macdonnell does not exists and this was the first time in a long series of gallant exploits that he had been unsuccessful; poor Von Tempsky, one of our most gallant officers fell heroically in this affair, the day before his death he wrote to me discussing the state into which the colonial force had been allowed to fall, and concluded by saying, "but I am a man and a Christian, and accept cheerfully what God sends me." The same mail brought me intelligence of his death. A kind of panic seems to have ensued, most important posts were abandoned by order of the Defence minister, amongst them Weraroa pah; the prophet of course gained fresh confidence, and advanced into the settled country with greatly augmented forces. Colonel Whitmore, now a settler in New Zealand, formerly an officer in Her Majesty's service, is now in command; from my personal knowledge of him, I have every confidence that he will do all that man can do with the means at his disposal, if he is left with full powers to act, and is properly supported, which there is no reason I hope to doubt. However, up to the present moment, no marked success has been gained on the West coast, and the prophet still

ravages the country and threatens the settlers and friendly natives of Wanganui.

I will say but little of the horrible massacre which has taken place at Poverty Bay on the East coast; it too is the act of the fanatical party, the chief actors were the escaped Chatham Island prisoners. Atrocities were committed equalling in horror the tales of the Indian mutiny. Major Biggs, one of the very best of our colonial officers, was amongst the slain; his poor young wife refused to fly, and witnessed his death, she had often said before that she would die with him; she was held by the natives whilst they killed her baby and threw it into her lap, her maid having refused to leave her mistress, perished with her. The last mail from New Zealand brought news that these murderers, whose numbers had swelled to a formidable force, had been several times defeated with loss by friendly natives, and were being followed up by a still larger body of natives and Europeans.

I have now finished my rough and rapid historical sketch, many incidents of interest have necessarily been omitted, and I have confined myself almost entirely to matters bearing on the native question. I have desired not so much to express my own opinions, as to give data upon which opinions may be formed by others; I have endeavoured too to mark the distinction between those natives (the minority) who are plunderers and murderers, and those who have fought against us from motives of

sentiment or policy, and those again who have identified their interests with ours. If I have given prominence to an explanation of the policy which has been known by my name, it is because I am constantly questioned about it, and also because I believe it to be the true policy for the future, as whilst it was fairly tried, it proved itself successful in the past. And now I will proceed to touch upon the present position of New Zealand, as a prelude to a few remarks upon the present crisis and suggestions for the future.

New Zealand is divided into two principal islands, the Northern, which comprises the provinces of Auckland, Taranaki, Hawkes Bay, and Wellington; and the Southern (or middle) island, separated from it by Cook's straits, which is divided into the provinces of Nelson, Marlborough, Canterbury, Otago, Southland, and the county of Westland.

The Northern island contains a native population of about 37,000; of this population fully 8 or 10,000 inhabit the district north of the city of Auckland. That city is situated upon a narrow isthmus, and consequently may be said to cut off the northern tribes from the rest of New Zealand. These northern tribes have European settlements amongst them; they have never risen since Heki's war in the early days of the colonization of New Zealand; they are generally loyal, and as a last resource part of them might be brought down in arms against other tribes. South of the Auckland

isthmus the island assumes a rounder shape. The Taupo plains and lake occupy the centre; they are in turn (I am speaking very generally to convey a general idea) surrounded by difficult mountain and forest country; the Waikato river and country (the King's country) runs from the centre to the north, in the direction of Auckland; its upper part still occupied by the King's adherents, the lower part now in the occupation of settlers and friendly natives; on its left flank at Coromandel and the Thames lie the new Auckland gold diggings, with a considerable and increasing population. A zone of rough forest country runs from Wanganui and Taranaki on the west coast, through the centre to the East Cape on the east, and this will explain how the fanatics keep up so frequent and easy a communication from one side of the island to the other. The European settlements lie scattered round the circumference: the tribes living near them are generally friendly, which in itself disproves the assertion that it is European wrongs that have disposed the natives to war. The disaffected natives acting from a centre, of course have the advantage of being able to bring down a concentrated force, at any given moment, on any weak point; and can fall back on their fastnesses in case of defeat.

The European population of the Northern island is about 79,900, or 36.55 per cent on the whole European population.

The Southern (or Middle) island, contains a native

population of about 1500 only, chiefly the remnants of numerous tribes, destroyed by their Northern island countrymen before the advent of the Europeans, – they live peaceably and on good terms with their neighbours.

The European population of the Southern island amounts to about 138,500, or 63.37 per cent, on the whole European population.

These statistics are the latest which have been received, of the year 1867; since then the European population has doubtless increased.

The native population is decreasing – not as may be supposed to any extent on account of wars, though they doubtless have some effect, but owing to the infecundity of the race, the disparity of the sexes, and the immorality which has prevailed for centuries, and which the present fanaticism exalts into a system; but the decrease of the native population has, if any thing, been checked since the advent of the Europeans. Infanticide is less common; immorality perhaps less gross; and wars certainly less frequent and bloody; whilst on the other hand a passion for drink, in spite of the efforts of legislation, is now gaining ground rapidly amongst the natives.

The European population on the other hand rapidly increases, and now probably amounts to 250,000 souls.

I am often asked why, if the European population of the Northern Island alone is 79,000, and that of

the natives about 37,000, whilst half the natives or more are neutral or friendly, there can be any difficulty in repressing outrages. I confess there ought not to be, and will not be, with proper self-reliance and self-exertion; but yet there are several compensating circumstances which make the balance hang more evenly than at first sight would appear probable. In the first place, every native male is a born warrior} he loves excitement, and does not think about death; their women are often as fond of fighting as their men, and are great aids to them in war, carrying their provisions, cooking for them, making their huts, and in a thousand different ways. Then it must be remembered that an immensely larger proportion of the Europeans are women and children, (who are of no service of course in war,) than is the case amongst natives. Again, as I have said, the native is acting from the centre of a circle, and can suddenly come down in force upon any point of the circumference.

It must be also remembered, that the British immigrant does not go out to the Colony with the intention of fighting. Should there be an attack on his district, I have always found him to be a brave man, and he doesn't mind a fight, but he hates being called out, except on an emergency. He hates being taken from his farm to drill; his cows go dry, his crops are not put in, he is no coward, but he says, "I'll be off to the next colony or to the diggings." And if he does that, or even if he is kept

long from his work, the revenue receipts fall off, and the real difficulty of the Colony is money: but the early American colonists didn't do this; no, but then the early American colonists had no next Colony to go to, and they had no digging's, and those colonies after all advanced very slowly indeed. Yes, there is something to be said on both sides.

I am often asked questions as to the relative bravery of the New Zealanders and our own countrymen. The New Zealander, I need not say, is a finished skirmisher, besides being a good tactician, with a keen eye to country, and skilled in throwing up such defensive works as best suit half-savage warfare. He is a brave man, a very brave man, but his is not the determined, steady bravery, under difficulties and discouragement, of our own countrymen. Amongst the whalers, boats manned by natives were never considered to be so well-handled in danger as those manned by Europeans, though they were perfect boatmen and swimmers. No doubt the frenzy of the war dance, or the rush of a body of naked and excited savages, has its effect upon men unaccustomed to such sights. I have heard it gravely asserted that a thousand disciplined Maoris would meet and scatter a thousand Europeans in the open with the bayonet. I do not believe it for an instant. Were it possible once, it would never be possible again. The rush of the Highland clans in 1745, a new and unaccustomed and terrible onset, cowed the brave hearts of men who had

fought at Fontenay. It did not last: but the Maoris are not what the Highlanders were, at least not in my estimation. Many of the old settlers who lived amongst them in the early times looked with something like contempt at a savage, working himself up into a frenzy and brandishing his tomahawk, "bouncing," as they called it. The native was generally struck by the coolness of his antagonist; his eye wandered, a sudden move generally resulted in his discomfiture and the capture of his tomahawk. A stout little Devonshire wrestler at Taranaki was famous for such exploits; they were not uncommon. On such occasions the natives (being the aggressors) bore no malice. Old Wairarapa settlers will remember, some twenty years ago, when two of their number were attacked in the middle of a pah on the Ruamahunga, one of them, to save his friend's life, severely wounded the chief on the head with a heavy stick – (a chiefs head and a chiefs blood are sacred). They were armed, they set their backs to a precipice, they were surrounded by twenty or thirty natives with axes and tomahawks. Each side had one gun; the native was told he would be shot if he raised his – a hunting-knife kept off the rest. Though urged on by the chief, no native dared be the first to advance. At the end of half an hour the chief, sick and faint, retired to his hut; many of the natives, cowed and ashamed of themselves, sat down; the victorious Europeans moved off slowly, taunting them with

treachery, wrong, and cowardice. The slightest sign of fear would have been fatal. Public opinion among the Maoris afterwards ran strongly in favour of these Europeans. Some five years afterwards one of them, travelling through a forest with a native, seeing a pigeon on a tree, remarked, "I wish I had a gun." "Why not break his head?" was the reply. "What, do you know that old story?" said the Englishman. "Oh!" cried his friend, with great glee, "why, I saw it. I was one who hemmed you in, I and my axe. You struck a very strong blow. You were very strong. We would have killed you – blood for blood – or at least taken some blood for satisfaction, and sent you tied hand and foot on a rail, like a pig, up the country. But you were too strong; and you were quite right. Our's was the evil deed. But the chief has been a good man ever since; he wears a long lock of hair in memory of that blow, and he will be very glad indeed to see you – great indeed is his love for you."

Such a race is evidently amenable to high and generous impulses. In my intercourse with them I found that by being always just to them, taking a friendly interest in them, and being always firm and unwavering, a great ascendancy over them was not difficult to obtain. And many years after I had quitted the native district in which I once lived, I went to it on the part of the Government, to settle a land question of the most serious nature. They

refused to have anything to do with interpreters, or officials of any kind. They said they were my tribe; we sat and smoked together in the bush. I gave them my decision in a few words. On a young chief rising to speak, he was at once put down by an older one, who said: "You are young; you don't know our old friend, that he is a man who never can be moved from his first word." By 12 o'clock the next day, the time appointed by me, they returned. They received the compensation I had adjudged them for a grievance, real indeed, but originating in a mistake, and they gave up to a number of small farmers lands, with the crops upon them, which they had seized and long held by force. Both parties were perfectly satisfied.

I mention this as a case in point, as illustrative of the character of the larger part of the native tribes. I need not say that there are many men with infinitely more knowledge of the natives than myself, and whose influence among them is proportionately greater; mine was local, and for many years I have been chiefly a resident in the Southern Island, whence, however, the native question may perhaps be most dispassionately studied.

It may not be amiss here to say, as I have got into the subject of illustrations of native character, that the New Zealander is not treacherous. In times of peace you may travel alone from one end of the native districts to another in perfect safety. Greedy as they are for money, you may lie down at

night in a native village with a bag of gold by your side; no one would touch it. It would be at least as safe as in an English country village.

The most remarkable thing, to my mind, about the New Zealander is his shrewd worldliness; he always has an eye to the main chance. He looks, not only on European arts and customs, but even on religion, mainly as a means of worldly advancement. And this accounts for the readiness with which thousands of natives, outwardly Christians (some of them Scripture readers by occupation), suddenly adopted the tenets of the prophet, in which they saw a new interest and the prospect of a more sudden gain. They have a wonderful insight into character. They soon find out people's weak points and work upon them with great art and deep diplomacy. This very tact makes them pleasant fellows. Capital companions for a bush journey, they are fond of a joke, and delight in gossip and in narratives. On the whole, I think the New Zealander, intellectually and physically, is deserving of the high character that is usually given him. It is strange, however, that he has less idea of political organization than other very inferior races. Still, it is a noble race, and one in which (in spite of those horrible excesses which are natural to the savage when in his worst mood) it is impossible not to feel a great interest, especially when we remember what a large portion of that race are now standing shoulder, to shoulder by our countrymen, and fighting by

them, alike with them, for property, for family, for life and religion.

After these remarks regarding the geographical divisions of the Colony, and the characteristics of its inhabitants, I must say a few words upon its political constitution. The Governor represents the Crown – Ministers hold their offices on the same tenure, and subject to the same practice as in England. The General Assembly or Parliament is composed of two houses: the Upper, which is called the Legislative Council, is composed of members nominated for life by the Crown under advice of Ministers; and the Lower House, or House of Representatives, is chosen by a constituency which is little removed from Universal Suffrage, the limit being- a £5 Household Suffrage. The Upper House originally had very little influence, but successive Ministries have given it new blood and strengthened it, and I think it has gained of late years relatively to the House of Representatives. My own idea has long been that the best way to constitute an Upper House for a country in which no hereditary members exist, or from the nature of thing's can exist on any real basis, would be to give to persons who have held certain high offices, to ex-governors, ex-premiers, or other members of the executive, ex-judges, and others, the right to be called to the Upper House for life. This appears to me the only way by which in a Colony an Upper House can be placed in its proper position as a check to hasty legislation – by such a

plan it would be largely composed of independent men, who at one time or other, must be presumed to have enjoyed the confidence and respect of at least a large portion of the public, who would naturally represent different views, who would perpetuate a tradition of politics, and so dovetail the past into the present and future – who would bear known names – who would certainly be above the average in intellect. I know of no better plan, and am surprised that this or some similar one, has never yet been proposed or attempted as far as I am aware. A property test in a new country is almost valueless in my opinion. The constitution of the House of Representatives could not, I think, be altered for the better, a new country must be necessarily democratic, and any restriction of the franchise would have been building on a false basis. The House of Representatives is of course the more powerful one, and contains as a rule, most of the leading men – its debates have generally been well conducted and marked by earnestness and ability, but it is said that at the present moment, it is hardly equal to its former reputation,

The Provinces have also their elected chiefs (called Superintendents) and their miniature parliaments, and at one time assumed the character almost of independent states – a very expensive cumbrous and complex machinery for so small a country, and productive of many evils. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that they have given a great amount of

political intelligence to the people, that at one time they were safeguards against undue centralization, and that they have done much to develop the resources of the country and to colonize it: there was so little communication originally between the various settlements, and their character and requirements were so different, that exceptionally large local powers were necessary. The misfortune was that the Constitution Act did not sufficiently define those powers, and in giving a general power to make laws "for the peace, order, and good government" of the Provinces, the exceptions and reservations were not defined sufficiently in detail – but the great blot, a blot which the Stafford government is I believe taking steps to remove, and has palliated by the Public Revenues Act 1867, is the existence of a common purse, if I may so speak. The taxation raised by the General Assembly is dealt with in this fashion: the General Assembly appropriates a certain portion to the uses of the Colony generally, and the residue becomes the property of the Provinces. The consequence is that the Provincial governments as a rule, do very little of the unpopular work of taxation, they get that done for them. Members come up to the General Assembly, not so much as members, as bands of provincial delegates. They will consent to a tax, but only on condition that so much of it is to go home to their Provinces. The result of this is, that a Colonial Ministry does not so much stand or fail by its general policy – that may be

excellent, but the question is – what are you going to give us to take home to our province? Hence all kinds of combinations, of "logrolling," and political corruption; I say strictly political corruption, arising necessarily out of a vicious system which engenders it. Personal corruption I believe to be as rare in the New Zealand Assembly as in any body of men in any country; our leading men have as a rule impaired their fortunes rather than augmented them, and salaries of Ministers do not anything like pay their simplest expenses if they have families, or if not, can they be said to compensate for the neglect of private affairs and absence from homes distant, and often not readily accessible.

It will be at once perceived, that it becomes the direct interest of members, if they would stand well with their respective provinces, to starve the general Government; local improvements are always locally of more interest than general necessities, – and so the dish of meat of the general Government is often devoured before its eyes. This will throw some light upon the causes of my resignation, it will shew why the Government, except at moments of imminent public danger or great excitement, will be in fact sold to the highest bidder, and can only be held by sacrificing everything to the necessity of making terms with the provinces. This accounts for the non-existence of any efficient force at the moment of the present outbreak, and to this may be fairly attributed the bloodshed and the enormous expen-

diture, now rendered necessary, and at present going on.

I will now conclude, by a few remarks and suggestions. The latest advices from New Zealand, informed us, that the prophet Tito ko waru, at the head of a force flushed with success, amounting probably to about 800 men, was menancing Wanganui on the West coast, and ravaging the country, and that a large number of settlers had been ruined. Major Whitmore, with a force of Europeans and some Wanganui natives was opposing him, but as yet had not achieved any marked success, probably his force is not yet thoroughly organized – the militia was called out throughout the island – recruiting was being rapidly proceeded with. On the East coast the friendly natives appear to have outnumbered the fanatics, who had, after committing the massacre of Poverty Bay, marched in force towards the South-east, in the direction of the Bay of Plenty and Hawkes Bay: they had been already defeated, and as a European force was about to join the friendlies, it was hoped that they might even be surrounded and cut off. Te Kooti, their leader had been wounded or killed. The Maori King had not yet thrown his tomahawk into the scale; it was hoped that he would not. The fear of further confiscation, and the fact that he probably is jealous of the prophet, and that he does not sympathize with the murderers, perhaps deters him: did he give the signal for a general rising, the most dreadful

consequences might be anticipated. The most serious item in the late intelligence is the enormous expenditure which is going on, and the consequent political attitude of the Southern island; the war expenditure is stated to be at the rate of £250,000 a year, that is at least at the rate of £1 per head upon the entire population of New Zealand, and cannot be provided for out of the revenue. The revenue is falling off; at present it is I believe something over a million annually, besides local imposts; – the taxation therefore will be seen to be enormously heavy for so small a country; and it has reached that limit, when smuggling begins to pay, when property is depreciated in value, and commercial enterprise is paralysed, by that and other causes. A check in a new country stops the influx of capital and of immigration which is life-blood – these are serious and grave considerations. And I feel that I am warranted in saying that England, which supplies nearly five millions worth annually of goods to us, and takes in return almost the same amount in wool, gold, and other produce, is also interested in the fate of a Colony, which, in proportion to its population, is one of her best customers. The New Zealand trade occupies a fleet of her ships, our wool helps to fill her warehouses and factories; many a workshop is kept busy in supplying our market, and we have sent from our shores no less a sum than sixteen millions of pounds worth of gold. I assume that in the last resource, England would not permit,

either from motives of self-interest, or from a sense of honour, the destruction of the Northern Island as a colony I do not, however, in the least anticipate such a contingency; but I do consider it possible, that the European and loyal natives of the North Island, embarrassed by want of money, (should further disasters and further risings take place,) might be forced into one of those desultory irregular wars, which are horrible for their ferocity, and in which all the most terrible passions are evoked. Assist them to prevent this, by assisting them by an Imperial guarantee, to raise a loan, to be applied to the organization of a sufficient force to suppress this, and to prevent future risings, and which would allow the Southern Island to see the end of the repeated calls upon its purse. Such a step on the part of England would cost her absolutely nothing. It was proposed by Mr. Cardwell, when Secretary of State for the Colonies, but his proposal could not be accepted for reasons I have before stated. It must be allowed that the origin of these native wars took place under English rule and under Imperial policy, and that England suddenly handed over to the Colony obligations she had undertaken with regard to the native race. It would be a boon which England has not hesitated to confer upon other countries in less urgent circumstances. I believe the Southern Island of New Zealand would, were such an offer made, join with the North in accepting it, under proper conditions; for the

Southern Island, though quite uninterested in the case, did, from motives of loyalty, support Governor Gore Browne and Sir G. Grey in war; and the Southern Island is at least as responsible as the Northern one, for the narrow economic policy which has led to these disasters and expenses, and which overthrew measures which ere this would have placed the Northern Island in safety, and relieved herself from heavy and intolerable burthens.

What more? Again, I say, fall back upon the self-reliant policy – go back to the policy of 1864-5. I do not withdraw from a single item of that policy. Had it been carried out, it is, I firmly believe, impossible that recent events could have happened, even if an outbreak had not been altogether averted. Not 1500, but 500, thoroughly armed, trained, and efficient bushmen disposable at the first would have crushed the evil in the bud. Poor Von Tempsky's opinion on that subject I know; and could I, I would confidently appeal to Whitmore, McLean, Macdonnell, and Frazer on that point. No, I say; send no troops from England, they have not been asked for by the Government of New Zealand as far as I am aware; my private letters, which are numerous, do not ask for them. A public meeting at Wellington has decided on not asking for them. – -Their employment would be only a signal for a long and expensive war, expensive to England, unjust to the British taxpayer, because unnecessary, ruinous financially to New Zealand, destructive to the

spirit of self-reliance in the Colony, and productive of all the old evils of divided command and distracted councils. Do not send troops, I repeat – The Colony has learnt much under this disaster, it will nor forget the success of its forces in 1865, and I doubt not that we shall soon hear that those successes have been renewed. I would not say that the few soldiers who are now occupying the stockades in Wanganui town, should be removed at this instant in the face of the enemy; such a step might be considered as a sign that the Queen had withdrawn her protection from the settlers, and might encourage the fanatics; but I would withdraw that one regiment at the earliest practicable moment. I say this on grounds which must be apparent to any reader of these pages. It is not, but that I hope, that the red coat, which I cherish from old friendships, old associations, and as a symbol of union with England, may be yet seen and welcomed on the New Zealand shores, but that it should be seen and welcomed, under different circumstances, and for different purposes than the present. Any measures which may lead a party amongst the colonists to believe that England will always send her troops if the Colony cries out for them, weakens the hands of any colonial ministry which may take its stand on self-reliance and self-exertion; my ministry would have remained in office, measures of native policy and defence measures would have been carried out, and

the present disasters averted, had the British troops been removed when first I requested it; the delay encouraged those, who from timidity, policy, or interest, desired the retention of the troops, and the opposition was proportionately strengthened. I may almost say that in this respect, I was unwittingly sacrificed by the Imperial Government, though I was carrying out a policy which they thoroughly approved and wished to see put into effect. Let the colonists accept self-government, if they are to have self-government, with its duties as well as its rights; thus only will they grow into a nation, with national virtues all the more strongly developed and firmly rooted, because they will have grown amidst storm and adversity. The first and immediate duty of the Colonial Government is now to repress and sternly punish murder and outrage; they must form and keep up a defensive corps of both races; it will not do to rely on one race alone. They are now making great efforts in this respect, the Government is straining every nerve. I hope they will not err on the other hand by keeping up an army, when a constabulary force, not disciplined according to the tactics of regular war, but a small force especially trained to individual and independent action in the bush, is the thing required. If millions of money were at their command, and it was desirable or necessary, suddenly to attempt the absolute subjugation of the island, and of the King party; I should say, place a very strong self-sup-

porting military settlement at Taupo in the centre of the island, and garrison it with a sufficient force, to enable its commander to direct a body of men on the rear of any insurgents who might make an attack upon the settlements, which lie, as I have said, round the circumference of a rough circle. But I do not advocate this – it is quite beyond the means of the Colony, it would inevitably lead to a general war, in which neutrals would become our enemies, and it would destroy hopes which still exist, of saving a large portion of the native race. I should, on the contrary, hold myself ready to punish outrages with severity, I should treat them as locally as possible, I should make my operations as much like police operations as possible; I should gradually endeavour, by encouraging the natives without regard to their being friendly, neutral, or ill-disposed, to have recourse to the land courts, to individualize their titles to land, and to raise themselves out of communism; and by the establishment of native districts, with local self-government, local armed police, local revenues, and localized government properties, to interest themselves in the maintenance of law and order: I should avoid any crusade against the King party, by these means, by promoting immigration, and by judicious treatment of the friendly natives, to whom we owe so much, I believe that not many years would elapse, before a happier state of things might be hoped for, and the Southern island would cease to be called upon for

war subsidies. I have spoken of punishment being inflicted for outrages; I do not advocate large or indiscriminate confiscation, it should be resorted to as little as possible; the policy of confiscation requires a very large outlay on the part of the Colonial Government, it does not pay, and is unpopular in the Colony, and difficult properly to carry out: in England, more especially, it is looked upon as the origin of the present disasters; but all the wars which have afflicted New Zealand from the beginning to the great Waikato war, took place before a single acre of land had been taken from the natives against their will. The Domett and the Whitaker-Fox Ministries proposed confiscation, not from any desire to obtain land, – land could have been bought for a twentieth part of the outlay, but because up to that date, no punishment whatsoever had been inflicted for insurrection. To any one who has read the preceding narrative of the wars of New Zealand it will be obvious, that the love of war, the love of excitement, the love of distinction, is inherent in the New Zealander; the further back you go in his history, the more evident this fact becomes; it was argued that we encouraged this passion by letting him make peace and war as he liked and when he liked, that he must be taught that something was to be lost by war, that after war the European settlements ought to be strengthened, that a loss of prestige to the attacking party ought to be the result; and as in their own native wars no defeat was

acknowledged unless the defeated party lost their land, and as insurgent natives constantly themselves declared, "If we defeat you we will take your land, if you defeat us, ours shall become your prize;" the attention of the Government was turned to the subject. It was never proposed to drive the natives off confiscated land – it was proposed to plant self-defending settlements on it; to restore, under Crown grant and in individualized title, ample for the wants of the defeated natives and of their families – it was expected that they would settle down with an increased value given to their properties by roads, individual title, and the proximity of Europeans – it was believed, that such natives would shortly become friendly and loyal, and be among the richest natives in the country. Want of money and other causes have no doubt neutralized many of the benefits to be derived from this scheme, and prevented its full development; it was supposed too by the Whitaker-Fox Government, that the confiscated lands would pay their own expenses, by the sale of part of them, and even some of the expenses of war. I was never sanguine on that point, and it has proved entirely abortive. Still the fact remains, that the prestige of tribes that have lost land by confiscation, has been diminished, and that of friendly tribes proportionately increased. Mr. Cardwell, it will be remembered, instructed the Governor, that his "concurrence" in confiscation would be necessary, "not merely as a Ministerial Act, but as evidencing: his

"own personal satisfaction with the arrangement," also, in his despatch of the 24th April, 1864, he leaves in the Governor's own hands "ample power of doing substantial justice to every class of claimants for restitution or compensation." Thus the Crown, though unwillingly perhaps, immediately and directly, accepted the responsibility of the Act and its consequences. As a matter of fact, every Government has since then to some extent made use of this power – that it has been always wisely exercised I will not say, a closer study of each individual case than the means at my present disposal permit, would be requisite to give an opinion. All Governments are liable to error, and faults of administration are not uncommon, nor will they as long as man is man; but if I am asked, whether in my opinion, the present outbreak would have occurred had there been no confiscation, I reply, undoubtedly it would. The first prophet arose before confiscation, all the greatest wars in New Zealand occurred before confiscation, and there is no reason to suppose that the present fanatical outbreak would have arrived at the dignity of a "war" at all, had the Government been prepared for it. The fanatics, many of whom have lost no lands, are not fighting for the possession of any particular land, they are fighting, because their oracles tell them to drive the Europeans and peaceful natives into the sea. The constitutional changes that I should wish to see carried into effect in New Zealand, I have already indicated, and will only say, that they lie in the

direction of an extension of the principle of local self, government for purely local purposes, of a more accurate definition of local and general powers. I think that taxation should be raised by the same power that expends it, and that the machinery of government should be simplified.

I have now nearly completed the task I have imposed upon myself; I have declared myself to be, as all my life I have been, a firm adherent of the old colonial policy; self-government, self-exertion, self-reliance. But let it not be thought, that I wish to loosen the tie that binds the Colonies to England; far from it; I know, that not only on theoretical and political grounds, but also from a consideration of the state of public opinion in England, and in the Colonies, that that policy is the only possible policy; but I should all the more desire to strengthen, (and I believe that policy properly carried out, may tend to strengthen,) the moral tie, which binds the Colonies to the Throne and to the Mother country. It is not natural to our race to be governed from a distance; mistakes must occur, jealousies, divided Authority, bickerings, and recriminations. Remove the occasion of these – I go so far as to say deliberately, that I very much prefer, should occasion require it, the suspension of a constitution, when a Colony cannot govern itself and maintain internal order; to any division of authority, any sham constitutionalism.

Virtually at present, the Colonies are perfectly

free, the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis, in his work on Dependencies, says, that no dependency can be considered perfectly free; he says, if I mistake not, that their legislatures can always be legitimately coerced by the Imperial legislature; I venture to differ from him; I do not of course refer to a resort to force – but I am of opinion that the power of stopping supplies, does really, put the winning card in the hand of the dependency; be that as it may, there is no likelihood in the present day that England will attempt to coerce any Colony, there is more fear perhaps, that she will give them too little sympathy, in return for their love and loyalty. I cannot help feeling that England without her Colonies, would be a "Niobe of Nations;" "Ships, Colonies and Commerce" have done much to make her what she is – and I should be sorry to see the day, when it could be no longer said that the sun did not set upon her dominions. I believe too that that day would add greatly to the misery of her overcrowded population. I cannot but think, that if some of our English public men and writers felt this more strongly, the bond that unites the Colonies to Great Britain would be infinitely strengthened. The Colonies are very sensitive to English public opinion, but that sensitiveness is diminished and dies out, when English public opinion is hasty and formed upon insufficient grounds. A part of the public press is fond, I think unreasonably fond, of taunting Colonists with supposed deficiencies instead of criti-

cising in a friendly spirit. How many articles have we seen upon the incapacity of Australian politicians, and yet, of the two or three Australian statesmen who have turned their attention to English politics, one is at present Chancellor of the Exchequer, and another holds the high office of First Lord of the Admiralty – and so in regard to New Zealand affairs; Colonists who have for years devoted their minds to an honest endeavour to solve the great problem of civilizing and saving the native race, though they may be aware that in this very difficult task, mistakes may have been made and no complete success attained, may fairly ask, that their critics should treat them with some consideration, should weigh the difficulties they have had to encounter, should remember that England herself undertook the task and retired from it – and at least, should make themselves thoroughly acquainted with what has been actually done and what left undone. It is the fashion with some writers to generalize from what has happened in other countries, and to suppose all Colonists must be greedy, graspers of other men's land, cruel, and blood-thirsty. In times of great excitement, men suffering under loss of property, in the presence of sudden danger, their friends and relatives murdered, may occasionally speak in no measured tone – but in New Zealand there have been no Jamaica floggings or hangings. After poor Volkner the missionary, whose last word was a prayer for his enemies, was murdered in cold blood

with attendant circumstances of unheard of atrocity and cannibalism, I sent an expedition which captured some of the murderers – they were found guilty by court martial, and still, to secure a greater certainty of fairness, they were forwarded for further trial by my successors to Auckland and tried by the Supreme Court. A friend of mine, a gentleman of position and influence in New Zealand, from whose letter I extracted the details I have given of the murder of Mrs. Biggs and her child, goes on to say, "and yet if these wretches are taken, it will be "difficult to get evidence for a conviction." This does not look like any ferocious setting aside of the principles of justice, and I may fearlessly, in spite of party speeches and party articles, which abound in the Colony, (as they must in every free country) assert, that no man can study the speeches, the course of legislation, and look at the large annual grants of money for native purposes, made in the New Zealand Parliament, without coming to the conclusion that the settlers as a body, in spite of many failures, have earnestly and honestly wished to do their duty by the natives.

Closely akin to this topic, is that of the protection of the character of public men in the Colonies by the Home Government. I allude especially to the underhand accusations made against a most distinguished public servant not long ago. It appears to me that it is the true interest of England, to protect, not only the character of those who represent the

Crown in the Colonies, but also of Colonial Ministers, from secret and calumnious attacks; they should be made to feel that their honour is cared for, that their interests and their success, not only evokes local but Imperial sympathy; thus may interests strictly Imperial have due weight in their counsels and influence their policy, a policy, especially in commercial matters, not unimportant to England. There are matters too of growing importance, in which the time is coming, if it be not already come, when England and her Colonies must act together: emigration appears to me to be one of these. Immigration is the life blood of a Colony, if it stops stagnation ensues; in immigration lies the basis of the financial credit of new Colonies: they need not be afraid to borrow, especially for reproductive work, if they can by a constant influx of new tax-payers, annually reduce their debts by multiplying the shoulders that are to bear the burthen. Nor is the question less important to England, Scotland and Ireland, with an increasing population of men and women, struggling for life itself, and sinking into deeper and deeper moral and physical degradation. Legislation cannot cure that sore, which assumes a magnitude that threatens to infect the whole body politic, and which may even become all the more dangerous, as our institutions are placed on a broader basis – yet it is undeniable that each one of these men and women, removed to a Colony, would not only improve their own circumstances, bring up their

families in rude plenty, but actually become consumers of British produce, and employers of British labour. I think a great national scheme of emigration is looming in the future, and if so, will it not be advisable, nay necessary, to cultivate the sympathies, and to secure the cordial co-operation of the leaders of Colonial policy.

The defence of the outlying parts of the Empire in case of war is another matter of joint interest. I need not ask what would be the effect on England if her supplies of gold, of wool, and of other colonial produce, were suddenly cut off. At the end of the last Russian war it became known that a powerful expedition was fitting out in the Amoor river, which, traversing the Pacific, was destined to pounce upon the Australian colonies. We had no force to cope with it. True, the issue of a war would probably be decided in European waters; but that might be too late to avert the disarrangement of trade, the distress, and consequent discontent, of the labouring population at home; and should any Colony fall into the hands of an enemy, doubtless in the consideration of terms of peace such a hold would not be to our advantage. Nor can it be forgotten that Colonies are involved in such wars through no act of their own or of their representatives. That is the price they pay for the honour and advantage of forming part of a great Empire. Should they find that they are unprotected and uncared for, even their loyalty might

break down, and they might seek protection by forming alliances and making commercial regulations to the advantage of Foreign powers. This is not impossible at some future day, and is so obvious a danger that I may confidently presume that it has not escaped the attention of British statesmen, and that they will be prepared to consider, as occasion may arise, the great question of external defence in a spirit of reciprocal liberality; in this too they will need, and they may fairly expect, the hearty support of the colonists.

A federation of the Australian Colonies, including New Zealand, is another question for the future.

In these and all other matters, colonists look to England for counsel, for sympathy, and for support. I feel sure that they will not be disappointed, and that England, whose envoys represent the Crown in those distant regions, will still exercise a large and legitimate influence over them – an influence, affecting as it does the future of nations yet in their infancy, not lightly to be neglected or thrown away. On its wise use what destinies may hang, what great portions of the globe may they not hereafter sway!

If, in writing these few pages, I have at all contributed, either to the better understanding of the Native question of New Zealand, or succeeded, however imperfectly, in my endeavour to afford some food for thought upon general questions of Colonial policy, my end will have been attained. We who

have grown up with Colonies may be pardoned if we look fondly forward to their days to come; and not the least great in those days will those Colonies be, that have had the rudest and hardest early training. I do not for a moment doubt the ultimate prosperity of New Zealand. She has every possible gift of nature, and men, who will, I trust, prove themselves not unworthy of their race. I once left her shores, and as I looked back on them, over a sunny sea, my eye dwelt lingeringly on peaks and glaciers gleaming in a cloudless sky, and I hailed the omen of a prosperous voyage. Last time I staggered on deck for a parting look, and, over the tumbling waves, saw afar off, the last blue promontory, low down, half hid in mist and storm; but the latter voyage was better than the first. From darkness comes oft-times light, and out of danger peace and security – so may it be with New Zealand.

FRED. A. WELD.

Rotherwas, near Hereford, Feb. 9, 1869.

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