CHAPTER X. THE URIWERA CAMPAIGN.
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CHAPTER X.
THE URIWERA CAMPAIGN.
ACCIDENT prevented a very excellent opportunity of meeting with Te Kooti. During the West Coast operations he had not been idle, and had made another raid on the coast, this time at Whakatane, in the Bay of Plenty. Here he again left traces of blood, and escaped almost with impunity. Major Mair pursued, but his Arawa contingent misbehaved and could not be induced to follow into the Uriwera Mountains. Emboldened by this success, Te Kooti then crossed the mountains to Wai-kare-moana and thence, leaving Wairoa to the north, surprised and killed several settlers and many friendly Maories at Mohaka, some seventy miles north of Napier.
I had resolved to steer north or south from Waitara, according as the wind was favourable either way, and as it happened to be a south-west wind, made for Manukau, marching across to Auckland and embarking there for Tauranga. Had the wind been from the north, I should have been off Napier on the very day Te Kooti was at Mohaka, and might have landed and attacked his force while carousing at the public house they had plundered, and incapable of
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resistance or escape. But in two days he was gone back to the fastnesses of the Uriwera and the chance was lost. We reached Matata by land from Tauranga, and began establishing our depot at that inhospitable spot, for our projected expedition to the Uriwera Mountains. We found a district inhabited only by Maories, without even enough cattle or sheep to supply the force with meat. There was no shelter for our stores, and apparently no road to the interior for the transport of supplies.
Having discussed the position with Mr. Richmond, who had once more come to acquaint me with the wishes of the Government, and to lend me his valuable assistance, I came to the conclusion that we could do nothing by awaiting Te Kooti outside the mountains, because to do so we must have divided our forces in several settlements and left him to choose the most favourable point of attack. True strategical policy demanded our entering the mountains by the best known paths, and destroying all the food that might be growing or stored at the several native settlements. This course I thought must compel Te Kooti to leave the mountains, where he could with difficulty be attacked except at a disadvantage, and oblige him to come out towards the open country of the interior, where he could be more easily and satisfactorily dealt with. But the difficulties of such an expedition were enormous. To begin with, the country was almost unknown
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and, even by examining persons who knew parts, and collating the information thus obtained, it was not easy to get a satisfactory knowledge of the ground. Moreover, it was known that horses could not be taken, or if taken, part of the way could not be fed, and would greatly impede the force. The winter, too, was almost upon us, and the cold of that high region would make it a painful service for the men. Lastly, the base of supply at Matata was most imperfectly divided, and difficult of access. The Sturt it is true had come in, but nothing short of the devotion and enterprise of Captain Fairchild could have accomplished this dangerous feat with her.
But it had to be done. Difficulties surround all enterprises, and it is only the weak-minded who shrink from them. Our force now was reliable and inured to hardship, and I felt every confidence in its efficiency. A sort of a map was at length constructed by Mr. Richmond and myself from all the different accounts we could get and the diary of a journey undertaken some years before by Mr. Hunter Brown--the only really reliable account existing. From this map I made my plans and decided to enter the Uriwera Mountains from the three main entrances, and rendezvous if possible at Ruakituna on the same day. Accordingly I divided the force at my own disposal into two columns: the one to enter from Whakatane, the other from the
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western side at the spot subsequently named Fort Galatea, which was obviously the most important strategical point of the Rangitaiki Valley. The supply of the Whakatane force under Colonel St. John was comparatively easy, as it could be carried out by sea, and the road intervening between the mountains and the coast was practicable and not very long. But to penetrate the country from Ngatata obliged us to depend upon a boat service for some twelve miles up the Rangitaiki River, and upon pack-transport for two days beyond. These services were organized as speedily as possible, boats being brought from Tauranga, and horses hired from the natives. Meat was obtained by sea from Napier; Captain Fairchild having brought two shiploads of sheep which, with difficulty, were forwarded to the interior. In spite of the difficulties to be overcome, great as they appeared, no price seemed too high to pay to dislodge an enemy from a stronghold which was a standing menace and constant danger to the whole of the coast settlements from Matata to Napier.
The Whakatane column under Colonel St. John was composed of 250 Europeans and 140 friendly coast natives. That from Fort Galatea under Major Roberts of 100 Europeans and 200 Arawas, and the third which Mr. Richmond undertook to forward from Wai-kare-moana was to be under the command of Colonel Herrick and to consist of such a force as, in addition to 100 A. C. sent there by me,
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and the Ngatiporo under Ropata, could be collected in the district.
When, in spite of various delays and bad weather, the two Bay of Plenty columns were ready to start, that by Fort Galatea had to march two days before the Whakatane force. No hitch, however, occurred, and Fort Galatea was occupied and entrenched on May 3rd.
On the 4th and 5th both columns marched, carrying six days' provisions, with a further supply of bacon, borne on the backs of the friendly natives. These latter also carried a certain quantity of spare ammunition.
It is not easy now to understand the immense terror which the Arawas had of the mountains of the Uriwera. They had in times past so often penetrated those defiles and returned decimated and defeated that they could hardly conceive a successful issue to our expedition. Their superstitious dread extended to the neighbouring tribes, and even to the Europeans, but happily had but little influence upon the field force. It was on the 5th that all was ready at Fort Galatea, and our men, loaded with six days' food, moved on. The native bearers carried each of them forty pounds of bacon or 400 rounds of ammunition, for the horses were left behind. We had secured a guide, in whom we had a doubtful confidant, to show us the path, but we trusted to the information we had collected and felt comparatively
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sure of finding our way. The first settlement before us, Te Whaiti, was easily found, and we surprised it at early dawn, on the 6th, killing six of the Uriweras and capturing a considerable number of women and children. Here we halted for the night, Mr. Clarke, the R.M., who had kindly accompanied the column, advising this concession to the Arawas who were loth to march forward that day. It was not much better at first, next day, for after waiting till 11 a.m. for them, Major Roberts moved on, taking with him the chief Pokiha (Fox). Ultimately Mr. Clarke brought up the Arawa, and the whole force pushed on towards Ruatahuna. Time was of great importance because Colonel St. John depended upon the support of Major Roberts' column, and a day's rain might at any moment render the road impassable. This lay along the bank of a river between two steep ranges and often by its bed, the river itself being crossed no less than fifty-five times during the day by the column. The march was necessarily conducted with the greatest caution, for in the narrow defile every yard presented facilities for ambuscade. The corps of guides led the way in single file it being quite impossible, owing to the density of the undergrowth, to provide flankers for the column. At length the march was interrupted and the enemy opened fire from an ambuscade. But the guides, gallantly led by Captain Swindley, A.D.C., and Sergeant Maling, dashed forward, and
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being at once supported by the leading men of the A. C. column drove off their assailants after a smart skirmish. In this trifling affair we lost three guides, one mortally and two severely wounded. Hemi, the man mortally wounded, was a native who had served in former years with the 43rd Light Infantry with great credit as a guide. The other two were Europeans, and very valuable members of the force. We were compelled by this delay to halt on the ground where the attack occurred, some two hours' march from the spot at which we had intended to encamp, which was unfortunate, as it retarded our arrival next day at Ruatahuna. At night the "big mouthed" Arawas whom this skirmish had frightened, entertained us by loudly expressed threats of returning next day; but Fox, their chief, undertook to bring them on after a violent harangue in which he denounced their pusillanimous behaviour. This tribe never so good in action as in boasting before the event, had been spoiled in the past from having formed the majority of all the expeditions with which they had served. Time after time their flinching had rendered each operation in which they took part abortive, but now finding that we were not dependent on them they became more amenable to reason, and at length Fox reported that if permitted to advance at the head of the column, firing as they went at nothing in particular, he could guarantee the good behaviour of his tribe. On the following
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morning we sent back a native escort with the wounded and Mr. Clarke, who had fallen lame from an old wound. There was no longer any prospect of concealing our advance, the firing of the previous evening and during the night (for the Arawas fired incessantly, at nothing, to keep their courage up) having echoed through the mountains and given full notice of our approach. I therefore made no objection to Fox's ridiculous proposal.
On the 8th, Fox moved on at the head of the column, firing away briskly, but not hesitating in his advance. The road, after continuing at the bottom of the wedge-shaped ravine along which we had hitherto marched, now turned off to the left and led us up a succession of exceedingly steep ranges, till at 2 p. m. when the summit was gained, at a deserted pah called Takuaroa, overhanging the Whakatane River, which flowed closely along its base. There we came in sight of Ruatahuna, which Colonel St. John at that moment was attacking but which, owing to the precipitous nature of the hill, it was plain we could not reach in time to intercept the fugitives. This high mountain, said by Mr. Hunter Brown to be 1300 feet from its base, is almost a precipice, and it would be a good day's work for any man to scale it, even without a load on his back. But, stimulated by the desire to aid the other force, the men, notwithstanding loads, made great efforts to descend, and Fox's Arawas
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pushed on with wonderful alacrity. Running, rolling, tumbling, sliding along, at last we got to the foot of the hill, and there Fox decided to remain, and no persuasion would move him. Swiftly as we had scrambled down, the descent occupied nearly four hours. The Europeans not having come up, and as it was absolutely necessary to communicate, I went forward myself with my staff, a bugler and two of the guides. As evening was past, and night closing in, we had to use a candle to keep the track till we reached the ford of the Whakatane opposite to Ruakituna. Here I directed the bugler to sound the officers' call, and the instant reply and prolonged cheering of Colonel St. John's force soon showed how baseless had been Fox's alarm, that the armed party might prove to be Te Kooti's force. Mr. Preece, afterwards R. M. at Napier, then my interpreter, happened a year or two later to revisit the spot with an Uriwera who had been present. It seems that an ambuscade had been set close to the ford, which we passed within a few feet, but when the bugle sounded, the men in ambush, fancying that all our force was at hand, and that they might be caught between the two expeditions, took a sudden panic and made off. Their surprise when Mr. Preece told them the chance they had lost was extreme, but they good-naturedly laughed at their own timidity. From Takuaroa heights we had had a splendid view of the far-famed Uriwera Mountains
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stretched out before us like a panorama. Nothing but a succession of steep, almost precipitous, forest-clad hills could be discovered all round us, cleft here and there by narrow gullies. Far away to the eastward were pointed out to us the stony peaks of Tamai-kowha's pah at Maunga-powhatu. Towards the north-east were the heights overhanging the entrance of the Waimana and Whakatane Valleys. To the south, the narrow gorge leading by the snowy mountain of Huirau to Lake Wai-kare-moana. Beneath and before us lay the basin in which the central pah of Ruatahuna was built--the only spot in which a hundred acres or so of comparatively level land could be descried. This pah was fortified, and several small kaingas were in its vicinity. But of open and cultivated land there was almost no extent at all visible elsewhere. Here and there a small patch of clearing could be seen, and several others overgrown with scrub which had served as potato patches in former years. About Ruatahuna itself there were larger cultivations than in any other place, but the area was very limited, and insufficient for the support of any large number of natives. From this circumstance, and from others that came under our observation, two things appeared certain, that the population of the mountains was far from numerous, probably under 300 adult males, and that the amount of food available could not possibly suffice for any considerable demands in
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addition to the requirements of the tribe. I had calculated upon this, and felt sure that if we could destroy the greater portion of the potatoes and other native food, much of which was not yet harvested, Te Kooti's exodus to the interior would become a question of weeks.
At Ruatahuna the enemy, though in some force, made but a poor resistance. They knew they were between two fires, for Fox's musketry must have been heard since early dawn, and news of the skirmish of the preceding evening had reached them. All their plans for defence had been made on the assumption that Major Roberts' force would arrive first, and it would have done so but for the early halt of the 7th. The road was prepared, and clear lines cut through the scrub in convenient spots to rake an advancing column, or to fire upon it when crossing streams or likely to be stopped by fallen trees. But Colonel St. John's arrival on the scene, before the sister column made its appearance, disconcerted the Uriwera plans, and left them no resource but flight, except the defence of the pah, a kind of warfare for which their habits unfit them, and which could not have been carried out without the certainty of ultimate defeat. Ruatahuna, though fortified, was really not strong and, when both columns united, could have easily been invested and taken. Of all natives the Uriwera are the least disposed to act in concert in war, each man
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preferring to fight on his own account, with the free mountains as his refuge if driven back. To have shut themselves up in a pah, like rats in a trap, was not only distasteful, but in point of fact must have been fatal to them. They therefore made off in every direction and, from the summits of the surrounding hills, watched the proceedings of the invaders.
Lieut.-Colonel St. John had marched from the Whakatane Valley at Opuriao on the 4th, and on the 5th camped at the foot of the Wharau mountain, where he was joined by his native contingent of 140 men, with thirty-five native bearers. His European force consisted of 250 men, and he had under his command Lieut.-Colonel Fraser, A.C., and Major Mair, R.M., both experienced officers. On the 6th he surmounted the Wharau mountain and surprised the kainga of Omara-teangi, killing six of the Uriwera. Following the deep valley of the Whakatane River, on the 7th he fell in with an ambuscade at the foot of a hill called Hakeumi, where he lost a gallant officer, Lieutenant White, in charge of the guides, who, though wounded the day before, continued to render valuable service. The Uriwera had intended to make a stand at this spot, having posted men on a neighbouring hill, as well as on the top, to support the ambuscading detachment. But Lieut.-Colonel St. John turned the flank of the position and carried the hill, in spite of the resistance he encountered
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and the extreme difficulty of inducing the native contingent to advance. Having gained the summit of the hill without further difficulty, and having halted a short time to cook, he resumed his march and advanced to within 600 yards of Takora, the pah of Whenuanui, one of the most influential of the Uriwera chiefs. To have moved directly on Takora would have cost many lives, as the interval was comparatively open, and the troops would have been exposed to the fire of the concealed ambuscading parties of the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel St. John therefore divided his force and moved round both flanks of the pah by the bush, a manoeuvre which caused the enemy to evacuate the position.
On the 8th the march was resumed through the bush under considerable difficulties, and about 11 a. m. the force came in sight of Pata-hoata at Ruatahuna, the pah of Pairau, another influential chief of the Uriwera. Here the enemy made a stand, and Lieut.-Colonel St. John disposed a portion of his force to cover his advance upon the fortification. The enemy had posted a party to threaten the flank of his advance from the bush, and the detachment sent in this direction became hotly engaged when it reached their position. Meanwhile Colonel St. John, having got within a very short distance of the pah, was about to throw up an entrenchment, when the occupants suddenly made off, withdrawing their flanking party and retreating too swiftly to be
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overtaken by Captain McDonnell who was sent in pursuit. It was during this engagement that Major Roberts' column had reached Takuaroa, and were struggling down the precipitous descent, vainly trying to be in time to intercept the enemy's retreat. During the skirmish on the flank of the pah a very fine young officer, Sub-Inspector Travers, scorning to take cover, was mortally wounded in leading his men.
The two columns had thus met with very similar obstructions, although that under Lieut.-Colonel St. John encountered a resistance at Ruatahuna in which that under Major Roberts had not taken part. The loss of Lieut.-Colonel St. John's force, comprising two officers and three men killed and six men wounded, had been more severe, but the total casualties were much less than had been anticipated.
The columns united at Ruatahuna on the 9th, and foraging parties were at once despatched to collect food, and destroy cultivations in every direction.
Meanwhile there was no sign of Colonel Herrick's column which had been expected from Wai-kare-moana, where Te Kooti was believed to be at the time. The Native Minister had relieved me of the care of this column, and had himself proceeded to Napier to organize and push it forward. Lieut.-Colonel Herrick was an officer whom I knew and trusted, and I felt sure that no ordinary obstacle would have delayed him. Except to take part in
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these operations there was no pressing urgency for an expedition from the Wairoa side, and I felt sure Mr. Richmond would have exhausted every expedient to expedite the march of the column. It was therefore with great anxiety that I watched the gorge leading to Waikare, looking for some sign of our missing column.
Combined operations are always liable to miscarry; in fact, it but rarely occurs where good roads exist and the country is well known, that two expeditions setting out from distant points meet, with anything like punctuality, as the two columns met at Ruatahuna, at a preconcerted place of rendezvous.
That Lieut.-Colonel Herrick might therefore be a day or even two days behind would not have surprised me, but as time went on I began to fear that he had met with a reverse and had been unable to force his way through to join me. I could, however, only hope for the best, and hold my force ready to lend him support should his approach he ascertained.
The main object of the expedition was the destruction of the food supply in the mountains, and in carrying out this service the troops were aided by the season and the wild pigs. Every potato garden was securely fenced, and the removal of a small portion of the enclosure insured the co-operation of the troops of pigs running in the forest. By next morning in every case the whole of the ground was
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turned over by the animals, and all the potatoes they did not devour were spoiled by the heavy frosts which occurred every night. A few cattle were found and shot for consumption by the men, and in some instances stray Uriweras, endeavouring to drive them off, were killed by the foraging parties. So hopelessly had the native inhabitants lost confidence in themselves and their fastnesses that they did not attempt to molest the foragers or combine to avenge themselves on the invaders, but scattered in small groups, occupied the hill tops, and made the mountains resound with their sorrowful tangis and lamentations. Yet no opportunity of inflicting loss upon their enemy could have been more suitable to their mode of warfare, and the conformation of the ground, than the ambuscading of these detachments, especially after they had gained confidence from impunity and had ceased to look for resistance. Nothing could have more clearly demonstrated the conviction which had come home to these mountaineers that they were, at least, on this occasion bearded in their strongholds by a force and by men of whom they had had no experience in their own time and against whom they felt it useless to apply the tactics of their ancestors. The mountains and the defiles upon which they had relied had failed them this time, and such ambuscades as they had laid had been insufficient to stop or even materially delay the march of their enemy, who was now rioting about
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among their plantations, apparently quite careless of their proximity. All this tended to convince me that Te Kooti had not yet come upon the scene, for he would have made himself felt long ago, and I therefore expected his approach hourly. The 9th and 10th passed thus; and a slight skirmish occurred on the latter day which resulted in nothing. On the 11th, however, it seemed necessary to make a reconnaissance in force towards Lake Wai-kare-moana, in the hope of gaining news of Colonel Herrick's column or falling in with Te Kooti's force. A column was accordingly prepared for this service when Te Kooti's advanced guard came in sight on the top of a hill overhanging the gorge leading from Waikare. Fox's Arawas to the number of 100 men, supported by 100 of the A. C., under Major Roberts, moved down towards the gorge, and Fox met and drove back the enemy in fine style, leaving a party of men in ambuscade before retiring. Te Kooti's men once more advanced, but the leading man was shot and, thereupon, Te Kooti recalled his force by bugle sound. For what reason it is difficult to say, unless frightened by the unusual sound of an enemy's bugle, the Arawa ambuscade, thereupon, precipitately decamped, and the opportunity of inflicting loss was lost. Fox evidently expected an immediate attack by Te Kooti in force, for he now drew in his lines and joined the A. C. camp, declining to hold his old position some 200 yards lower down the valley.
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But no attack was made, and the afternoon and night passed quietly. On the 12th I had hoped to push on further towards the lake, but as too often had been the fate of colonial officers commanding a mixed force of Europeans and natives, I was obliged to be satisfied with a partial execution of my plans. I confess that in my want of information as to the nature of the ground to be traversed, and in my ignorance of the reason of the continued delay of Colonel Herrick's column, I had many doubts as to the advisability of pressing much further into an unknown region, even with willing troops. My supplies were exhausted, and the troops were being maintained on such meat, pigs, cattle, and horses as we could capture, and upon potatoes. The latter though plentiful were bulky and burdensome, and the force could hardly carry more than two days' supply on a march. I had husbanded my reserve ammunition, and still had a supply on hand, but a single engagement might reduce it materially, for the natives cannot be controlled in their expenditure of cartridges. I was compelled, if I moved forward with a portion of the force, to hold Ruatahuna, both for the sake of the wounded and because in the event of a retreat, unless held by us, the enemy would have been enabled to make such dispositions as to render the ascent of Takuaroa, or in fact any progress beyond Ruatahuna almost impossible. I resolved, therefore, if I could rely on the support of the native allies both in holding
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the present camp till our return, and in advancing towards Waikare, that I would make the attempt and be guided by the difficulties I encountered in pushing through to the lake or returning to my camp. Consequently, I spoke to the natives, and told them what I contemplated but, with the exception of Fox, all the Arawa chiefs opposed the scheme, Petera Pukuatua positively refusing to co-operate. The coast natives throughout had been kept with difficulty from desisting en masse, so all depended on the Arawa. When the column moved off, the native portion left their blankets behind, so it was evident we could not go far that day. The Arawa were directed to make a circuit by the left, while the A. C. moved forward by the direct track to the hill where again Te Kooti's force was displaying itself. Once more upon our approach the enemy made off, leaving a picquet or rear-guard to delay our advance. Major Mair with a few natives had got in front of the Europeans as they pushed on beyond the crest of the hill, and he was fired upon by this picquet and one of the natives slightly wounded, when all but one of his men fell back. But Major Mair, though left almost alone, rushed forward and fired all the charges of his revolver at the enemy before it was possible for them to reload. Upon this, the picquet seeing the A. C. coming up to Major Mair's assistance, made off precipitately, and were closely pursued. Lower down the hill the Arawas, who had by this
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time turned the position, reached the main track just as the enemy's picquet ran past, and dashed on in pursuit, inflicting some loss. Petera Pukuatua, who in Fox's absence through illness commanded the Arawa contingent, barbarously cut off and brought back the heads of three of Te Kooti's men who were known and recognized, and others were wounded or killed in the affair.
The Arawa and A. C. had continued their pursuit some miles down the valley, and only halted when they saw the main body of the enemy at a considerable distance, if not entirely beyond our reach. Thereupon, both Europeans and natives returned and made their report, as night was approaching, and it would have been unwise to proceed further that day. On the summit of the hill first taken the Arawas now collected and began to discuss the situation. It was evidently a foregone conclusion. They were resolved to do no more. Many excuses were made. We should soon be short of powder. We had no food. Let us send back for a convoy for supplies. I agreed to send back, but this concession was of no use. They went on speaking all the evening, Major Roberts holding the hill with the A. C. in an untouched position meanwhile. At last the natives returned to camp, and Fox brought me the ultimatum of his tribe. They wished to return, and in point of fact, I knew, meant to go back if I refused my consent. The question of sending for
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further supplies settled itself, as no native bearers could be induced to undertake the service. Fox, however, was by no means proud of the conduct of the Arawa, and assured me that if I went to Waikare he would go with me, and thought that if I called for volunteers many of his friends would share our fortunes. I accordingly tried this experiment and sixty Arawas volunteered. To have pushed on to Waikare without some natives would have been foolhardy, as their experience of the bush and knowledge of rough expedients would have been indispensable to us in crossing an arm of the lake, which I was led to believe I must in some way pass to reach the enemy's pah.
The Arawas and other natives now wrote me a letter bearing out Fox's report of their resolution to return, and I discovered that there had throughout been an understanding among them not to go beyond Ruatahuna. This had been kept secret from me, and that, too, although it had been carefully explained beforehand that they were required to go to Waikare and Maungapowhaki. An officer in this warfare often finds his plans thwarted and the safety of his force endangered by such strikes among the native allies. On this occasion the result was not disastrous, but it might easily have been so. We had accomplished the main object of the expedition, and as it subsequently proved Colonel Herrick had not started on his march towards us, no great inconve-
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nience arose from the conduct of the Arawa on this occasion. But had the third column been in difficulties the case might have been very different. As it was, I still felt bound to try to collect a column for the service, and consequently arranged to divide the force, sending back the wounded with those who would not go any further by the Horomanga gorge, and remaining between them and the Waikare gorge till I could determine whether it was prudent to push on to the lake with the remaining force. I divided the reserve ammunition equally between the two columns, and crossed the Whakatane to another camping ground with the column intended for Waikare. During the night, however, Fox's followers came to a decision neither to accompany the wounded nor go on with me to the lake, but to go home. Fox in reporting this told me he had tried but could not alter their determination. The Europeans upon whom the hardships of the expedition told far more than on the Maories, whose boots were worn out by the incessant crossing of rivers with sharp shale bottoms, and who were not accustomed to a potato diet, nevertheless showed a spirit and cheerfulness beyond all praise. They were willing and ready to march to the possible assistance of their comrades of the third column, at all events towards the enemy at Waikare, and they were not discouraged by the knowledge that with their bleeding feet and insufficient food they must march
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and camp two days in the snow of the Huirau range.
But I had to consider the risk, the small chance of success without the co-operation of at least some Maories, in traversing so long a forest path and crossing one branch of the lake, and I had to bear in mind the necessary abandonment of our present line when once the position of Ruatahuna was evacuated, and that anything less than complete success and the capture of a settlement well provided with food at the end of our march would cause a disaster the extent of which could hardly be estimated. In such operations, while all fair risks must be run, a very small error, a very trifling want of judgment might produce terrible results, and on the whole I preferred to risk the possibility of not being at hand to aid Colonel Herrick to that of sacrificing the whole force I had at my disposal at Ruatahuna. At all events Colonel Herrick had failed me, and the expedition could not be kept longer in the mountains. If prevented advancing by the enemy it was probable that Colonel Herrick had long ago retired to a place of safety. If he had not yet started he could hardly expect to find me at Ruatahuna so long after the date of rendezvous.
In this dilemma I chose the course I believed best for the Colony, however humiliating it might be to be thus dictated to by our allies. On the 14th we commenced the return march to Ahikereru, which
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we reached without molestation on the 16th. Here we found supplies awaiting us, and on the following day we returned to Fort Galatea, being joined late in the evening by Major Mair and the native column, which like ourselves had experienced no serious opposition on the march.
Marching myself with Colonel Roberts' column homewards, by a parallel line and nearer to the enemy's force, I still had felt great anxiety for the safety of the column under Major Mair. Because I felt convinced that a determined attack of the enemy might at any moment produce a stampede, in which the cry of "sauve qui peut" would drown the remonstrances of those who wished to defend the helpless sufferers in their charge. But happily the discomfiture of the Uriweras had been too complete, and the demoralization of the tribe too pronounced to admit of any serious effort for the time. Major Mair had had sufficient difficulty to keep his force from hurrying on without regard to the progress of the wounded, to show what a few well-directed shots would have done in the way of disorganizing his column, but his firm and judicious management of the natives had its effect, and the column reached Fort Galatea in good order. The natives were inordinately proud of their achievement, and of having resisted the temptation to hurry on and leave the rear to take care of itself. In fact, Petera Pukuatua made no small boast of his heroism and devotion in
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delaying for the wounded he had in charge, and afforded an excellent example of the sort of support a colonial commander may expect from friendly natives should he unfortunately be driven to rely upon their assistance in moments of real danger.
Such was the Uriwera expedition, undertaken with the double object of punishing the mountain tribe and of destroying the stores of provisions without which, at all events, Te Kooti's followers, who were not accustomed to the rough bush food that sufficed for the hardier Uriweras, could not remain in the locality. The success had been complete; not only had the enemy lost a considerable number of his men, but he had measured his strength five or six times with us, in positions carefully chosen, and found it impossible either to repulse or even to inflict serious loss upon our columns. On no occasion had he gained any material success, but on the contrary had always found himself resolutely attacked in his ambuscade and driven off at once. The difficulties of the march and of the supply of the men had been got over satisfactorily, and the Uriwera had learned that neither were sufficient to protect them in future as they had proved in the past. The adjacent tribes who had for centuries regarded the strongholds of the Uriwera as being not only difficult to assail but, for practical purposes, impregnable, were dis-illusioned by our success. The superstitions of the past being dissipated, the result in the early future was seen in
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the native expeditions of Ropata and Kemp, who for the first time on record entered the mountains unhesitatingly when ordered to do so a year later by Mr. McLean. Our men had given proof in their conduct during the expedition of the great superiority of our race when placed upon terms of equality with the native one. An ordinary English soldier, trained to fight in the open, will march determinedly to attack a battery belching forth volleys of iron hail; but the same man thrown into a jungle, called upon to fight invisible savages, has too often shown to disadvantage. The reason is evident. A brave dragoon might well quail to furl a sail in the breeze--he is out of his element, unaccustomed to the position, or even to thinking of finding himself so situated. Our men had by this time got over the difficulty which oppressed them at first.
Six months' continuous marching and fighting in the bush had destroyed its terrors, and they were now able to do anything except to run as fast as their naked native opponents, and as regards their pluck, constancy, discipline, and use of their arms, they were better beyond comparison.
