1863 - Carey, R. Narrative of the Late War in New Zealand - CHAPTER IX. State of the country...p 181-200

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CHAPTER IX.

IT was not to be expected that quiet and tranquillity could be immediately restored in the country, and that the Europeans could at once live in the distant and isolated districts away from the protection of soldiers or police. But the duration of this state of affairs would depend, if not more, certainly as much, on the machinations of the European community as on any actual ill feeling of the natives; and, indeed, it has since been seen that, so long as the English Government is content to maintain a large force of military in New Zealand, at the expense of England, there is no chance

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of the cessation of the repeated rumours of the renewal of the war, or of harmony being established between settlers and natives. Nor will the settlers, while they can retain this expenditure, cooperate with Sir George Grey to heal feuds and thus to cut off such a source of revenue. In former wars the natives had really lost nothing; and while we claimed the victory from capturing some hill or pah, that was of no use to either party, they could count their gain in the much larger casualties inflicted on us. They had now learnt a new lesson. From the arrival of General Pratt, in August 1860, until the end of the campaign, in March 1861, not a single instance had occurred in respect of which they could in the least claim a success; while the capture and destruction of some of their strongest pahs, the loss of many of their bravest chiefs, and the number of their dead and wounded left in our hands, were injuries that they could not hide or disregard.

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And in the last three months' campaign at the Waitara, in a very strong country, peculiarly suited to their style of warfare, and one which they had selected themselves, they had not only been beaten, but the conquered country had been settled upon by us. Our redoubts had been built close to their own posts, and on several occasions within 100 yards and less of their riflemen. Both by day and night during the whole time they had been kept on the alert, and had been driven farther back into the forest, suffering a continual loss of men. The forest itself, when it interfered with our operations, was cut down in spite of the fire of their skirmishers; and the five miles of ground occupied by our redoubts became so secure that our people on duty rode forwards and backwards without escorts, and our ammunition, provisions, &c, passed up only slightly guarded. They had chosen this country themselves, their warriors were well armed, and they had

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ammunition and provisions in abundance. They were all animated with the feeling that they would carry on the same successful plan as before, and that when tired they could disperse. But in all their expectations they had been disappointed; they had been foiled in everything, and had to confess their discomfiture.

When General Pratt left, the winter was setting in. This season, when hostilities must of necessity cease, it was to be expected, would be employed by the natives in attempts to bully us out of concessions, --not that they could seriously contemplate renewing the war in the event of our refusing to grant them. They were too intelligent a race not to know how disastrous the struggle must eventually prove to them. They had seen that they had not the means to maintain a contest, even against General Pratt's very small force, that was opposed to them in the Taranaki district; and they could not be blind to the fact, that against the

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well-equipped army of General Cameron in the comparatively open country, they could have no chance; for, in the event of the war being resumed, they could foresee that the Waikato country must be the future seat of operations, in which case the Waikatos would lose lands, houses, in fact, everything they possessed; and moreover, their country, which they had hitherto jealously guarded from the visits of Europeans, would be thrown open to the colonists.

These considerations to my mind were almost a guarantee that the Waikato would endeavour to avoid further hostilities, unless forced into them by the impolitic conduct of many colonists, who, it would almost appear, are desirous of fomenting the quarrel, chiefly with a view to retain the enormous military expenditure, probably also with the design of exterminating the natives and dividing their lands; though they seem to have overlooked that this result could only be arrived at by a general war -- lasting

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some years--in which the destruction of their property, in the first instance, would be inevitable.

The plan of the Waitara campaign, and the previous military operations of the war of 1860-1861, have been severely criticised by many persons who did not know the country or circumstances, as well as by many interested parties who did. It has been overlooked that one of the greatest difficulties was to find the enemy; for the Maori was quite aware that his main strength lay in neutralising the efforts of our columns, by dispersing whenever we were likely to come to close quarters. It must also be remembered that there were certain political reasons for keeping the war in the Taranaki district; and besides these, no general with the force at hand in August 1860, and up to the termination of hostilities in March 1861, could have ventured to bring on a general rising of the natives. It is true it might have been

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done with this risk. In August 1860, when the colonists refused to send away their families, the general might have moved every available man into the field, and left New Plymouth and its inhabitants to their fate. Had this been done, however, the probability is that the soldiers would not have met the enemy, and that New Plymouth would have been burnt and destroyed by the natives. 1 And there were many even among the highest officials in the country who believed that, if the

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Maori did take prisoners, he would soon revert to his old habits and eat them. To have left New Plymouth, therefore, to be defended by its inhabitants, I consider would have been not only cruel but impolitic and unnecessary.

Without going back to the history of former wars, and reading the despatches of Colonel Despard before Heke's pah in 1845 with reference to his campaign, and without considering the causes of the failure of the attack on Puketakauere, on the 27th June 1860 (which occurred previous to the arrival of General Pratt), few who have seen the Taranaki country, in which operations were conducted, but will be convinced that they were undertaken on the right principle. The skirmishes round New Plymouth in August and September, the capture of the Kahihi redoubts, and the destruction of a large number of pahs in October, before the arrival of the Waikatoes, had even then worked a good

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result in the district. In consequence of our success, several natives who had seceded returned to their allegiance, and many more would have done so but from fear of the colonists, who treated even the friendly tribes with the greatest brutality. 2 That the hill on which Te Area or Pukerangioria stood might have been charged and carried, though with much loss of life to us, I do not doubt; but, as has been

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shown, it would have been just what the Maori wanted. It should be remembered, moreover, that we would not have remained there, for there could have been no object in doing so. By the course pursued the native was completely checkmated. Had the Maori nation joined all their forces together to attack us on open ground, as report gave out that it would, the war would soon have been brought to an end, and the native race also. I observe that this canard has, only a few months since, been repeated in the New Zealand papers. It was stated that 20,000 Maoris were about to assemble with the object of attacking General Cameron's army! But who is to credit that the native, without organisation and without artillery, would abandon his guerilla mode of fighting, and all the advantages accruing from the nature of his country, to bring an unwieldy mass in front of our disciplined troops? The fact is, that this report was invented for the

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English mail and the English public, with the sole object of keeping up the present large expenditure in New Zealand.

No better plan to destroy the prestige of the native and reduce him to submission could have been adopted. The belief of the southern natives in the strength of the Waikato was destroyed. The friendly natives in the district worked willingly, even at the Waitara, where, in proximity to the redoubts, they helped in clearing away fern. It was easy to see, from their pleased expression and altered looks, that whatever fears they at first may have had as to the Waikato defeating us and obtaining the district, these had all passed away, and that they were anxious to become entitled to be regarded favourably by the English Government. This and other circumstances showed, some time before the war was ended, that submission was contemplated by the insurgents.

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The enemy's loss could not be ascertained, but we buried above 120 bodies on the field; and in our advance we found large vaults, where they had buried many more. The Waikato confessed to 400 killed in all, probably not half his loss. The wounded, known to be most numerous, were scattered all over the country, and were not likely to encourage the martial ardour of the more peaceable races.

Our loss, though small, was large for the small force engaged: it was caused chiefly by the unceasing daily skirmishes, in which a few fell every day. It was, however, nothing compared with the losses that must have ensued if the tactics of former wars had been adopted in this. It was as follows:--

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NEW ZEALAND. --TARANAKI WAR, 1860-61.

NOMINAL RETURN OF THE KILLED AND WOUNDED FROM COMMENCEMENT TO CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

(Signed) J. MOUAT,

Deputy Inspector-General, P. M. Officer.
Principal Medical Officers' Office,
Auckland, Feb. 6, 1862.

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The campaign ended on the 18th March 1861, since which time not a shot has been fired. The fine division under General Cameron has had no other occupation than road-making. Should war be resumed it could now be carried on on an entirely different footing, and on a more extended scale, the forces in New Zealand being now, for the first time, large enough to be called an army. Still, there would be many difficulties to be contended with that are not dreamt of in England, where the only feeling with reference to this country would appear to be one of astonishment, that a race of mere savages should not be easily forced into submission. Sir George Grey, who certainly is a good authority on such subjects, has a very different notion of the matter; or, at least, had in 1846, as the following extract from the New Zealand Blue Book will show:--

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In this short history of the New Zealand war, I have purposely avoided speaking of individuals and corps of the regular army; not that I am insensible to their uniform courage, or to the arduous nature of their work. For months they were exposed to a harassing and unceasing fire from natives hidden in the fern and forest, and during the greater part of the time they were unable to take off their clothes. They knew that in skirmishing in the dense scrub, if a man missed his comrade and was wounded, he would be mercilessly tomahawked by the natives, should his absence be unnoticed when we changed our position. Their steadiness in the redoubts was admirable. When required to work, they stood on the top of the parapets within 200 yards of the enemy's rifle-pits, with

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the utmost coolness, and they occupied themselves with cooking, washing, and other necessary duties, as unconcernedly as though they were in barracks. All this had a depressing effect on the natives, who were unable to comprehend how men could 'fight and work together,' as they termed it. The quiet perseverance of our men, so totally opposed to their own habits, dispirited them beyond measure, and led them to doubt their power of tiring us out.

I will take the opportunity, however, of mentioning that there was one corps, the Taranaki Mounted Volunteers, who, about 30 strong, under the command of Captain De Voeux, did most valuable service. They were badly armed, and badly clothed, but they were well mounted, plucky, and always ready. Even in the most dangerous times they rode long distances, carrying orders, day or night, alone or in twos. It was with these mounted men that the communication with New Plymouth and Kahihi

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was kept up, as it afterwards was between the Waitara and the redoubts, where, anxious to work and ever fearless of danger, they were invaluable. One of them, Mr. Mace, an excellent rider, was the pluckiest fellow I ever met. I believe he lost much property at the outbreak of the war; and I trust the Government may have found some means to reward him.

Our land transport was very insufficient; we had only some 40 bullock carts, but with these we managed to supply the redoubts with ammunition, provisions, and gabions (of which about 60 were made daily at the Waitara), besides water, which was carted to each redoubt from the Waitara, and was kept in barrels. The troops will, I am sure, long recollect how much they owe Mr. Elliott, of Taranaki, for his exertions in keeping up the supply to the full wants of the men, under a good deal of difficulty, not unattended with danger.

In the foregoing account of the Taranaki

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war, I have merely desired to place on record a correct version of the events that occurred, both because I conceive that the history of the war, when attentively considered, is a very interesting one, and because I have some hopes that my observations may tend to counteract the garbled and fictitious statements that have from time to time appeared in the public journals of New Zealand. The reports that have been circulated through them must have had the effect of giving most erroneous impressions to the English public--as they have to the neighbouring colonies here--not only as to the quarrel which led to the war, but as to the conduct of the war itself; while the natural difficulties of the country, as well as the available strength of the military, have always been intentionally underrated by the interested contributors to these journals.

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