CHAPTER IV. THE REVERSE AT MOTUROA.
[Image of page 42]
CHAPTER IV.
THE REVERSE AT MOTUROA.
I AT once made up my mind to transfer my headquarters with all the available A. C. (70), and such Patea volunteers as I still had, to Wairoa, and endeavour to prevent Titokowaru's incursion into the settled districts beyond the Waitotara. I felt sure the Government would approve my action, though I technically left the district over which my command extended. If the Ngarauru had joined I knew Titokowaru's force must be largely increased, probably to 500 or 600 at least, so to approach equality in numbers I must rely on the friendly natives. Therefore they were ordered to Wairoa, and a section under Hunia obeyed, and followed the little column of Europeans sent in advance to Wairoa. But the bulk of the Wanganuis marched down the coast to the Waitotara mouth. This was not ascertained till evening, and happily at the same time intelligence reached me that a new recruit division from Auckland had disembarked at Wanganui, and was on its march to join the Field Force.
I now examined Captain Hawes, who commanded
[Image of page 43]
the settlers at Wairoa, who had enrolled themselves as militiamen, and erected a strong redoubt. His force, about sixty of all kinds, had not been idle under him. He had patrolled the whole of the surrounding country, and the day before Titokowaru's arrival had visited Moturoa, a clearing in the bush at the foot of the Okotuku hill, where we had vaguely learned the enemy was now encamped. Captain Hawes readily agreed to bring some of his men, and to guide a column to Moturoa, where he assured me there was no kind of fortification, only a day or two before. I saw that in that case the sooner we attacked the less probability there would be of a pah being erected, or at least completed, and therefore the more hopeful my chances. Consequently I resolved to move before daybreak, and endeavour to engage Titokowaru before his fortifications were ready. No. 6 came up late in the afternoon, and a very fine body of young men they were. The commanding officer, Captain Roberts, favourably impressed me, and I was delighted to find the men eager to go into action next day, though just arrived from a long march and sea voyage. They were rather a young average of men, and I thought it best to take out of the ranks those who appeared the weakest and youngest, and to leave them in the redoubt to take the place of the Wairoa settlers, who, to the number of about forty, were to accompany the
[Image of page 44]
expedition. I now gave out orders for the march, a little after midnight, of all the troops except No. 6, giving that division an hour or two's more rest. When all were told, the European available force, including the Waverley (Wairoa) settlers, was about 190 strong. During the evening and through the night the Wanganuis held high "korero." Unhappily, besides the enemy in front, we had a worse enemy in rear.
There were persons so unpatriotic, and so vile, as in this extremity to be willing to obstruct, to hamper and intrigue, solely to gratify political or personal hostility to the Government and to myself. I was, in truth, unknown to these snakes in the grass. What my personal offence was I do not to this day know, but that from the hour I assumed command to the day that I sailed for Auckland, leaving the West Coast, freed from the rebel occupation that I found it in, and reposing in a peace which has ever since been unbroken, I was opposed pertinaciously, insubordination preached to my men, and my smallest action criticized with relentless spite, if not contorted and misrepresented.
My first experience of this was what occurred this night. I had no confidence in the horde of friendly natives under my orders. The composition of the body was at variance with all military organization. Orders were regarded as themes for discussion, and obeyed or not, as seemed fit.
[Image of page 45]
During the night of the 6th and 7th certain Europeans, whose names I know but do not care at this distant time to specify, came to my camp. The "opposition" at Wanganui had been annoyed at my success in inducing the native force to move up to Patea. It was still more irritated to find that they appeared to get on well with me. It became, in consequence, important to them to prevent my utilizing their services. Certain deputies accordingly came up after dark to Wairoa, and attended the native korero, employing all their influence to dissuade the tribe from taking an effective part in the anticipated action next day, using freely the names of Messrs. Fox and McLean. I learned from Te Keepa (as much as he chose then to tell me) that mischief had been rife among his people. I was also informed to the same effect by some Europeans of undeniable reliability and experience, who warned me that the natives might, or some might, prove of no use or treacherous.
This was in no way a matter of surprise, though it certainly did astonish me to hear that my own countrymen, whom I had disobeyed orders to protect, and for whom I was about to engage in a very unequal struggle, should have been base enough to stab me thus in the dark. I hope their patrons did not know, and would not have approved the full turpitude of their action, though done in their name.
[Image of page 46]
The night proved to be dark and showery. For the first time the men had been deliberately made to encamp, or rather bivouac, without tents, at a place where tents might have been brought. But I had told the Government, on taking command, that all impedimenta must be abandoned directly I was able to move at all, and that the force must march as in my early days we marched in South Africa. The spirit ration, too, we had dropped, and it is possible that there may have been some friction caused by these sudden changes. Not, however, among the men. These from that day forward never once complained of the hardships and privations it was their fate to suffer under my command. All saw its necessity. All knew I suffered the same myself, and all cheerfully responded to a tax upon their endurance and discipline which they recognized to be unavoidable.
We marched then with all our Patea A. C. and part of Captain Hawes' militia volunteers from Wairoa towards Okotuku at midnight. Night marches are always dreary and more or less dispiriting, but the Europeans showed no lack of willingness. At daylight, or near it, I halted outside of the bush and directed Captain Hawes to employ his militia--who being all actual settlers in the district, and mostly married, I did not wish to use in the bush--in throwing up a small earthwork as a protection if we had to retire, and to form a reserve to guard the ammunition.
[Image of page 47]
No. 6, Roberts' Division, and about fifty Wanganui natives under Te Keepa joined me as day broke. We unloaded our men, leaving their blankets and haversacks at the earthwork Captain Hawes was erecting, and then moved on. The road entered the bush by a cleared path some twelve feet broad and led up to a pah which had been erected during the last two days and nights on an open clearing of about 150 yards square. As soon as I came in sight of this work I halted and concealed my men. I then detached No. 1 Division and Kemp's (Te Keepa's) natives to move round by our right, directing them to get close to the pah and assail it on that flank while I assaulted it in front. No. 6 I extended on my left. Up to that moment we believed that the work, though apparently complete in the front, could not have been finished in rear, and that our men dashing at the open gorge must be able to penetrate the pah. A signal was duly arranged when Kemp and No. 1 should be ready in the bush.
Behind us fifty more natives under Wirihana reached the edge of the bush. The rest, graduated according to their courage or loyalty, were at certain distances along the road sitting down. The great "General Mete Kingi," who was the worst disposed of them all, having got no further than a pistol shot from the Wairoa redoubt where he and the largest section of his tribe squatted to await events.
[Image of page 48]
We in the centre shivering in the raw damp of the morning noticed that no dogs barked, no natives seemed moving to collect wood to light fires which at that hour in the vicinity of any kainga or resting-place of Maories might have been expected, and we called to mind Kemp's remark that he feared they had had warning of our coming. That treachery was afoot among our native allies I have no doubt. They were impressed by Titokowaru's remarkable successes, by the comparative ease with which he had gained possession of so large a district, and by the defection of their relatives the Ngarauru. The sequel shows, that even if not warned the previous evening by the Wanganuis, at least Titokowaru was aware of our approach and fully prepared.
At length the signal was given from our right front, and the storming party under Major Hunter sprang from its concealment and moved rapidly towards the left flank of the pah at a double, No. 1 and Kemp's party opening a hot fire on the enemy. Nothing could have been finer than the way in which Major Hunter led his select body of old soldiers. He had his brother killed two months before at Te Ngutu to avenge, he had to vindicate himself from a wanton and most untrue charge of dilatoriness in going to the rescue of the Turu-Turu-Mokai garrison when it was surprised, and no one who saw him that morning could doubt that he would do and dare anything to achieve these objects.
[Image of page 49]
I went with the stormers but, my mind being fully occupied, I forgot in doing so to leave behind a long mackintosh coat I had been wearing. We got close to the angle of the work and Hunter passed on to the rear of it. I stumbled over my coat and fell, and Kemp, thinking me shot, sprang up from behind a log close by to help me. Though within a few yards of the pah, however, I was unhurt, and I pushed on to find a weak spot in the palisade. Simultaneously with the advance of the stormers, the enemy had opened fire, the first shot wounding one of our men in the roadway before a single man gained the open clearing. The fire was hotly kept up and replied to by Kemp and No. 1 Division from our right advance. Major Hunter and most of his men got safely past the front of the work, and they were searching for a gate or unfinished spot, when he and two others were hit.
Poor Hunter was shot in the thigh through the femoral artery, and though I tried to staunch the bleeding, the effect of such a wound is so swift, that in less than two minutes he was speechless and beyond human aid. Nevertheless, the three men who supported him stood by him, and though one, if not two, were shot in bearing him out, their places were at once taken by others, and he was eventually carried from the field. I now satisfied myself that short as had been the time, and incredible though it seemed, the pah at Moturoa,
[Image of page 50]
unlike that at Te Ngutu, was completely closed in and entrance only obtainable by small underground passages. The palisade, which did not look a formidable one from outside, some months later I was able to examine at my leisure and found to he a double row of stout green timber, with a ditch and bank behind, from which the defenders fired from loopholes or interstices in the palisade almost on the level of the ground. It had by this time become clear, too, that the force and appliances at my command were not sufficient to take a closed-in fortification so strongly held, and that to persevere would only cause a useless waste of life. I therefore directed a deliberate and orderly retreat to cover the removal of such wounded as we already had lost. The natives under Te Keepa became the first rearguard, being shortly after replaced by No. 1 Division, which retired through the bush under Captain Goring with great regularity and order. I now sent for No. 6 Division, which, with Captain Roberts at its head, came up at the double in single file, and crossing the rear, knelt down in skirmishing order to allow the other division to withdraw. Te Keepa halted when he regained the roadway with some of his men. No. 6, retiring skirmishing, was now attacked by the enemy almost all along the line, and nearly hand to hand. Through the jungle the deep voice of the gallant commander rang out continually, "Be steady, my men, stick together," and each
[Inserted unpaginated illustrations]
[Image of page 51]
time a cheery reply, "We will, sir," might have been heard in answer from the "young division." No. 6 retained the name of the "Young Division" which I gave it when it joined me till the end of the hostilities. At one point, so hotly did the enemy press, that one of our men was seized and terribly wounded by tomahawk cuts, so as to present the appearance of a crimped fish. His comrades unluckily devoted their energies to tearing him away from his assailants instead of shooting them down, and though they saved their man, the enemy only lost one of his number at that spot.
The fire of the Terry and Calisher breechloaders was, however, so hot and well sustained that the enemy ceased to press so heavily on Captain Roberts, and he was thus, after a short time, enabled to extricate his division. Meanwhile I had gone to find Te Keepa, who was searching in and near the roadway for wounded men. In this he seemed to me to expose himself, with utter disregard of danger, and I remonstrated with him to little purpose; for until satisfied that not a wounded man remained, he persisted in examining the ground near where the first fire had reached us. At last he consented to withdraw, and all the force by degrees, still showing front to the enemy, retired on Captain Hawes' entrenchment. Here I made the men reform their divisions, and commence retiring slowly by fours in column of route. Alternately each division from the
[Image of page 52]
front extended, knelt down, and prepared to relieve the rearguard as it retired skirmishing. As each rearguard passed its relief, it reformed fours, and rejoined the column. Thus no rearguard had to fight more than 150 yards at most, and was sure of support.
I had meanwhile sent to Wairoa for carts to take away the wounded, who were so numerous as to embarrass my small force, for the Maoris did not assist in this duty except in one remarkable instance. The enemy being drawn out at the edge of the bush, fired heavily on the redoubt, where there were still some men loitering in spite of orders, looking for articles they had lost. One of these, a native chief, who chose to expose himself by ostentatiously standing on the parapet calling out defiance to the enemy, was at length shot in the lungs. Few were about, and the rearguard had passed. I hurried back with Kemp who, seeing no one helping the wounded man, who was a relative of his own, took him in his arms and carried him in safety to the column. The enemy now advanced in a long line of skirmishers, but would not close, nor at the distance he maintained was it possible to do him much injury. I therefore sent for the Armstrong guns to advance from the Wairoa redoubt and take up a position from which they could fire effectively. After we had safely retired something over two miles, and despatched our wounded to Wairoa in the carts, the
[Image of page 53]
guns opened on the enemy and fortunately hit off the range at once. This had the desired effect, and drove off his skirmishers, enabling us to resume our march unmolested to Wairoa.
The returns of casualties showed that in this unfortunate engagement we had lost as follows:--
Killed--1 officer, Major Hunter.
4 men.
Wounded--20.
Missing--11; of whom 3 were killed.
It was a very heavy loss and might well have dispirited the force. But the effect on the men was very different. Hardly had I reached Wairoa, when I was requested to see them and begged to resume the attack next day. It was certainly a gratifying proof that their morale was not impaired, and that their spirit was untamed, but hampered as I was with wounded, separated too from supplies, and Patea, where my reserve ammunition and stores were collected, and which was almost without defenders, I could not hesitate what course I should adopt. With wounded it is a recognized principle to move them if possible to the hospital where they are to remain, before the effect of the shock to the system has worn off. Therefore, I sent mine under an escort of No. 1 Division in carts to Patea at once, and took steps to fall back behind the Waitotara to be able to keep between Titokowaru and the settlers
[Image of page 54]
of Wangnui. I also took away sick women and children as wished to leave under escort of the troops. New Zealand had no force but mine, small as it was, and the enemy each day gaining strength could, if unopposed, reach Wanganui in two marches. It was true that two companies of H. M.'s 18th Regiment held that town, and with their discipline and training could have kept a host of Maories at bay. But their orders restricted them to the defensive, and they could not have moved outside of the town. Therefore if Titokowaru had moved rapidly, all the dwellers in the suburbs must have retreated to the town, and all access to the country and communication by land with me would have been lost. I felt it, therefore, to be my duty, though by doing so I left my district altogether, to cross the Waitotara and place myself between the enemy and my fellow-settlers, trusting to be reinforced either by volunteer militia or by recruits to the constabulary before the enemy, who were not pushing on as fast as his interests should have suggested to him, barred the road to the colony.
I now wrote to the Government, placing my resignation in their hands, if in their opinion I had failed to do what was possible at Moturoa, or if the interests of the colony demanded my removal.
With the relics of my force I then crossed the Waitotara and took post at Nukumaru, leaving No. 1 Division and some other men to defend Patea.
[Image of page 55]
The Government generously decided to support me in my command. Wanganui at the eleventh hour had responded to the appeal of the officer commanding, and sent me fifty militia to hold the Weraroa redoubt, releasing a few constabulary who were there.
The friendly natives made off to Wanganui, and I strengthened my camp at Nukumaru by an irregular parapet fitted to the ground, rather than to any symmetrical outline.
Patea with No. 1 A. C. and its other defenders was safe from a Maori attack. Wairoa with its redoubt was also safe, and had been recently victualled for a month. Nothing I had found intact had been sacrificed, though the field force had fallen back to Nukumaru to await reinforcements.
To my front was Weraroa--in itself not a valuable position, neither protecting a road or line of communication, nor even forming a post of observation. There were those at Wanganui who exaggerated the importance and prestige of the post. But to me it was simply a drag on my operations, unless at least reliable as an outpost for observation. But Titokowaru had by this time passed the Waitotara himself unseen from it, and had taken post between my camp and the redoubt, and in that position commanded my flank in any movement I made to supply or communicate with the garrison.
I had been promised aid from Wanganui, and
[Image of page 56]
that of 1000 nominal militiamen on the roll fifty more would be sent up to the front to enable me to relieve the force holding Weraroa which, though I regarded it as absolutely useless, local superstition had invested with so much importance in the mind of the Wanganui native and European public. My force, including all the remaining men of No. 6 A. C. and certain fragments of other divisions, with a few men whom I still had on pay of the temporary local forces, was not above 160 in number. The Wanganui friendly natives had long disappeared, and Titokowaru in my front was building a pah at the edge of the bush with 700 followers.
The Government meanwhile was doing its best to enrol and equip further recruits. But in those days, and under Mr. Stafford's government, loans were not utilized for the defence of the Colony, and the sums voted were insufficient for such an emergency as now stared us in the face. Economy therefore was imperative, though with singular courage Mr. Stafford and Colonel Haultain did all that could possibly be done with such means as were obtainable, and strained every nerve to support me. Consequently, though as yet without sufficient force, I felt justified in attempting to hold my ground close to Titokowaru if he permitted me to do so. The detachment of Wanganui militia, all smart lads under Captain Powell who had relieved Sub-Inspector McDonnell at Weraroa, had enabled
[Image of page 57]
that officer to rejoin my field force with his detachment of thirty men. Day by day a stray recruit joined my ranks, and at length, on the 12th, the Defence Minister to my great relief arrived at my headquarters. He announced the arrival at Wanganui of a new Division No. 7 under Sub-Inspector Brown and their march to join me. He also brought some twenty more Wanganui militia who were all that he could get to relieve Captain Powell's force next day according to promise at Weraroa. Unluckily No. 7 Division did not reach the camp till after dark, and such was the universal terror which Titokowaru's cannibal atrocities had created, that I feared these young soldiers would hardly get through the night without a panic. This actually occurred. I had lain down fully dressed in expectation of something of this kind, having only recently returned from visiting the sentries, when one of these latter created an alarm by firing his rifle. I knew that this must have been a recruit's folly, and was almost instantly on the ground, among the men who, huddled together behind the parapet, were spreading a senseless panic in the camp. However, by sternly rebuking the officers for not restoring order, and ordering the divisions to fall in at once, and the rolls to be called, we soon got them into some sort of order, and were able to turn in again and finish our night's rest. One recruit, however, disappeared and deserted in the panic.
[Image of page 58]
The Defence Minister was much impressed with this proof of how much remained to be done before our men could be relied on, and when he further heard the Weraroa garrison firing heavily all night, and next day saw how long a flank I must leave open to attack every time I moved with reinforcements or supplies to that point past Titokowaru's position, he resolved that the redoubt was not worth the risk of its retention. Firstly, to have done so meant an immediate deduction of thirty men from the field force as only twenty instead of fifty militia had come up; and, secondly, it was clear that to keep open communication with the redoubt must have involved an abandonment of every other duty of the field force, and compelled it to remain at Nukumaru, whatever Titokowaru might do, in order to fight an almost daily engagement to cover the escort with supplies, along the narrow ridge surrounded by bush which forms the only practical approach.
Colonel Haultain would not thus hamper the only force the Government possessed, and was too generous to throw the odium of abandoning the position on me. He therefore gave orders to cause the immediate withdrawal of the garrison, whose time was out, and who must have been relieved at all events at once. All stores that would otherwise fall into the hands of the enemy were ordered to be destroyed. The ammunition was brought off, but
[Image of page 59]
the supplies and spirits in the settlers' hut adjoining could not be removed, and the whare was consequently burnt. Captain Powell reached the camp without molestation, the whole force being brought up to hold the ground between the enemy and the road. He reported that the redoubt had been fired into during the night, and that the garrison had replied to the shots.
It is probable that the attack was by a reconnoitring party and chiefly intended to discover the strength of the garrison and the position. But the Wanganui lads could not have known how soon the parapet might be swarming with assailants, and their behaviour was admirable. They remained all night under arms, firing at any suspicious object, or replying to any shot directed towards them, with perfect coolness and confidence. Their behaviour showed how much assistance we should have derived from the Wanganui militia, if it had at this critical time turned out, until we were able to obtain recruits.
I do not propose to examine the pros and cons of the vexed question why at this sole place in New Zealand public danger failed to induce the adult male population to turn out under arms in accordance with the militia law. Auckland, New Plymouth, Napier, Wellington, and even Tauranga and Opotiki, had always complied with the requirements of the law; but from one cause or another it broke down
[Image of page 60]
at Wanganui. It was not a new difficulty, it was a resistance to authority of some months date, which in all probability would not have arisen in the beginning if the enemy had then, as now, been almost upon them. With two companies of H. M.'s 18th to protect their town and families, at no place could the requirements of the Militia Act have been more easily or safely carried out. But men had become stiff-necked in their opposition, which the Government, in such troublous times, had no power to put down. Personally, I had but an imperfect knowledge of the condition of things in the district, and, moreover, I had really no command over it, and had only taken upon me to enter it in order to try to keep between the enemy and the settlements. So I did not interfere, though I urged on the Government the absolute necessity of enrolling a special force which might be relied upon at all times to confront the increasing force of Titokowaru, rather than attempt to rely on a law which had at all events in this instance proved inoperative.
Colonel Haultain remained but a short time in my camp, and returned to Wanganui, where the Governor and Premier had arrived. I set myself to work to try to train my recruits a little, and to teach them at least how to use arms which many had never handled before. The inexplicable inaction of the enemy so close to our front lost him his
[Image of page 61]
golden opportunity to complete his already unequalled triumphs by stamping out the small force opposed to him. Had he resolutely attacked my lines before the last recruits joined, or even directly after, as they were hardly reliable at first, he should have been able to destroy us. He had three times our force, his men were flushed with success, they were active and well armed, and even granting that we had shown a stubborn resistance, the issue could not have been doubtful. A nucleus might, and would have fought bravely, but the great bulk of the force might too probably have given way, though so doing might have caused a massacre.
Happily, however, after a few days, Titokowaru's opportunity was lost, and I desired no better than to be attacked by daylight in force. I had little dread of a night attack. Natives, with all their courage, are of little use in the dark, and never willingly move during night. I may except the Uriweras from this, as they are singular in conducting their operations during that portion of the twenty-four hours. But I was pretty confident Titokowaru would not, and the result justified my confidence. I now waited on His Excellency at Wanganui, but nothing was decided, nor indeed could be decided, except to endeavour to obtain reinforcements. The militia clearly would not turn out, or at least so it seemed; and as to the natives, Te Keepa had strongly advised me to have nothing to do with
[Image of page 62]
them unless the force raised were picked men, and actually sworn in and enrolled. I therefore returned to my camp, and had the satisfaction of finding the men daily gaining more confidence in themselves, and more expertness with their weapons.
