1863 - Carey, R. Narrative of the Late War in New Zealand - CHAPTER VII. Military preparations--Expedition to the Waitara...p 138-159

[Image of page 138]

CHAPTER VII.

ON the departure of the detachment for Auckland, the strength and distribution of the troops in the district of Taranaki were as follows (pp. 140-41). The actual effectives in the garrison of New Plymouth hardly mustered 550.

From this time the most contradictory reports were circulated regarding the numbers and intentions of the natives in the Taranaki district; but it was clear, though they were concealed by the forest, that parties from all sides were flocking to them.

[Image of page 139]

These new arrivals boasted of what they would have done, and how different the result of the action at Mahoetahi would have been had they been there. The apparently impenetrable position they occupied in the forest; their daily increasing numbers; the energy displayed by the leaders in the Maori king movement; the opinion as to the rights of their cause-- publicly expressed by influential Europeans; and the advantage many settlers reaped by the duration of hostilities, still kept the tribes united, and prepared to make a farther stand for their coveted independence. On our side nothing aggressive could now be done until the return of the detachments sent to Auckland, and until the completion of the stockade at Ngapuketurua should place a few hundred men at the General's disposal. For to attack the forest in an effectual manner, keeping the ground as it was conquered, would require every available soldier in

[Image of page 140]

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS AT TARANAKI, NEW ZEALAND. -- HEAD-QUARTERS, NEW PLYMOUTH, NOVEMBER 19, 1860.

Stations	Distribution	F. O.	Capts.	Subalts.	Staff	Sergts.	Drs.	Rank and File
New Plymouth	Staff and Departments	2	1	1	9	4	--	--
	Royal Artillery	--	1	--	--	2	--	27
	Royal Engineers	--	1	--	--	2	--	30
	12th Foot	--	1	4	2	7	2	167
	40th Foot	1	1	2	4	16	11	125
	65th Foot	1	2	3	2	24	3	166
	Naval Brigade	--	--	1	--	2	--	16
	Militia	1	7	10	1	26	8	378
	Total	5	14	21	18	83	24	909
Mahoetahi	Medical Staff	--	--	--	1	--	--	--
	Royal Artillery	--	--	--	--	--	--	10
	Royal Engineers	1	--	1	--	1	--	9
	12th Foot	1	1	1	--	3	1	59
	40th Foot	--	--	1	--	1	--	30
	65th Foot	--	--	3	--	5	3	150
	Militia	--	--	--	--	--	--	7
	Total	2	1	6	1	10	4	265

[Image of page 141]

Stations	Distribution	F. O.	Capts.	Subalts	Staff	Sergts.	Drs.	Rank and File
Waitara	Commissariat (Acting)	--	--	--	1	--	--	--
	Royal Artillery	--	--	1	--	--	--	23
	Royal Engineers	--	--	1	--	--	--	8
	40th Regiment	1	2	5	2	10	3	239
	65th Regiment	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
	Naval Brigade	1	2	6	1	6	2	138
	Militia	--	--	--	--	--	--	16
	Total	2	4	13	4	16	5	427
Bell Block	Royal Artillery	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
	65th Regiment	--	1	1	1	2	1	50
	Militia	--	--	2	--	2	--	41
	Total	--	1	3	1	4	1	94
Omata	Militia	--	1	2	--	2	--	49

(Signed) JAMES PAUL, Captain,
Acting Major of Brigade.

[Image of page 142]

the country; while to storm posts, capture them, and the same day abandon them, would only be encouraging the enemy to continue a strife that was carried on in the manner most beneficial to him. If the war was to be concluded in the district, without culminating in a general rising of the northern island, it was most important to take advantage of the dry season. The wet season would commence in April, the country would then become impassable, the embarking and landing of troops and stores would be dangerous, difficult, and most uncertain. General Pratt had written to England to say that if all the tribes in the northern island joined the insurgents, as it yet appeared probable they might, the next campaign must be in the Waikato country, for which at present our means were totally inadequate. Reinforcements in men and ordnance had been asked for -- the latter as far back as May 1860; and until their arrival the war was perforce

[Image of page 143]

confined to the district of Taranaki, both because it was too late to transfer it to another spot, and because of the paucity of troops. During the short time that was left, however, the Major-General hoped that by a systematic attack in the forest, and by holding captured posts, he might ensure a series of successes which should induce the natives, who already showed some misgiving as to their power, to abandon a struggle so disastrous to themselves.

Preparations were therefore carried on vigorously to make the Waitara the base of operations. Provisions, ammunition, and stores were daily collected there, and as many carts and bullocks as possible were gathered for a transport corps. Supplejack, cut by the friendly natives at some personal risk, was sent to the Waitara in quantities, and the troops there, aided by the Naval Brigade, worked these up into gabions, of which a good store was prepared. The head-quarters of the 14th

[Image of page 144]

Regiment having arrived from England on the 1st and 5th of December, the detachments sent to Auckland returned. But the weather, which up to this time had been beautiful, now changed, and the rain poured down daily in torrents, so that moving was impossible. Arrangements, however, were pushed on, and on the 28th of December the force moved to the Waitara to commence the intended plan of attack on Pukerangioria. The troops composing this field force were, when assembled at the Waitara, including the Naval Brigade and regular troops, as follows (p. 145).

The garrison of New Plymouth was thus reduced to about 400 effective regular troops, in addition to the Taranaki Militia and Volunteers, who, though detailed as part of the above force for active operations in the field, did not turn out for certain reasons of their own, and remained for the protection of their families. Besides these

[Image of page 145]

FIELD FORCE. --WAITARA, DECEMBER 28, 1860.

Distribution	Field Officers	Captains	Subalterns	Staff	Sergeants	Doctors	Rank and File
Staff and Departments	1	1	1	6	1	--	--
Royal Artillery	--	1	1	--	1	--	45
Royal Engineers	1	1	1	--	1	--	39
12th Regiment	--	1	3	--	4	2	105
40th Regiment	2	4	10	4	30	15	466
65th Regiment	1	2	8	3	18	7	380
Naval Brigade	1	3	8	3	10	2	173
Mounted Corps	--	1	--	--	1	--	15
Total	6	14	32	16	66	26	1,223

[Image of page 146]

there were the non-effectives who could be depended on for manning the alarm posts.

Pukerangioria, the right of the enemy's position, and the point on which our attack was to be made, was an old pah, situated on high and commanding ground, on the left bank of the Waitara, about five miles from the mouth of the river. Though open in front, its rear and left flank were embedded in the main forest, and the right rested in dense bush on a perpendicular cliff three hundred feet high. Only a small space in front of the pah was open ground, and up this ran a narrow path which was flanked by the forest and exposed to the enemy's fire. This approach for about one and a half miles was over steep and broken ground covered with fern and brambles, thickly interlaced and most difficult to penetrate; while gullies and ravines, crossing one another in all directions, sent their streams in torrents either into the Waitara or through the forest into the Waiongona

[Image of page 147]

river. Between these there was little space for the movements of the troops. At Huirangi the main forest, making a bend, stretched down to the river, and this portion of it, about five acres only, quite hid the position of the enemy at Pukerangioria from the camp at the Waitara. From the Huirangi pah to the sea the ground was level, though intersected with ravines and covered with the interminable fern and bramble, and with occasional patches of Scotch thistles, some eight feet high. This plateau was a large spur from the distant mountains lying between the Wanganui and Waiongona rivers. Its sides were steep and precipitous where they formed the banks of these two rivers. In the valley through which they ran, stood gigantic forest trees, the tops of which were barely visible from our position. At the mouth of the river, on its left bank, we had a blockhouse, for the protection of our stores and commissariat. The Waitara

[Image of page 148]

Camp was on the same side, but about a mile higher up in the bend of the river; a large portion of its contour being protected by a deep marsh. Though the camp was conveniently situated, both as regards water and general requirements, it was commanded by higher ground on the right bank --- under existing circumstances a matter of no very great consequence. For the tacit agreement seemed to be that neither side were to use this bank of the river; and even had the enemy occupied the place, our shells could very soon have dislodged them. The stockade of Onakukaitara was on the side of the old pah of Puketakauere, about 2, 000 yards in advance of our camp, and that of Nga-puke-turua was on the left bank of the Waiongona, protecting the crossing at the main track--known as the Devon line.

Early in December it was reported that the enemy had occupied, as an advanced post, Matororikoriko, a spur of the plateau

[Image of page 149]

near the Waitara river, midway between Huirangi and the camp; and that they were constructing an extensive pah there. The position was singularly strong. It was protected on one side by the river and marshy ground, in which stood a forest that was quite invisible from the plateau, on which we were, till its edge was reached. On the other side the only approach was by a narrow neck of land, only a few yards wide, which wound through interlacing gullies, covered with scrub and bramble. The spur on which the pah stood, running as it did parallel to the river, also gave the enemy a direct fire on the opposite steep of the plateau. The pah itself, as far as could be seen, was not very strong, but information had been given that the whole ground had been honeycombed with ingeniously-contrived rifle-pits; and that the whole length of the precipice had been cut into steps for riflemen. These pits were constructed with much skill; some of them

[Image of page 150]

were covered and well traversed, while those on the slope of the hill contained cuttings for escape, and had, in many cases, underground communication with one another.

On the evening of the 28th of December, the force was assembled at the Waitara camp, and orders were issued for the intended operations of the following morning. The plan proposed was to take up a position near Kairau, on the main communication to Huirangi, and to establish there a permanent post; and having effected this, to attack Matarorikoriko by a somewhat regular approach, similar to that which had been so successful at Kahihi. At 2 A. M. on the 29th, the following force paraded and advanced, strange to say, unopposed through the most adverse ground, to within about eight hundred yards of the pah (p. 151).

A suitable site having been selected, and the troops having been disposed so as to resist attack on all sides, the working

[Image of page 151]

MARCHING-OUT STATE OF FIELD FORCE. -CAMP WAITARA, DECEMBER 29, 1860.

Distribution	Field Officers	Captains	Subalterns	Staff	Sergeants	Doctors	Rank and File
Staff Department	1	1	1	4	1	--	--
Royal Artillery	--	1	1	--	--	--	20
Royal Engineers	1	1	1	--	1	--	20
12th Regiment	--	1	2	--	3	--	80
40th Regiment	2	3	7	1	16	8	325
65th Regiment	1	2	6	1	14	4	320
Naval Brigade	1	2	5	1	4	1	125
Mounted Corps	--	1	--	--	1	--	10
Total	6	12	23	7	40	13	900

[Image of page 152]

parties were told off, and the redoubt, laid out by the engineers, was commenced. It was of an irregular half bastion trace, and had an area of about 2,560 yards. The work went on until 9 A. M. without a shot being fired; but about that time a heavy fire was opened by the enemy. The volleys were principally directed on the left face of our redoubt. They came from the direction of Matarorikoriko pah, and from the rifle-pits in the adjoining ground, the exact situation of which had been hitherto unknown to us. The smoke, however, now showed us their position and extent, and how very near we had advanced towards the edge of the precipitous descent to the Waitara river. Our men worked steadily; the skirmishers, unrelieved, remained the whole day at their posts under a broiling sun; from 9 in the morning till 7 pm. the enemy maintained a continuous fire on our posts, warmly returned. The Maoris in the advanced rifle-pits were directed in

[Image of page 153]

their movements, and firing, by signals, from the flagstaff at the Matarorikoriko. This enabled them to fire with great effect, without unnecessarily exposing themselves. The work being now sufficiently advanced, it was garrisoned by the 40th Regiment, a company of the 12th, a small detachment of Royal Artillery, and Royal Engineers, and Naval Brigade, in all about 450 men. The remainder of the force returned to camp. The native garrison of Matarorikoriko, in a few hours, resumed even a heavier fire on the redoubt, which they kept up until daybreak. During the night, hoping to surprise the garrison left in the redoubt, the Maoris crept up in the fern all round, but finding the sentries on the alert they did not venture on an attack. Work was resumed again at daylight (Sunday), but without any firing on either side, as the enemy hoisted a white flag. In the evening the 65th Regiment relieved the 40th, as garrison. On the morning of

[Image of page 154]

the 31st, when the troops were marching up to the redoubt, the Rev. W. Wilson, a missionary, who had long and lately been in the Waikato country, expressed his belief that the post was vacated, and volunteered to ride in and report. He was allowed to go, and received authority, if he found his suspicions correct, to direct a portion of the garrison at the redoubt to take possession of the pah. Mr. Wilson visited the pah, found it empty, and according to his instructions it was occupied by the garrison from the redoubt. The position was found even stronger than was suspected, and all available spots had been made use of for rifle-pits. The haste with which the enemy had decamped was evident from the tomahawks and "merries" left behind; and some hastily constructed graves showed that he had suffered loss, and that he could not carry off all his dead. Many persons maintained that we ought to have charged the enemy's rifle-pits, on the

[Image of page 155]

first day. An after examination of the ground convinces me that it was fortunate we did not do so. In the first place, the first line of rifle-pits was constructed on the edge of the ravine, and not sixty yards from our skirmishers, but the approach to them was covered by high fern, and they were invisible. Had we taken this first line, there were successive lines of rifle-pits, which, by a parity of reasoning, we should also have had to attack, and thus we should have been drawn on to storm the position; the very thing that the enemy desired, and that it was our special object to avoid. Secondly, had our men charged the first line of rifle-pits, they could scarcely have avoided going over the edge of the ravine, the existence of which was unknown to us, as it was completely hidden by the fern. Had this occurred the confusion must have resulted in severe loss; for the men would have had some difficulty in scrambling up the steep slope, and during the whole of

[Image of page 156]

the time they were doing this they would have been exposed to the enemy's fire from their numerous adjacent rifle-pits. Our object was not to take the rifle-pits, but to put up a redoubt; and I am sure that the effect of seeing our men do this, within a hundred yards of their advanced posts, regardless of a continual and heavy fire poured on them all day and night, had a most astonishing effect on the Maori mind; moreover, it proved to them that we were going to retain possession of the ground we conquered.

Regarding the general plan of the attack, there could hardly be two opinions. By the plan pursued, the enemy vacated the place after two days' resistance, with a loss to us of three killed and twenty-two wounded. The enemy's loss never could be ascertained; but as we found twelve bodies buried, we may suppose many wounded and some dead were carried off. Our guns could not breach the place, and

[Image of page 157]

had we stormed it, we might and should have taken it in a few hours, but with heavy loss to ourselves and scarcely any to the enemy; for he would have slipped unseen into the ravine, when his position in the pah became untenable, and this he would have counted a victory. The Waikato however was humbled, and had now to submit to the taunts of the southern tribes on whom he looked down. This second severe reverse was a sad blow to his prestige. The destruction of the old pah was at once begun, and a new stockade was commenced and pushed forward. The fine fern trees which abounded at Matarorikoriko gave excellent timber for its construction, and was easily worked.

The Rev. W. Wilson now visited the enemy, who had retired to their second position in the forest at Huirangi. On his return he was accompanied by a fine young Waikato, who pointed out the recent graves of some of his relatives, which our men then fenced in. While it would not have

[Image of page 158]

been safe for others to travel about the country, the Maoris always respected their missionaries; and though, as operations neared the forest, they declined to see them, they warned them off civilly, and never injured them. They told Mr. Wilson that they were glad to see him, and that they had only given up the Matarorikoriko pah out of compliment to him. This gentleman's visits were, I believe, principally with a view to induce the natives to agree to a compact by which they should bind themselves not to murder or to torture any of our men whom they might find wounded in the fern or scrub, or whom they might capture in any way. The Maoris debated the point, and at last negatived Mr. Wilson's proposition, as not being in accordance with native custom. The matter being thus settled, they told Mr. Wilson that they could not admit him inside their position any more. He then left our camp.

The position now taken up by the enemy was very strong; his right rested on the

[Image of page 159]

Waitara, and was on that small portion of the main forest that was divided from it by the road to Pukerangioria; his centre was at Huirangi, and extended thence, on the edge of the forest, to the Waiongona river, and was covered by marshes and by an impracticable ravine; the pahs of Manutahi and Mataitawa were on his left, and were in the midst of the forest. The whole extent of the forest was, for about 1,500 yards, one continuous line of rifle-pits, constructed in the usual ingenious manner, with passages for retreat. Their chief fault was that the loopholes, being on the level of the ground, caused their marksmen to fire too high. The Maori now made a great stir to incite other tribes to come to his aid, and envoys were despatched south; and a large body of natives assembled at Waireka with the hope that, by threatening New Plymouth, we should be induced to divide our force, and consequently obliged to suspend operations at the Waitara.