CHAPTER III. Major-General Pratt arrives at New Plymouth...
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CHAPTER III.
Major-General Pratt arrives at New Plymouth -- Number and distribution of the troops -- Topography of the Taranaki district --Description of Warea Forest Pah -- Strength of the enemy -- Sources of information regarding their movements -- Their military capabilities -- Native commissariat.
ON the 3rd August 1860, Major-General Pratt landed at New Plymouth, and took personal direction of the war.
The troops in the colony of New Zealand were in numbers and distribution as here shown; and out of these 860 were militia and volunteers:--
|
|
F. O.
|
Capt.
|
Subs.
|
Depart-
mental
Staff
|
Sergts.
|
Drs.
|
Rank and File
|
| Taranaki
|
11
|
29
|
60
|
23
|
139
|
44
|
2,320
|
| Auckland
|
--
|
2
|
2
|
1
|
14
|
2
|
212
|
| Napier
|
--
|
2
|
4
|
1
|
5
|
2
|
144
|
| Wellington
|
1
|
5
|
11
|
--
|
17
|
1
|
269
|
| Wanganui
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
--
|
10
|
2
|
187
|
| Total
|
13
|
39
|
80
|
25
|
185
|
51
|
3,132
|
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THE TROOPS IN THE TARANAKI DISTRICT BEING STATIONED AT THE FOLLOWING POSTS:--
|
|
F. O.
|
Capts.
|
Subalts
|
Staff
|
Sergts.
|
Drs.
|
Rank and File
|
|
| Staff
|
4
|
2
|
1
|
--
|
4
|
--
|
--
|
|
| Commissariat Department
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
4
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
|
| Medical do.
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
3
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
|
| Purveyor's do.
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
|
| Military Store do.
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
|
| Royal Artillery.
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
24
|
|
| Royal Engineers
|
1
|
2
|
--
|
--
|
2
|
--
|
30
|
New Plymouth.
|
| 40th Regiment
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
4
|
15
|
13
|
154
|
|
| 65th Regiment
|
--
|
4
|
11
|
4
|
39
|
12
|
595
|
|
| Naval Brigade
|
2
|
2
|
10
|
1
|
8
|
2
|
169
|
|
| Militia
|
1
|
7
|
9
|
2
|
27
|
7
|
425
|
|
| 12th Regiment
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
6
|
|
| Total
|
9
|
20
|
35
|
20
|
96
|
34
|
1,403
|
|
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|
|
F. O.
|
Capts.
|
Subalts
|
Staff
|
Sergts.
|
Drs.
|
Rank and File
|
|
| Royal Artillery
|
--
|
----
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
25
|
|
| Royal Engineers
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
10
|
|
| 40th Regiment
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
1
|
17
|
4
|
266
|
Waitara.
|
| Naval Brigade
|
--
|
2
|
6
|
1
|
5
|
2
|
141
|
|
| Militia
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
15
|
|
| Total
|
1
|
6
|
13
|
2
|
22
|
6
|
457
|
|
| Royal Artillery
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
3
|
|
| 12th Regiment
|
--
|
2
|
4
|
1
|
7
|
2
|
119
|
Bell Block.
|
| Militia
|
--
|
--
|
2
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
43
|
|
| Total
|
--
|
2
|
6
|
1
|
8
|
2
|
165
|
|
| Militia
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
--
|
3
|
1
|
49
|
Omata.
|
| Royal Artillery
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
11
|
|
| Royal Engineers
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
--
|
1
|
--
|
5
|
|
| 12th Regiment
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
--
|
4
|
1
|
127
|
Waireka.
|
| 40th Regiment
|
--
|
1
|
2
|
--
|
4
|
1
|
103
|
|
| Total
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
--
|
10
|
2
|
246
|
|
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DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES.
This distribution was the one that was adopted by Colonel Gold when his force was too small for any operations at a distance, and when his hands were tied from attacking William King at the Waitara. It was clearly made to afford confidence to the settlers, and to encourage them to occupy their farms and cultivate their grounds, at all events in the neighbourhood of New Plymouth, and was not made with the intention of undertaking active offensive movements against the native tribes. Col. Gold's object might, to a certain degree, have been attained previous to the defeat of the 27th of June, but after that the arrangement proved totally inoperative; and by disseminating his small force over a large district, it quite precluded the assembly of a column sufficient for the field, and was of no advantage to the colonists.
To the non-military reader the effective force may appear larger than it really was; and it may be well here to remark that
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these numbers represent every man in the service, sick, infirm, wounded, orderlies, semaphore station-men, and others, employed on duties that necessarily devolved on the army.
The militia, numbering on paper 425, could barely muster 100 for service; except in case of an attack on the town, when each man had his appointed post. Many of them, however, made no secret of it, that if this did happen, they would stand at their own houses, and defend their families there, and not attend to orders. The militia and volunteers were the whole male population of the town capable of doing any work; consequently large numbers had to be struck off garrison duty to carry on the trades of butchers, bakers, grocers, carters, and for employment as commissariat labourers, boatmen, &c. -- not only for the army but for the population of the town, now largely increased by the influx of settlers from the more distant parts of the
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NEW PLYMOUTH.
district. Nor was it fair to expect any good service from them; they were ill armed, ill organised, and without any discipline, and had not as yet had either time or means to become an efficient auxiliary force, however anxious they might be to learn their duty.
The situation of the town of New Plymouth, and the configuration of the whole of the Taranaki district, were most adverse to military operations. The district extends on the north from the Waitara, and to the river Patea on the south. Small and divided parts of it belong to Europeans, the much larger portion to the natives-- friendly, hostile, and doubtful. The town itself is on the sea-coast, twelve miles from the Waitara. Landing, only to be effected by means of surf-boats, at all times difficult and dangerous, is at many periods of the year impracticable. No master of any sailing-ship would ever stay on the coast a moment longer than absolutely necessary.
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Steamers, with troops on board, had frequently to put out to sea for days until the weather moderated; and during the winter the steamers in the naval squadron on the station were kept away for as long as ten days at a time. The colonial steam-sloop 'Victoria,' which having most steam-power held her ground the longest, had on one or two occasions to put to sea, and did not return for some days.
The striking features of the place were Marsland Hill, on which were the barracks, Mount Elliot, and the Sugar Loaves. In the background, about thirty miles distant, stood Mount Egmont, 8,250 feet high, during the greater part of the year a perfect cone of snow, which, though partially melting, never during the greatest heat entirely disappears. The torrents caused by the melting snow and heavy rain rush down the sides of the deep and precipitous ravines which rise from it or from its offshoots, and which intersect the whole of this part of the
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DIFFICULT COUNTRY.
district to the very coast, and even to the town of New Plymouth. Thus the ravines, which are sometimes dry and covered with furze and brambles, are at other times rapid mountain torrents, often impassable.
Difficult and adverse as this description of country was to military operations, even it did not extend above three to five miles inland, where began the interminable and impracticable forest, running nearly parallel with the coast. A better description of this forest can hardly be given than is contained in the following letter from Mr. Reimenschneider to Colonel Gold. It will be borne in mind that the country he describes is that in which the officer in command was expected, with the inadequate means at his disposal, to carry on sharp, secret, and decisive operations:--
'New Plymouth: May 15, 1860.
'SIR, --I have the honour to inform you that on the occasion of my recent visit at my station, at the Warea, I have availed
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myself of the opportunity it afforded me for visiting the native forest pah, situated in the more immediate neighbourhood of that locality, and which, as you are aware, forms one of the three different pahs, or strongholds, of the Taranaki tribe, which have been erected by them since their defeat at, and their return from, Waireka.
'As in all probability it may be interesting to you to obtain from an eye-witness a somewhat more precise and exact view than it is otherwise easy to obtain, respecting the site and description of either (if not all) of the three pahs now extant in the Taranaki district, I take the liberty of submitting to you the following brief statement of what I have seen.
'The Warea Forest pah (the only one I have as yet found an opportunity to approach and to enter) is situated at a distance of about four or five miles from off the coast inland, in the midst of a dense and, as it appears, almost interminable, of what may
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THE WAREA FOREST.
perhaps be termed, light forest (i.e. of no heavy timber), on the summit of a small hill, called Mahainui, which at its base covers, perhaps, about one acre, whilst it is of so moderate a height as to render the pah (as far as I was able to discover it) altogether indiscernible from any distance (owing to the woody and undulating country by which it is surrounded), except within about 200 paces of it, more or less; all around up to its very base, the hill is surrounded by the thick forest, whilst the slope of the hill is cleared of bush, and rendered smooth, and more steep, by the red earth which has been thrown up out of the interior earthworks of the pah, previous to the erection of the outer double rows of strong palisade fences. Just upon the immediate edge above the hill, and without allowing any landing to take a footing upon, is the outer stockade or double row of palisade fence erected, which have the usual appurtenances for preventing their being
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scaled from without. Through a narrow entrance through the outer stockade you arrive at a sort of terrace of about eight or ten feet deep, the whole of which has been converted into what might be termed a deep or broad moat, and this again is subdivided by strong banks of earth and fern into square compartments--say 8 by 8, or 10 by 10 feet, and all of which communicate with each other by a narrow cut through the embankments (on the innermost part) that divide them. In these holes are the covered galleries, from under which the natives fire upon their assailants; and above them there are fighting stages, &c, to defend the upper part of the stockades.
'Having passed through the outer stockade and the earthworks inside of it, as just described, you reach the second terrace of the hill, which at the same time forms its summit, and the surface of which has much the form of a basin, being concave, and which is again, upon its outer edge, sur-
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THE WAREA FOREST PAH.
rounded by a very strong palisade and fence. This forms the inner pah, where the women and children chiefly are kept. About in the centre of it, I observed what appeared much like a companion-way on board ship, and looking down into it I saw what seemed to me to be a strong subterranean vault, and a retreat against anything that might come in overhead, such as shot or shell. I would have been glad to have gone down into it, but this, and also making more particular enquiries, would have only raised suspicion, more than I am suspected already, and would therefore have led to no more satisfactory result; but, even as it is, I have seen sufficient to convince me that, in my humble judgement, the pah as it stands and is, is such that both the attack upon it and the taking it cannot fail proving to be a very severe task, and one connected with immense difficulties and considerable loss of life. At all events, it is by far the strongest and best defended of all native pahs
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I have ever yet had an opportunity to see. Now a few words about the road that leads to it. The road takes its starting-point at the Warea village, recently destroyed; from thence it leads straight inland through an open fern country, only here and there approached by some small bush of koromiko, and very level for about a distance of two miles. At the end of this first part of the way begins the more woody part of the country, and the road, hard and level as before, passes through between plantations interspersed here and there, but all backed in the rear on both sides, by thick and dense bush and forest, affording every shelter and lurking-places to ambuscades. Thus it may be about one mile or more, when the road, which is thus far wide enough for a cart to pass, suddenly closes in with strong bush and woodland, so as to leave only a very narrow footpath to proceed on; and this continues all the way, say about two miles farther (with but one trifling little spot
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KPIKAPAREA RIVER.
from which you can see nothing but trees all around you) to the very foot of the stronghold, through a forest as thick and dense with underwood as hardly to allow a cat to get through it, though natives (and perhaps they only) can make way through it. At all events it would require a road to be cut through it before any number of men, or more especially any artillery, could advance through it.
'Further, in the very thickest of this road it is divided by the Kpikaparea River, a river certainly of no great consequence; still, just where it is to be forded, there it would, as far as I am able to judge, require either to have some bulky rocks blasted, which obstruct the passage, or else the cannon &c. would have to be dismounted and carried through, and all this in the midst of, and surrounded by, an interminable forest, and more or less broken surface of country, swarming everywhere and in all directions with native skirmishers and ambuscades
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(who, being on the ground they are grown upon, and thoroughly familiar with, would have great advantages over approaching strangers), and without, perhaps, of affording any clear and eligible spot (at least, I could discover none from among the trees) from which to bring cannon to bear upon the pah.
'As I have stated already, the thick woods reach to the very base of the hill on which the pah stands, and surrounds it on all sides, whilst the sides of the hill are cleared, so that, in order to make an attack upon it, our forces would have to undergo a most murderous fire; and, in the attempt of surrounding it, either to breach or undermine it, they would by day, and more especially by night, be harassed by hostile native hordes infesting the forest all around.
'Allow me, Sir, to add a remark which I extract from a letter I have just lately written to a friend, and which runs thus:-- "I do believe the Commander of the Forces
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THE WAREA FOREST PAH.
has exercised a very sound judgement in not marching at all up to the pah with the forces &c. at present at his disposal."
'The number of fighting men collected in the stronghold may amount to about a hundred or upwards, but immediately they see danger approaching (and they have their spies out always) they obtain assistance from the other pahs; so it has been on your late going down there.
'When you went first to the neighbourhood of the Wareatea Pah, nine miles this side that of Warea, the other pahs sent at once, through the back bush, their men as reinforcements; and so Warea received the same when you got down as far as there; and on your return from thence you were followed up by the people from Warea and Upper Taranaki as far back as the Wareatea Pah, as they suspected that there an attack might be made, and other reinforcements had been sent for from
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Ngatiruanui, and were afterwards only countermanded.
'Another consideration is that the natives, if it comes to close quarters upon them, and after they might have harassed and cut off many of our brave troops on the road to the pahs, will in all probability evacuate the pah before it could possibly be surrounded and closed in, and retreat to another one, about ten or eighteen miles farther off, and there try the game over again.
'I must close in hurry, for the present time permits no more.
'I have, &c, (Signed)
'J. L. REIMENSCHNEIDER.
To the Hon. Colonel Gold,
Commander of the Forces.'
From this letter the reader will easily comprehend some of the difficulties that must be encountered in carrying on a war in New Zealand.
New Plymouth contained at this time,
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WILLIAM KING'S POSITION.
in addition to its male population, about 1,700 women and children. The actual position of the enemy was difficult to ascertain. William King's strongholds and places of retreat would certainly be Mataitawa, Manutahi, and Kairan--places near the Waitara, well embedded in the forest; and, in addition, he occupied Puketakauere, the pah unsuccessfully attacked by our troops on the 27th of June, and distant about two thousand yards from the camp Waitara.
The Taranaki and Ngatiruanui tribes to the south surrounded Omata and Waireka in detached bodies. Scattered in small parties in the forest between this and the Waitara, they could, under its cover, unite at a very short notice, and could break up again as suddenly--as indeed they often did, even before we had heard of their union. This was done with no apparent, and I believe no real, object in view, though it actually caused continual alarms in the overcrowded town. The natives who
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remained friendly to us were the husbands, fathers, and relatives of many of those in the camp of the enemy, and intercourse between the friendly and rebel natives could not be prevented. Those who still remained faithful to the English, did so because they felt that English power must, in the end, triumph over the small means at the disposal of the New Zealanders. Still, their feelings were with their own race, whose cause of complaint they believed to be a just one. The last success of the natives at Puketakauere had given many of them an exaggerated notion of their power, and led some of our staunchest friends to doubt if the reign of the Pakeha was not really about to terminate, and the Maori again to become an independent nation; so that the whole country was ripe for rebellion, and very little was required to cause a general rising of the tribes throughout the northern island. As may be supposed, information from the natives was difficult
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THE NATIVE DEPARTMENT.
to be obtained, and when given, it was given unwillingly; it was generally too late to be of any use, and was always neutralised by our plans and movements being communicated to the enemy.
The Native Department, which was not organised as an intelligence department, was the principal and best source from which to obtain information; and its officers ventured during the war into the interior of the country, and even into the very camps of the enemy, gaining all the information possible.
The Maori, however, though glad to maintain some show of friendship with his old master and adviser, which might be to his advantage if the fortune of war turned against him, was too cautious to let anything be seen that did not suit him; and the daily and hourly contradictory reports that came in, while they created anxiety as to the progress of the outbreak, gave little information that could be depended on.
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Another source of intelligence was from the missionaries residing in the Waikato and in other disturbed districts; and during the heat of the war, and up to its termination, these gentlemen remained at their posts in the midst of the most turbulent tribes, whose blood was inflamed by news of repeated defeats, and by the sight of their maimed and wounded comrades returning from the field. From such a source it was natural to expect that valuable information might be obtained; such, however, was not the case, and the intimation of movements was either old, contradictory, or too vague to be of any use. In addition to this, the missionaries had little knowledge of military matters; and, speaking from their experience of the manner in which our feuds with the Maori had hitherto been conducted, they had overestimated his sagacity, his superiority to the European, and the inaccessibility of his strongholds against systematic attack.
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SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE.
There still remained two other sources from which intelligence might be gained, viz., from the settlers and those military officers who had been some time in the country. On enquiry it turned out that the settlers, located on their own farms and occupied with their own affairs, could tell little beyond the limits of their homesteads; and the few observations they could make in driving cattle, farming, and the other pursuits of their calling, were not valuable for military purposes. Officers had been discouraged from travelling into the interior, partly because the state of our relations with the Maori did not render it safe, and probably also because the habits of the former would have done more to estrange than to conciliate the independent tribes in the interior; and in the few excursions that they had been enabled to make into the interior, officers appeared to have remarked mostly on the picturesque.
After-experience showed the Maori that
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his superiority to the European was a mistake. The advantage he really had lay in his knowledge of the country, and his aptitude, individually, to avail himself of its many difficulties; but as to his boasted sagacity and military genius, the positions he took up, the strong ones he abandoned, and the want of opposition made to the force, on all occasions, on its advance to the attack through an intricate country, where every inch could have been defended, and daily loss inflicted on the advancing party, did not bear out the idea of high military talent so generally attributed to him by all parties. No strategical knowledge was shown by the Maori in his plans, and but little praise need be given to him in the mere selection of a place on which to build a pah, in a country where the difficulty was to find a bad one. One principle, however, he maintained all through, viz., that his escape should be secure; and no pah was ever placed on a spot of bush that could be sur-
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MAORI VALUATION.
rounded, or in such a position that his line of retreat could be intercepted. The fact was, our repeated failures in former wars with the Maori had been caused by our own blunders and want of system. We had ignored this, and had attributed our want of success to the superior military genius of the savage, who at last, taking us at our own valuation, maintained openly that he was more than our match.
The following extract of a memorandum by the Governor's Ministers, dated Auckland, April 27th 1860, bears out this view:
'The absurdity of these pretensions does not render them less dangerous. Unfortunately they are supported in the minds of the natives by an overweening opinion of their own warlike skill and resources. It must be confessed that the imperfect success of military operations in New Zealand has given some countenance to the natives' fixed opinion of their own superiority. In the debates of the Maori Council at
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Ngaruawahia, the experience of the wars against Heki and Rangihaeata, and of the Wanganui war, are constantly referred to as showing how little is to be feared from the prowess and the boasted warlike appliances of the Pakeha.'
Still the Maori was by no means an enemy to be despised: he was a noble-looking, stalwart man, well armed, brave, naturally fond of war and excitement, and a patriot fighting for his country's independence. His clothing was light--usually a blanket, which in fighting was dispensed with.
The following letter from Epiha, the wife of the chief who commanded the tribes at the Waitara, on hearing of the reverse sustained by the Waikatos under his command at Mahoetahi, will show the proper care taken of their husbands' clothes by the Maori women, and the small amount of baggage required:--
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LETTER OF EPIHA.
'Kihikihi: November 21, 1860.
'Go this my loving letter to Epiha. Salutations to you and to your fathers who are lost, and all your relatives. Their death is very bad, having passed into the hands of the Europeans. If you had recovered them it would have been clear in our thoughts, because it was you who moved them about.
'Enough of my sighing! Friend Epiha, salutations to you: great is my love towards you, because you escaped from death.
'I have a question to put to you respecting your garment. If you lost all in the fight, write, and I will send you a blanket.
(Signed) 'Hana Epiha.'
The Native Commissariat Department was also easily managed. The women carried the food for the men on their backs, and to any distance, consuming little themselves. All the tribes converging on
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Taranaki also adopted the plan of planting potatoes, &c on the road to the seat of war; so that by these means they might secure food for their return after a few months; or, in the event of their requiring them, the crops could be raised and forwarded to the front. The sites of these plantations were quite beyond all reach of our operations.
