LETTER I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
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THE COLONIAL POLICY
OF
LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S ADMINISTRATION.
LETTER I.
COLONIAL POLICY.--PRELIMINARY REMARKS.--EFFECT OF FREE TRADE ON THE COLONIES.
MY DEAR LORD JOHN,
The affairs of the Colonies have of late years been very largely discussed. The books, the pamphlets, and the speeches of which they have been the subject, have been almost innumerable; but of these even the few to which I should be the last to deny the praise of ability and fairness, advocate views which seem to me either incorrect or incomplete; while, as the rest have for the most part been designed to serve party or personal objects, they have been little calculated to assist the Public in forming a sound opinion on the questions to which they relate. No small proportion of what has been spoken or written about the Colonies for the last few years, has had for its aim to decry and to misrepresent the policy pursued towards them by the
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Administration of which you were at the head; and as so large a share of the responsibility for the measures of that Government devolves upon myself, it is natural that I should wish the Public to have the means of knowing the real character and scope of those measures, and the grounds upon which they were adopted. Nor is this unimportant on grounds far higher than what concerns any individual: the national interest is deeply involved in having the course of Colonial administration correctly understood. In Parliament, or at least in the House of Lords, the debates which have taken place on Colonial affairs have been entirely confined to particular questions, affecting individual Colonies, and have never afforded me an opportunity of stating my views as to our general system of Colonial Policy, which, to be properly understood, requires to be considered as a whole; perhaps, also, the subject is too extensive for Parliamentary discussion. I propose therefore to endeavour in these pages to supply a deficiency which I conceive to exist, by laying before the Public a connected view of the Colonial policy which was pursued while I was entrusted with the task of conducting it, as a member of your Administration.
It has appeared to me that I shall be able to do this most conveniently in the form of a series of Letters, which I address to you, because you were acquainted, while they were in progress, with the transactions to which I shall have to advert, and will therefore be able to judge of the accuracy of my statements.
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You cannot but take an interest in the subject, since all the most important of the measures of which I shall have to speak were, of course, adopted with your knowledge and assent; and I am happy to think that there has never been the slightest difference of opinion between us, as to the principles which ought to form the guide of our policy.
It is my intention to avoid, as far as possible, any notice of the various attacks made upon our measures, and of the misrepresentations to which we have been exposed. I shall do so, because it is my wish to give to these Letters a tone as little controversial as is consistent with the object I have in view, and also because the objections which have been made to our policy have been so multifarious and so contradictory, that an attempt to answer them all would be intolerably tedious. Hence, without adverting to the various speeches and pamphlets by which our Colonial administration has been assailed, I shall endeavour to give a general sketch of our policy, of the views on which it was founded, and of its results; leaving it to those who take an interest in the subject to draw their own conclusions, and noticing objections which have been made to our policy only when necessary for its elucidation. I fear that, even adopting this plan, it will be difficult to compress within a moderate compass a statement, however succinct, of what has been done in the numerous Colonies of the British Empire, with an explanation of the grounds on which we have acted; and that much which is not unimportant will
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have to be omitted. The ample information laid before Parliament, to which I shall take care to refer, will however enable those who desire it, to obtain a more perfect knowledge of the transactions to which I shall advert.
Before I proceed to give an account of what has been done in particular Colonies, it will be convenient that I should state, somewhat fully, the general principles which have in all cases been the guide of our policy, and that I should call your attention to the manner in which the peculiar circumstances of the times have affected the administration of Colonial affairs. To begin with the last, I have to remark that in these affairs much of the opposition we have met with, and the principal difficulties we have encountered, have arisen, directly or indirectly, from our having thought it our duty to maintain the policy of free trade, and to extend its application to the produce of the Colonies. That these difficulties must be expected from this policy I was quite aware when your Government was formed; but the greatest service that I believed we were called upon as a Government to render to the country was that of completing the work, which had been happily begun, of removing restrictions from industry, and securely establishing a system of free trade throughout the empire. So far back as when I first entered upon public life,--now more than twenty-five years ago,--it was my conviction that, next to the removal of the religious disabilities which then threatened the disruption of the Empire, and to the accomplishment
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of such a reform of the House of Commons as was requisite to make it a fitting instrument for effecting every other public improvement, the political object of the greatest importance to the public good was to relieve industry and commerce from the shackles with which they had been encumbered by measures adopted for their advancement under the erroneous theory of "Protection." Hence, beginning with the year 1827, when I voted with a very small minority against the principle of the sliding scale, in the Bill for the amendment of the Corn Laws brought forward by Mr. Canning, I had, both by votes and speeches, supported every proposal submitted to the House of Parliament of which I was a Member, which I considered to be calculated to advance the object of giving greater freedom to industry. I believed that the Colonial trade ought to form no exception to the general rule, but should be placed on the same footing as other branches of our commerce. I considered it to be no less for the real and permanent interest of the Colonies themselves, than for that of the Mother-country, that industry should cease to be diverted from its natural channels, and a useless burden to be imposed on the consumer by differential duties, levied for the purpose of favouring Colonial produce in our markets, and our produce in the markets of the Colonies.
Entertaining these opinions, I should not have accepted your proposal to form part of your Administration, if I had not felt satisfied that its measures would
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be directed to the completion of the work of commercial reform, and had I not expected that, notwithstanding the difficulties I anticipated, we should be supported in this policy by Parliament.
In that expectation I have not been disappointed. By the measures which we have succeeded in carrying, for the alteration of the duties on sugar, coffee, and timber, for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and for giving power to the local Legislatures to abolish differential duties in the Colonies, provision has been made for placing the Colonial trade on a footing free from serious objection; while the accomplishment, at no very distant period, of the further improvements it still requires has obviously been ensured.
These measures, necessary and beneficial as I am convinced they will ultimately be admitted to have been, amounted however to nothing less than a revolution in an established system of policy, which could not fail to shock many long received opinions, and to bring about a great change in the relations hitherto subsisting between this country and the Colonies. For more than two centuries, the great object of all European nations, in seeking to obtain possession of Colonies, was the gain supposed to accrue from the monopoly of their commerce, which it was the practice for the parent State to maintain, while, on the other hand, it gave to their produce a preference in its own markets. This policy began to be relaxed by Parliament immediately after the American Revo-
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lution (of which calamity it was, in truth, the chief cause); but, although the views on which it is founded had been considerably modified, the principle of placing the trade with the Colonies on a different footing from that with other countries had been maintained up to the year 1846, and was generally regarded as one of unquestionable propriety and wisdom. So much was this the case, that in the beginning of Sir Robert Peel's commercial reforms, the tariff of 1842, as originally submitted to the House of Commons, contained provisions by which various new protected interests would have been created in the Colonies, and a large revenue would have been sacrificed by the Mother-country, without any real benefit accruing to them. Amongst other articles proposed to be dealt with were tea and tobacco, on which it was intended to reduce one half the amount of duty to which they would otherwise be liable when they were the produce of British possessions. It so happens that I was myself the person by whom the attention of the House of Commons (of which I was then a Member) was called to the inexpediency of this mode of dealing with the customs-duties; and I moved a resolution against the establishment of any new protecting duties in favour of Colonial produce 1, arguing that, in order to derive a revenue from duties on imports without imposing an undue burden on the consumer, and without diverting industry from its natural and therefore most productive channels, duties
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ought not to be levied on the importation of any articles which would meet in our market articles of the same kind produced in the Colonies, and not subject to an equal amount of taxation.
This principle, which is equally applicable to articles produced at home and to those obtained from the Colonies, 2 is now recognized as sound by the
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majority of intelligent and educated men; but this was far from being the case until very recently, and it was so much otherwise at the time of which I am speaking, that, although in the resolution I moved I abstained from proposing to abolish existing protecting duties in favour of the Colonies, and only sought to lay down the rule that no new ones should be created, the motion was rejected, obtaining the support of a minority far below the usual strength of the Opposition; and in the tariff of 1842 the erroneous principle I had endeavoured to condemn was adhered to, the Government only abandoning its application in those cases in which it would have seriously affected the revenue. I refer to this circumstance, because it shows how strong was the hold on men's minds of the old opinions respecting the Colonial trade, and how great was the shock given to these opinions, when the policy of placing our trade with the Colonies on the same footing as that with foreign countries was first systematically adopted in Sir Robert Peel's Act for the repeal of the former Corn Law, and in the measures which followed it. This accounts for the great bitterness of the political discontent and opposition to your Government excited by these measures. It is notorious that distress is usually the parent of political discontent, even when that distress cannot be referred by the sufferers themselves to the conduct of the Government; much more so, when they believe their difficulties to have been occasioned by its measures. But the abandonment of long esta-
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blished commercial and fiscal regulations, however vicious in policy, generally occasions temporary loss and inconvenience to those engaged in the branches of trade and industry affected by such changes; and if they do not occasion actual loss, these changes invariably excite the apprehension of it, which is nearly as bad. Hence reforms of this description are always found to create many enemies to the Government by which they are accomplished; and in the application of the principles of free trade to Colonial produce, the hostility thus excited was aggravated by its being thought, however unreasonably, that these measures involved an act of injustice, as invading what had long been regarded as a right on the part of the Colonists.
Nor is this all; the abandonment of the ancient commercial system of this country towards the Colonies brought a still larger question under discussion. Not only those who still adhered to the opinion that the former policy with respect to colonial commerce was the right one, but many of the most eager advocates of the principles of free trade, concurred in arguing that, if the Colonies were no longer to be regarded as valuable on account of the commercial advantages to be derived from their possession, the country had no interest in keeping these dependencies, and that it would be better to abandon them; thus getting rid of the heavy charge on the country, especially in providing the requisite amount of naval and military force for their protection. In like manner, the Colonists
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began to inquire whether, if they were no longer to enjoy their former commercial privileges in the markets of the Mother-country, they derived any real benefit from a continuance of the connection. It is obvious that questions of this kind could not be raised without creating great difficulties in the administration of Colonial affairs, and the more so, because it is impossible to deny that the view of the subject to which I have adverted is at least plausible; and when the old doctrine, that the great value of Colonies arises from the commercial monopoly which the Mother-country can claim with respect to their trade is abandoned, some other explanation may fairly be asked of the grounds on which we should nevertheless continue to support the charges inseparable from the maintenance of our Colonial empire.
Although it would be impossible, within the limits to which I must confine myself, fully to discuss in this Letter so large a subject, it is requisite, for the clearness of what is to follow, that I should state generally why, and on what terms, I think that the connection between this country and the Colonies ought to be preserved, and also that I should explain how these views have been applied in practice. I consider, then, that the British Colonial Empire ought to be maintained, principally because I do not consider that the Nation would be justified in throwing off the responsibility it has incurred by the acquisition of this dominion, and because I believe that much of the power and influence of this Country
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depends upon its having large Colonial possessions in different parts of the world.
The possession of a number of steady and faithful allies, in various quarters of the globe, will surely be admitted to add greatly to the strength of any nation; while no alliance between independent states can be so close and intimate as the connection which unites the Colonies to the United Kingdom as parts of the Great British Empire. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that the power of a nation does not depend merely on the amount of physical force it can command, but rests, in no small degree, upon opinion and moral influence: in this respect British power would be diminished by the loss of our Colonies, to a degree which it would be difficult to estimate. Hence, if it is an advantage, not for the sake of domineering over other countries but with a view to our own security, to form part of a powerful nation rather than of a weak one (and, considering the many examples we have seen of the injustice to which weak ones are compelled to submit, this can hardly admit of a question), it seems to follow, that the tie which binds together all the different and distant portions of the British Empire, so that their united strength may be wielded for their common protection, must be regarded as an object of extreme importance to the interests of the Mother-country and her dependencies. To the latter it is no doubt of far greater importance than to the former, because, while still forming comparatively small and weak communities, they enjoy, in return for their
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allegiance to the British Crown, all the security and consideration which belong to them as members of one of the most powerful States in the world. No foreign Power ventures to attack or interfere with the smallest of them, while every Colonist carries with him, to the remotest quarters of the globe which he may visit in trading or other pursuits, that protection which the character of a British subject everywhere confers, and can depend, in any difficulties, or under any oppression to which he may be exposed, on the assistance of Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular servants, supported, if necessary, by the whole power of the Empire.
But I should regard it as a very unworthy mode of considering this subject, if it were to be looked at with a view only to the interests of this Country, as that word is usually understood. I conceive that, by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. Supposing it were clear (which I am far from admitting) that a reduction of our national expenditure (otherwise impracticable), to the extent of a few hundred thousands a year, could be effected by withdrawing our authority and protection from our nume-
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rous Colonies, should we be justified, for the sake of such a saving, in taking this step, and thus abandoning the duty which seems to have been cast upon us?
It is to be remembered, that if we adopted this policy we must be prepared for very serious consequences, which would undoubtedly result from it. Some few only of these I will mention. No one acquainted with the actual state of society in the West India islands, and the feelings prevalent among the different classes of their inhabitants, can doubt that, if they were left, unaided by us, to settle amongst themselves in whose hands power should be placed, a fearful war of colour would probably soon break out, by which the germs of improvement now existing there would be destroyed, and civilization would be thrown back for centuries. In Ceylon a similar result would follow; its native races are utterly incapable of governing themselves, and yet they certainly would not submit to be ruled by the mere handful of Europeans who have settled among them, if this small body were unsupported by British power. The great wealth which within the last few years has been created in this island would be destroyed, and the most hopeless anarchy would take place of that security which now exists, and under the shelter of which such promising signs of improvement are beginning to appear. Even in New Zealand, although I have little doubt that the Colonists of European descent would be found capable of establishing a government, under which they might eventually rise to prosperity, yet we could scarcely
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hope to see this effected without a series of contests with the native inhabitants, in which the latter would in the end be destroyed, but not until they had inflicted and suffered an almost equal amount of misery. On the West Coast of Africa there is at this moment a far more encouraging prospect than at any previous time; the efforts which have been so long made to improve the negro race seem to be at length beginning to produce important results, and a great change for the better may be looked for. But if we take up a, new policy, and abandon our positions on the African coast, the Slave Trade will again revive in the extensive territory within reach of our settlements, where it has now been extirpated, and has given place to a legitimate commerce, which is daily becoming more important.
To say nothing of higher motives, and of the duty which I conceive to be no less obligatory upon nations than upon individuals, of using the power and the advantages entrusted to them by Providence to advance the welfare of mankind, I would ask whether, even in mere money, there would not be something to set off against the saving of expense from the abandonment of our Colonies? On the other side of the account we have to put the destruction of British property which would thus be occasioned, and the annihilation of lucrative branches of our commerce, by allowing anarchy and bloodshed to arrest the peaceful industry which now creates the means of paying for the British goods consumed daily in larger quantities, by
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the numerous and various populations now emerging from barbarism under our protection.
It is true there are several of our Colonies to which the last observations do not directly apply; but the policy of abandoning a part of our Colonial Empire could scarcely be adopted, without giving so great a shock to the feeling of confidence and security in the remainder, as greatly to increase the difficulty of maintaining it; and I must add, that it appears to me very doubtful whether even the Colonies most capable of governing themselves, and which have no uncivilized tribes to deal with, from whom any danger could be apprehended, would not for some time have much difficulty in maintaining their present state of tranquillity and security, both externally and internally, if their connection with the Mother-country were suddenly dissolved.
In New South Wales, for instance, the interference of the Home Government in the internal administration of the Colony is exceedingly slight; but, slight as it is, it may be questioned whether, without it, the conflict of interests and opinions between different classes of the inhabitants and between different districts would not be likely to lead to very dangerous struggles; while in their relations with each other it would be still more likely that the different Australian Colonies would be involved in. difficulties, if they ceased to be all placed under the supreme authority of the Imperial Government.
I have thought it necessary to state thus strongly my
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dissent from the views of those who wish to dismember the British Empire by abandoning the Colonies, because it is impossible not to observe that this policy--unworthy of a great Nation, and unwise as I consider it to be--is not only openly advocated by one active party in the country, but is also hardly less effectually supported by persons occupying an important position in Parliament, and who, while they hesitate to avow their adherence to it, hold language which obviously leads in the same direction, and advocate measures the adoption of which would inevitably bring about this result.
If the reasons which I have just stated for maintaining the connection between this Country and the British Colonies are admitted to be sound, it will follow as a necessary inference, that two very plain rules as to the terms on which that connection should be continued may be laid down. In the first place, I think it will clearly follow that this Country has no interest whatever in exercising any greater influence in the internal affairs of the Colonies, than is indispensable either for the purpose of preventing any one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large; or else for the promotion of the internal good government of the Colonies, by assisting the inhabitants to govern themselves when sufficiently civilized to do so with advantage, and by providing a just and impartial administration for those of which the population is too ignorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs. While
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it was our policy to maintain a monopoly of the trade of the Colonies, it was necessary for the Home Government to exercise a considerable control over their internal administration, because otherwise this monopoly would certainly have been evaded; and accordingly it will be found, on looking back at the earlier history of our Colonies, (especially those which now constitute the United States,) that the interference of the servants of the Crown in their internal affairs, and the differences which that interference occasioned, arose almost entirely from the endeavour to uphold the commercial system then in force. The abandonment of that system has removed the necessity for this interference. Secondly, I think it will follow, that when this Country no longer attempts either to levy a commercial tribute from the Colonies by a system of restriction, nor to interfere needlessly in their internal affairs, it has a right to expect that they should take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the expenses incurred for their advantage.
In subsequent Letters I shall endeavour to show, with reference to the transactions of the several Colonies, that these rules were strictly adhered to while I held the office of Secretary of State; but before I do this, it will be convenient that I should offer some further general remarks upon, the rules themselves, and the manner in which they have been acted upon. And first I would observe, with regard to the vague declamation on the absurdity of attempting to govern the Colonies from Downing-street, of which we have
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heard so much, that it would undoubtedly be in the highest degree absurd to attempt to govern from Downing-street, if this is to be understood in the sense of directing from thence all the measures of the local Authorities; but I am not aware that such an attempt has at any period of our history been thought of. On the other hand, it is obvious that, if the Colonies are not to become independent States, some kind of authority must be exercised by the Government at home. It will conduce to a clearer understanding of the subject, to consider by what means any control over its dependencies is now practically maintained by the Mother-country, and to what extent that control ought to be carried.
The authority of the Home Government over the Colonies is exercised mainly in two ways; first by the appointment of Governors, and secondly by sanctioning or disallowing the measures of the local Governments, of which these officers are at the head. It is also exercised sometimes, but much more rarely, by prescribing measures for their adoption. With regard to the selection of Governors, though I am aware that a contrary opinion has sometimes been expressed, it appears to me clear that, if we are to have Colonies at all, the appointment of their Governors must necessarily be retained by the Crown, since I do not perceive by what other means any real authority or control could be exercised over the executive government of the Colonies by the advisers of the Crown. But though the Governors of Colonies ought in my
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opinion always to be named by the Crown, (and, looking to the consequences of Presidential elections in the United States, I believe that the advantage to the Colonies of having persons entirely unconnected with local parties, thus appointed to these situations, cannot easily be over-rated), the nature and extent of the powers entrusted to the Governors, and consequently the character of the Colonial Governments, must differ widely in different cases. In the Settlements on the west coast of Africa, the Governors substantially exercise both executive and legislative authority, limited only by an appeal to the Home Government. In Canada, a representative Assembly has not only the chief power of legislation, but also virtually a large share of executive authority, since the members of the Executive Council are required to possess its confidence. Between these two extremes there are many intermediate degrees, of more or less power being exercised by the Governors of different Colonies.
The degree of control to be exercised over the local Authorities by the Secretary of State, as the organ of the Home Government, ought obviously to depend very much on the greater or less amount of power with which the Governors of different Colonies are invested. In a colony like Canada, where representative institutions have attained their full development, and the Governor is aided in his administrative duties by Ministers who are required to possess the confidence of the Legislature, exceedingly little interference
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on the part of the Government at home seems to be required. In Colonies where this system of government is in successful operation, the Home Government should, in my opinion, attempt little (except in those rare cases where Imperial interests or the honour of the Crown are affected by local measures or proceedings), beyond advising the Colonial Authorities, and checking, so as to give an opportunity for further reflection, any ill-considered and hasty measures they may be inclined to adopt. Practically I believe that the influence which can thus be exercised through a judicious Governor is very considerable, and may be of great service to the Colonies. In the strife of parties which prevails in all free governments, the existence of an impartial authority serves to check the too great violence with which political contests are sometimes carried on, and the experience and position of a Minister of the Crown in this country enable him frequently to offer useful advice to the Colonial Legislatures. There are other Colonies in which representative institutions exist, but in a form suited to a less advanced stage of society, and where the Governor consequently is called upon to exercise considerably more power than under the system to which I have just adverted; and there are other Colonies again in which no such institutions yet exist.
In proportion as Governors are more independent of any local control, it becomes necessary that some should be exercised over them from home; and in those Colonies where they are unchecked by any
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kind of representative institutions, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to maintain a vigilant superintendence over their proceedings. Although he ought, as I conceive, to abstain from any meddling interference in the details of their administration, and to support their authority so long as they appear to deserve his confidence,--and rather to advise their recall when they cease to do so, than to fetter their discretion by detailed instructions,--he is yet bound to attend to complaints which may be made against their measures, and to prescribe for their guidance the general line of policy to be pursued.
These rules, as to the degree of interference to be exercised by the Secretary of State, are equally applicable to the legislative and executive measures of the local Authorities in the Colonies; but while I am of opinion that the authority of the Crown, of which the Secretary of State is the depositary, should be used in all cases with great caution, and in Colonies possessing representative institutions with extreme forbearance, I cannot concur with those who would prohibit all interference on the part of the Home Government in the internal affairs of the Colonies. It seems to have been overlooked, by those who insist that such interference must always be improper, and who would adopt without any qualification the rule that the Colonies should be left to govern themselves, that this would in some cases imply leaving a dominant party, perhaps even a dominant minority, to
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govern the rest of the community without check or control.
To permit the government of a distant Colony to be so carried on, notwithstanding the oppression or corruption which might be known to exist, would in general be for the ease and advantage of the Ministers of the day, but would not be consistent with any but a very low view of the duties belonging to the responsible advisers of the Sovereign of this great Empire. In point of fact, it has not unfrequently happened, that the absence of difficulty in some parts of our Colonial administration has arisen, not from its merits, but from its faults. For instance, so long as the Home Government took no thought of the condition of the Negro population of the West Indies, it met with no opposition from the Assemblies of Jamaica and the other West Indian Colonies; but when, urged on by public opinion in this Country and by the House of Commons, the Government undertook to give effect first to the resolutions of 1823, for the amelioration of the condition of the slaves, and ultimately to the Act of Emancipation, it found itself placed in a position of antagonism to the dominant class in these Colonies, the difficulties arising from which are not yet by any means at an end. Yet it was clearly the duty of the Imperial Government not to leave the population of these Colonies to the unrestricted disposal of the local Governments, and in this respect at least the discontent engendered by the interference of the Home Government was the discon-
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tent of the dominant few (who can alone make themselves heard in this Country) at interference exercised for the protection of the helpless and ignorant many. Even now, in the former Slave Colonies which possess representative institutions, the body of the population does not practically exercise such an influence in the Assemblies as to exempt the advisers of the Crown from the duty of keeping a watchful eye upon the proceedings of the Legislatures, for the purpose of checking any attempts which might be made to pass laws bearing unfairly on the labouring classes.
But even where the interference of the Home Government is not necessary for the protection of a part of the population, too ignorant or too weak to protect itself, there is another consideration, which may require the exercise of some control over the proceedings of the local Governments with regard to the internal affairs of the Colonies. Every act of these Governments, whether legislative or executive, is done in the name and by the authority of the Sovereign; hence the honour of the Crown, which it is of the highest importance to the whole Empire to maintain unimpaired, must be compromised by any injustice or violation of good faith, which it has the power to prevent, being committed by the local Authorities. It is therefore the duty of those by whom the Imperial Government is conducted, and to whom, as the responsible servants of the Crown, its honour is entrusted, to take care that this honour does not suffer by the Sovereign's being made a party to proceedings in-
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volving a departure from the most scrupulous justice and good faith towards individuals, or towards particular classes of the inhabitants of any of our Colonies.
In the Colonies which are the most advanced in civilization and in the exercise of the powers of self-government, it is not superfluous to insist on this consideration: on the contrary, it is in Colonies having popular forms of government that there is perhaps most danger that, in the excitement of party contests, to which such governments are peculiarly liable, measures not consistent with strict justice may sometimes be attempted, and may require to be checked by the authority of the Crown, entrusted to the Secretary of State. Any interference on the part of that Minister with measures of purely internal administration in the Colonies to which I am now adverting, is to be deprecated, except in very special circumstances, the occurrence of which must be exceedingly rare; but I am convinced that it may sometimes be called for, and that it is therefore expedient to trust, for averting the evils and the dangers which must arise from an improper interference by the Home Government with the local administration, rather to the discretion with which the powers now vested in the Crown are exercised, than to a limitation of these powers, by new legal restrictions. In particular, I should regard it as in the highest degree unadvisable to adopt the proposal that has been made to take away, so far as regards certain classes of laws, the general power which the Crown now possesses of disallowing all acts
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or ordinances passed by the Colonial Legislatures. I shall have to advert to this question hereafter, with reference to New South Wales; I will therefore abstain from considering it more particularly at present.
I have little doubt that the propriety of regulating the amount of control to be exercised by the Secretary of State over the measures of the local Authorities, by the greater or less infusion of popular power in the constitutions of the several Colonies, will be generally recognized; it remains to be considered what steps ought to be taken for the establishment of representative institutions where they do not now exist, or for improving them where they exist only in an imperfect form. On this head also I think there can be little difficulty in determining the principles which ought to be acted upon, although there will be a good deal more in their practical application.
Keeping steadily in view that the welfare and civilization of the inhabitants of the Colonies, and the advantage which the Empire at large may derive from their prosperity, are the only objects for which the retention of these dependencies is desirable, and believing also that there can be no doubt as to the superiority of free governments to those of an opposite character, as instruments for promoting the advancement of communities in which they can be made to work with success, I consider it to be the obvious duty and interest of this Country to extend representative institutions to every one of its dependencies where they have not yet been established, and where this can
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be done with safety; and also to take every opportunity of giving increased development to such institutions where they already exist but in an imperfect form. But I believe that in some cases representative governments could not safely be created, and also that the same form of representative institutions is by no means applicable to Colonies in different stages of social progress. The principal bar to the establishment of representative governments in Colonies, is their being inhabited by a population of which a large proportion is not of European race, and has not made such progress in civilization as to be capable of exercising with advantage the privileges of self-government.
Of such Colonies Ceylon affords the best example. The great majority of its inhabitants are Asiatics, very low in the scale of civilization, and having the character and habits of mind which have from the earliest times prevented popular governments from taking root, and flourishing among the nations of the East. Amidst a large population of this description there are settled, for the most part as temporary residents engaged in commerce or agriculture, a mere handful of Europeans, and a larger number (but still very few in comparison with the whole population) of inhabitants of a mixed race. In such a Colony the establishment of representative institutions would be in the highest degree inexpedient. If they were established in such a form as to confer power upon the great body of the people, it must be
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obvious that the experiment would be attended with great danger, or rather with the certainty of failure. If, on the other hand, the system of representation were so contrived as to exclude the bulk of the native population from real power, in order to vest it in the hands of the European minority, an exceedingly narrow oligarchy would be created,--a form of government which experience certainly does not show to be favourable to the welfare of the governed. Were a representative Assembly constituted in Ceylon, which should possess the powers usually entrusted to such a body, and in which the European merchants and planters and their agents had the ascendency, it can hardly be supposed that narrow views of class interests would not exercise greater influence in the legislation of the Colony than a comprehensive consideration of the general good. To anticipate that this would be the effect of placing a large measure of power in the hands of a small minority, implies no unfavourable opinion of the character and intelligence of the European inhabitants of Ceylon, but only a belief that they would act as men placed in such a situation have generally been found to do.
In Mauritius, Trinidad, St. Lucia and Natal, a somewhat similar state of things exists; for although the preponderance of the uncivilized races in these Colonies is far less overwhelming than in Ceylon, still, taking into account the immigrants from India and Africa (whose welfare is entitled to especial consideration), the inhabitants of European origin are but a fraction of the whole population. Hence it appears to me, that the
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surrender of a large portion of the powers now exercised by the servants of the Crown, and the establishment of representative Legislatures, would not be calculated to ensure the administration of the government upon principles of justice, and of an enlightened regard for the welfare of all classes in these communities. This end may, I believe, be far better attained by maintaining for the present in these Colonies the existing system of government, of which it would be a great mistake to suppose that, because the inhabitants are not entitled to elect any of the members of the Legislatures, it provides no securities against abuse. Other influences are brought to bear upon the government of these Colonies, which answer many of the objects of a Legislature of a representative character.
In the first place, in all of them the Press is perfectly free; the newspapers comment upon all the measures of the Government, not only with entire liberty, but with the most unbounded license; and the force both of local opinion, and also to a considerable degree of opinion in this country, is thus brought to bear upon all the measures of the Administration. Every inhabitant of the Colonies is also entitled freely to address to the Secretary of State any complaints or remarks he may think proper on the measures of the local Authorities, subject only to the rule that such letters shall be transmitted through the hands of the Governor (who is bound to forward them), in order that he may at the same time send such explanations on the subject as appear to him to be called for. This privilege is largely
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exercised, and is the means of supplying much useful information. It is hence impossible that the Secretary of State can be kept in ignorance of any errors or abuses committed by the local Authorities, while, if he fails to interfere when he ought, he cannot himself escape the censure of Parliament. The greatly increased facilities of intercourse with the Colonies have of late years effected a great practical alteration in the position of Colonial Governors; and, whatever may have been the case formerly, it undoubtedly cannot be alleged that Parliament is now indifferent to what goes on in the Colonies, or that faults, real or imaginary, which may be committed in the administration of their affairs, can hope to escape the ever-ready criticism of an Opposition eager to find matter for objections to the Government of the day. Perhaps some persons may think that this disposition has been carried too far for the real interest of the Colonies.
In these Colonies there exist also Legislative Councils consisting partly of persons filling the chief offices of the Government, partly of some of the principal inhabitants, who, though named to their seats in the Legislature by the authority of the Crown, and not by popular election, are yet in the habit of acting with great freedom, and practically express to a considerable extent the opinion of the class to which they belong. It was my object, while I held the seals of the Colonial department, without relinquishing the power possessed by the Crown, gradually to bring these legislative bodies more under the influence of the
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opinion of the intelligent and educated inhabitants of these Colonies. With this view, in one or two cases, the proportion of unofficial to official members was augmented, and the practice was everywhere introduced of requiring the whole expenditure to be provided for by ordinances discussed and passed by the Legislative Council; these ordinances being founded on estimates prepared and submitted to the Legislature by the Governor, and published for general information. In general the fixed establishment of the Colonial Governments is provided for by permanent laws, and that part of the expenditure which is of a more fluctuating character, by Ordinances passed annually, every charge on the Colonial revenue being required to have, in one form or the other, the sanction of the Legislature. This regulation was adopted, under my instructions, in all the Colonies to which I am now referring, in place of the very lax and irregular practice previously prevailing in some of them, by which the only authority for a large proportion of their expenditure consisted of instructions given by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Treasury. The publicity given to the estimates and accounts of the Colonial expenditure, and the rule that, except in cases of great emergency, the drafts of all proposed ordinances should be published before being passed, have enabled the Colonists to bring under the consideration of the Governors and the Legislative Councils, and ultimately of the Secretary of State, any objections they have entertained to proposed ordinances or
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financial arrangements. Every encouragement has been given to them to make known their opinions freely, both to the local and Home Governments; and the most careful consideration has been given to their views, especially when these have been stated by chambers of commerce or municipal bodies, the advice and assistance of which, in the administration of Colonial affairs, are in my judgement of the highest value.
These are as effective securities as in the present state of these Colonies I believe to he attainable, for ensuring their good government; but I conceive, that gradually to prepare them for a more popular system of government ought to be one of the principal objects of the policy adopted towards them, and it is one of which I never lost sight. It was more particularly with this view that I endeavoured, whenever practicable, to create a system of Municipal organization, entertaining a strong conviction that the exercise of the powers usually entrusted to municipal bodies is the best training that a population can have for the right use of a larger measure of political power.
With regard to Colonies which already possess representative institutions, I have observed above that the form of these institutions varies very much in different cases. In Canada and the neighbouring provinces the system of government has, within the last few years, been assimilated as nearly as possible to that which prevails in this Country, Ex-
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ecutive Councils having (as I have already mentioned) been established, composed of persons holding their offices only while they possess the confidence of the Assemblies, and the administration of the government being carried on by their assistance. In the other Colonies the representative bodies do not generally participate so directly, and in some scarcely at all, in the exercise of any power but that of legislation. When I come to treat of the affairs of particular Colonies, I shall have to notice the more important peculiarities in their Constitutions, and the reasons for allowing those peculiarities to continue: for the present I will confine myself to some general remarks, on the inexpediency of adopting the suggestion which has sometimes been made, that the system of government in all the Colonies possessing representative institutions should be assimilated to that which now exists in Canada.
The system now established in Canada is that of Parliamentary Government, that is to say government by means of parties. This form of government is now working well in that and the neighbouring provinces, and is probably on the whole the best plan hitherto adopted of enabling a Colony in an advanced stage of its social progress to exercise the privilege of self-government; it may therefore be regarded as the form which representative institutions, when they acquire their full development, are likely to take in the British Colonies. The experience however of our own Country, in which this system of government
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has so long flourished, may teach us that its advantages are by no means unmixed, even in communities the best adapted to it, but that there are considerable drawbacks to the benefits we derive from it. We know also that hitherto Parliamentary government has not been carried into successful operation for any considerable time, in any other country in the world but our own, and that it is little more than ten years since it was first attempted in any of our Colonies, while in none of them can it be said to have been brought into full operation until far more recently. Even this short experience of its working in the Colonies, would seem to show that it is suitable only to a community which is not a very small one, to a population in an advanced stage of civilization, which has had the advantage of some training by the working of a free constitution of a simpler kind, and, I should be inclined to add, in which Municipal institutions exist, capable of dividing with the Legislature the very large powers which it would engross, if in the absence of such institutions the representatives of the people had a virtual control over the appointment of the executive officers of the government.
In a small community the successful working of this system of government is rendered difficult, by the necessarily restricted number of members of the Legislature, and of persons qualified by their intelligence and education to fill the principal offices of the government, and at the same time in possession of sufficient means to devote their time to the public
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service, without adopting such employment as a permanent profession. Where the popular branch of the Legislature necessarily consists of only a small number of members, the increased importance which attaches to individual votes greatly increases the danger of those abuses to which party government is always liable, as will readily be understood by those who have observed the effect produced in this Country by a nearly equal division of parties. Even in the Assembly of Canada, although a numerous body, compared to most Colonial assemblies, it has been remarked that its great inferiority in numbers to the House of Commons has a decided and injurious effect upon its adaptation to the system of government now in force in that Colony. The want of a sufficient number of persons possessing the leisure and competence requisite to enable them to give up their time to the public service without adopting it as a profession, is even a greater difficulty in the way of the adoption in a small society of what has been called in the Colonies "responsible," but what may more properly be termed "party" or "parliamentary," government. Where the persons capable of holding office are very few, party contests have a tendency to run into extreme and dangerous bitterness. It may be questioned whether these considerations have been sufficiently attended to, and whether, in one at least of the North American Colonies, the inhabitants have not required prematurely the establishment of a system of
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government for which they are not yet sufficiently prepared.
Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the peculiar form of government to which the above remarks apply is by no means necessary for the enjoyment, by a Colony, of the advantages of a free government. If a representative Legislature exists, the people not only possess the power through their representatives of determining all questions relating to legislation, the imposition of taxes, and the expenditure of the public money, but they have likewise the means of expressing their opinion, in a manner which makes it certain that it will not be neglected, on the administration of the executive government. In those earlier days of our Colonial history, to which it is now so much the fashion to look for an example to be followed, these were the only securities for good government; and there can be no doubt that they are now far more effective than in those times, in consequence of the altered state of public opinion in this Country on such subjects, and of the increased facilities which now exist for bringing before Parliament any grievances of which the Colonists may have to complain. Nor is it immaterial to observe, that, even in the United States of America, Congress does not possess any such direct control over the executive government as that which is exercised by the Legislatures of Colonies in which Parliamentary government is established; and the President during the term of his office exercises an authority far larger, and far less subject to any check
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against abuse, than that which is vested in the Governor of a British Colony possessing a Representative Legislature. It is true that the President is elected by the people he is to govern, whereas the Governor of a British Colony is appointed by the Crown; but as the election of the President renders him in fact the nominee of a party, and creates many temptations for the exercise of the great power he possesses for mere party purposes, it may not unreasonably be questioned whether even greater securities are not required against its abuse, than are necessary in the case of a Governor entirely unconnected with all local parties, and who has the strongest interest in administering the affairs of the Colony entrusted to his charge with fairness, and in such a manner as to give general satisfaction to the inhabitants.
These observations on the general principles which ought to govern our Colonial Administration would be incomplete, without adding some remarks upon the important subject of Patronage. It is commonly believed, that one of the principal objects for which the Colonies are retained is the patronage which they are supposed to afford. It is impossible to conceive a greater delusion. It is now many years since the Colonies have afforded to the Home Government any patronage which can be of value to it as a means of influence in domestic politics. Since Parliament has ceased to provide, except in a very few special cases, for any part of the expense of the civil government of the Colonies, the Colonists have naturally expected
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that offices paid for by themselves should be filled up by the selection of persons from their own body, when this can be done without inconvenience. Accordingly offices in the Colonies have, for a considerable time, been for the most part practically disposed of by the Governors. It is true that these offices, when their value exceeds £200 a year, are in general nominally at the disposal of the Secretary of State, and, when vacancies occur, can only be filled up by the Governors, subject to the confirmation of the Crown signified by that Minister. But in the great majority of cases the recommendation of the Governors is accepted as a matter of course; the patronage therefore is in effect exercised, by them, and offices are filled up by the appointment of Colonists.
This practice prevails more or less completely in different Colonies according to circumstances. In the North American Colonies appointments may be said to have been for a long time given exclusively to residents; and in the other Colonies, having temperate climates and a European population, they have been chiefly so, perhaps with fewer exceptions than would have been for the real advantage of the Colonies themselves. I say with fewer exceptions than would have been for the real advantage of the Colonies themselves, because, until they reach an advanced stage in their progress, I believe that the appointment to some of the principal offices in the Colonies of persons not selected from the narrow circle of their own inhabitants, and imbued with the peculiar feel-
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ings and opinions which are apt to prevail in such communities, but chosen from among the well-educated gentlemen of the Mother-country, is calculated greatly to improve the tone of Colonial society, and to prevent it from gradually degenerating from the standard of manners and acquirements to which we are accustomed at home. It is also an advantage in small societies, as tending to mitigate the bitterness of that party spirit which is so often their bane, that, some of the offices of most importance should be filled up by persons from a distance, not connected with any of the small knots and cliques into which such societies usually become divided; while the interchange of appointments between different Colonies not only answers this object, but tends also to keep up among them a feeling of connection with each other and with the Empire of which all form a part. These remarks apply more especially to Judicial appointments, which, I believe, it would be wise, as a general rule, to fill up from the Bar of the Mother-country or of other Colonies, until the Colonies have made a considerable advance in wealth and population.
For these reasons it seems to me in the highest degree inexpedient, that a transfer of patronage from the Crown to any Colonial Authorities should be formally made. The existing arrangement enables the Secretary of State occasionally to depart from the restricted field of selection for important offices afforded by the society of the particular Colony, though practically this can be done very rarely; while
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the necessity imposed upon the Governor of reporting the reasons for his recommendations to vacant offices, and obtaining the confirmation of the Secretary of State for the provisional appointments he may make, affords no unimportant check on any abuse of the patronage thus exercised; especially as those candidates for employment, whose claims have not been admitted by the Governor, have the right of bringing their case by letters sent through his hands under the consideration of the Secretary of State.
In the tropical climates, where the number of residents of European race is comparatively small, and the Colonial society affords a still narrower field of selection, appointments are rather more frequently made from home; but even in these Colonies, the more important and lucrative situations are usually filled by the promotion of those who have held inferior appointments; and it is desirable, for the encouragement of the civil servants of the Government, that this course should in general be followed; though no positive or invariable rule can be laid down, and it is sometimes of great advantage to depart from the usual practice. The above observations apply to all appointments under the rank of Lieutenant-Governor, or President, administering the government of a Colony; and the effect of the practice I have described, which has been followed for some years by successive Secretaries of State, has been to reduce the number of appointments, really at the disposal of this Minister, within limits so narrow as to render the patronage an object
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of no importance as a means of obtaining political support for an Administration.
Governors and Lieutenant-Governors, it is true, are invariably appointed by the Crown, on the advice of the Secretary of State; but this patronage can only be looked upon as a source of difficulty and anxiety. The welfare of every Colony, and the alternative of success or failure in administering its affairs, are so mainly dependent upon the choice of a Governor, that I can hardly believe that any Secretary of State, even if he were insensible to all higher motives than a regard for his own interest and reputation, would willingly be guided in his selection by any consideration except that of the qualifications of the individual preferred. At the same time, the advantages of these appointments are not such as to lead to their being often accepted by persons who have much distinguished themselves by the ability they have shown; so that the services of men who have filled other important offices, and who would therefore be preferred for such situations, cannot be commanded. Hence the choice generally lies among: persons of less tried fitness.
I certainly shall not in this Letter attempt to canvas the merits of the various appointments to Colonial Governments which were made while it was my duty to advise the Queen on this subject; it would be impossible to do so without entering into considerations quite unfit for public discussion. I will only state generally, and I can with con-
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fidence appeal to you for the correctness of the statement, that no pains were spared which it was in my power to take, in order to secure the services, as Governors, of the persons who appeared to me most likely to discharge their important duties with judgement and ability; that the great majority of those appointed were known to me only by reputation and by their public services; that a very large proportion of the Governments filled up while I held office, were so by the promotion of persons already in the Colonial service, (it being my opinion, that the efficiency of that service, as a whole, would be increased by thus rewarding those who had distinguished themselves in it); and that the selection cannot, on the whole, be regarded as otherwise than successful, looking to the manner in which the affairs of the Colonies have been administered by the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors whom I recommended to the Queen. I will give in the Appendix a list of the persons so appointed, distinguishing those with whom I had no personal acquaintance previously to their nomination, and specifying the public services by which they were known to me 3.
I have observed in the earlier part of this Letter, that if the principles I have endeavoured to establish are admitted, it will follow that the Colonies ought to take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the charges they occasion.
The chief source of expense at present on account
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of the Colonies is their military protection, as the charges of their civil government are now generally paid by themselves; and the naval expenditure, which is frequently charged against the Colonies, cannot in my opinion be so with any justice, since, if we had no Colonies, I believe that the demands upon our naval force would be rather increased than diminished, from the necessity of protecting our commerce.
Our military expenditure on account of the Colonies is certainly very heavy, including the charges for the pay of the troops stationed in them; the cost of barracks and ordnance works, that of transport, and the large proportion of the dead weight of the army which is fairly chargeable to the Colonies. This expenditure ought, I think, to be very largely reduced; and the Colonies, now that they are relieved from all that is onerous to them in their connection with the Mother-country, should be required to contribute much more than they have hitherto done to their own protection. This would, in point of fact, be only a return to what was formerly the practice of this Country. In the early days of our Colonial history it is well known that the settlers, in what are now the United States, were thrown very much upon their own resources in their contests, not only with the Indians, but with the French, and that the Mother-country acted rather as an ally than as a principal in their wars. In the West Indies the Colonies were also required to contribute largely towards their own military protection; indeed it is only within the last twenty years that
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Jamaica has ceased to provide rations and barracks for the troops quartered there; and even now there is a relic of the ancient system, in the charge still borne by the Island, on account of the forts, though the keeping up of these forts has, I fear, become little more than a form.
I believe it was not until the time of the great revolutionary war with France, that nearly the whole burden of the defence of the Colonies was undertaken by this Country; but for the last fifty or sixty years this has been so generally done, and the charges on this account borne by the Colonies have been so few and inconsiderable, that a sudden change of system could not have been safely effected. The importance of returning to a sounder system was not however lost sight of, and we endeavoured to establish, and by degrees to act upon, the principle that the Colonies can only look to the Mother-country for military support in any dangers to which they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that Her Majesty's troops are not to be expected to undertake the duties of police, and of maintaining the internal tranquillity of the Colonies; and that the Colonies ought to undertake to provide for the expense of barracks for such of Her Majesty's troops as may be stationed in them for their protection. I except the case of those important naval and military stations, which are maintained rather with a view to the interests of the Empire at large, than those of the particular Colony, such for instance as Malta, Bermuda, etc., where the fortifica-
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tions are of far more importance to the Empire than to the Colony.
As a first step towards carrying these views into effect, instructions were transmitted to the Australian Colonies very early in your administration, for a large reduction of the force quartered there, and for the transfer of the barracks to the Colonial Authorities, except in Van Diemen's Land, where, on account of the large number of convicts, a different rule was of course adopted. The transfer of the charge for barracks to the Colonial Governments appeared to be one of the first steps which ought to be adopted in attempting to reduce our Colonial military expenditure; because the charge for barracks and military works is a very heavy one, and is also one which it is impossible effectually to check at the great distance of many of our Colonies. Copies of the correspondence with the Governor of New South Wales on this subject, containing a full explanation of the policy pursued on this subject, will be found in the Appendix 4. Although the principle thus acted upon in Australia was one which it was our intention to adopt as the general guide of our policy, there were strong reasons for beginning its application in Australia, and proceeding somewhat cautiously in acting upon it elsewhere. The Australian Colonies are, of all the Queen's dominions, the safest from attack by any foreign enemy; their position and the nature of the country render it impossible that in war such an enemy should do
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more than plunder and burn some of the seaport-towns, and even this would be effectually guarded against by a very small amount of exertion on the part of the Colonists, in erecting batteries and forming volunteer corps of artillery. In peace, there being no warlike natives (I confine these observations to the Colonies in Australia, excluding New Zealand), there is absolutely no danger to apprehend. Hence the amount of force required (except for purposes of police, which I do not conceive to form part of the proper duties of Her Majesty's troops) is very inconsiderable, and the Colonies may without difficulty undertake the charge of keeping in repair the barracks which have already been built. It is also to be remembered that the Australian Colonies have not lost anything by our recent commercial legislation: on the contrary, the effect of that legislation has been only to relieve them from restrictions, without depriving them of any peculiar and gainful privileges.
In other Colonies, though the same principle has already been partially acted upon, and was intended gradually to be so more completely, there were, as I have said, reasons for proceeding cautiously. In the North American Colonies the necessity of maintaining a considerable force arises almost entirely from their proximity to the United States, and from the fact that, if we were unfortunately involved in a quarrel with that Republic, our Colonies would be attacked as a means of injuring us. These Colonies, as I shall hereafter have occasion more particularly to show, had also
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suffered more really than any others from the changes of our commercial policy; and the moment when they were struggling with the difficulties thus brought upon them, was not one which could properly be chosen for calling upon them to submit to an entirely novel charge on account of their military expenditure. In the West India Colonies the commercial distress, which has for many years weighed so heavily upon them, formed a complete obstacle to their being now called upon for any contribution towards their military defence. But both in the North American and West Indian Colonies a large reduction of force has been effected (a part of this reduction having been only ordered, and not completed, when we left office), by which a very considerable saving has been made; and, in the former, the maintenance at the cost of this Country, of an irregular local force, which formerly cost £16,000 a year, has been discontinued, and steps have been taken towards the complete adoption of the same principle as in Australia. I shall have occasion, in adverting to the transactions of Canada, to return to this subject, and state more particularly what has been done there. The other Colonies are chiefly either garrisons, such as Malta and Gibraltar, or else already contribute largely to their own military expenditure, as Mauritius and Ceylon.
Other arrangements have also been made, with the view of gradually diminishing the military expense of the Colonies; of these one of the most important has
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been that for sending out pensioners, instead of detachments from the regular regiments of infantry, as convict guards, and for settling enrolled pensioners in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.
I am persuaded that if the policy which I have thus sightly sketched is followed up, and if the Colonies, as they become better able to bear the charge, are required to take upon themselves a larger share of their military expenditure, this burden on the Mother-country may at no distant period be reduced to a very moderate amount. Considering that it is little more than five years since the first steps were taken towards the adoption of this as a regular system of policy, and that during that brief period the disturbance of our commercial relations with the Colonies has imposed upon us the necessity of avoiding any hasty proceedings in carrying it into effect, the progress already made is as great as could reasonably be expected.
I fear that this preliminary explanation of the principles on which the administration of Colonial affairs was conducted while under my immediate direction, as a member of your Government, must have appeared tedious to you, to whom these views are so familiar, and with whom I have so often had to discuss them. I am, however, writing for the information of persons who have not your knowledge of the subject; and I trust that the general explanation I have now given will enable me, by avoiding repetitions, to compress within narrower limits than would otherwise be
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possible, without failing to make our policy intelligible to persons not possessing that knowledge, the account I propose to give of the principal events of the last six years in the different Colonies. But here for the present I will stop. In future Letters I intend to advert in succession to the several Colonies or groups of Colonies, and to call your attention to what is of most importance in their transactions, and in the discussions to which they gave occasion during the time of your Administration.
April 27, 1852.
