THE NATIVE WAR AT TARANAKI.
[Image of page 165]
THE NATIVE WAR AT TARANAKI.
IT is intended to write a short history of the Native insurrection in Taranaki; and in order that the reader may have a correct notion of the nature of the contest itself, and the probable consequences issuing from it, it will be necessary to make some preliminary observations on the course of events which led to the grave necessity for the Queen's representative in this colony to resort to extreme measures--measures which have resulted in a heavy destruction of life and property on the one hand, without having produced any commensurate success on the other. It will be a task of no small difficulty for the future historian of New Zealand to disentangle the facts from the audacious mis-statements and ingenious sophistries with which ignorance, fanaticism, and political ambition have severally done their utmost to involve a question, in its original merits remarkably clear; and if those who have lived in the colony from the beginning are sometimes obliged to grope their way amidst the palpable obscurity in which the contest of words involves the question, what wonder that the leading journal of England altogether despairs of unravelling it? A noble lord, no doubt looked on by a select circle of friends as the highest authority, since he had not only visited the colony, but had actually resided at the seat of war a whole week, very summarily disposed of it by informing the House of Commons that the war was got up by a collusion between the settlers and Mr. Parris, the Assistant Land Commissioner, for the sole purpose of getting more land. Amazing discovery! How much foundation there was for the charge, the recently published correspondence between Mr. Parris and Bishop Selwyn will show. Certainly the former gentleman and the generation of officials that preceded him can most conscientiously testify to the small amount of fellow-feeling between them and the New Plymouth settlers, an amount quite inadequate to produce such important results.
It was a great misfortune for New Zealand that the first settlement was in express opposition to the wishes of the British Government, which was for obvious reasons nevertheless compelled to accept the
[Image of page 166]
unwelcome addition to its already numerous family. This feeling of dislike was fostered and increased by the unwise antagonism of the New Zealand Company--a feeling which perhaps to this hour somewhat tinges the councils of the Colonial Office. At all events, it soon became apparent that the British Government was determined not to allow a repetition of the acts which disgraced the foundation of her former colonies; but unfortunately, in its zeal for humanity, it omitted to provide the necessary safeguards against an abuse of its privileges and misinterpretation of its motives, and "hence those tears." The system of concession to the natives once began, the descent into the lower regions of Maori thraldom was easy, nay inevitable. It reached its climax under Captain Fitzroy, and has lasted under successive governors up to the present time, having for its able practical exponent during the whole of that long time Mr. Donald McLean. It was not long before it began to bear fruit plenteously. Heki's rebellion in 1845 would have extended through the whole of the northern island, only that tribal wrongs were too deep to be so soon forgotten; and further, that then the Maoris knew of no bond of union, either real or shadowy, to direct their national instincts.
Sir George Grey managed by a lavish expenditure (his reign is popularly known as the flour and sugar period of our history) to make all smooth outwardly. He appeared, however, to be so satisfied with his success in governing these intractable savages, as to make it the basis of a series of dispatches, which must have been a welcome addition to the light literature of the Colonial Office library. As a proof that Sir George believed what he wrote, he recommended the withdrawal of one of the two regiments which composed the military strength of the colony, and indulged in delightful anticipations of an approaching millennium, when the mother country would be relieved of all military expenditure, except against foreign foes. Yet his native policy was continually giving evidences of its inherent weakness, and it was only by amazing tact, combined with great good fortune, that the evil day was put off. Sir George Grey left behind him a fair reputation for practical sagacity and administrative talent. Perhaps the majority even of colonists believed his mission to be a success, and that we should never have another native war. There were notwithstanding some few who believed otherwise, and who thought that in strict justice, Sir George's tenure of office should be
[Image of page 167]
renewed, and his policy be allowed to proclaim, through himself, its triumphant success or its disastrous failure.
Not long after Colonel Browne's assumption of office, an event took place which, from its novelty, could but attract immediate attention. We mean the native meeting in Waikato in the winter of 1857, which was attended by delegates from several tribes, and which meeting declared their determination to elect a king, and form a separate nationality. One of the fundamental laws of the new kingdom was to be--that the land was vested in the king, and was inalienable; and as it was intended to absorb the whole native race in this compact alliance, of course further extension of the colony would then be impossible. It is necessary to review these occurrences, as they have a most important bearing on the subject in hand, viz., the Taranaki war.
In the beginning of the year 1859, certain natives at Waitara--a small navigable river 10 miles to the north of the town of New Plymouth, flowing through a country of great natural beauty and fertility, entirely in the occupation of the native owners--guided no doubt by the motives which usually influence natives in these waters, of which personal ambition and tribal jealousy undoubtedly form a large share--determined on offering to the Government about 800 acres of land on the south bank of the river. It is noteworthy, although not in the remotest degree affecting the general question, that this spot of land is the most valuable (looking to the future) from Auckland to Whanganui. It is, in fact, the site for the town of the port of Waitara--and a noble site it is. The imagination in looking over it from one of the gentle eminences in the neighbourhood can easily conjure up the Waitara of a century hence--a great city, the river crowded with shipping, and spanned by magnificent bridges--massive docks and wharves, railroads north and south from the interior, and all the thousand appliances required in a mighty entrepot for the tens of thousands of fertile acres lying around it and far away into the interior. It is needless to say that it now lies, as it has always been, utterly waste.
The owners of this land, headed by a very respectable native called Teira, clearly announced their intention to sell it to the Government about the beginning of the year 1859. In March his Excellency Colonel Browne arrived. Teira and his followers went and
[Image of page 168]
tendered the land for sale. Teira's share and also that of his tribe was accepted. William King got up and opposed it, but proffered no counter claim. Governor Browne, before dismissing the Assembly, clearly and emphatically enunciated the sound English doctrine, that "he would protect every owner of land in his right to dispose of that land." A twelvemonth was allowed for all claimants to that piece of land throughout New Zealand to send their claims. Many did so, and were satisfied; W. King never made a claim to that land during the whole of that time, yet Governor Browne has been again and again accused of precipitancy. He no doubt will be yet, again and again--because these slanders are made for a purpose, they suit that purpose, therefore are repeated knowingly and wilfully. But the idea of precipitancy in native matters in Taranaki is simply absurd; and if the charge was confined to New Plymouth itself, refutation would be needless. The Government, with the experience of 20 years before them, have always, in purchasing land, very properly demanded in this place, an amount of evidence vastly greater than in any other part of New Zealand. The necessity for this extreme circumspection arises from the fact that the tribes in the Taranaki province being all more or less of plebeian tendencies, acknowledging no chief of paramount influence, have to be treated with individually; and considering the minute subdivision of land arising from the almost perfect communism of centuries, the conflict of claims may be imagined; and precisely this extra amount of elaborate caution was used in the Waitara purchase.
About the beginning of the year 1860, rumours began to circulate in the little province of Taranaki that W. King (who, it was long known had with his followers taken possession of the disputed land, and planted it) was to be summarily ejected. But little credit was given to this, as such an act of vigour was pronounced, quite to the satisfaction of the ordinary capacities of the province, to be altogether incredible, and well nigh impossible--never having before happened in the recollection of the oldest inhabitant. In fact, absolute, persistent, insolent, and open defiance of all laws, was the normal state of Maori society from the beginning, nearly 20 years ago, and indeed was almost considered as a settled domestic institution. But the settlers soon found that something was really intended, and immediately seconded the Government heartily and
[Image of page 169]
earnestly. The most perfect union among all classes prevailed, and a common sentiment inspired the whole, that the time to make the character of our country respected at once and for ever, was come. At the same time the Taranaki settlers well understood what a native war meant. Two strong stockades were immediately built. The whole country districts were abandoned to the enemy, and but few, of at least, the old settlers ever expected to see their comfortable and thriving homesteads again. It was one of those rare occasions when the heart of the whole community is stirred as one man, and men do not so much reason as feel, that the time for action is come; and most remarkably the feeling seemed to pervade all. Not ten able-bodied men left the place, even when no impediment was in the way, and a still further striking evidence of the strength of the affection the New Plymouth man feels for the land of his choice is afforded from the undeniable fact, that in spite of the blighted hopes and cruel sorrows of the last eighteen months, but few have finally deserted it.
On the 20th day of February, 1860, the surveyors were sent to make out the boundaries of the land, accompanied by the vendors Teira and others. As was anticipated, they were prevented from completing the survey by W. King's natives. At that time there were in New Plymouth about 200 of the 65th Regiment, a few Artillerymen and Engineers, and two guns, commanded by the subsequently notorious Brevet, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray. No one at all conversant with the feelings or opinions of the Maoris themselves, or who had taken pains to fathom their profound contempt for us as men, mingled with the darkest suspicions of our motives, could for a moment doubt that the contest on which we were entering would be stubborn and sanguinary. But, beyond contradiction, no man in Taranaki, and it perhaps can be added in all New Zealand, would have ever prognosticated that which has happened:-- 1st, That all the tribes in the province would at once become engaged in the quarrel, drawing in still other tribes, until the original casus belli was lost sight of; and, 2ndly, That the military leaders, whom the regular course of official succession or accident have brought on the stage, should have shown a degree of blundering incompetency such as is completely without a parallel.
[Image of page 170]
When, therefore, the settlers heard that, the survey being forcibly put an end to, an appeal was made. to Auckland for further reinforcements to take possession of the land at once, they could read no further into the future than that a sharp struggle was at hand, that their own outstanding property was doomed, and that they themselves would be called on to do their part towards vindicating the tarnished honour of Old England in these realms. It is true that they felt they had no reason to plume themselves on any special evidences of favour from the old country from the time they had first left its shores. On the contrary, they had good reason to feel almost daily, that they were suspected of evil designs on the Maoris, but nevertheless,--strong in their consciousness of innocence in this matter, they did not expect to find themselves baffled at every step they took to punish the wanton plunderers of their homes and murderers of their friends, and obliged tamely to stand by and witness these atrocities in the broad day within rifle shot. They therefore did not shrink to hazard both property and life to gain permanent peace and prosperity at last, being persuaded that most of the glorious privileges, which they had in due course inherited, had been originally won by a like painful process.
With the reinforcements from Auckland came also the Governor himself to superintend negotiations with the rebels, and, if necessary, sanction extreme measures. The space between the 1st and 5th of March was spent in fruitless endeavours to induce W. King to cease his opposition to the occupation. Among others, a deputation from the ministers of the different religious bodies deserve to be recorded. But all in vain; the old savage, true to his character, either met these proposals with sullen and ill-disguised contempt or more frequently refused to show himself. The land-league had already begun to do its work and bear its proper fruit. King well knew that he might rely on being seconded by the southern tribes, and years of impunity had encouraged him to believe that the Government even then, would give in. But the Governor could not and would not retract. Every consideration of justice and humanity, his own character as the Queen's representative, all combined to forbid such a step. Besides, had not every step of the procedure been well matured and were the results of twelve months' solemn deliberation?
On the 5th the Rubicon was passed, and a body of troops, 400 in
[Image of page 171]
number, under the command of Colonel Gold, took possession of the block without opposition--the natives sullenly leaving their pahs as the men-of-war's men entered them. People began to think that the game was already up. But they were quickly undeceived. For on the night of the 15th, a small pah, of a single row of palisades, shaped like an L, about 110 feet on the outside and 80 feet on the inside, and 33 feet across, had risen like an exhalation, just inside the boundary, on the table land, where one of the numerous gullies, each invariably holding a small stream, gradually shelved to the Waitara. They had also dug a number of subterraneous cells, with an opening in front commanding the approaches, and bomb-proof. No one can fail to observe, on looking at the site, and having a description of the structure that stood on it, that the audacious hardihood of 60 or 70 savages attempting to hold it against 300 or 400 disciplined men well supplied with artillery, almost exceeds belief. Had the force been properly handled, no one can doubt but that the pah would have been invested and taken within an hour, and every man of the garrison bayoneted either in the pits or as they attempted to escape. But it would seem that the foe, all through this disgraceful war ignorant and untutored as they are, have had juster and clearer conceptions of the mental calibre of our commanders than we have had ourselves. The plan adopted by Colonel Gold was to begin cannonading the west side at the safe distance of 750 yards, gradually approaching within 200 yards. By this time it was nightfall. The troops lay down where they were, extended a short distance to the right and left. But the whole of the eastward face, with the gully shelving down in front, was left totally unwatched and unguarded. On the next morning, about eight or nine o'clock, a fierce bombardment was again begun, striking awe and terror into the hearts of the foe looking on from the neighbouring eminences. It continued for about an hour, when, as the garrison made no sign, it was confidently believed by some that they were all killed. On closer inspection, however, it was found that they had ignominiously fled under cover of the night, leaving to the victorious troops as booty the empty pah and about half a ton of indifferent potatoes. As a small set-off however against the overpowering brilliancy of this remarkable passage-at-arms, two valuable men were mortally wounded on our side; the loss on the side of the rebels has also been correctly ascertained, and was--killed, none; slightly wounded, two. As might
[Image of page 172]
be expected, the moral effects of this first encounter with the native were not slow in developing themselves. If the Maoris had certain lingering fears up to this time that the Queen's soldiers would be prompt and terrible in their onslaught, the illusion was at once dispelled. Their hopes of ultimate success rose immediately, and the wavering among them were at once decided. In the course of a few days, Manahi (or Manasses) with a number of his followers, whose relations with the settlers had always been of the closest nature, deserted to the enemy, carrying the guns and ammunition which, on the occasion of their swearing fealty to the Queen, a week or two before, had been liberally supplied to them.
A plan was laid by some of those in authority and the details well considered and digested, for surprising the arch-rebel Manahi and his followers at their village, Ratapihipihi, about four miles from town. About 200 men arrived from Waitara late on the night of the 24th. It was arranged that in combination with a body of militia and volunteers, they should be taken by night by well-known paths, so as to be well in ambush all around the enemy, and not show themselves till at a preconceived signal, at daybreak. The whole was under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Murray. The entire plan was rendered futile--1st, by the troops not starting within an hour of the time agreed on; 2ndly, by the wrong route being taken. There was almost but one opinion that the failure was predetermined by the commanding officer himself, and the same also applies to Colonel Gold's failure at the L pah. Indeed, throughout the whole subsequent course of the war, it is impossible not to observe, that in each of the commanders who one after another appeared on the scene, the same obstinate determination to throw away a rare succession of opportunities, which--now that the crafty foe have learnt and profited by experience--any future general may long covet in vain. And this consentaneousness of action looks more than the result of mere accident.
The blundering attempt of the Government to arrest Manahi afforded a good pretext (which they eagerly embraced) to the southern tribes, with whom he was closely connected, to commence hostilities. They immediately began plundering and destroying the settlers' property about Tataraimaka and Omata, and on the 27th, Manahi himself planned and perpetrated the cold-blooded murders
[Image of page 173]
of Shaw, Ford and Passmore, and the two boys, Parker and Pote.
Wednesday, March 28th, will ever be memorable in the annals of Taranaki as the day when the rebels met with the first check to what they might hitherto have well considered their career of victory. It is a well ascertained fact that an attack on the town was fully intended either on this day or the day after; and from what we now know of the character of those on whom would have devolved the defence of a straggling town, open on all sides, and filled to overflowing with women and children, we might stand aghast at the tremendous peril which cowardice and incapacity would have hazarded. Thanks to the settlers themselves, backed by the Governor, whom the men of Taranaki will hold in everlasting remembrance, for the way in which he fulfilled his duty on that trying day, the tide of battle was turned, and the mixed crew of marauders and murderers was sent back to then homes discomfited and broken.
About the middle of the day succeeding the murders, word was brought into town that three or four families had been foolhardy enough to remain in their houses during the enacting of the awful scenes in their neighbourhood. Two of the heads of these families, it afterwards appeared, presumed on the sacredness of their office. The whole, however, had a most narrow escape, and were saved from sacrifice entirely by the exertions of two neutral chiefs. The truth of this has since been fully confirmed, as these tribes have repeatedly declared that for the future they will neither spare age, nor sex, nor station, nor even the sick; and they have hitherto, it must be admitted, been scrupulously consistent in the due performance of their vows. The whole of the volunteers and some of the militia, in all about 140 men, offered to go and bring these families in. By the request of the Governor, the light company of the 65th and about 30 marines of the Niger were sent to co-operate. The civil force took the beach, the military the road, with, it is affirmed, strict orders to go no further than the 'Whaler's Corner,' about midway between the town and the spot where the unfortunates were living; and Colonel Murray, in command of the whole, had Colonel Gold's directions to bring back his men before dark.
The militia and volunteers, on arriving at a certain gully debouching into the sea, containing a small stream called Waireka,
[Image of page 174]
left the beach to reach their destination, but found themselves almost immediately engaged with natives, pouring down from the direction of the Omata village, and lining the gullies, branching out in various directions. The onset of the Maoris was exceedingly fierce; but the volunteers and militia steadily advanced, and gained the cultivated plateau, doing great execution on the foe with the rifle. In the meanwhile, the soldiers, marines, and a party of militia from the Omata stockade had come by the inland road, and, crossing some fields, operated on the left flank, and thereby afforded most sensible relief to the hard-pressed militia and volunteers. But long before nightfall Colonel Murray ordered the retreat to be sounded, and drew off the whole of the men under his immediate orders; and all check in that direction being removed, the savages closed hard on three sides, and compelled the civilian force to concentrate on a house about 200 yards on a line from the beach, where they hastily threw up a rude fortification of firewood, sheaves of oats, &c., and, with ammunition nearly expended, kept the Maoris at bay. Colonel Murray, in reply to a messenger, who at great risk crossed over and demanded further assistance, and, above all, a supply of ammunition, answered that they had got into a mess, and might get out of it as they best could.
About six o'clock a most powerful diversion was made in favour of the beleagured militia by the arrival of about 60 blue-jackets under command of Captain Cracroft, of the Niger, who marched up the main road, and, in true man-of-war style, attacked the rebels, entrenched and fortified position on the crest of a hill about half a mile from where the settlers lay. The pah (if it can be dignified with the name) was taken at once, without loss, excepting a few wounds to the assailants. This little affair was most opportune, and was the turning point of the day. The Maoris, dispirited by the losses they had sustained in the field, with the capture of the key to their position and their flags, drew off, leaving the dead and wounded behind.
Meanwhile the militia force, in ignorance of what had happened, and supposing the enemy to be still lurking around them, waited till the moon was set, and calling in a small detachment who held the communication between them and the beach, deliberately and slowly commenced their march homewards by the inland road, with
[Image of page 175]
skirmishers before, behind, and on both flanks, carrying their dead and wounded with them; but no living foe was seen, and they occasionally stumbled, in the dark, over a dead body. They reached home soon after midnight, meeting a strong body of military and civilians on their way to succour them.
In the course of the narration of the events of this memorable day, however desirable it may be, still it is clearly impossible to ignore individual responsibility. We have spoken of Colonel Murray's desertion of the civil force, and consequent disobedience of the orders of his superior officer; for his orders to be home before dark clearly must have been intended to apply to the whole force under his command, any attempt to separate it being contrary to the routine of the service. No message or order was conveyed to the officer in command of the militia and volunteers to join Colonel Murray and return home, and whatever may be the result of the late Court of Enquiry on that office, the verdict of public opinion is, that the desertion of the civil force on that day was base, cowardly, and detrimental to the public service, and when it is considered that it, i. e., the civil force, consisted principally of young men and boys under 21--that scarcely a man of it, except the gallant commander of the Rifle Volunteers (Captain Strapp) had been in action before--the men of Taranaki may well attribute their deliverance first to an ever-watchful Providence; second, to their own stout hearts and the gallant intervention of Captain Cracroft and the blue-jackets, with whom must be included the brave First-lieutenant Blake and the marines of the Niger.
It now becomes necessary to offer a few reflections on the obvious enquiry, why was not a success so gloriously begun at Waireka immediately followed up? The disgrace of the astounding fatuity which refused to profit by such an unmistakeable interposition of Providence, rests with Colonel Gold, in supreme command. It may be here observed that it was only by repeated and urgent request from the Governor that he at length sent out the relief which met the militia and volunteers on their return. Incredible as it may seem, although the most fearful doubts about them were universal, Colonel Gold was so frantically possessed with apprehensions for the safety of the town that he long resisted all expostulations and entreaty. As soon as the return of the civilians sufficiently showed how matters stood, strong representations
[Image of page 176]
were made by the Governor and others to send out a mixed force before daylight, and to land another force down the coast to interrupt the enemy on their retreat, and the commonest intelligence would have also suggested the advisability of planting a couple of ambuscades on their line of retreat, beautiful spots for which were well known, and the enemy were so occupied in howling over their dead that there was but little chance of such an ambuscade being detected. But all to no purpose. The town, the town; was the ever-present object of insane terror to the Colonel's imagination.
The rebels were engaged during the greater part of Thursday in carting away their dead and wounded, and collecting their arms. The casualties on our side were one militia-man killed, 6 wounded, 2 or 3 very severely, 1 marine killed, 6 blue-jackets and soldiers wounded. The loss on the side of the rebels it is always difficult to discover. They acknowledge to 17 killed on the field; among them was Paora, head chief of Taranaki, and Hanatana, head chief of Ngatiruanui. Their total loss in dead probably amounted to at least 30. Not the slightest impediment was offered to their operations on Thursday, although it would seem they expected it, as the dead buried on the battle-field were scarcely covered with earth.
We cannot but regard the glorious but inconclusive fight at Waireka with mixed feelings of pride and disgust. It has shown Englishmen at home that the old hereditary valour of their race, which won Cressy and Poictiers, Trafalgar and Waterloo, is not extinct even now, and small as it is in comparison, it will exercise a beneficial influence on the volunteer movement there. Those, on the other hand, whose strong minds are too apt to dwell exclusively on what they believe to be the external designs of Providence, will be apt to draw fresh evidences from the incidents at the L pah, at Waireka, at Puketakauere, from the incessant course of events up to the present--that the Maori race is doomed. Had the L pah been taken, and every man inside bayoneted, the whole rebellion, we in Taranaki firmly believe, would have been nipped in the bud, hundreds, aye, perhaps thousands of human lives would have been saved, and Waireka would never have been fought. Had Waireka been well fought out, Puketakauere and the concatenation of miseries up to the present would never have been, and who can venture to assert that these troubles are at an end?
[Image of page 177]
On Friday morning the Niger steamed to the Southward and shelled the rebels' pahs, most likely without much if any loss to them, but no doubt to their intense alarm, as they fully expected an invasion of their territory.
No further molestation of the Southern tribes took place until the 20th of April, when a large force, consisting of about 500 of the 65th, and 150 blue-jackets from the Pelorus and Cordelia, with heavy guns and a great team of baggage carts, started for the Southward, went about 25 miles, and returned on the 30th, without having seen scarcely a rebel. Their performances amounted to the destruction of a little wheat, a few old wharfs, and a slight damage to their mill, which the rebels were able to repair themselves, and set to work almost immediately. This mill was of the most signal service to them during the succeeding summer in supplying the Waikato combatants with flour and damper.
Strong reinforcements continued to arrive from Australia during the next two or three months, but no further movement was made, although W. King was reinforced by a party of Waikatos, 150 strong, and events were fast tending to make his quarrel an undisguised King movement, and a general agitation in his favour was going on among most of the tribes.
The next salient point in the history of the war was the disastrous fight of Puketakauere, of which it is not too much to say that it was the crowning disgrace of the whole war--that it has already produced events pregnant with importance, and that its hidden influence on the future history of the native race of New Zealand can scarcely be overestimated. It happened in this wise. The Waitara was held by a gallant officer (Major Nelson) with a detachment of the 40th Regiment, and a party of seamen from the Pelorus, under Capt. Seymour. On Tuesday, June 26, it was known in town that an attack was intended on the morrow on the Puketakauere pah, a strong position about half a mile inland of the site of the L pah. On Wednesday morning, about daybreak, the force, consisting of the Light and Grenadier Companies--as fine a body of men as any in the British service--and 60 marines and blue jackets, with the artillery, intending to operate on the north and west sides, moved out of camp in the direction of Puketakauere. Another party of 50 men was posted on the Waitara flat to the eastward, on a much lower level than the
[Image of page 178]
pah, and a third party of about the same strength, passed along the river banks, and attempted to take the pah in the rear. These two last divisions were separated by a considerable interval (perhaps half a mile) from each other and the main division, and this proved unquestionably a fatal mistake. The whole of the ground was covered with fern, much of it six or eight feet high. It was at the time, and is to this day firmly believed in Taranaki, that there was a plan fully preconcerted between Major Nelson and Colonel Gold, and that the battle was begun in the thorough expectation that reinforcements would be forwarded at the proper juncture. Confirmatory of this opinion is the fact that a body of friendly natives was collected at the Bell Block (midway between the town and Waitara) with the view of operating on the enemy's inland pahs, and thereby distracting his attention. But as has so often happened during this war, the plan was carried out no further, no one could understand why. Yet Colonel Gold, in his letter to the 'Times,' published just after his arrival in England, says, in reference to the Puketakaure business, "with reference to your article on Major Nelson's attack on the Waikato pah at Waitara, I had neither the knowledge that such would take place, nor had I arranged any combined movement whatever with him. It is true I made a reconnoisance as far as Mahoetahi, where I was anxious to form an outpost, but (independently of the river being impassable) I could not have advanced further without endangering the town, and its 2,000 women and children." However official conventionalism may gloss over this wilful perversion of known facts, it is quite certain that here there is but one opinion on the subject.
To return to our narrative. Early in the fight most of the natives left the pah, and fought in the entrenchments outside, and in the high fern around. Notwithstanding the opinion that was held by the commanders at the time, it is pretty certain that they did not much, if at all, exceed the troops in number. But then the latter fought under many disadvantages--they were the attacking party-- they disdained (and were encouraged by their officers in the senseless infatuation) to avail themselves of the cover which rendered their wily foe but rarely visible. Yet, spite of all this, it had been ascertained beyond doubt that their loss had not yet exceeded that of the enemy, and more important still, the friendly natives declare that at
[Image of page 179]
the very time that Major Nelson, disappointed at the non-arrival of succour, and under the mistaken notion that fresh swarms of Maoris were constantly arriving from the bush, gave the order for retreat, the natives themselves were on the point of giving in. They were not slow to benefit by then unexpected good fortune, and pressed fiercely on the rear of the retreating columns, but were checked by a discharge of grape and canister. They then naturally threw their whole force at the two detachments on the flat by the river. These unfortunates were trying to regain the camp by way of the river bank, and there seems to be but little doubt, on finding themselves cut off from the main body, and with the whole force of savages concentrated on them, they lost heart, and fled in confusion. Ignorant also of the country, they became entangled in a swamp, and were then an easy prey to their infuriated pursuers. Twenty-nine poor fellows never returned to camp, and most of the number were cruelly slaughtered on the next and following days, as they were found helpless and bleeding in the fern; and while a great part of these foul transactions, which affix an indelible disgrace on the British name, were going on, a strong British force was within a little more than two miles, every heart of which (except the commander's) we may be sure, was burning to relieve their distressed countrymen. For in consequence of the firing heard, even the feeble-hearted Colonel was aroused to something like action, and sent off men and guns during the morning, with himself at their head. On arriving at an old pah, called Mahoetahi, lying on the route about 2 1/2 miles in a direct line from Puketakaure, he stopped the force, and with the miserable excuse that the Waiongona river was unfordable (although the Mangoraki, about the same size, had just been passed without wetting the men higher than the legs), persuaded himself that everything was quiet, and that no assistance was wanted. Amidst the indignant hootings of his men, he ordered an immediate return to town. Had he gone on even then many valuable lives would have been saved, and perhaps the ill fortune of the morning might have been retrieved.
By the events at Puketakauere, as might be naturally expected, such an impulse was given to the rebellion, north and south, that by the time that, General Pratt arrived from Melbourne with fresh reinforcements, about the beginning of August, the whole country
[Image of page 180]
was ravaged by fire and sword, inside the limits of the town itself. The barracks, which had been erected for a company of soldiers at the Henui, was destroyed by fire, and barbarous murders committed with impunity up to our suburbs. Naturally enough the ruined and harrassed settlers of Taranaki welcomed the arrival of a new commander with unmingled satisfaction. They could not imagine that even the English military service could, on such a limited field as New Zealand, reproduce so soon the main features of Colonel Gold's system. Yet so it was. It was soon found that General Pratt's stunted intellect could supply him with no adequate check to the wily audacity and practical common sense of these children of nature, and to the ceaseless activity of the foe he had nothing to offer but old obsolete dogmas of civilized warfare, befitting the time and circumstances of Marlborough and Frederick the Great. Indeed, the natives, emboldened at length by constant impunity, despised even the commonest precautions, and the whole of the first part of General Pratt's career in New Zealand was a dreary succession of absurd military spectacles which the foe could always witness at a safe distance. And from the commencement of the war they practically held entire possession of the country, --living gloriously at our expense, in a style of primitive abundance and rude luxury, such as never before a Maori imagination could have dreamt of.
Both of those men (Colonel Gold and General Pratt) were apparently quite incapable of taking a statesman-like or even patriotic view of the war. The true nature of the contest, viz., open rebellion and defiance of their Sovereign's authority, seems never to have cost these liege servants of the Queen a thought. They knew it had the effect of necessitating a change in the even tenor of their way, which was extremely unpleasant--that an amount of vigilance, forethought, and ceaseless exercise of the higher faculties of the man were required, which when the entered the service, they had not at all calculated on. They therefore professed to look on the war as brought on by the cupidity of the settlers for more land, and which consequently should be put an end to with the least possible trouble to themselves. And as they looked on the service in which they were engaged with extreme aversion, it is not likely they should regard the Taranaki settlers--the alleged cause of it--with extraordinary favor. During the whole of winter and spring of 1860 the militia and
[Image of page 181]
volunteers had ample proof given them that they were expected to contribute more than their share to pickets, escorts, and fatigue duties generally. It was also observed that as a rule on any of the expeditions, the volunteers were usually the advance guard. These things, however, are only spoken of incidentally as showing the system on which the war has hitherto been conducted, and we think they will help to explain why the presence of a large force, so fully and perfectly equipped--possessed of all the attributes which ought to ensure success--has been so barren of favourable results.
At length, General Pratt, after keeping his men in a state of inaction (excepting on parade days and an occasional escort with provisions to the two blockades on the main line of road north and south from the town--the line of communication to Waitara had been always maintained by sea), organized a combined movement for attacking the southern rebels in their encampment near Omata. It must, however, be understood that on several occasions, when the Maoris were engaged in large numbers near the town in burning and destroying property, driving off cattle, horses, and indeed doing everything which is usually included in the term, "ravaging an enemy's country," and that up to the town itself the General undoubtedly took measures to stop them; but how? By sending a force of all arms, accompanied by artillery, tumbrils, and ambulances along the main lines of road, most frequently in one body. As may be supposed, as the troops advanced, the Maoris retired to the skirts of the forest, and re-occupied the ground as soon as the troops left. The only merit appertaining to this plan of dealing with the enemy is the very questionable one of extreme simplicity. On one occasion, when the General so far deviated from his system as to endeavour to outflank his adversary, it proved so far a success that they killed and fairly bagged a Maori--a most uncommon occurrence in those days. But as a general rule all attempts to circumvent the crafty foe by stratagem or night attacks were loftily despised, and all advances made by the civilians to make their perfect knowledge of the surrounding country available to the military authorities invariably met with no encouragement. When a rare endeavour at a surprise was made, it was altogether so clumsily done, with such an obvious disregard of common precaution as to render its failure
[Image of page 182]
inevitable, and throw an air of insincerity over the whole proceeding. The movement to which we have above referred on Burton's Hill on the night of September 5th was precisely of this kind. No action was taken until the southern tribes, enriched with the plunder they had been collecting for weeks, were evidently preparing for a start. During the morning of the 5th it was telegraphed from the Omata stockade that they were moving, and in the afternoon that they were in full march. Yet the details of the expedition still went on, and at 11 o'clock 500 or 600 men started in three bodies; yet so ill contrived was the attack, that one of the divisions (No. 3), in the event of hostilities, would not have been at the place indicated for hours after the others, and the commander of No. 2 clearly had no distinct idea of what he was expected to do. The whole force, of course, returned to town as wise, and no wiser than they went. Now, it will be a matter of profound astonishment for future generations of settlers to have pointed out to them the route by which a great train of loaded carts, with a herd of the choicest cattle and horses in Taranaki, passed to the southward; and it will also he interesting, but by no means complimentary to the courage and manliness of their forefathers, for them to know, that not the slightest molestation was offered to these plunderers and murderers. Colonel Gold's conduct at Waireka, incredible as it seems, has been far eclipsed, all things considered, by General Pratt on this and subsequent occasions equally bad. The northern rebels were allowed, in even a more open manner about the same time, to carry off several cart loads of valuables, and a large herd of cattle and horses, by the beach track between the town and Bell Block stockade! Colonel Gold might have pleaded inexperience in Maori warfare, and insufficient force; but General Pratt had all the benefits derivable from Colonel Gold's mistakes, and nearly treble the number of men.
The next move of importance after General Pratt's arrival was on the 10th September, when, with a large force of all arms, he marched to Waitara, and was joined by a reinforcement from the camp, making the whole attacking body upwards of 1000 men. He destroyed two or three empty pahs, but was stopped at the first bush by an insignificant body of natives, less than 100 in number, who fired on the advanced guard, and killed one man. The General
[Image of page 183]
contented himself with expending a vast amount of ammunition--in raking the timber in all possible directions with his guns, inflicting (as was proved) but little damage on the Maoris, and then retired, fired on to the last by the enemy. It was a subject for general and indignant animadversion among the force engaged, that no attempt was made to recover the body of the man who had fallen. This disgraceful indifference to the fate of our men increased the feelings of contempt and dislike which the Maoris before felt for us; but it redounds to their credit that, at the cessation of hostilities, in March, the grave was found, which proved that the poor man had been decently interred.
The next noticeable episode in the history of the war was the occasion (September 29) when the Maoris, disdainful of what they believed to be the sheer pusillanimity of their adversaries, no longer waited for the onset, but boldly attacked in fair open ground.
A strong column, consisting of the 40th, sailors and marines, with three howitzers, under Colonel Leslie, marched to the old pahs taken and partially destroyed on the 11th--Kairau and Ngataiparima--to fill in rifle pits; the natives soon commenced firing on them at a distance, but emboldened by impunity on the column commencing its return, they gradually approached nearer, until they were actually within 150 yards of the rear guard, and five men were wounded. The men had strict orders not to fire, although the guns were loaded with grape and canister. At length it became necessary to make some kind of demonstration, or the rear-guard would have been sacrificed; and there can be no doubt but the whole force was panic-struck, and the retreat became a regular flight. They therefore turned and fired without orders, and the Maoris retired. As a punishment for their disobedience, on their return to camp the men were severely reprimanded, and had their grog stopped!
Now, arguing from this and other congenial occurrences, it is impossible to explain the disgrace entailed on the British arms at all satisfactorily, but in one way, viz., that the General would in the end prove himself the Nestor of the British army--was luring the foe to destruction--and at the proper time would annihilate them at a blow. This truly was the opinion at one time very commonly held in Taranaki. How miserably their expectations have been falsified--
[Image of page 184]
how General Pratt has proved himself in the art of war neither an Ajax, "fierce, inexorable, impetuous," nor a "crafty Ulysses," excellent in council, but a very common-place individual--an ornament, we dare say, in private life, but sadly out of place at the head of an army, the world has now had ample opportunities of judging.
As it must necessarily be patent to all that a General with 1500 men under him would be expected to be doing something more than maintain possession of a small town and three outposts. That something proved to be another fussy demonstration to the southward.
On the 9th October, General Pratt, with a force of all arms numbering upwards of 1000 men, four guns, fifty carts laden with ammunition and supplies, moved from the town. They fell in with the enemy at Kaihiki, about sixteen miles from New Plymouth. There they occupied three small pahs, insignificant enough to look at, but really formidable from their weakness, offering no resistance to artillery, but allowing shot and shell to go through them freely. But the rears of all were considerately left open. So when they found a sap approaching them, and the places generally becoming too hot for them, the enemy's fire became silent, and on rushing the pahs, nobody was found inside. The casualties on our side were five wounded; those on the side of the enemy were unknown. It was known at the time that the enemy had retreated a few miles inland, and naturally expected they would be pursued. The General, however, thought that the glory of taking three pahs was sufficient for the time; and it was therefore with no great surprise that the expedition (they had become used to these things) heard on the night of the 12th that they would be on their way homeward to-morrow. General Pratt rested on his laurels for nearly a month, and it was only the daring temerity of the rebels which even then caused an interruption of the state of calm.
On the 5th November, information was brought to town that a party of Waikatos, lately arrived to join W. King, had occupied the old pah of Mahoetahi, on the line of road to Waitara, rendered remarkable as the extent of Colonel Gold's march towards Waitara on the memorable day of Puketakauere. Early in the morning of the 6th, a force numbering full 600 men, with two 24-pounders,
[Image of page 185]
marched out towards Waitara. On crossing the Mangoraka, the militia and volunteers, under their stalwart Major, were on the left flank, and were extended into the high fern. The Waikatos commenced by firing on the front line of skirmishers, who continued to advance until within about 200 yards, when they rushed up the hill, and quickly gained possession of the left and centre, with the assistance of the 65th, dispatching all they met with. The right side was still occupied by the foe, as also a swamp encircling the end. This party severely enfiladed the pah, and here the volunteers and 65th met with their loss. Meanwhile Major Nelson had come up on the north front with a column from Waitara, and this reinforcement turned the enemy's flank, and after a struggle the latter fled in confusion down the only outlet left to them--viz., the road leading to Huirangi--pursued by the avenging 40th, who remembered on that day their slaughtered comrades at Puketakauere. The enemy left behind in the swamp were killed by the bayonets of the 65th and volunteers. Thirty-one killed and six wounded were left on the field, and one prisoner. The whole of the enemy's losses must have amounted to sixty or seventy. The loss on our side was four killed and sixteen wounded.
Thus ended the battle of Mahoetahi, in which all engaged, it must be fairly acknowledged, acquitted themselves like men! Yet, if the relative numbers be considered, we cannot congratulate ourselves on its particular brilliancy. It is a most invidious task to be always obliged to note the shortcomings of public men, especially when in many things we cannot but heartily admire and approve of their conduct. We are ourselves in this painful position. Nothing could be finer or more chivalrous than the bearing of General Pratt and staff on this day. Wherever the firing was hottest and the danger greatest, they were seen encouraging their men by that which best of all promotes discipline and ensures influence--viz., personal example. But truth compels us to declare that at Mahoetahi, after the commencement of the battle--of generalship there was none. It was a simple and straightforward affair of British pluck dashing up the hill with one single object in view--viz., to get at the enemy; and had four times the number occupied it, no one can for a moment doubt but the result would have been the same. But a simple thing would have closed the only avenue of escape, and have put the
[Image of page 186]
whole (excepting a few who got clean off at the first rush) completely in our power. But that single thing was not done, and therefore the victory was not complete. Again, in accordance with the now-recognised principles of conducting this war, there was no attempt at following up what was so auspiciously begun, and reaping material advantages from the terror and panic inspired by their unexpected reverse. Instead, therefore, of at once going on and attacking W. King's stronghold, the expedition went back to town, leaving a detachment to hold and fortify the hill.
We now come to that part of our story which may be perforce considered the campaign of the war--viz., the operations at Waitara, commencing at December 28, and finally ending March 18. The system of operations pursued, the main feature of which was the never-to-be-forgotten sap, have been greatly criticised, and will perhaps be still more. Without pretending for a moment that it was a success, or that it at all fulfilled what ought to be the main object of the war, still, on calm reflection, one cannot but see that it was, after all, a decided improvement on the expeditionary system. These, in the eyes of the Maoris, were simple absurdities, conveying an impression that we were both fools and cowards. But the vis inertia of the sap gradually creeping on them like a nightmare, the steady pertinacious courage of our men, and the swift and terrible nature of their retribution they dealt out whenever they (the Maoris) gave them a fair chance, and the daily, and, in the aggregate, heavy losses they sustained, must have tended to impress them with the stern determination of their opponents, and have recalled to their minds certain traits in the British character, by the depressing influence of these latter days almost forgotten. We can, therefore, but regard the strange history of events comprehended in those three months with more fervour than has been usual to accord it. It was so far successful that by it the ducks were invited to come and be killed, and they were killed accordingly. A loss of 200 men, which they confess to here and at Mahoetahi, is a very heavy per centage on 1500 or at the most 2000 men, and has also this recommendation, that if the war begins again, we shall have this number the less to fight. All things considered, we believe that General Pratt committed far greater mistakes than that of encouraging the Maoris to waste their energies and expend their resources on his
[Image of page 187]
ever-advancing earthwork. Judging from his antecedents, an attack on the large body of natives at Waitara on the orthodox plan, would not have been attended with very hopeful results, and might have ushered in a succession of most disastrous consequences. It may be argued that the sap would never have gained the object for which we have been fighting, viz., to conquer the natives and inspire them with a feeling of the utter hopelessness of resistance. Granted; but to do all this was not within the scope of General Pratt's genius; it is left for some far abler man than he, and whatever maybe the result of Sir George Grey's second mission to New Zealand, unless twenty years' intercourse with the natives has taught us nothing, the thing will have to be done yet.
The motives which induced the natives to consent to an armistice and finally to evacuate Waitara, it is almost impossible to interpret. Of course there were a variety of feelings in operation. As semisavages have not the power of reflection, so neither have they the fixedness of purpose of more cultivated races, and these two deficiencies constitute their most remarkable points of distinction. They were probably tired out by the singular deliberation and pertinacity of their adversaries, not being altogether elated in summoning up their gains, and they wished to change the venue to a more fortunate field.
In concluding this brief narrative of the native war of Taranaki, wo would observe that truth and duty has compelled us to be severe in our strictures on its military conduct. But the political part of it, more especially as regards the policy pursued towards the natives themselves, including those who are termed friendly natives, has been equally disgraceful and infatuated, and in justice, General Pratt cannot be charged with this. The fault lay with the Governor and his Executive, and the tendency of this system during the whole of the war has been to disgust the whole of those natives who were our staunch friends, and who really could and were willing to assist us, in the hopes of gaining over a few deceitful vagabonds, whose friendship, if sincere, would be valueless. And notwithstanding the obvious emergency--the natural anxiety the Governor felt to disentangle the Waitara land from the quarrel--the people of Taranaki feel that either he or his subordinates, in carrying out the details of the peace, were guilty of many measures, senseless in the appli-
[Image of page 188]
cation and derogatory to the honor of Her Majesty's representative.
Finally, we feel we cannot end better than by saying a few words to the men of all arms, whose lot for so many months was cast with the settlers of Taranaki. It has all along been quite clear that the fault of the war not being long ago sealed in such a way as to confer illustrious renown on all engaged in it, did not rest with the men or subordinate officers. They were equal to anything. A finer body of men, both morally and physically, could not be. The memory of the people of Taranaki will long dwell with pleasure on the civil, orderly, and genial deportment of those engaged in both Her Majesty's services, who passed with them in such close companionship the eventful year 1861.
