CHAPTER XIII. THE TAKING OF TAURANGAIKA PAH AND FURTHER MOVEMENTS
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CHAPTER XIII
THE TAKING OF TAURANGAIKA PAH AND FURTHER MOVEMENTS
IT was most fortunate for our force that the natives did evacuate Taurangaika pah. It was simply astonishing to see the amount of work which had been done by Titokowaru's men, numbering about six hundred, in less than ten weeks, to fortify their position. The pah covered about an acre of ground, and was situated on a hill outside, but close to the bush. Underground passages and rooms were dug out, so that their men were entirely protected from our shells; and double palisading was erected around the whole, making the place so strong, that it is more than doubtful if we should have taken it by storm, had they remained to defend it;
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TAURANGAIKA PAH
we could certainly not have done so without considerable loss of life. With all their clever engineering, they left out the most important necessity--water; they had to go outside to get it, and when they saw our force was sufficiently large to surround them, they decided to vacate the position, which they did in a very clever manner.
Our troops at about four o'clock p.m., took up a position about two hundred yards from the pah, in a ditch which protected them from the fire of the enemy. We were so close to each other that conversation in a loud voice was carried on between the enemy and ourselves, they calling out to us at eight o'clock at night, to come on and attack them, as they wanted to breakfast on us in the morning. At ten o'clock at night, they apparently made a greater noise than ever; at the same time, their force was clearing out at the back into the bush; and when, at break of day, our troops rushed the position, they found an empty pah. I went in myself to examine
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it, and owing to the numerous little compartments leading one into another, had some difficulty in finding my way out again. Had Colonel Whitmore been able to surround the position and attack them when they came out for water, the result might have been different; but his force was chiefly composed of men who had previously suffered reverses under Lieutenant-Colonel McDonell, and Colonel Whitmore had to move with great caution at first, until he felt he could thoroughly rely upon his men.
Colonel Whitmore as a commander was in many respects a success, and certainly the best we had during that period; at the same time, it was very unfortunate that his manner at times was so offensive to his officers and his men, and also that he did not look better after the interests of his wounded. It was owing to this, that I had two serious altercations with him.
That he was thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which my department
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RESULT OF ALTERCATION
carried out their duties, is unmistakably given in his dispatch of February 3rd, 1869, an extract from which already appears in this book; yet, within a week after that, though the department carried out implicitly the orders he gave as to the number of days' rations to be issued to certain troops, because that did not dovetail with his operations, he blamed the department for doing exactly what he instructed them to do; and spoke in such violent and offensive language to the assistant-quartermaster, that the latter came to me to complain, and said he wished to resign his appointment, which I would not hear of. On my taking the matter up, Colonel Whitmore again spoke in such an insulting manner to this officer that I felt it my duty to interfere, and on the evidence of his own A. D. C., I proved my quartermaster was perfectly right on the question at issue. It was very lamentable such an altercation did take place; the result, however, was good for the force, as his manner afterwards was decidedly better towards
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them; but not for me, as will he hereafter shown.
At this time the head-quarters of the force were at Wereroa, a high hill commanding the Waitotara river, and a little event occurred, which, owing to had luck, told against me.
An advance was ordered, and Colonel Whitmore gave instructions to put a pontoon bridge over the Waitotara, and to cross the guns, ammunition, and stores over the river by that means. This meant an unnecessary delay of several hours, as, by marching the men about four miles down the river, we could ford without any difficulty, and thus save the necessity of putting up the bridge. I pointed this out, but received orders to carry out the instructions given, which were issued accordingly, when Colonel Whitmore countermanded them, and told me that it was my work, that I was responsible, and was to do what I pleased.
I then carried out what I had suggested, and sent the guns, ammunition,
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FAILURE OF PLAN
and stores, with a guard, to ford the river four miles lower down, early in the morning. The river was low, and there was no sign of rain, but during the night, though it did not rain in camp, it did far back in the hills, so much so that the river rose to a high flood, and though I waited for two days, I could not ford, and had to return to Wereroa, and carry out the orders originally given by Colonel Whitmore. His army was in front, separated from his ammunition and stores, and it exchanged a few shots with some of the rearguard of the enemy.
It was most unfortunate, and the colonel scored heavily against me; but it was still more unfortunate for the wounded at Patea, as a change in the hospital arrangements took place there, which I am confident never would have taken place had I been present; and I severely censured the principal medical officer, who rode out specially to tell me, for allowing such a change to he made without reference to the Government, even though the com-
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mander of the troops had ordered it. The medical department was under my control, and I had to see that they received the necessary stores and medical comforts.
The Resident Magistrate's house at Patea, comprising several good-sized rooms, had been converted into a hospital, and several wounded were being attended to there, some of them being serious cases, and yet Colonel Whitmore, when he arrived at Patea, ordered the wounded to be moved into huts with sand floors, and took possession of this hospital as head-quarters for himself and his staff, I being one of the number.
I went immediately to Colonel Whitmore, and requested him to at once give up the building again to the wounded, but he refused, stating that he must have those quarters for H. R. H. the Duke of Edinburgh, who was daily expected in New Zealand, and would visit the camp. I still remonstrated as strongly as I could, and said I felt sure that neither H. R. H. the Prince of Wales nor H. R. H. the Duke
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REMOVAL OF WOUNDED
of Edinburgh would dream of turning the wounded out; that they could not remain where they were, with the sand blowing into their wounds while they were being dressed, and that, if he would not give in, I must turn the settlers out of their block-house, which had a wooden floor.
It ended in my having to do that. I went to see the wounded, and naturally they found great fault at the treatment they had received. Unfortunately I was away looking after the stores being crossed over the Waitotara; had I been present before the wounded were removed, awkward position as I should have been placed in to prevent it, I feel confident this would never have happened.
However, I suffered for the action I took, as will be shown later on. H. R. H. the Duke of Edinburgh did not come to New Zealand, as he was unfortunately fired at and wounded by O'Farrell in Sydney. After the enemy had evacuated Taurangaika, they fled across the Waitotara river; our troops expeditiously followed
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them up in the bush, Colonel Whitmore eventually overtaking and surprising them at Otauto, where he fought his first engagement in this expedition, and routed the enemy. He sent his wounded to Patea, which ought to have had that good hospital to receive them. Colonel Whitmore followed up his success, scattering Titokowaru's force.
At Keteonatea he halted for a few days prior to attacking the natives at Te Ngaire, a place eight miles inland, surrounded by what was assumed to he an impregnable swamp, to which the larger portion of Titokowaru's army had fled. After that he determined to march his army, at the back of Mount Egmont, to Waitara, by the same route as Major-General Sir Trevor Chute so successfully took with the Imperial and native troops in 1860. The natives residing on the coast between Mount Egmont and the sea, at Kaipukenui, Warea, and Opunake, though not actually fighting against us, allowed no one to pass through their country, and stated they would fight
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HONE PIHAMA
if any troops were sent that way, our only friend being Hone Pihama, a chief at Oeo who formerly had fought against us, and who a year or two before, had led the attack against General Cameron at Nukumaru, with such success that some of his men got into the camp and killed one of the cooks.
