CHAPTER XI. END OF THE WAR, AND GENERAL REFLECTIONS.
[Image of page 177]
CHAPTER XI.
END OF THE WAR, AND GENERAL REFLECTIONS.
THE exposure and fatigue had told upon me, and I was now compelled to leave the field, suffering from acute dysentery, from which I had scarcely recovered before I found myself crippled with rheumatism. I was obliged therefore to resign the active command in the field to Lieut.-Colonel St. John, and, after obtaining medical advice at Auckland, proceeded to Wellington to assist the Government by such advice and information as I was able to afford. But I left stringent orders with the force to advance the main camp to Opepe or Taupo for reasons based upon the calculations made before the campaign began, and upon the assumption that all our objects having been obtained, Te Kooti must in a very few weeks break cover and come out on the plains.
The third column had not moved. Mr. Richmond, thinking that the best if not the only way to reach the enemy's position was by water, had directed boats and pontoon rafts to be constructed, which at that distance inland, and without appliances save such as could with difficulty be brought up, proved a task requiring far more time than he had anticipated.
[Image of page 178]
The consequence was that this expensive expedition, which did not eventually aid towards the general object of the campaign, became simply a demonstration against the enemy's pah on the opposite shore. Nay more, having commenced the undertaking, there was a not unnatural disinclination to withdraw and seem to acknowledge failure, without at all events crossing the lake and capturing the Waikare pah. We had been therefore weakened by the absence of the force without gaining any adequate advantage, while we had been very near attempting a dangerous, painful, and difficult operation to support loyally a column which could not have succeeded for a month later at least.
The mistake was one which shows how essential it is in war that there should be no division of command, at least in the same operations. If Lieut.-Colonel Herrick had been directed simply to reach Ruatahuna on a certain day, and told if the lake could not be crossed in time to march round its shore, he would have come up as intended. To have marched round it was quite feasible, and indeed was afterwards accomplished by Mr. Hamlin and a native party. I am certain that Colonel Herrick had he received such orders would have allowed nothing to prevent his carrying them out, and in all human probability he would have reached the rendezvous successfully. As it was, a fine force was locked up and unable to co-operate, and the long bill so incurred was made
[Image of page 179]
the most of in Parliament as a weapon of attack upon the Government. Yet it had been the result of a generous effort of the Native Minister to lighten my work. All, however, proved to have been fulfilled.
Te Kooti found before long that the food for his following no longer existed, and as signs that he was outstaying his welcome began to be manifested, he very soon left the Uriweras and marched for Taupo with his own band and a few volunteers from the mountain tribe. Before leaving the force I gave positive orders to Lieut.-Colonel St. John to take the earliest possible opportunity of moving the headquarter camp forwards from Fort Galatea to a suitable point on the road from the Uriwera Mountains to Taupo, and indicated Opepe, the point where the Napier road crossed the main track from Taupo to the Rangitaiki Valley, as the best strategical position, if otherwise suitable. Failing Opepe, either Tapuaikereru the northern point of the lake or some intermediate spot was to be selected; but as Opepe afforded both wood and water as well as better grass than usually found on the plains I thought if possible it should be occupied. I had collected with immense trouble a large supply of biscuit and other stores as well as of ammunition at Fort Galatea, and when the main camp was established on the Napier road, I calculated upon a second line of supply from another and better base.
From various causes, however, it was not till June
[Image of page 180]
6th that Colonel St. John felt able to take preliminary steps to carry out his orders, and on that day he proceeded to examine the site of Opepe with a cavalry escort. Captain St. George in command at Tapuaeharuru joined him, and by the 7th, having satisfactorily fixed a camping ground, Lieut.-Colonel St. John was induced to direct his escort to halt at Opepe while he himself rode over to Captain St. George's quarters at Tapuaeharuru. Up to this time everything had been quiet in the district, and the probable approach of Te Kooti, upon which I had reckoned with certainty, seems to have been entirely overlooked by Captain St. George and his natives. Lieut.-Colonel St. John, rendered too confident by their assurances, told his men that they need apprehend no danger, that a sentry was unnecessary, and that they might rest and feed their horses till his return next day. Two gentlemen returning to Napier from Tapuaeharuru, on the morning of the 8th, came upon two dead bodies lying stripped on the highway near Opepe. They turned back and made their report to Lieut.-Colonel St. John whom they met coming back to his escort, with Captain St. George. Lieut.-Colonel St. John at once sent back Captain St. George to collect some friendly natives, and after waiting till nightfall again moved on himself when they came up, so as to reach Opepe by daybreak. At Opepe nine dead bodies were found and traces of a considerable native force which had passed on southwards.
[Image of page 181]
This lamentable surprise, the direct consequence of the unfortunate delay in obeying my orders, and of over-confidence, did much to retrieve Te Kooti's prestige. He had left the mountains with only the following of 100 men, and on reaching Opepe had conversed with some of the escort, pretending that the force was a friendly contingent. When the whole of his men arrived the unfortunate escort was attacked unexpectedly while unarmed, and all those that could be reached were shot. One or two, including the cornet in command, made their escape and reached Galatea, spreading unnecessarily gloomy reports and discouraging the men already suffering from the cold, tedium, and hardship of their life on the plains. Lieut.-Colonel St. John had hitherto kept them employed in road-making to facilitate the transport of supplies, but to do so he had to subsist them from the reserve provisions brought up with so much difficulty by pack horses to Galatea. It had been a strong additional reason for an early movement to Opepe that by that means the supply at Fort Galatea would not be exhausted, as Napier could have been relied upon to furnish ample provisions and meat, the latter being most difficult to obtain at Galatea. Thus a reserve depot would always have been accessible in case of stoppage on the Napier line, and I had intended to have collected a large supply from both directions at Opepe. To eke out the Galatea supplies the ration was not increased as the extreme cold required, nor
[Image of page 182]
would it have been necessary to economize at all had the camp been pushed on say by May 20th or 24th. After the reverse at Opepe, not in itself important, it was unfortunate that Lieut.-Colonel St. John did not at once collect every available man, and move by forced marches over the doubtful tribes whom he could easily overawe if they saw no chance of our protection. But it was otherwise ordered, and Te Kooti's prestige enormously increased by an apparent unwillingness to try conclusions with him, even with an immensely superior force and in the open plains. By doing this we seemed to accept the unfortunate surprise of a small escort as an overwhelming defeat to our arms, compelling a complete evacuation of an enormous breadth of territory and once more leaving the road open to Te Kooti to resume his razzias upon the peaceful settlements of the coast.
Beginning this when a very few weeks must have ended the war, in a manner and at a spot which would have taught its own lesson to the sulky Kingites not far off, it is not wonderful that Government found the hostilities so nearly concluded when they took office still continuing in a guerilla form a year later; and when it is remembered that by a more vigorous course we had in the preceding seven months, created a force, retrieved our disasters, re-conquered our lost districts, and defeated the enemy on the West Coast who had been more or less in arms for
[Image of page 183]
nine years, besides conducting a campaign on the East Coast so nearly to an equally satisfactory conclusion that we had reduced assistance to the small focus of 100 men on the Taupo plains, it is easy to compare the advantages reaped by the Colony from one system and the other.
Mr. Fox's Government had a trained, proved and reliable force to hand. Unlike its predecessors, it was not obliged to conduct war with men always months in arrears of pay; for they paid the troops out of loans. It had, too, only one side of the island to think about, and on that the enemy was not occupying a dense and pathless bush, nor in numbers to cause the smallest anxiety. Yet the war, so nearly ended when Mr. Fox took office in 1869, more than a year later, continued in a desultory way, and fourteen months elapsed before Te Kooti was at last suffered to go back with his followers almost unpursued and unmolested, to the safe asylum of the Uriwera country. Meanwhile he had been slowly hunted round Lake Taupo till at last with his force, when the crops of the Uriwera were again ripe, he was able to regain the shelter of the mountains from which so much pains had been taken to dislodge him. How all this occurred I am not the person to explain. This should be done by the officer whom the Government affected to trust with the command, but treated with neither confidence nor support from the first, and finally made the scapegoat of its own shortcomings.
[Image of page 184]
Possibly Colonel McDonnell may have erred sometimes, but the Duke of Wellington must have failed had he been tied hand and foot as he was. The regular or A. C. force Colonel McDonnell did not then belong to, though he commanded such men and officers as happened to be serving with him. It had been the earnest endeavour of the late Government and of all the officers of the A. C. to implant a military spirit into the only approach to a regular force which we possessed. To a very great extent they had succeeded in this, though as the late Major von Tempsky said, where a force has no history and no traditions it is not easy to create an esprit de corps. The virulent and unmerited abuse political windbags showered upon the character of the A. C., however successful in rendering the force unpopular in the country, united the men in a fellow-feeling of injustice that all experienced. By fostering the military spirit which was undoubtedly growing fast in the force, the Government might have achieved almost anything with the men that British pluck, devotion, and endurance could accomplish. But the new Government, at the outset, decided upon taking a step as unwise as it was distasteful to the force, and in one day destroyed the military character of the constabulary. Mr. Brannigan, a Police Commissioner from Otago, who enjoyed the character of being very smart in that capacity, but who had no experience in commanding military bodies, was appointed to
[Image of page 185]
the command of the force. His first step was to break up the divisions which had each their own individuality in our little history, which created an emulation in each to be smarter than the rest. Policemen's rattles were issued to men who hitherto had only used the rifle. The uniform was to be at once modified to the police pattern. And a code of bye-laws was drawn up for the government of the force, very suitable for a city police, but hardly for troops in the field; while a multitude of reports and returns were ordered to be sent in with the utmost punctuality, which in themselves would have taken up half of every officer's time to prepare.
These initiatory steps disgusted both officers and men, and destroyed their self-respect. It was not only that they had been placed under the command of an officer who was a pure civilian, but that it was quite clear that they were now policemen, not soldiers. The new regime was inaugurated by many propitiatory sacrifices, and the best and bravest men felt that they were specially selected for the prescribed list. Many, unable to bear the humiliation of the new system and disgusted at the espionage, encouraged and even directed by the Government, resigned their appointments. Others, excellent men in every respect, were turned out of the force pitilessly without notice, and in fact a reign of terror began in which the character and utility of the
[Image of page 186]
force, as a military protection to the country, was entirely destroyed.
Colonel McDonnell had therefore but a small mainstay to rely upon as the backbone of the heterogeneous assemblages he was called upon to command. Moreover, he had to put up with the jealousy of the new Commissioner, who resented the employment of his men in the field under another. It really looked as if the Government wished to rule the military forces in the field on the Austrian principle of divide et impera. How many commanders there were, all more or less independent and yet each directing portions of the force employed during the same operations, it is hard to say. Their name was legion. For instance, there was Mr. Brannigan in Waikato burning to do something to gain the confidence of the force by his conduct in the field. There was Colonel Moule also in Waikato controlling the militia and volunteers, while the "Carnot" of the War Deparment, Mr. McLean, controlled both from the other end of the telegraph wire in Auckland. Then there was Colonel Fraser at Tauranga with the bulk of the A. C. strictly obeying his orders by displaying a masterly inactivity, yet whose force in two or three marches might have enabled Colonel McDonnell, who was the only one doing any work and should have been supreme, to bring Te Kooti to decisive action at any time. Then there were the chiefs Kemp and Topia, with the
[Image of page 187]
Wanganuis, Colonel Herrick, and later, Major Roberts, all only partially under Colonel McDonnell; and lastly, the most important of all, the Commissariat Department administered independently from Napier by Mr. Ormond, on purely economical principles, and cutting things so close that Colonel McDonnell rarely had a complete day's ration at all, never knew when to expect a convoy, and was always absolutely without a reserve. It might have been foreseen that either Colonel McDonnell should have been left unfettered and absolutely supreme over all detachments and departments, or he should have been removed, and an officer to whom the Government was willing to confide such powers appointed in his place. Half trust and perpetual interference could have but one result, failure and delay.
Some three months after the general retreat to the coast, every position, then so wantonly abandoned, had to be reoccupied. Te Kooti from being a fugitive with but 100 men had regained all his prestige, was at the head of a considerable force, and actually had made a triumphal progress through the Maori King's country. He had entered into relations with Rewi and other kingite chiefs, and had he met with any remarkable success, they would undoubtedly have taken up arms on his side, and a war to last for years might have ensued. Parliament being prorogued the Ministry was able to act as it pleased, and, alarmed at the dangerous results of the retreat
[Image of page 188]
policy, it was resolved to assemble a force once more in the interior. Accordingly from north, south, east, and west, detachments on no particular plan were hurried towards Lake Taupo, affording Te Kooti an opportunity of attacking them in detail, of which he took advantage. Having struck one or two blows, however, Colonel McDonnell, who had come up, assembled some of the detachments, and drove him back at Pourere beyond Rotorua. At length opportunity occurred to strike a decisive blow. Te Kooti entrenched himself with his force at Poutou, south of Taupo some twelve miles, and was attacked and defeated by Colonel McDonnell. The action I shall not describe as I was not present, but it was a success which, had it been followed up, would have ended the war. But there were no provisions for a pursuit, as the Government preferred economizing the supplies and leaving the men to waste their energies and time in searching for potatoes. Thus the force had, after a movement in advance, to retire to dig its dinner. As the line of supply passed through perfectly safe, easy and open country, this commissariat economy, to most minds, was inexplicable. It was, however, appreciated by Te Kooti, who speedily took heart after his defeat and retired upon the King's country. Meanwhile, Mr. Fox had sent a native contingent, under Topia, up the Wanganui River to Taupo, for what purpose nobody could understand. Half the cost so incurred
[Image of page 189]
applied in the supply of portable rations to Colonel McDonnell would have left nothing more to be done. Te Kooti was, however, safe for a while, the Government having issued the most stringent orders to prevent Colonel McDonnell pursuing him across the King's boundary. After a while Mr. McLean attempted personal negotiation with Rewi, and was received in a peculiarly humiliating manner by that chief and others. The nearest to a practical proposition got out of them was a suggestion by Rewi that we should lay down our arms first, and then, perhaps, Te Kooti would lay down his. To such a point had our imbecile management of affairs made us contemptible in the eyes of the warlike Waikatos, who a few short months before had been waiting day by day to hear that Te Kooti and his few adherents had been utterly destroyed at Taupo.
Though the Kingites would neither arrest nor attack Te Kooti to please Mr. McLean, they still did not wish to have their district compromised, perhaps invaded, in consequence of his presence, so as soon as the Minister left they politely requested the rebel leader to "move on." Refreshed and recruited, Te Kooti obligingly took his departure and repaired to the Patetere country, where the people favoured him and his "religion."
Here Colonel McDonnell, had he been a free agent, would probably again have signally defeated the enemy. But circumstanced as he was it was hopeless.
[Image of page 190]
Fifteen or sixteen hundred men were all near, but none except Colonel McDonnell's own column came up. All waited the signal, not from their commander, but from the War Minister, who failed to give it till the chance was lost. The Waikato force stood still. Te Kooti burst through Colonel McDonnell's force by a surprise and got clear away. Marching on, he met and defeated Colonel Fraser, slowly coming up by the bush, and drove him back to Tauranga. Last of all he made for Rotorua, and if he could have surprised that place his path was open to the mountains across the only practicable ford of the Rangitaiki, carefully left unguarded, at Fort Galatea. He did not, however, succeed in carrying out his programme quite as successfully as he had expected, for a French Canadian half-breed, named Baker, a deserter from one of H. M. ships of war, who had long resided among the Maories, brought the intelligence of his design to Captain Gilbert Mair at Ohinemuri. Thereupon, hurriedly assembling a scratch force, Captain Gilbert Mair moved out and attacked Te Kooti, who made off towards Fort Galatea. But Captain Mair, who for his gallantry afterwards received, on my recommendation, the New Zealand Cross, held Te Kooti's rear-guard in a continual skirmish at very close quarters, killing some eighteen or twenty of his best men, and only giving up the pursuit at nightfall. This feat of arms accomplished by a few irregulars, almost all Maories,
[Image of page 191]
was one of the most brilliant episodes of the war, and but for the miserable mistake of leaving Fort Galatea unoccupied might have, even then, enabled the Colony to extricate itself with some credit from the struggle. It is worth remarking that the stable was carefully locked afterwards when the steed was gone, and Galatea was garrisoned for the future, though perhaps never to be of any use again.
Thus ended these operations which, after fourteen months, left us in a worse position than ever. Somebody had to bear the blame. Some scapegoat had to be found; Colonel Fraser happened to die just then, Mr. Brannigan and Colonel Moule had not been suffered to lift their fingers by their imperious master. Mr. Ormond was too influential a member of the party, and Mr. McLean too necessary to it, to be called to account; there remained only poor Colonel McDonnell, more sinned against than sinning, who had really not been responsible for any part of the failure, but had been grossly ill-used in being so much interfered with. So Colonel McDonnell was recalled, and the command suffered to devolve or revolve between Ropata and Kemp (English troops not being competent, in the opinion of Ministers, to do the work). Happily the expedition of 1869 had burst the bubble of superstition which till then had protected the Uriwera, and Kemp and Ropata penetrated and hunted the mountains from hill to hill, almost unresisted. Two successes occurred, one
[Image of page 192]
of which might have had very important results. It had been the outcome of operations designed and carried out by Kemp, but owing to the jealousies or want of concert between the rival leaders, the attack was made by Ropata too soon, while Kemp was endeavouring to surround the position, and thus the enemy escaped. After this no further active operations on a large scale were attempted. Small expeditions of enlisted Maories under Mair, Preece, Porter, and Hamlin, traversed the mountains in all directions, practically unopposed, seeking for Te Kooti. After evading their pursuit for several months, the New Zealand Nana Sahib at length gathered some of his followers and was suffered to depart openly enough, but unpursued, and sought refuge in the King's country. There, having but a remnant of his old following, he remained quiet and unmolested till, some years later, the Hon. Mr. Bryce, then Native Minister, invited the outlaw, as he was still regarded, to meet him at the King's settlement, Whatiwhatihoe, under the Pirongia ranges, in the Upper Waikato. On this occasion Mr. Bryce shook hands with Te Kooti and extended to him the amnesty from which he had hitherto been specially excluded. Following upon this, not only was the proclamation, offering £5000 for his head, formally revoked, but, with the magnanimity so characteristic of the British nation, coupled with this pardon was the gift of a house and section of land at Kihikihi,
[Image of page 193]
which the Government had purchased for that purpose. Here Te Kooti peacefully ended his remarkable career, living for several years on terms of amity with his neighbours and dying at length "in the odour of sanctity."
Te Kooti's public submission was, in point of fact, the final act in the Maori war which had disturbed the Colony for so many years and had cost, from first to last, some millions of money.
I have endeavoured in these pages to tell an unvarnished, truthful story of how the Self-Reliant policy was put in force by the colonial Government, and the Maories made to feel, once for all, that the struggle against British supremacy was a useless one. There is no reason to apprehend any future disturbances. The whites and the Maories are now practically one people, and the best feeling exists between the two races. It finds its parallel in the relations subsisting between the English and French Canadians in the great Dominion. Firmness tempered by kindness is the true policy of the future. In short, to use the words of the brave old Sir Harry Smith, the hero of Aliwal, let us teach the Maories by our policy towards them that while "we have a heart for peace, we have an arm for war."
THE END.
[Image of page 194]
[Page 194 is blank]
