The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration. [New Zealand chapters]

Henry George Grey

First published by R. Bentley in 1853

Digitised and made available online by the University of Auckland Libraries and Learning Services.

Epub © 2013 Early New Zealand Books Collection

ISBN 978-1-927279-96-0

[TITLE PAGE]

THE

COLONIAL POLICY

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S ADMINISTRATION,

BY EARL GREY.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
Publisher in Ordinary to Her Majesty.
1853.

PRINTED BY
JOHN EDWARD TAYLOR, LITTLE QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS.

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[PREFACE]

PREFACE.

IT is the object of the following Letters to give some account of the Colonial Policy of the Administration in which I held the office of Secretary of State for the Colonial Department. I have not attempted more than a very slight sketch of the transactions to which these pages relate, yet much more time and labour have been occupied in writing them than I anticipated when they were begun, chiefly, from my having found it necessary to examine minutely the voluminous papers laid before Parliament, from which the materials have been principally drawn. The completion of the task which I ventured to undertake has also been delayed by various interruptions from other avocations, so that

these pages will be published some months later than they were intended to appear.

I am sensible that this must somewhat detract from any value they may possess; for the progress of events is so rapid in the times in which we live, that even the delay of a few months has made more than one material change in the aspect of affairs, and my remarks will consequently be found in these cases to have reference to a state of things which has since been altered. Instead of attempting to correct what I had written, so as to make it correspond with more recent information, I have thought it better to affix to each of these Letters the date at which it was finished, and in reading them I would request that these dates may be borne in mind.

I have spoken of the Colonial Policy described in the following Letters as that of the Administration of which I was a member, because I conceive it to have been so both constitutionally and in fact; but I am far from desiring by this to diminish my own responsibility. Though the Secretary of State entrusted with the Department of the Colonies receives much assistance from his Colleagues, and though the most important measures which it is his duty to carry into effect ought to

be decided upon with their advice and concurrence, still the main responsibility for all errors that are committed properly rests with him.

Nor does any portion of this responsibility fall upon those by whose assistance the business of the Department is conducted. It has often been asserted that there is some mysterious influence within the walls of the Colonial Office, which under every different Secretary of State prevents what is right from being done, and causes disappointment and discontent to the Colonists, and persons connected with the Colonies, who have business to transact with the Department. Nothing can be more unfounded than such a notion. Those who have observed with attention the administration of Colonial affairs for the last five-and-twenty years will, I am persuaded, agree with me in thinking that it is much more justly chargeable with want of steadiness and consistency, from the inevitable differences in the views of successive Secretaries of State, than with an obstinate adherence under them all, to the same erroneous system. No doubt there are many demands urgently pressed upon the Department which have been successively rejected by different Secretaries of State; but this only shows that these demands are so unreasonable that

they are alike rejected by men of the most opposite political views, when they are required to decide upon them with full information and with official responsibility.

I am glad to have this opportunity of saying, that while I shall always feel most deeply indebted to the gentlemen holding permanent situations in the Colonial Office, for the exceedingly able and willing assistance I received from them in conducting its business while I presided over it, I can assert, in the most positive manner, that never upon any occasion was there on their part the slightest attempt improperly to influence my decision upon questions brought before me, or to withhold the best aid they could afford, in the execution of measures which may have been decided upon contrary to their opinion. Having mentioned the permanent members of the Colonial Office, I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of expressing my regard and esteem for those who were my Parliamentary Under-Secretaries. I should indeed be most ungrateful if I could ever forget how much I owe to Mr. Hawes for his unwearied assiduity, and the friendly zeal with which he shared with me, not only the ordinary labours of the Department, but the cares and anxieties of five most toilsome and

harassing Sessions of Parliament, during which I consulted him unreservedly upon every question that arose, and derived the greatest benefit from his advice and assistance. With Mr. Peel my official connection was very much shorter, having lasted only about four months; but this was quite long enough for me to form a very high opinion of his abilities, and to feel much indebted to him for the anxiety he displayed to give his best assistance in conducting the business of the Department, and in preparing to meet the anticipated difficulties of the Parliamentary campaign, which was so speedily cut short by the breaking up of the Administration.

I have nothing further to add in the way of Preface, except to call attention to what I have said in the concluding Letter of the series, as to the information I have thought it right to make use of. If I had felt justified in availing myself of information of a more confidential character, it would not have been difficult to make my account of some of the transactions referred to more complete than it is, and probably more interesting to the reader. It was however obviously my duty to abstain from disclosing information not already public, of which I had come into possession in the discharge of my duties as a Servant of the Crown;

and I trust that whatever may be the other faults of these Letters (and I am painfully sensible that they have many), they are at least free from that which would justly have been regarded as an unpardonable one – a departure from the reserve imposed upon me by the office I had the honour to fill.

DECEMBER 28, 1852.

[CONTENTS]

CONTENTS.

LETTER I.

COLONIAL POLICY. – PRELIMINARY REMARKS. – EFFECT OF FREE TRADE ON THE COLONIES ... 1

LETTER II.

THE SUGAR COLONIES GENERALLY .... 50

LETTER III.

MAURITIUS. – ST. LUCIA. – TRINIDAD ... 98

LETTER IV.

GUIANA. – JAMAICA. – BARBADOES .... 143

LETTER V.

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA. – CANADA . . . 200

LETTER VI.

LOWER PROVINCES OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA. – NEWFOUNDLAND ...... 274

LETTER VII.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES. – SALE OF LAND. – EMIGRATION 303

APPENDIX.

A. – List of Officers appointed to the Government of Colonies, by Lord Grey ..... 349

B. – Correspondence relative to the reduction of Military Force ........ 353

C. – Recapitulation of Measures relating to the Sugar Colonies ........ 367

D. – Tables of Import and Consumption of Sugar .. 390

E. – Mauritius – Address to Governor Higginson, and His Excellency's Reply ..... 392

F. – British Guiana – Tables of Produce ... 402

G. – Extracts from Reports of Select Committees, etc., relating to the West Indies .... 404

H. – Jamaica – Despatches to Sir C. Grey ... 409

I. – Report of Privy Council – Constitution for the Australian Colonies ....... 422

LETTER I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

THE COLONIAL POLICY

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S ADMINISTRATION.

LETTER I.

COLONIAL POLICY. – PRELIMINARY REMARKS. – EFFECT OF FREE TRADE ON THE COLONIES.

MY DEAR LORD JOHN,

The affairs of the Colonies have of late years been very largely discussed. The books, the pamphlets, and the speeches of which they have been the subject, have been almost innumerable; but of these even the few to which I should be the last to deny the praise of ability and fairness, advocate views which seem to me either incorrect or incomplete; while, as the rest have for the most part been designed to serve party or personal objects, they have been little calculated to assist the Public in forming a sound opinion on the questions to which they relate. No small proportion of what has been spoken or written about the Colonies for the last few years, has had for its aim to decry and to misrepresent the policy pursued towards them by the

Administration of which you were at the head; and as so large a share of the responsibility for the measures of that Government devolves upon myself, it is natural that I should wish the Public to have the means of knowing the real character and scope of those measures, and the grounds upon which they were adopted. Nor is this unimportant on grounds far higher than what concerns any individual: the national interest is deeply involved in having the course of Colonial administration correctly understood. In Parliament, or at least in the House of Lords, the debates which have taken place on Colonial affairs have been entirely confined to particular questions, affecting individual Colonies, and have never afforded me an opportunity of stating my views as to our general system of Colonial Policy, which, to be properly understood, requires to be considered as a whole; perhaps, also, the subject is too extensive for Parliamentary discussion. I propose therefore to endeavour in these pages to supply a deficiency which I conceive to exist, by laying before the Public a connected view of the Colonial policy which was pursued while I was entrusted with the task of conducting it, as a member of your Administration.

It has appeared to me that I shall be able to do this most conveniently in the form of a series of Letters, which I address to you, because you were acquainted, while they were in progress, with the transactions to which I shall have to advert, and will therefore be able to judge of the accuracy of my statements.

You cannot but take an interest in the subject, since all the most important of the measures of which I shall have to speak were, of course, adopted with your knowledge and assent; and I am happy to think that there has never been the slightest difference of opinion between us, as to the principles which ought to form the guide of our policy.

It is my intention to avoid, as far as possible, any notice of the various attacks made upon our measures, and of the misrepresentations to which we have been exposed. I shall do so, because it is my wish to give to these Letters a tone as little controversial as is consistent with the object I have in view, and also because the objections which have been made to our policy have been so multifarious and so contradictory, that an attempt to answer them all would be intolerably tedious. Hence, without adverting to the various speeches and pamphlets by which our Colonial administration has been assailed, I shall endeavour to give a general sketch of our policy, of the views on which it was founded, and of its results; leaving it to those who take an interest in the subject to draw their own conclusions, and noticing objections which have been made to our policy only when necessary for its elucidation. I fear that, even adopting this plan, it will be difficult to compress within a moderate compass a statement, however succinct, of what has been done in the numerous Colonies of the British Empire, with an explanation of the grounds on which we have acted; and that much which is not unimportant will

have to be omitted. The ample information laid before Parliament, to which I shall take care to refer, will however enable those who desire it, to obtain a more perfect knowledge of the transactions to which I shall advert.

Before I proceed to give an account of what has been done in particular Colonies, it will be convenient that I should state, somewhat fully, the general principles which have in all cases been the guide of our policy, and that I should call your attention to the manner in which the peculiar circumstances of the times have affected the administration of Colonial affairs. To begin with the last, I have to remark that in these affairs much of the opposition we have met with, and the principal difficulties we have encountered, have arisen, directly or indirectly, from our having thought it our duty to maintain the policy of free trade, and to extend its application to the produce of the Colonies. That these difficulties must be expected from this policy I was quite aware when your Government was formed; but the greatest service that I believed we were called upon as a Government to render to the country was that of completing the work, which had been happily begun, of removing restrictions from industry, and securely establishing a system of free trade throughout the empire. So far back as when I first entered upon public life, – now more than twenty-five years ago, – it was my conviction that, next to the removal of the religious disabilities which then threatened the disruption of the Empire, and to the accomplishment

of such a reform of the House of Commons as was requisite to make it a fitting instrument for effecting every other public improvement, the political object of the greatest importance to the public good was to relieve industry and commerce from the shackles with which they had been encumbered by measures adopted for their advancement under the erroneous theory of "Protection." Hence, beginning with the year 1827, when I voted with a very small minority against the principle of the sliding scale, in the Bill for the amendment of the Corn Laws brought forward by Mr. Canning, I had, both by votes and speeches, supported every proposal submitted to the House of Parliament of which I was a Member, which I considered to be calculated to advance the object of giving greater freedom to industry. I believed that the Colonial trade ought to form no exception to the general rule, but should be placed on the same footing as other branches of our commerce. I considered it to be no less for the real and permanent interest of the Colonies themselves, than for that of the Mother-country, that industry should cease to be diverted from its natural channels, and a useless burden to be imposed on the consumer by differential duties, levied for the purpose of favouring Colonial produce in our markets, and our produce in the markets of the Colonies.

Entertaining these opinions, I should not have accepted your proposal to form part of your Administration, if I had not felt satisfied that its measures would

be directed to the completion of the work of commercial reform, and had I not expected that, notwithstanding the difficulties I anticipated, we should be supported in this policy by Parliament.

In that expectation I have not been disappointed. By the measures which we have succeeded in carrying, for the alteration of the duties on sugar, coffee, and timber, for the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and for giving power to the local Legislatures to abolish differential duties in the Colonies, provision has been made for placing the Colonial trade on a footing free from serious objection; while the accomplishment, at no very distant period, of the further improvements it still requires has obviously been ensured.

These measures, necessary and beneficial as I am convinced they will ultimately be admitted to have been, amounted however to nothing less than a revolution in an established system of policy, which could not fail to shock many long received opinions, and to bring about a great change in the relations hitherto subsisting between this country and the Colonies. For more than two centuries, the great object of all European nations, in seeking to obtain possession of Colonies, was the gain supposed to accrue from the monopoly of their commerce, which it was the practice for the parent State to maintain, while, on the other hand, it gave to their produce a preference in its own markets. This policy began to be relaxed by Parliament immediately after the American Revo-

lution (of which calamity it was, in truth, the chief cause); but, although the views on which it is founded had been considerably modified, the principle of placing the trade with the Colonies on a different footing from that with other countries had been maintained up to the year 1846, and was generally regarded as one of unquestionable propriety and wisdom. So much was this the case, that in the beginning of Sir Robert Peel's commercial reforms, the tariff of 1842, as originally submitted to the House of Commons, contained provisions by which various new protected interests would have been created in the Colonies, and a large revenue would have been sacrificed by the Mother-country, without any real benefit accruing to them. Amongst other articles proposed to be dealt with were tea and tobacco, on which it was intended to reduce one half the amount of duty to which they would otherwise be liable when they were the produce of British possessions. It so happens that I was myself the person by whom the attention of the House of Commons (of which I was then a Member) was called to the inexpediency of this mode of dealing with the customs-duties; and I moved a resolution against the establishment of any new protecting duties in favour of Colonial produce 1, arguing that, in order to derive a revenue from duties on imports without imposing an undue burden on the consumer, and without diverting industry from its natural and therefore most productive channels, duties

ought not to be levied on the importation of any articles which would meet in our market articles of the same kind produced in the Colonies, and not subject to an equal amount of taxation.

This principle, which is equally applicable to articles produced at home and to those obtained from the Colonies, 2 is now recognized as sound by the

majority of intelligent and educated men; but this was far from being the case until very recently, and it was so much otherwise at the time of which I am speaking, that, although in the resolution I moved I abstained from proposing to abolish existing protecting duties in favour of the Colonies, and only sought to lay down the rule that no new ones should be created, the motion was rejected, obtaining the support of a minority far below the usual strength of the Opposition; and in the tariff of 1842 the erroneous principle I had endeavoured to condemn was adhered to, the Government only abandoning its application in those cases in which it would have seriously affected the revenue. I refer to this circumstance, because it shows how strong was the hold on men's minds of the old opinions respecting the Colonial trade, and how great was the shock given to these opinions, when the policy of placing our trade with the Colonies on the same footing as that with foreign countries was first systematically adopted in Sir Robert Peel's Act for the repeal of the former Corn Law, and in the measures which followed it. This accounts for the great bitterness of the political discontent and opposition to your Government excited by these measures. It is notorious that distress is usually the parent of political discontent, even when that distress cannot be referred by the sufferers themselves to the conduct of the Government; much more so, when they believe their difficulties to have been occasioned by its measures. But the abandonment of long esta-

blished commercial and fiscal regulations, however vicious in policy, generally occasions temporary loss and inconvenience to those engaged in the branches of trade and industry affected by such changes; and if they do not occasion actual loss, these changes invariably excite the apprehension of it, which is nearly as bad. Hence reforms of this description are always found to create many enemies to the Government by which they are accomplished; and in the application of the principles of free trade to Colonial produce, the hostility thus excited was aggravated by its being thought, however unreasonably, that these measures involved an act of injustice, as invading what had long been regarded as a right on the part of the Colonists.

Nor is this all; the abandonment of the ancient commercial system of this country towards the Colonies brought a still larger question under discussion. Not only those who still adhered to the opinion that the former policy with respect to colonial commerce was the right one, but many of the most eager advocates of the principles of free trade, concurred in arguing that, if the Colonies were no longer to be regarded as valuable on account of the commercial advantages to be derived from their possession, the country had no interest in keeping these dependencies, and that it would be better to abandon them; thus getting rid of the heavy charge on the country, especially in providing the requisite amount of naval and military force for their protection. In like manner, the Colonists

began to inquire whether, if they were no longer to enjoy their former commercial privileges in the markets of the Mother-country, they derived any real benefit from a continuance of the connection. It is obvious that questions of this kind could not be raised without creating great difficulties in the administration of Colonial affairs, and the more so, because it is impossible to deny that the view of the subject to which I have adverted is at least plausible; and when the old doctrine, that the great value of Colonies arises from the commercial monopoly which the Mother-country can claim with respect to their trade is abandoned, some other explanation may fairly be asked of the grounds on which we should nevertheless continue to support the charges inseparable from the maintenance of our Colonial empire.

Although it would be impossible, within the limits to which I must confine myself, fully to discuss in this Letter so large a subject, it is requisite, for the clearness of what is to follow, that I should state generally why, and on what terms, I think that the connection between this country and the Colonies ought to be preserved, and also that I should explain how these views have been applied in practice. I consider, then, that the British Colonial Empire ought to be maintained, principally because I do not consider that the Nation would be justified in throwing off the responsibility it has incurred by the acquisition of this dominion, and because I believe that much of the power and influence of this Country

depends upon its having large Colonial possessions in different parts of the world.

The possession of a number of steady and faithful allies, in various quarters of the globe, will surely be admitted to add greatly to the strength of any nation; while no alliance between independent states can be so close and intimate as the connection which unites the Colonies to the United Kingdom as parts of the Great British Empire. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that the power of a nation does not depend merely on the amount of physical force it can command, but rests, in no small degree, upon opinion and moral influence: in this respect British power would be diminished by the loss of our Colonies, to a degree which it would be difficult to estimate. Hence, if it is an advantage, not for the sake of domineering over other countries but with a view to our own security, to form part of a powerful nation rather than of a weak one (and, considering the many examples we have seen of the injustice to which weak ones are compelled to submit, this can hardly admit of a question), it seems to follow, that the tie which binds together all the different and distant portions of the British Empire, so that their united strength may be wielded for their common protection, must be regarded as an object of extreme importance to the interests of the Mother-country and her dependencies. To the latter it is no doubt of far greater importance than to the former, because, while still forming comparatively small and weak communities, they enjoy, in return for their

allegiance to the British Crown, all the security and consideration which belong to them as members of one of the most powerful States in the world. No foreign Power ventures to attack or interfere with the smallest of them, while every Colonist carries with him, to the remotest quarters of the globe which he may visit in trading or other pursuits, that protection which the character of a British subject everywhere confers, and can depend, in any difficulties, or under any oppression to which he may be exposed, on the assistance of Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular servants, supported, if necessary, by the whole power of the Empire.

But I should regard it as a very unworthy mode of considering this subject, if it were to be looked at with a view only to the interests of this Country, as that word is usually understood. I conceive that, by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. Supposing it were clear (which I am far from admitting) that a reduction of our national expenditure (otherwise impracticable), to the extent of a few hundred thousands a year, could be effected by withdrawing our authority and protection from our nume-

rous Colonies, should we be justified, for the sake of such a saving, in taking this step, and thus abandoning the duty which seems to have been cast upon us?

It is to be remembered, that if we adopted this policy we must be prepared for very serious consequences, which would undoubtedly result from it. Some few only of these I will mention. No one acquainted with the actual state of society in the West India islands, and the feelings prevalent among the different classes of their inhabitants, can doubt that, if they were left, unaided by us, to settle amongst themselves in whose hands power should be placed, a fearful war of colour would probably soon break out, by which the germs of improvement now existing there would be destroyed, and civilization would be thrown back for centuries. In Ceylon a similar result would follow; its native races are utterly incapable of governing themselves, and yet they certainly would not submit to be ruled by the mere handful of Europeans who have settled among them, if this small body were unsupported by British power. The great wealth which within the last few years has been created in this island would be destroyed, and the most hopeless anarchy would take place of that security which now exists, and under the shelter of which such promising signs of improvement are beginning to appear. Even in New Zealand, although I have little doubt that the Colonists of European descent would be found capable of establishing a government, under which they might eventually rise to prosperity, yet we could scarcely

hope to see this effected without a series of contests with the native inhabitants, in which the latter would in the end be destroyed, but not until they had inflicted and suffered an almost equal amount of misery. On the West Coast of Africa there is at this moment a far more encouraging prospect than at any previous time; the efforts which have been so long made to improve the negro race seem to be at length beginning to produce important results, and a great change for the better may be looked for. But if we take up a, new policy, and abandon our positions on the African coast, the Slave Trade will again revive in the extensive territory within reach of our settlements, where it has now been extirpated, and has given place to a legitimate commerce, which is daily becoming more important.

To say nothing of higher motives, and of the duty which I conceive to be no less obligatory upon nations than upon individuals, of using the power and the advantages entrusted to them by Providence to advance the welfare of mankind, I would ask whether, even in mere money, there would not be something to set off against the saving of expense from the abandonment of our Colonies? On the other side of the account we have to put the destruction of British property which would thus be occasioned, and the annihilation of lucrative branches of our commerce, by allowing anarchy and bloodshed to arrest the peaceful industry which now creates the means of paying for the British goods consumed daily in larger quantities, by

the numerous and various populations now emerging from barbarism under our protection.

It is true there are several of our Colonies to which the last observations do not directly apply; but the policy of abandoning a part of our Colonial Empire could scarcely be adopted, without giving so great a shock to the feeling of confidence and security in the remainder, as greatly to increase the difficulty of maintaining it; and I must add, that it appears to me very doubtful whether even the Colonies most capable of governing themselves, and which have no uncivilized tribes to deal with, from whom any danger could be apprehended, would not for some time have much difficulty in maintaining their present state of tranquillity and security, both externally and internally, if their connection with the Mother-country were suddenly dissolved.

In New South Wales, for instance, the interference of the Home Government in the internal administration of the Colony is exceedingly slight; but, slight as it is, it may be questioned whether, without it, the conflict of interests and opinions between different classes of the inhabitants and between different districts would not be likely to lead to very dangerous struggles; while in their relations with each other it would be still more likely that the different Australian Colonies would be involved in. difficulties, if they ceased to be all placed under the supreme authority of the Imperial Government.

I have thought it necessary to state thus strongly my

dissent from the views of those who wish to dismember the British Empire by abandoning the Colonies, because it is impossible not to observe that this policy – unworthy of a great Nation, and unwise as I consider it to be – is not only openly advocated by one active party in the country, but is also hardly less effectually supported by persons occupying an important position in Parliament, and who, while they hesitate to avow their adherence to it, hold language which obviously leads in the same direction, and advocate measures the adoption of which would inevitably bring about this result.

If the reasons which I have just stated for maintaining the connection between this Country and the British Colonies are admitted to be sound, it will follow as a necessary inference, that two very plain rules as to the terms on which that connection should be continued may be laid down. In the first place, I think it will clearly follow that this Country has no interest whatever in exercising any greater influence in the internal affairs of the Colonies, than is indispensable either for the purpose of preventing any one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large; or else for the promotion of the internal good government of the Colonies, by assisting the inhabitants to govern themselves when sufficiently civilized to do so with advantage, and by providing a just and impartial administration for those of which the population is too ignorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs. While

it was our policy to maintain a monopoly of the trade of the Colonies, it was necessary for the Home Government to exercise a considerable control over their internal administration, because otherwise this monopoly would certainly have been evaded; and accordingly it will be found, on looking back at the earlier history of our Colonies, (especially those which now constitute the United States,) that the interference of the servants of the Crown in their internal affairs, and the differences which that interference occasioned, arose almost entirely from the endeavour to uphold the commercial system then in force. The abandonment of that system has removed the necessity for this interference. Secondly, I think it will follow, that when this Country no longer attempts either to levy a commercial tribute from the Colonies by a system of restriction, nor to interfere needlessly in their internal affairs, it has a right to expect that they should take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the expenses incurred for their advantage.

In subsequent Letters I shall endeavour to show, with reference to the transactions of the several Colonies, that these rules were strictly adhered to while I held the office of Secretary of State; but before I do this, it will be convenient that I should offer some further general remarks upon, the rules themselves, and the manner in which they have been acted upon. And first I would observe, with regard to the vague declamation on the absurdity of attempting to govern the Colonies from Downing-street, of which we have

heard so much, that it would undoubtedly be in the highest degree absurd to attempt to govern from Downing-street, if this is to be understood in the sense of directing from thence all the measures of the local Authorities; but I am not aware that such an attempt has at any period of our history been thought of. On the other hand, it is obvious that, if the Colonies are not to become independent States, some kind of authority must be exercised by the Government at home. It will conduce to a clearer understanding of the subject, to consider by what means any control over its dependencies is now practically maintained by the Mother-country, and to what extent that control ought to be carried.

The authority of the Home Government over the Colonies is exercised mainly in two ways; first by the appointment of Governors, and secondly by sanctioning or disallowing the measures of the local Governments, of which these officers are at the head. It is also exercised sometimes, but much more rarely, by prescribing measures for their adoption. With regard to the selection of Governors, though I am aware that a contrary opinion has sometimes been expressed, it appears to me clear that, if we are to have Colonies at all, the appointment of their Governors must necessarily be retained by the Crown, since I do not perceive by what other means any real authority or control could be exercised over the executive government of the Colonies by the advisers of the Crown. But though the Governors of Colonies ought in my

opinion always to be named by the Crown, (and, looking to the consequences of Presidential elections in the United States, I believe that the advantage to the Colonies of having persons entirely unconnected with local parties, thus appointed to these situations, cannot easily be over-rated), the nature and extent of the powers entrusted to the Governors, and consequently the character of the Colonial Governments, must differ widely in different cases. In the Settlements on the west coast of Africa, the Governors substantially exercise both executive and legislative authority, limited only by an appeal to the Home Government. In Canada, a representative Assembly has not only the chief power of legislation, but also virtually a large share of executive authority, since the members of the Executive Council are required to possess its confidence. Between these two extremes there are many intermediate degrees, of more or less power being exercised by the Governors of different Colonies.

The degree of control to be exercised over the local Authorities by the Secretary of State, as the organ of the Home Government, ought obviously to depend very much on the greater or less amount of power with which the Governors of different Colonies are invested. In a colony like Canada, where representative institutions have attained their full development, and the Governor is aided in his administrative duties by Ministers who are required to possess the confidence of the Legislature, exceedingly little interference

on the part of the Government at home seems to be required. In Colonies where this system of government is in successful operation, the Home Government should, in my opinion, attempt little (except in those rare cases where Imperial interests or the honour of the Crown are affected by local measures or proceedings), beyond advising the Colonial Authorities, and checking, so as to give an opportunity for further reflection, any ill-considered and hasty measures they may be inclined to adopt. Practically I believe that the influence which can thus be exercised through a judicious Governor is very considerable, and may be of great service to the Colonies. In the strife of parties which prevails in all free governments, the existence of an impartial authority serves to check the too great violence with which political contests are sometimes carried on, and the experience and position of a Minister of the Crown in this country enable him frequently to offer useful advice to the Colonial Legislatures. There are other Colonies in which representative institutions exist, but in a form suited to a less advanced stage of society, and where the Governor consequently is called upon to exercise considerably more power than under the system to which I have just adverted; and there are other Colonies again in which no such institutions yet exist.

In proportion as Governors are more independent of any local control, it becomes necessary that some should be exercised over them from home; and in those Colonies where they are unchecked by any

kind of representative institutions, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to maintain a vigilant superintendence over their proceedings. Although he ought, as I conceive, to abstain from any meddling interference in the details of their administration, and to support their authority so long as they appear to deserve his confidence, – and rather to advise their recall when they cease to do so, than to fetter their discretion by detailed instructions, – he is yet bound to attend to complaints which may be made against their measures, and to prescribe for their guidance the general line of policy to be pursued.

These rules, as to the degree of interference to be exercised by the Secretary of State, are equally applicable to the legislative and executive measures of the local Authorities in the Colonies; but while I am of opinion that the authority of the Crown, of which the Secretary of State is the depositary, should be used in all cases with great caution, and in Colonies possessing representative institutions with extreme forbearance, I cannot concur with those who would prohibit all interference on the part of the Home Government in the internal affairs of the Colonies. It seems to have been overlooked, by those who insist that such interference must always be improper, and who would adopt without any qualification the rule that the Colonies should be left to govern themselves, that this would in some cases imply leaving a dominant party, perhaps even a dominant minority, to

govern the rest of the community without check or control.

To permit the government of a distant Colony to be so carried on, notwithstanding the oppression or corruption which might be known to exist, would in general be for the ease and advantage of the Ministers of the day, but would not be consistent with any but a very low view of the duties belonging to the responsible advisers of the Sovereign of this great Empire. In point of fact, it has not unfrequently happened, that the absence of difficulty in some parts of our Colonial administration has arisen, not from its merits, but from its faults. For instance, so long as the Home Government took no thought of the condition of the Negro population of the West Indies, it met with no opposition from the Assemblies of Jamaica and the other West Indian Colonies; but when, urged on by public opinion in this Country and by the House of Commons, the Government undertook to give effect first to the resolutions of 1823, for the amelioration of the condition of the slaves, and ultimately to the Act of Emancipation, it found itself placed in a position of antagonism to the dominant class in these Colonies, the difficulties arising from which are not yet by any means at an end. Yet it was clearly the duty of the Imperial Government not to leave the population of these Colonies to the unrestricted disposal of the local Governments, and in this respect at least the discontent engendered by the interference of the Home Government was the discon-

tent of the dominant few (who can alone make themselves heard in this Country) at interference exercised for the protection of the helpless and ignorant many. Even now, in the former Slave Colonies which possess representative institutions, the body of the population does not practically exercise such an influence in the Assemblies as to exempt the advisers of the Crown from the duty of keeping a watchful eye upon the proceedings of the Legislatures, for the purpose of checking any attempts which might be made to pass laws bearing unfairly on the labouring classes.

But even where the interference of the Home Government is not necessary for the protection of a part of the population, too ignorant or too weak to protect itself, there is another consideration, which may require the exercise of some control over the proceedings of the local Governments with regard to the internal affairs of the Colonies. Every act of these Governments, whether legislative or executive, is done in the name and by the authority of the Sovereign; hence the honour of the Crown, which it is of the highest importance to the whole Empire to maintain unimpaired, must be compromised by any injustice or violation of good faith, which it has the power to prevent, being committed by the local Authorities. It is therefore the duty of those by whom the Imperial Government is conducted, and to whom, as the responsible servants of the Crown, its honour is entrusted, to take care that this honour does not suffer by the Sovereign's being made a party to proceedings in-

volving a departure from the most scrupulous justice and good faith towards individuals, or towards particular classes of the inhabitants of any of our Colonies.

In the Colonies which are the most advanced in civilization and in the exercise of the powers of self-government, it is not superfluous to insist on this consideration: on the contrary, it is in Colonies having popular forms of government that there is perhaps most danger that, in the excitement of party contests, to which such governments are peculiarly liable, measures not consistent with strict justice may sometimes be attempted, and may require to be checked by the authority of the Crown, entrusted to the Secretary of State. Any interference on the part of that Minister with measures of purely internal administration in the Colonies to which I am now adverting, is to be deprecated, except in very special circumstances, the occurrence of which must be exceedingly rare; but I am convinced that it may sometimes be called for, and that it is therefore expedient to trust, for averting the evils and the dangers which must arise from an improper interference by the Home Government with the local administration, rather to the discretion with which the powers now vested in the Crown are exercised, than to a limitation of these powers, by new legal restrictions. In particular, I should regard it as in the highest degree unadvisable to adopt the proposal that has been made to take away, so far as regards certain classes of laws, the general power which the Crown now possesses of disallowing all acts

or ordinances passed by the Colonial Legislatures. I shall have to advert to this question hereafter, with reference to New South Wales; I will therefore abstain from considering it more particularly at present.

I have little doubt that the propriety of regulating the amount of control to be exercised by the Secretary of State over the measures of the local Authorities, by the greater or less infusion of popular power in the constitutions of the several Colonies, will be generally recognized; it remains to be considered what steps ought to be taken for the establishment of representative institutions where they do not now exist, or for improving them where they exist only in an imperfect form. On this head also I think there can be little difficulty in determining the principles which ought to be acted upon, although there will be a good deal more in their practical application.

Keeping steadily in view that the welfare and civilization of the inhabitants of the Colonies, and the advantage which the Empire at large may derive from their prosperity, are the only objects for which the retention of these dependencies is desirable, and believing also that there can be no doubt as to the superiority of free governments to those of an opposite character, as instruments for promoting the advancement of communities in which they can be made to work with success, I consider it to be the obvious duty and interest of this Country to extend representative institutions to every one of its dependencies where they have not yet been established, and where this can

be done with safety; and also to take every opportunity of giving increased development to such institutions where they already exist but in an imperfect form. But I believe that in some cases representative governments could not safely be created, and also that the same form of representative institutions is by no means applicable to Colonies in different stages of social progress. The principal bar to the establishment of representative governments in Colonies, is their being inhabited by a population of which a large proportion is not of European race, and has not made such progress in civilization as to be capable of exercising with advantage the privileges of self-government.

Of such Colonies Ceylon affords the best example. The great majority of its inhabitants are Asiatics, very low in the scale of civilization, and having the character and habits of mind which have from the earliest times prevented popular governments from taking root, and flourishing among the nations of the East. Amidst a large population of this description there are settled, for the most part as temporary residents engaged in commerce or agriculture, a mere handful of Europeans, and a larger number (but still very few in comparison with the whole population) of inhabitants of a mixed race. In such a Colony the establishment of representative institutions would be in the highest degree inexpedient. If they were established in such a form as to confer power upon the great body of the people, it must be

obvious that the experiment would be attended with great danger, or rather with the certainty of failure. If, on the other hand, the system of representation were so contrived as to exclude the bulk of the native population from real power, in order to vest it in the hands of the European minority, an exceedingly narrow oligarchy would be created, – a form of government which experience certainly does not show to be favourable to the welfare of the governed. Were a representative Assembly constituted in Ceylon, which should possess the powers usually entrusted to such a body, and in which the European merchants and planters and their agents had the ascendency, it can hardly be supposed that narrow views of class interests would not exercise greater influence in the legislation of the Colony than a comprehensive consideration of the general good. To anticipate that this would be the effect of placing a large measure of power in the hands of a small minority, implies no unfavourable opinion of the character and intelligence of the European inhabitants of Ceylon, but only a belief that they would act as men placed in such a situation have generally been found to do.

In Mauritius, Trinidad, St. Lucia and Natal, a somewhat similar state of things exists; for although the preponderance of the uncivilized races in these Colonies is far less overwhelming than in Ceylon, still, taking into account the immigrants from India and Africa (whose welfare is entitled to especial consideration), the inhabitants of European origin are but a fraction of the whole population. Hence it appears to me, that the

surrender of a large portion of the powers now exercised by the servants of the Crown, and the establishment of representative Legislatures, would not be calculated to ensure the administration of the government upon principles of justice, and of an enlightened regard for the welfare of all classes in these communities. This end may, I believe, be far better attained by maintaining for the present in these Colonies the existing system of government, of which it would be a great mistake to suppose that, because the inhabitants are not entitled to elect any of the members of the Legislatures, it provides no securities against abuse. Other influences are brought to bear upon the government of these Colonies, which answer many of the objects of a Legislature of a representative character.

In the first place, in all of them the Press is perfectly free; the newspapers comment upon all the measures of the Government, not only with entire liberty, but with the most unbounded license; and the force both of local opinion, and also to a considerable degree of opinion in this country, is thus brought to bear upon all the measures of the Administration. Every inhabitant of the Colonies is also entitled freely to address to the Secretary of State any complaints or remarks he may think proper on the measures of the local Authorities, subject only to the rule that such letters shall be transmitted through the hands of the Governor (who is bound to forward them), in order that he may at the same time send such explanations on the subject as appear to him to be called for. This privilege is largely

exercised, and is the means of supplying much useful information. It is hence impossible that the Secretary of State can be kept in ignorance of any errors or abuses committed by the local Authorities, while, if he fails to interfere when he ought, he cannot himself escape the censure of Parliament. The greatly increased facilities of intercourse with the Colonies have of late years effected a great practical alteration in the position of Colonial Governors; and, whatever may have been the case formerly, it undoubtedly cannot be alleged that Parliament is now indifferent to what goes on in the Colonies, or that faults, real or imaginary, which may be committed in the administration of their affairs, can hope to escape the ever-ready criticism of an Opposition eager to find matter for objections to the Government of the day. Perhaps some persons may think that this disposition has been carried too far for the real interest of the Colonies.

In these Colonies there exist also Legislative Councils consisting partly of persons filling the chief offices of the Government, partly of some of the principal inhabitants, who, though named to their seats in the Legislature by the authority of the Crown, and not by popular election, are yet in the habit of acting with great freedom, and practically express to a considerable extent the opinion of the class to which they belong. It was my object, while I held the seals of the Colonial department, without relinquishing the power possessed by the Crown, gradually to bring these legislative bodies more under the influence of the

opinion of the intelligent and educated inhabitants of these Colonies. With this view, in one or two cases, the proportion of unofficial to official members was augmented, and the practice was everywhere introduced of requiring the whole expenditure to be provided for by ordinances discussed and passed by the Legislative Council; these ordinances being founded on estimates prepared and submitted to the Legislature by the Governor, and published for general information. In general the fixed establishment of the Colonial Governments is provided for by permanent laws, and that part of the expenditure which is of a more fluctuating character, by Ordinances passed annually, every charge on the Colonial revenue being required to have, in one form or the other, the sanction of the Legislature. This regulation was adopted, under my instructions, in all the Colonies to which I am now referring, in place of the very lax and irregular practice previously prevailing in some of them, by which the only authority for a large proportion of their expenditure consisted of instructions given by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Treasury. The publicity given to the estimates and accounts of the Colonial expenditure, and the rule that, except in cases of great emergency, the drafts of all proposed ordinances should be published before being passed, have enabled the Colonists to bring under the consideration of the Governors and the Legislative Councils, and ultimately of the Secretary of State, any objections they have entertained to proposed ordinances or

financial arrangements. Every encouragement has been given to them to make known their opinions freely, both to the local and Home Governments; and the most careful consideration has been given to their views, especially when these have been stated by chambers of commerce or municipal bodies, the advice and assistance of which, in the administration of Colonial affairs, are in my judgement of the highest value.

These are as effective securities as in the present state of these Colonies I believe to he attainable, for ensuring their good government; but I conceive, that gradually to prepare them for a more popular system of government ought to be one of the principal objects of the policy adopted towards them, and it is one of which I never lost sight. It was more particularly with this view that I endeavoured, whenever practicable, to create a system of Municipal organization, entertaining a strong conviction that the exercise of the powers usually entrusted to municipal bodies is the best training that a population can have for the right use of a larger measure of political power.

With regard to Colonies which already possess representative institutions, I have observed above that the form of these institutions varies very much in different cases. In Canada and the neighbouring provinces the system of government has, within the last few years, been assimilated as nearly as possible to that which prevails in this Country, Ex-

ecutive Councils having (as I have already mentioned) been established, composed of persons holding their offices only while they possess the confidence of the Assemblies, and the administration of the government being carried on by their assistance. In the other Colonies the representative bodies do not generally participate so directly, and in some scarcely at all, in the exercise of any power but that of legislation. When I come to treat of the affairs of particular Colonies, I shall have to notice the more important peculiarities in their Constitutions, and the reasons for allowing those peculiarities to continue: for the present I will confine myself to some general remarks, on the inexpediency of adopting the suggestion which has sometimes been made, that the system of government in all the Colonies possessing representative institutions should be assimilated to that which now exists in Canada.

The system now established in Canada is that of Parliamentary Government, that is to say government by means of parties. This form of government is now working well in that and the neighbouring provinces, and is probably on the whole the best plan hitherto adopted of enabling a Colony in an advanced stage of its social progress to exercise the privilege of self-government; it may therefore be regarded as the form which representative institutions, when they acquire their full development, are likely to take in the British Colonies. The experience however of our own Country, in which this system of government

has so long flourished, may teach us that its advantages are by no means unmixed, even in communities the best adapted to it, but that there are considerable drawbacks to the benefits we derive from it. We know also that hitherto Parliamentary government has not been carried into successful operation for any considerable time, in any other country in the world but our own, and that it is little more than ten years since it was first attempted in any of our Colonies, while in none of them can it be said to have been brought into full operation until far more recently. Even this short experience of its working in the Colonies, would seem to show that it is suitable only to a community which is not a very small one, to a population in an advanced stage of civilization, which has had the advantage of some training by the working of a free constitution of a simpler kind, and, I should be inclined to add, in which Municipal institutions exist, capable of dividing with the Legislature the very large powers which it would engross, if in the absence of such institutions the representatives of the people had a virtual control over the appointment of the executive officers of the government.

In a small community the successful working of this system of government is rendered difficult, by the necessarily restricted number of members of the Legislature, and of persons qualified by their intelligence and education to fill the principal offices of the government, and at the same time in possession of sufficient means to devote their time to the public

service, without adopting such employment as a permanent profession. Where the popular branch of the Legislature necessarily consists of only a small number of members, the increased importance which attaches to individual votes greatly increases the danger of those abuses to which party government is always liable, as will readily be understood by those who have observed the effect produced in this Country by a nearly equal division of parties. Even in the Assembly of Canada, although a numerous body, compared to most Colonial assemblies, it has been remarked that its great inferiority in numbers to the House of Commons has a decided and injurious effect upon its adaptation to the system of government now in force in that Colony. The want of a sufficient number of persons possessing the leisure and competence requisite to enable them to give up their time to the public service without adopting it as a profession, is even a greater difficulty in the way of the adoption in a small society of what has been called in the Colonies "responsible," but what may more properly be termed "party" or "parliamentary," government. Where the persons capable of holding office are very few, party contests have a tendency to run into extreme and dangerous bitterness. It may be questioned whether these considerations have been sufficiently attended to, and whether, in one at least of the North American Colonies, the inhabitants have not required prematurely the establishment of a system of

government for which they are not yet sufficiently prepared.

Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the peculiar form of government to which the above remarks apply is by no means necessary for the enjoyment, by a Colony, of the advantages of a free government. If a representative Legislature exists, the people not only possess the power through their representatives of determining all questions relating to legislation, the imposition of taxes, and the expenditure of the public money, but they have likewise the means of expressing their opinion, in a manner which makes it certain that it will not be neglected, on the administration of the executive government. In those earlier days of our Colonial history, to which it is now so much the fashion to look for an example to be followed, these were the only securities for good government; and there can be no doubt that they are now far more effective than in those times, in consequence of the altered state of public opinion in this Country on such subjects, and of the increased facilities which now exist for bringing before Parliament any grievances of which the Colonists may have to complain. Nor is it immaterial to observe, that, even in the United States of America, Congress does not possess any such direct control over the executive government as that which is exercised by the Legislatures of Colonies in which Parliamentary government is established; and the President during the term of his office exercises an authority far larger, and far less subject to any check

against abuse, than that which is vested in the Governor of a British Colony possessing a Representative Legislature. It is true that the President is elected by the people he is to govern, whereas the Governor of a British Colony is appointed by the Crown; but as the election of the President renders him in fact the nominee of a party, and creates many temptations for the exercise of the great power he possesses for mere party purposes, it may not unreasonably be questioned whether even greater securities are not required against its abuse, than are necessary in the case of a Governor entirely unconnected with all local parties, and who has the strongest interest in administering the affairs of the Colony entrusted to his charge with fairness, and in such a manner as to give general satisfaction to the inhabitants.

These observations on the general principles which ought to govern our Colonial Administration would be incomplete, without adding some remarks upon the important subject of Patronage. It is commonly believed, that one of the principal objects for which the Colonies are retained is the patronage which they are supposed to afford. It is impossible to conceive a greater delusion. It is now many years since the Colonies have afforded to the Home Government any patronage which can be of value to it as a means of influence in domestic politics. Since Parliament has ceased to provide, except in a very few special cases, for any part of the expense of the civil government of the Colonies, the Colonists have naturally expected

that offices paid for by themselves should be filled up by the selection of persons from their own body, when this can be done without inconvenience. Accordingly offices in the Colonies have, for a considerable time, been for the most part practically disposed of by the Governors. It is true that these offices, when their value exceeds £200 a year, are in general nominally at the disposal of the Secretary of State, and, when vacancies occur, can only be filled up by the Governors, subject to the confirmation of the Crown signified by that Minister. But in the great majority of cases the recommendation of the Governors is accepted as a matter of course; the patronage therefore is in effect exercised, by them, and offices are filled up by the appointment of Colonists.

This practice prevails more or less completely in different Colonies according to circumstances. In the North American Colonies appointments may be said to have been for a long time given exclusively to residents; and in the other Colonies, having temperate climates and a European population, they have been chiefly so, perhaps with fewer exceptions than would have been for the real advantage of the Colonies themselves. I say with fewer exceptions than would have been for the real advantage of the Colonies themselves, because, until they reach an advanced stage in their progress, I believe that the appointment to some of the principal offices in the Colonies of persons not selected from the narrow circle of their own inhabitants, and imbued with the peculiar feel-

ings and opinions which are apt to prevail in such communities, but chosen from among the well-educated gentlemen of the Mother-country, is calculated greatly to improve the tone of Colonial society, and to prevent it from gradually degenerating from the standard of manners and acquirements to which we are accustomed at home. It is also an advantage in small societies, as tending to mitigate the bitterness of that party spirit which is so often their bane, that, some of the offices of most importance should be filled up by persons from a distance, not connected with any of the small knots and cliques into which such societies usually become divided; while the interchange of appointments between different Colonies not only answers this object, but tends also to keep up among them a feeling of connection with each other and with the Empire of which all form a part. These remarks apply more especially to Judicial appointments, which, I believe, it would be wise, as a general rule, to fill up from the Bar of the Mother-country or of other Colonies, until the Colonies have made a considerable advance in wealth and population.

For these reasons it seems to me in the highest degree inexpedient, that a transfer of patronage from the Crown to any Colonial Authorities should be formally made. The existing arrangement enables the Secretary of State occasionally to depart from the restricted field of selection for important offices afforded by the society of the particular Colony, though practically this can be done very rarely; while

the necessity imposed upon the Governor of reporting the reasons for his recommendations to vacant offices, and obtaining the confirmation of the Secretary of State for the provisional appointments he may make, affords no unimportant check on any abuse of the patronage thus exercised; especially as those candidates for employment, whose claims have not been admitted by the Governor, have the right of bringing their case by letters sent through his hands under the consideration of the Secretary of State.

In the tropical climates, where the number of residents of European race is comparatively small, and the Colonial society affords a still narrower field of selection, appointments are rather more frequently made from home; but even in these Colonies, the more important and lucrative situations are usually filled by the promotion of those who have held inferior appointments; and it is desirable, for the encouragement of the civil servants of the Government, that this course should in general be followed; though no positive or invariable rule can be laid down, and it is sometimes of great advantage to depart from the usual practice. The above observations apply to all appointments under the rank of Lieutenant-Governor, or President, administering the government of a Colony; and the effect of the practice I have described, which has been followed for some years by successive Secretaries of State, has been to reduce the number of appointments, really at the disposal of this Minister, within limits so narrow as to render the patronage an object

of no importance as a means of obtaining political support for an Administration.

Governors and Lieutenant-Governors, it is true, are invariably appointed by the Crown, on the advice of the Secretary of State; but this patronage can only be looked upon as a source of difficulty and anxiety. The welfare of every Colony, and the alternative of success or failure in administering its affairs, are so mainly dependent upon the choice of a Governor, that I can hardly believe that any Secretary of State, even if he were insensible to all higher motives than a regard for his own interest and reputation, would willingly be guided in his selection by any consideration except that of the qualifications of the individual preferred. At the same time, the advantages of these appointments are not such as to lead to their being often accepted by persons who have much distinguished themselves by the ability they have shown; so that the services of men who have filled other important offices, and who would therefore be preferred for such situations, cannot be commanded. Hence the choice generally lies among: persons of less tried fitness.

I certainly shall not in this Letter attempt to canvas the merits of the various appointments to Colonial Governments which were made while it was my duty to advise the Queen on this subject; it would be impossible to do so without entering into considerations quite unfit for public discussion. I will only state generally, and I can with con-

fidence appeal to you for the correctness of the statement, that no pains were spared which it was in my power to take, in order to secure the services, as Governors, of the persons who appeared to me most likely to discharge their important duties with judgement and ability; that the great majority of those appointed were known to me only by reputation and by their public services; that a very large proportion of the Governments filled up while I held office, were so by the promotion of persons already in the Colonial service, (it being my opinion, that the efficiency of that service, as a whole, would be increased by thus rewarding those who had distinguished themselves in it); and that the selection cannot, on the whole, be regarded as otherwise than successful, looking to the manner in which the affairs of the Colonies have been administered by the Governors and Lieutenant-Governors whom I recommended to the Queen. I will give in the Appendix a list of the persons so appointed, distinguishing those with whom I had no personal acquaintance previously to their nomination, and specifying the public services by which they were known to me 3.

I have observed in the earlier part of this Letter, that if the principles I have endeavoured to establish are admitted, it will follow that the Colonies ought to take upon themselves a larger proportion than heretofore of the charges they occasion.

The chief source of expense at present on account

of the Colonies is their military protection, as the charges of their civil government are now generally paid by themselves; and the naval expenditure, which is frequently charged against the Colonies, cannot in my opinion be so with any justice, since, if we had no Colonies, I believe that the demands upon our naval force would be rather increased than diminished, from the necessity of protecting our commerce.

Our military expenditure on account of the Colonies is certainly very heavy, including the charges for the pay of the troops stationed in them; the cost of barracks and ordnance works, that of transport, and the large proportion of the dead weight of the army which is fairly chargeable to the Colonies. This expenditure ought, I think, to be very largely reduced; and the Colonies, now that they are relieved from all that is onerous to them in their connection with the Mother-country, should be required to contribute much more than they have hitherto done to their own protection. This would, in point of fact, be only a return to what was formerly the practice of this Country. In the early days of our Colonial history it is well known that the settlers, in what are now the United States, were thrown very much upon their own resources in their contests, not only with the Indians, but with the French, and that the Mother-country acted rather as an ally than as a principal in their wars. In the West Indies the Colonies were also required to contribute largely towards their own military protection; indeed it is only within the last twenty years that

Jamaica has ceased to provide rations and barracks for the troops quartered there; and even now there is a relic of the ancient system, in the charge still borne by the Island, on account of the forts, though the keeping up of these forts has, I fear, become little more than a form.

I believe it was not until the time of the great revolutionary war with France, that nearly the whole burden of the defence of the Colonies was undertaken by this Country; but for the last fifty or sixty years this has been so generally done, and the charges on this account borne by the Colonies have been so few and inconsiderable, that a sudden change of system could not have been safely effected. The importance of returning to a sounder system was not however lost sight of, and we endeavoured to establish, and by degrees to act upon, the principle that the Colonies can only look to the Mother-country for military support in any dangers to which they may be exposed from a powerful foreign enemy; that Her Majesty's troops are not to be expected to undertake the duties of police, and of maintaining the internal tranquillity of the Colonies; and that the Colonies ought to undertake to provide for the expense of barracks for such of Her Majesty's troops as may be stationed in them for their protection. I except the case of those important naval and military stations, which are maintained rather with a view to the interests of the Empire at large, than those of the particular Colony, such for instance as Malta, Bermuda, etc., where the fortifica-

tions are of far more importance to the Empire than to the Colony.

As a first step towards carrying these views into effect, instructions were transmitted to the Australian Colonies very early in your administration, for a large reduction of the force quartered there, and for the transfer of the barracks to the Colonial Authorities, except in Van Diemen's Land, where, on account of the large number of convicts, a different rule was of course adopted. The transfer of the charge for barracks to the Colonial Governments appeared to be one of the first steps which ought to be adopted in attempting to reduce our Colonial military expenditure; because the charge for barracks and military works is a very heavy one, and is also one which it is impossible effectually to check at the great distance of many of our Colonies. Copies of the correspondence with the Governor of New South Wales on this subject, containing a full explanation of the policy pursued on this subject, will be found in the Appendix 4. Although the principle thus acted upon in Australia was one which it was our intention to adopt as the general guide of our policy, there were strong reasons for beginning its application in Australia, and proceeding somewhat cautiously in acting upon it elsewhere. The Australian Colonies are, of all the Queen's dominions, the safest from attack by any foreign enemy; their position and the nature of the country render it impossible that in war such an enemy should do

more than plunder and burn some of the seaport-towns, and even this would be effectually guarded against by a very small amount of exertion on the part of the Colonists, in erecting batteries and forming volunteer corps of artillery. In peace, there being no warlike natives (I confine these observations to the Colonies in Australia, excluding New Zealand), there is absolutely no danger to apprehend. Hence the amount of force required (except for purposes of police, which I do not conceive to form part of the proper duties of Her Majesty's troops) is very inconsiderable, and the Colonies may without difficulty undertake the charge of keeping in repair the barracks which have already been built. It is also to be remembered that the Australian Colonies have not lost anything by our recent commercial legislation: on the contrary, the effect of that legislation has been only to relieve them from restrictions, without depriving them of any peculiar and gainful privileges.

In other Colonies, though the same principle has already been partially acted upon, and was intended gradually to be so more completely, there were, as I have said, reasons for proceeding cautiously. In the North American Colonies the necessity of maintaining a considerable force arises almost entirely from their proximity to the United States, and from the fact that, if we were unfortunately involved in a quarrel with that Republic, our Colonies would be attacked as a means of injuring us. These Colonies, as I shall hereafter have occasion more particularly to show, had also

suffered more really than any others from the changes of our commercial policy; and the moment when they were struggling with the difficulties thus brought upon them, was not one which could properly be chosen for calling upon them to submit to an entirely novel charge on account of their military expenditure. In the West India Colonies the commercial distress, which has for many years weighed so heavily upon them, formed a complete obstacle to their being now called upon for any contribution towards their military defence. But both in the North American and West Indian Colonies a large reduction of force has been effected (a part of this reduction having been only ordered, and not completed, when we left office), by which a very considerable saving has been made; and, in the former, the maintenance at the cost of this Country, of an irregular local force, which formerly cost £16,000 a year, has been discontinued, and steps have been taken towards the complete adoption of the same principle as in Australia. I shall have occasion, in adverting to the transactions of Canada, to return to this subject, and state more particularly what has been done there. The other Colonies are chiefly either garrisons, such as Malta and Gibraltar, or else already contribute largely to their own military expenditure, as Mauritius and Ceylon.

Other arrangements have also been made, with the view of gradually diminishing the military expense of the Colonies; of these one of the most important has

been that for sending out pensioners, instead of detachments from the regular regiments of infantry, as convict guards, and for settling enrolled pensioners in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.

I am persuaded that if the policy which I have thus sightly sketched is followed up, and if the Colonies, as they become better able to bear the charge, are required to take upon themselves a larger share of their military expenditure, this burden on the Mother-country may at no distant period be reduced to a very moderate amount. Considering that it is little more than five years since the first steps were taken towards the adoption of this as a regular system of policy, and that during that brief period the disturbance of our commercial relations with the Colonies has imposed upon us the necessity of avoiding any hasty proceedings in carrying it into effect, the progress already made is as great as could reasonably be expected.

I fear that this preliminary explanation of the principles on which the administration of Colonial affairs was conducted while under my immediate direction, as a member of your Government, must have appeared tedious to you, to whom these views are so familiar, and with whom I have so often had to discuss them. I am, however, writing for the information of persons who have not your knowledge of the subject; and I trust that the general explanation I have now given will enable me, by avoiding repetitions, to compress within narrower limits than would otherwise be

possible, without failing to make our policy intelligible to persons not possessing that knowledge, the account I propose to give of the principal events of the last six years in the different Colonies. But here for the present I will stop. In future Letters I intend to advert in succession to the several Colonies or groups of Colonies, and to call your attention to what is of most importance in their transactions, and in the discussions to which they gave occasion during the time of your Administration.

April 27, 1852.

1 See Hansard, 3rd series, vol. lxxiii. p. 512.

2 It is obvious that, if any article of consumption is subject to a duty when imported from a foreign country, and is either free from duty or pays a lower duty when produced at home or imported from a Colony, the result, whether intended or not, is to give that artificial encouragement to a particular branch of industry which is known by the name of Protection. For this reason, by our present law, beet-root sugar produced at home is subject to an excise-duty equal to that on sugar imported from the Colonies, and which in two years more will also be charged on foreign sugar. Hence, it was a fallacy to contend, as was done in 1842 and in 1843, (if I remember right, the argument, which had much effect at the time, was first used by Mr. Gladstone,) that imports from the Colonies ought to be relieved from duty because they should be considered as "an integral part of the Empire." Though an integral part of the Empire, it is, from the nature of things, impossible that they should be under the same fiscal system as ourselves; and unless they could be so – that is, unless they paid all the same taxes that we do, and these taxes included excise-duties on all articles on which we raise a revenue, and which they produce – no special exemption from duty could be given to Colonial produce in our ports without incurring all the objectionable consequences of a system of protection. In the United States, free commercial intercourse between the several States of the Union would have led to the utmost confusion, if the power of levying customs-duties had not been given exclusively to Congress, excise-duties not being made use of as a mode of raising revenue. It does not appear to me at all inconsistent with the idea of the unity of the British Empire, that no attempt has been made to unite its several members, divided as they are from each other by the diameter of the globe, in one fiscal system.

3 See Appendix (A) at the end of this Volume.

4 See Appendix (B) at the end of this Volume.

[TITLE PAGE]

THE

COLONIAL POLICY

OF

LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S ADMINISTRATION.

BY EARL GREY . IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.

LONDON:
RICHARD BENTLEY, NEW BURLINGTON STREET,
Publisher in Ordinary to Her Majesty.
1853.

PRINTED BY
JOHN EDWARD TAYLOR, LITTLE QUEEN STREET,
LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS.

[CONTENTS]

CONTENTS.

LETTER VIII.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES. – TRANSPORTATION . . 1

LETTER IX.

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES. – CONSTITUTION. – GENERAL CONDITION OF THESE COLONIES .... 88

LETTER X.

NEW ZEALAND ....... 112

LETTER XI.

CEYLON ........ 161

LETTER XII.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE. – NATAL . . . . . 197

LETTER XIII.

HONGKONG. – LABUAN. – FALKLAND ISLANDS. – WEST COAST OF AFRICA. – MALTA. – CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ........ 263

APPENDIX.

A. – Despatch from Sir C. A. Fitzroy to Earl Grey – Remonstrance against the New Constitution . 313

B. – New Zealand Bill – Earl Grey's Speech in House of Lords ........ 334

C. – Report of Privy Council – Constitution of the Cape of Good Hope ....... 346

D. – Despatch from Earl Grey to Sir Harry Smith – Resignation of Four Members of the Legislative Council, Cape of Good Hope .... 374

E. – Despatch from Earl Grey to Sir Harry Smith – State of Affairs in British Kafraria .... 395

F. – Despatch from Earl Grey to Sir Harry Smith – Natal 400

LETTER X. NEW ZEALAND.

LETTER X.

NEW ZEALAND.

MY DEAR LORD JOHN,

I have hitherto had to speak of Colonies which, during the whole period of your Administration, have been in the enjoyment of uninterrupted peace. I have now to call your attention to those which have been disturbed by war or insurrection. The British Colonies which during the last six years have suffered from events of this kind are New Zealand, Ceylon, and the Cape of Good Hope. I do not add the Ionian Islands, because, though Cephalonia has also been the scene of insurrection, these islands are not a British Colony, but a distinct State, under British protection; and though their government is presided over by a British Commissioner, who acts under the directions of the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, their system of administration is in many respects different from that of a Colony. Hence, as I find the task I have undertaken, in proposing to give an account of the transactions of the

Colonies properly so called, is more than enough for me, I will take advantage of the circumstance of the Ionian Islands not forming part of the British dominions, to abstain from entering into their affairs. I do this the more gladly, because the most important subject connected with their administration which we were called upon to deal with, had not been disposed of when we retired from Office, but was still pending.

With respect to New Zealand, you cannot fail to recollect that the accounts received from that Colony were so unsatisfactory and alarming during the years 1844 and 1845, that, after having been the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry and of much discussion, Lord Derby, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, thought it necessary, in June 1845, to recall the former Governor, and to direct Captain (now Sir George) Grey, then Governor of South Australia, to proceed with the least possible delay to New Zealand, and take upon himself the administration of its affairs. When the new Governor reached the Colony, in November 1845, he found the British troops and settlers engaged in hostilities, (of which they had had greatly the worst,) with the Natives in the northern part of the islands. Sir George Grey's first object on his arrival in New Zealand, was to avail himself of the naval and military force at his disposal, to put down the dangerous rebellion in the district of the Bay of Islands, and his account of the complete success which attended the measures he took

for this purpose, had reached the Colonial Office three or four months before we were appointed to Office. The war was not renewed in that district, though it long continued to give cause for much anxiety; but in the southern province a few months later there were serious disturbances, which broke out at intervals, and did not finally cease until August, 1847.

It is unnecessary that I should give any detailed account of these disturbances; it is sufficient to state that, during the whole of 1846 and the greater part of 1847, though the Governor was making steady progress towards establishing permanent tranquillity, and succeeded in maintaining friendly relations with the great majority of the natives, some of the principal Chiefs continued to show a spirit of disaffection and insubordination, which on two or three different occasions broke out into open and very serious hostilities. By the energy and judgement of the Governor, admirably supported as he was both by the troops and by the naval force on the station, any general insurrection was averted, and all the military operations it was necessary to undertake were brought to an early and successful close. Among the most remarkable events of this period were the seizure of the famous Chief, Te Rauparaha, in July, 1846, and the rebellion at Wanganui, in April, 1847. Te Rauparaha, who was one of the most noted warriors in New Zealand, and had been a chief actor in the massacre of Captain Wakefield and his companions in 1843, was detected by the Governor in concerting

with his old ally, Rangihaeata, hostile proceedings against the British Settlers in the neighbourhood of Wellington, while professing friendship to them. When this was clearly ascertained, the treacherous Chief was seized without resistance, by a prompt and well-executed surprise, and he was detained a prisoner on board one of the ships-of-war until all danger from him was at an end, when, on the intercession of two of the friendly Chiefs, he was released. There is every reason to believe, that this measure prevented a very formidable outbreak from taking place.

At Wanganui, in April, 1847, the murder of the wife and children of a Settler led to another insurrection. The murderers were promptly taken, and delivered into the hands of the British Authorities, by our native allies; when some of the most powerful Chiefs in the district, who were nearly related to the culprits, assembled a war-party of no less than 600 men for their rescue. The British force at Wanganui consisted of only 170 men, notwithstanding which, Captain Laye, the officer in command, did not hesitate to try the murderers by court-martial, and, on their conviction, to have four of them hanged with as little delay as possible. The Governor reported, that this firmness and decision on the part of Captain Laye probably saved the country from a serious rebellion 5. The execution of the culprits was followed, as was to be expected, by an attack on the Settlement, which however Captain

Laye, with the small force at his command, gallantly repulsed, and with the assistance of the Settlers he defended the place successfully until the Governor arrived with reinforcements. There were afterwards two or three severe skirmishes, and it was not until the 3rd of September, 1847, that the Governor was able to report that the disturbances at this place were at an end, and not likely to be renewed 6. Since that time tranquillity has been maintained throughout the Colony, and it has continued to advance steadily and rapidly in prosperity. The policy by which this result has been obtained, and the difficulties the Governor has had to contend with, are so well described by himself, that I may be permitted to quote nearly the whole of the very interesting Despatch in which he has done so. In this Despatch, dated July 9, 1849 7, he states that the two Colonies, into which New Zealand was then divided,

"are composed at present of what may be termed nine principal European settlements, besides smaller dependencies of these. The largest of the settlements contains about seven thousand (7000) European inhabitants; and their total European population may be stated at about twenty thousand (20,000) souls. These settlements are scattered over a distance of about eight hundred (800) miles of latitude; they are separated from each other by wide intervals; and communication, even for persons on horseback, exists only between three of them. Their inhabitants are chiefly

British subjects, but there are amongst them many Americans, French, and Germans. The majority of them have never been trained to the use of arms. The settlers, both in the main Colonies and the subordinate dependencies, have occupied the country in so scattered and irregular a manner, that it would be found impossible to afford them efficient protection. They are generally without arms, and would probably be deprived of them by the aboriginal population if they possessed them at any remote stations.

"The wide intervals between these European Colonies are occupied by a native race, estimated to consist of one hundred and twenty thousand (120,000) souls, a very large proportion of whom are males, capable of bearing arms. These natives are generally armed with rifles or double-barrelled guns; they are skilled in the use of their weapons, and take great care of them; they are addicted to war; have repeatedly, in encounters with our troops, been reported by our own officers to be equal to any European troops; and are such good tacticians that we have never yet succeeded in bringing them to a decisive encounter, they having always availed themselves of the advantage afforded by their wilds and fastnesses. Their armed bodies move without any baggage, and are attended by the women, who carry potatoes on their backs for the warriors, or subsist them by digging fern-root, so that they are wholly independent of supplies, and can move and subsist their forces in countries where our troops cannot live.

"I should correct here a popular fallacy, which, if ever acted upon, might prove ruinous to these settlements. It has been customary to compare them to the early American Colonies, and the natives of this country to the North American Indians. There appears to be no analogy between the irregular manner in which these islands were partially

peopled by whalers and persons from all portions of the globe, and the Pilgrim Fathers who founded the early settlements in America. And I have been assured by many excellent and experienced officers, well acquainted with America and this country, that there is, in a military point of view, no analogy at all between the natives of the two countries; the Maories, both in weapons and knowledge of the art of war, a skill in planning and perseverance in carrying out the operations of a lengthened campaign, being infinitely superior to the American Indians. In fact, there can be no doubt that they are, for warfare in this country, even better equipped than our own troops.

"These natives, from the positions which they occupy between all the settlements, can choose their own point of attack, and might even so mislead the most wary Government, as to their intended operations as to render it extremely difficult to tell at what point they intended to strike a blow. They can move their forces with rapidity and secresy from one point of the country to another; whilst, from the total absence of roads, the impassable nature of the country, and the utter want of supplies, it is impossible to move a European force more than a few miles into the interior from any settlement.

"The natives moreover present no point at which they can be attacked, or against which operations can be carried on. Finding now that we can readily destroy their pas or fortifications, they no longer construct them, but five in scattered villages, round which they have their cultivations; and these they can abandon without difficulty or serious loss, being readily received and fed by any friendly tribe to whom they may repair. They thus present no vulnerable point. Amongst them are large numbers of lawless spirits, who are too ready, for the sake of excitement and the hope

of plunder, to follow any predatory chief. To assist in anything which might be regarded as a national war, there can be little doubt that almost every village would pour forth its chiefs and its population.

"With these characteristics of courage and warlike vagrancy, the Maories present however other remarkable traits of character. Nearly the whole nation has now been converted to Christianity. They are fond of agriculture, take great pleasure in cattle and horses; like the sea, and form good sailors; are attached to Europeans, admire their customs and manners; are extremely ambitious of rising in civilization, and of becoming skilled in European arts; they are apt at learning, in many respects extremely conscientious and observant of their word, are ambitious of honours, and are probably the most covetous race in the world. They are also agreeable in manners, and attachments of a lasting character readily and frequently spring up between them and Europeans.

"A consideration of these circumstances will, I think, lead to the conclusion that any attempt to form, in those portions of these islands which are densely peopled by the natives, an ordinary European settlement, the inhabitants of which produced all they required, and were wholly independent of the native race, must end in failure. The natives in the vicinity of such a settlement, finding themselves excluded from all community of prosperity with its inhabitants, would soon form lawless bands of borderers, who, if they did not speedily sweep away the settlement, would yet by their constant incursions so harass and impoverish its inhabitants, that they would certainly soon withdraw to the neighbouring Australian settlements, where they could lead a life of peace and freedom from such incursions. Upon the other hand, however, it would appear that a race

such as has been described could be easily incorporated into any British settlement with mutual advantage to both races; the natives supplying agricultural produce, poultry, pigs, and a constant supply of labour (although yet rude and unskilled), whilst, upon the other hand, the Europeans would supply the various manufactured goods required by the natives, and provide for the manifold wants created by their increasing civilization. Such a class of settlements might easily grow into prosperous communities, into which the natives, with characters softened by Christianity, civilization, and a taste for previously unknown luxuries, would readily be absorbed.

"The questions to be solved have therefore been, how to induce the native race cordially to assist in the attempt to create so desirable a state of things, and how to provide the funds requisite for governing so many isolated settlements, spread over so vast a tract of difficult country, the intervals between which are occupied by so warlike a race, over whom it was necessary to exercise some control? It is worthy of remark here, that the united population of New Zealand is as large as that of New South Wales has until very recently been, and that it is a population, from its mixed and peculiar elements, infinitely more difficult to govern than that of New South Wales, whilst the cost of the machine of government is greatly increased from the number of the settlements and their distance from each other. In point of fact, the several settlements are distinct colonies, and, both in the difference of feelings and interests of the Europeans and of the respective native tribes, inhabiting each, differ much more widely from each other than many British Colonies do. It appears, therefore, that it would be imprudent and unjust to attempt to draw any parallel in these respects between New Zealand and any other British Colonial Possession.

"In carrying out any plan, having for its object the amalgamation of the two races, the following difficulties have, until recently, presented themselves: –

"1stly. Hostile encounters had taken place between the settlers and the natives in the south of New Zealand, and between Her Majesty's forces and the natives in the northern portion of the country, in all of which the number of killed and wounded on our side had been comparatively so large, and the loss of the enemy so small, that they had been led to form an exaggerated notion of their own prowess and strength; and a desire of emulating the example of those chiefs who were imagined by their countrymen to have gained great successes, had excited a spirit of exultation and dissatisfaction throughout the greater portion of the islands; so that whilst a rebellion was actually raging in one portion of the islands, it was too probable that the natives would speedily break out into similar excesses in other portions of them.

"2ndly. Disputes existed between the settlers and the natives in various places regarding their respective rights to certain lands. These disputes, relating to the personal interests of the parties concerned, created between them feeling of hostility and bitterness which was gradually raising race against race, and which threatened ultimately to become a feeling which could only be put a stop to by the extermination of one party or the other.

"3rdly. As a necessary result of the difficulties existing under the two previous heads, the revenue had almost disappeared, and by the issue of paper money a large debt had been contracted; there was thus an absence of the funds requisite for the re-establishment of order and good government, whilst the settlers had also, to a great extent, lost all confidence in their future prospects, and were in a disheartened and desponding condition.

"4thly. A very great difficulty had been created by the Crown's right of pre-emption having been waived in favour of certain individuals over large tracts of land, and by the inordinate demands of other persons to extensive tracts of country having been entertained by the Government, the result of which was, that a party of land-claimants had been called into existence, who made demands so extravagant and illegal that no Government could accede to them; nor did it appear practicable to make a settlement of these claims, even upon the most liberal basis, without incurring for the Government such a degree of hostility from a large number of persons as would probably exceedingly embarrass and impede any subsequent Administrations.

"In determining the line of policy the Government should pursue, in reference to the first class of the difficulties above named, that is, in reference to the war which existed in New Zealand, and the rebellion which appeared likely to to break out, the following considerations seemed naturally to present themselves: –

"It appeared to be clearly the duty of the Government, in a firm and decided manner, to crush the existing rebellion, and to put down without delay any disturbances which might afterwards break out; but yet it also seemed clear that its riding line of policy should be, not to embark in any operations in which an absolute certainty did not exist of speedy and complete success, and rather to delay engaging in hostilities which might appear necessary, than hurriedly to embark in any contest the result of which could not be foreseen.

"Indeed, delay in engaging in hostilities was, wherever practicable, obviously the first duty of the Government of this territory. No knowledge of the country, of such a nature as to enable an officer to move with certainty a body

of troops even to a few miles from any of our settlements, was possessed by the Government.

"The number of persons who possessed a competent knowledge of the native language was so few that it was impossible to secure the services of the requisite number of interpreters. The two races had so recently been brought into close contact, that their ignorance of their respective appearance, of their language, customs, and manners, filled them with mutual distrust, whilst their disputes, in relation to land, embittered their feelings of hostility. It appeared very probable that, as the two races became more accustomed to each other, as their knowledge of each other's language and customs increased, and as their private differences were adjusted, so would all necessity for war and conflict between them wear away; whilst, should these anticipations of a delay in military operations rendering a war unnecessary, prove correct, it would clearly have been an uncalled for measure of severity to hurry on a contest with the natives. And in the case of each individual who fell in such a conflict, it might have been said that, from his ignorance, a man had been destroyed, whom a few months' enlightenment would have rendered a good subject, a valuable consumer of British manufactured goods, and a contributor to the revenue. The loss to Great Britain by engaging in an unnecessary war would also have been great; every hundred soldiers that had fallen must have cost at least £10,000. Moreover Great Britain, in despatching two regiments to this country, had made great exertions, which it could not continue or repeat without considerable inconvenience to the public service. Yet even a very few false movements might have entailed so considerable a loss upon the small force in this country, as to have rendered large and continued reinforcements necessary. It is per-

haps not too much to say, that during a considerable period of time, any signal failure in an operation which had been entered upon, would have led to a simultaneous and almost general rising, the effects and cost of which may be easily conceived.

"It was also certain that, even if the anticipations which had been formed, of the benefits which might spring to both races from delaying military operations, had not been realized, and it had proved ultimately necessary to embark in a war, yet that each month's delay, by increasing our knowledge of the country and of the native language, and by enabling us to complete our roads and to consolidate our establishments, would be of the greatest advantage to Great Britain, by enabling it to enter on the contest with greater means and more certainty of success.

"Mercy, justice, and prudence, all appeared therefore to point to delay as the general rule on which the Government should act. This line of policy has therefore been in all instances unswervingly pursued, and the result has quite equalled the anticipation which might reasonably have been formed; for whilst the rebellion which existed and the disturbances which naturally sprang from that rebellion have been in all instances crushed, the total loss, of all ranks, sustained on our side through so long a period of time has amounted to only 28 killed and 53 wounded; and in as far as human judgement can form an estimate of such matters, no probability exists of any extensive rebellion ever hereafter breaking out in the country; and even should such disturbances again unhappily break out, our knowledge of the country is now so much more accurate, our alliances with the natives have become so much more numerous, our military roads have already been so far completed, the number of persons acquainted with the

native language and customs so increased, and the natives' supplies of arms and ammunition have been so much diminished, that we should enter on such a contest with infinitely greater advantages than we formerly possessed.

"The efforts which have been made by the Government of this country for the removal of the second class of difficulties alluded to were of two kinds: –

"1st. The resumption of the Crown's right of pre-emption, which had unfortunately been abandoned, and

"2nd. The adjustment of many of the almost innumerable land questions which existed. The task of resuming the Crown's right of pre-emption appeared to be one of great difficulty and danger, but the natural good sense of the natives, and their continually increasing confidence in the Government, have rendered its accomplishment much less difficult than was anticipated. The various steps which have been taken, for the adjustment of the disputes in reference to land, have been so fully detailed in the Despatches from the various authorities, and the large mass of documents which have been transmitted to the Home Government, that it may be unnecessary to say more than that, with very few and trifling exceptions, every land question in the southern province has been already disposed of, whilst in the northern province nearly all questions connected with lands have been also arranged, with the exception of those which, resting upon grants issued by the Crown, can only be dealt with by our Courts in the ordinary manner.

"The measures taken to remedy the difficulties detailed under the third head, namely the want of a revenue, the existence of a depreciated paper currency, and the failure which had taken place in the confidence and expectations of the settlers, have also all been fully detailed in the

Despatches which relate to those subjects. The objects contemplated by the Government, in reference to these subjects, may be generally stated to have been, the imposition of duties, which, by a system of indirect taxation, might raise from the native as well as from the European population a revenue which would increase with every successive step of their advancement, and yearly yield the means for their more efficient control and government, whilst, in aid of and in connection with these plans, the depreciated paper currency was partly withdrawn, and the remaining portion of it was converted into a funded debt.

"In order to remedy, inasfar as possible, the evils enumerated under the fourth head, namely the difficulties which had been created by the Crown's right of pre-emption having been waived in favour of certain individuals over large tracts of lands, and the claims of others having been entertained to enormous tracts of country, every effort has been made to adjust these claims upon the most liberal terms, and to carry out these arrangements in the most conciliatory manner; this being, however, one of those cases in which individuals have been led to form extravagant expectations which it was impossible for any Government to realize, no efforts could probably have prevented much disappointment and bitterness of feeling ensuing, and it is probable that nothing but time can completely eradicate this evil, although, from the settlement of so large a number of these claims, and from the arrival of so many disinterested persons in the Colony, the proportionate number of individuals, whose expectations have been disappointed, is gradually decreasing, and their influence as a party will soon cease to be felt.

"But little would, however, have been accomplished if

the Government had confined itself simply to an attempt to remove the various evils under which these islands were labouring. It was necessary that active measures should at the same time be taken, without delay, for the amalgamation of the two races; that the confidence of the natives should be won; that they should be inspired with a taste for the comfort and conveniences of civilized life; that they should be led to abandon their old habits; that the chiefs should be induced to renounce their right of declaring peace and war; and that the whole of the native race should be led to abandon their barbarous modes of deciding disputes and administering justice, and should be induced for the future to resort to our Courts for the adjustment of their differences and the punishment of their offenders.

"Thoroughly to accomplish a change of this nature would require a long series of years and a succession of generations.

"The utmost therefore that any Government could hope to do was, to establish institutions which might imperceptibly but certainly lead to so complete a change of manners in a barbarous nation as was contemplated; and to secure these institutions by such laws and by such a constitution, as appeared to afford a reasonable guarantee for their perpetuity; the first step to be taken to ensure these ends appeared to be, to convince the natives that our laws were better than their own, as affording more perfect security for life and property, and a much more ready means of adjusting differences which might arise either between natives and Europeans or amongst natives themselves.

"To attain these ends, the Resident Magistrate's Ordinance was passed, and Mixed Courts were constituted for the settlement of disputes betwixt natives. At the same time a considerable number of their young chiefs and most

promising young men were enrolled in an armed police force, and thus habituated to act as actual administrators in the lowest offices of the law, and were made acquainted with the practical administration of the law in our inferior Courts. This latter measure, at the time it was introduced, excited unbounded ridicule, yet probably no measure has been so totally successful in its results. The native armed police force has furnished gallant men, who have led our skirmishing parties, and who have fallen like good soldiers in the discharge of their duty; and it has furnished intelligent, sober, and steady constables, whose services, under various circumstances, have been found of great utility. The actual result of the two measures combined is sufficiently attested by the number and importance of the cases in which natives were concerned which have been recently decided by our tribunals, to which until lately the natives never resorted.

"To bring the natives under the influence of the Government, and to gain their confidence and attachment, various measures have been resorted to by the Government. Hospitals have been established in the principal districts, to which both races have been equally admitted, and in which they have been tended with equal care; savings-banks have been instituted for the benefit of both races; a consirable number of natives have been employed in the minor offices of the Government establishments; pensions have been conferred on those chiefs who, during the first rebellion, were most distinguished by their gallantry, fidelity, and devotion to the British cause. Large numbers of natives have been employed on public works and in the construction of roads, thereby securing to the Colony the advantage of excellent lines of communication, whilst, from the discipline maintained amongst those employed upon

public works, those works formed in fact industrial schools, in which the natives were trained to European habits of order and obedience, were accustomed to use European tools instead of their own rude implements, and were thus gradually trained to become useful labourers for the colonists. The natives have also been encouraged to pursue improved modes of husbandry, to construct mills, to acquire vessels, to attend to the breeding of cattle and horses, and a newspaper is fortnightly published by the Government, for the purpose of giving them useful information and plain practical directions on all those points to which the Government is anxious they should direct their attention.

"These various measures may be however said to aim only at the present improvement and advancement of the native race, and to make no adequate provision for their continual advancement in the arts of civilized life, and for the education of the native children upon such a system that they might have a prospect of standing on terms of equality with the European race, and of understanding and speaking their language.

"Fortunately the task of the Government in this respect has been an easy one. There existed in this country three Missions, established by different Christian Denominations, amongst whom there is perhaps an emulation as to which should achieve the greatest amount of good; and it may reasonably be doubted whether at any period of the world there has existed in one country, amongst so large a number of men who had devoted themselves to the holy calling of a missionary, so many persons who were eminently qualified by piety, ability, and zeal to discharge the functions of the office upon which they had entered: the result has been that these gentlemen, scattered throughout the country, have exercised an influence without which all

the measures adopted by the Government would have produced but little effect. Won by their teaching, the natives have almost as an entire race embraced Christianity, and have abandoned the most revolting of their heathen customs. Instructed by their missionaries, probably a greater proportion of the population than in any country in Europe are able to read and write; and encouraged by the precept and example of the same gentlemen, they have, in all parts of the islands, made considerable progress in the rougher branches of civilized life. The Government therefore, in establishing schools, thought it most desirable not to attempt to set up a system of its own, which might have required years for its development (during which a generation might have melted away, and an opportunity have been lost which could never be recalled), but rather to join its exertions to those of the missionaries, and to endeavour, whilst it established its own educational institutions, to render the system of the missionaries more complete and effective than hitherto. It therefore provided considerable funds which should be set apart for educational purposes, but determined that these funds should be applied under the direction of the heads of the different Denominations who had missions established in New Zealand; it being provided that the several institutions, which received any portion of these funds, should be conducted upon the industrial system; that the English language should be taught there, and that a sound religious education should be imparted to the pupils. Provision was also made for the appointment by the Government of inspectors, who will examine into the state of the schools, and will ascertain that the various requirements which are imposed by the laws relating to these institutions are strictly complied with.

"All these measures appeared calculated to secure a permanent and constantly increasing, instead of a scanty and superficial, civilization for the native population; and in order still further to increase the chances of success, two laws were passed, the first of which prohibited the natives from procuring arms or ammunition, and the second of which debarred them from the use of spirituous liquors. These regulations appeared stringent and likely to create discontent, but it was thought probable that, united with so many other measures of a character which were agreeable to the natives, and clearly calculated to promote their welfare, their strong natural good sense would lead them to see that these more distasteful restrictions had originated in the same care for their welfare, as had suggested the other portions of the system; and the result has justified the anticipations which were formed, as they have without complaint acquiesced in these regulations, and generally and cheerfully acknowledge their beneficial tendency.

"In the course of the past eighteen months the natives have, on several occasions, shown in the most striking manner their increasing confidence in our institutions, and their knowledge of the rights they have gained by their incorporation into the British Empire, by carefully considering the effect that proposed measures are likely to have upon their future welfare, and by evincing their gratitude or dissatisfaction by forwarding congratulatory addresses for benefits received, or by transmitting memorials against proposed measures to the Queen, on whose justice and desire to promote their welfare they evidently relied with the most implicit confidence.

"The most cursory consideration of the large number of objects which the Government proposed to itself, in carrying out the system of policy which has just been detailed,

must have shown that it relied upon receiving, at east for some years, considerable moneyed assistance from some extraneous source, until the improvement which might naturally be looked for, in the internal traffic and external commerce of the Colony, had so far improved the revenue that it would suffice to defray the necessary expenditure of the Government.

"Such assistance was, in point of fact, most generously supplied by the Imperial Parliament, and it hence became an important object for the local Government so to conduct the financial operations of the Colony, that it might, at the earliest possible period, dispense with the assistance which was afforded to it, and thus cease to be a burden upon the parent State, which had so liberally aided it during its early struggles. This end may be said to be so far attained, that in the ensuing year the resources of the country will suffice to defray the whole of its expenditure with the exception of £15,000, if the proposed financial operations are approved of which were detailed in the Despatch named in the margin 8, whilst, as in each succeeding year, an increase of revenue may be looked for, and no corresponding increase in the expenditure will be requisite, the amount of assistance received from Great Britain can be still further rapidly diminished in each year subsequent to 1850.

"In order that every guarantee might be afforded that the state of prosperity to which these Colonies were attaining might have a character of permanency, it was still necessary that institutions should be devised, which would ultimately constitute a form of government which was likely to be adapted to the circumstances of this country, and to be

satisfactory to its mixed and peculiar population. It also appeared to be a matter of great importance, that continual advances should be made towards such institutions, so that their introduction might be gradual, and that they might, as it were, imperceptibly grow with the growth of the Colony.

"Such a form of institutions had already in their main outline been sketched by your Lordship, and these in their main features presented a constitution than which nothing better could be devised here, although alterations in the details appeared necessary to adapt them to this country and to the feelings of its inhabitants. These alterations were made, and the form of constitution which appeared best adapted to New Zealand was fully reported on in the Despatches named in the margin 9, whilst several steps preparatory to their introduction have already been taken in this country; and in point of fact, with the exception that the assemblies, instead of being elective, are nominated by the Crown, the proposed system may be said already to be in full operation in New Zealand. The great error which the local Government is in this respect thought by one party in the Colony to have committed, is too great a delay in introducing the elective principle. It may perhaps upon the other hand be urged that, looking to the peculiar condition and population of this country, it is better to err on the side of prudence, and not to incur the risk of the fearful evils which would ensue from another rebellion, for the sake of acquiring one or two years earlier that which must certainly within so short a period be obtained."

Enclosure.

Return of Killed and Wounded in New Zealand from March 4 to July 2, 1845.

Date.

Name of Place.

Killed.

No.

Wounded.

No.

1846

March4

Kororarika

Soldiers
Seamen

4
6

Soldiers
Seamen

1
8

May 8.

Okaihau

Soldiers
Seamen

13
–

Soldiers & Seamen

39

July 1.

Ohaiowai

Soldiers
Seamen
Pioneers

32
2
–

Soldiers
Seamen
Pioneers

60
2
4

Total to July 2, 1845

57

.....

114

Date.

Name of Place.

Killed.

No.

Wounded.

No.

1846

Jan. 11

Ruapekapeka

Soldiers
Seamen
Pioneers

3
9
1

Soldiers
Seamen
Pioneers

11
17
2

May 11

Boulcott's Farm, Valley of the Hutt

Soldiers

7

Soldiers

3

June 16

Valley of the Hutt

Soldiers

1

Soldiers

4

Sept. 10

Howkewi

Soldiers
Seamen

2
1

Soldiers
Seamen

6
–

1847

May 10
July 19 and 20.

Wanganui
Ditto

Soldiers
Soldiers

1
3

Soldiers
Soldiers

–
10

Total to July20, 1847

28

53

Grand Total, from March 4, 1845, to July 20, 1847: – 85 killed, 167 wounded."

A Report upon the condition of the Island, bearing a date more than two years subsequent to that 10 which

I have quoted, has since been laid before Parliament, and it shows that the prosperity of the Colony has continued to increase during that period, and to become more firmly established. The revenue from Customs, which is the principal source of the Colonial income, had in the northern province been abandoned altogether in the hope of conciliating the Natives, in the latter part of 1845. The present Governor re-imposed duties on imports almost immediately after his arrival, and in 1846 they yielded a revenue of £21,888, which in 1850 had increased to no less than £48,945. It is a remarkable fact, showing the soundness of the present prosperity of the Colony, that this revenue has continued to increase, notwithstanding the large diminution in the naval, military, and civil expenditure of this Country in New Zealand. In the year 1850 the value of the exports had also risen to £115,441, having been no more than £44,215 only two years before; from the diminution of British expenditure the imports, as was to be expected, showed a comparatively small increase. The European population (exclusive of the troops and their families) was 22,408 in 1850, having been 16,996 in 1848 11. The Natives have shown increasing confidence in the Government and in British law; they are rapidly acquiring the habits of civilized life, and becoming possessed of property, including water-mills and coasting vessels, and are carrying on a large trade with the Settlers,

to their mutual advantage 12. In short, the contrast between the state of things at the end of 1850, and that which the present Governor found existing on his arrival at the end of the year 1845, is so marked and so gratifying, that it is difficult to believe that so great a change should have been accomplished in the short space of five years. No general report of the state of the Colony, up to a later period than the end of 1850, has been laid before Parliament; but from the accounts in the newspapers it appears that, up to the date of the latest advices, nothing had occurred to check the progress of the Colony.

It is to the Governor, Sir George Grey 13, that New Zealand is mainly indebted for this happy alteration in its condition and prospects. Nothing but the singular ability and judgement displayed by him during the whole of his administration, and especially in its commencement, could have averted a war between the European and Native inhabitants of those Islands. It would have been one of the same character with that which has been raging so long at the Cape of

Good Hope, but still more arduous, since the New Zealanders would have been yet more formidable enemies than the Kafirs, and the scene of the contest so much more remote. The war which had already begun when Sir George Grey reached New Zealand, and in which at that time all the advantage had been with our adversaries, would have been converted into a mortal struggle between the European and Maori races by the slightest error of judgement on his part, and by his failing to unite with the most cautious prudence, equal firmness and decision. Such a struggle, once commenced, could hardly have been closed except by our abandonment of the Islands in disgrace, or the extermination of their aboriginal inhabitants.

The best proof of the wisdom of Sir George Grey's policy towards the Natives is afforded by the almost unbounded influence he has established over their minds, notwithstanding the severity he has been compelled to exercise upon some occasions. He has never attempted to conciliate their favour at the expense of justice to the Settlers, or by showing indulgence to lawless proceedings; on the contrary, he has maintained his authority over them with an exceedingly high hand, and has strictly enforced various regulations calculated to be very unpalatable to them, especially his prohibition of any trade with them in arms and gunpowder. Yet he has succeeded in impressing them with a conviction that he is their best and truest friend, and commanded thus their willing obedience to all his measures. There are, in the

voluminous papers which have been laid before Parliament, many remarkable proofs of the degree to which he has secured their affection and confidence. I will mention but two. When the Government House at Auckland had been destroyed by fire, a body of Natives came forward with an entirely spontaneous offer of their unpaid labour to rebuild it; and afterwards, when a report that he was to be recalled had been circulated by some of the White opponents of his Government, petitions to the Queen that he might be allowed to remain were signed by the Natives; and it is a curious circumstance that the first signature to one of these petitions was that of the Chief Te Rauparaha, whom he had kept so long in confinement. Some of the letters written by Chiefs to the Queen, expressing their earnest desire that he might not be removed, and the gratitude and affection they felt for him, are very interesting 14.

Giving then to the Governor the chief credit for having brought New Zealand in safety through the perilous crisis of the last seven years, the merit which we are entitled to claim, is what belongs to us for having supported him in the policy he has pursued, and co-operated with him to the utmost of our power. His previous administration of South Australia, under difficulties of another kind, but hardly less formidable than those he had to encounter in

New Zealand, and the justness of all his views with regard to the latter as explained in his despatches, entitled him to our unreserved confidence. This being the case, I am persuaded that we adopted the only course likely to lead to a happy result, in resolving to embarrass him by few positive and no minute instructions, but to leave it almost entirely to his own judgement to determine upon the measures to be taken by him, and to be guided mainly by his advice in what we were ourselves called upon to do.

This was the principle upon which we acted; and accordingly, when, a few weeks after we came into Office, we received despatches in which he expressed his opinion that, for four or five years, a larger force than he had previously applied for was required, we lost no time in taking measures to meet his demand, though there was much inconvenience in providing the 2500 men he had asked for, in addition to a naval force, for this distant Colony. 900 men, in addition to the 1100 already in New Zealand, were immediately ordered to join him from New South Wales; and 500 discharged soldiers from the army were raised and formed into a corps, called the New Zealand Fencibles, to make up the amount required 15. As this last was rather a novel measure, and has proved eminently successful, it is proper that I should give some account both of the reasons by which we were

governed in adopting it, and of the manner in which it was carried into execution.

What Sir George Grey required, was rather to be enabled to command at a short notice an overwhelming force, to put down any resistance which might be attempted to the authority of the Government, than the constant service of a large body of troops. Hence it appeared desirable that a part of the force sent to the Colony should consist of men well trained as soldiers, but who, instead of being kept constantly under arms and in the receipt of military pay, should be established in the Colony as settlers, in such a manner that their military services when wanted might be commanded on the shortest notice, and yet that they might be enabled to maintain themselves principally by their own labour. By such an arrangement it was anticipated that the Colony would gain the double advantage, of protection in the event of war, and in peace of a supply of labour and a permanent increase of its White population.

Such were the objects with which it was proposed that the New Zealand Fencibles should be raised. The Pensioners of the army, who, under the authority of Lord Hardinge's Act, had been organized for service in this Country under the direction of Colonel Tulloch, together with soldiers who had been discharged before they had acquired a right to pension, would, it was ascertained, afford ample means of raising a corps of the required strength, without admitting into it any but men of good character and

still vigorous constitution. In insisting upon the last condition, it was not of course expected that the men composing this force, however carefully selected, should be from their time of life as capable of enduring the toils of active warfare as the soldiers of a regular regiment. But as there would always be many posts which must be garrisoned for the protection of the capital and of the depots, (where all the supplies of the troops in the field require to be left in safety,) it was considered that a certain proportion of the force in the Colony might be of this description, without at all diminishing the number of regular troops which, on an emergency, could be employed in active operations. Nor was it overlooked that, though the experiment had been more than once tried, discharged soldiers had not hitherto proved good settlers; but there was nothing in these former failures to justify unfavourable anticipations as to the result of the present attempt. They were easily to be accounted for by the fact, that men accustomed during the greater part of their lives to be constantly under the care of their officers, and to be left very little dependent on their own forethought and prudence, had been sent to the Colonies under no superintendence whatever, and left to shift for themselves in circumstances altogether novel to them, and under difficulties with which they were little fitted to contend.

We trusted that, by avoiding this error, a different result might be obtained; and it was determined that the men embodied for service in New Zealand, al-

though they were not to be constantly receiving pay, and employed in military duty, should be under the continual care and superintendence of officers in permanent pay. Six Companies of about 500 men were to be raised, and established in two or three villages, to be prepared for their reception, probably in the neighbourhood of Auckland. The men were to be accompanied by their wives and families, and each was to have a cottage prepared for him, with one acre of land, one quarter of which was to be cleared. A larger quantity was to be reserved, which they were to have the right of purchasing at a moderate price if able to do so; but it was not intended that they should look to the cultivation of this land as their principal means of support, at least in the first instance. Their land was expected to be used as a garden, to assist them in maintaining their families, and employment as labourers was meant to be their chief dependence.

Such employment there was no difficulty in assuring them that they should have, since, in addition to the private demand for labour, there would be that of the Colonial Government in the construction of roads, which were urgently wanted both for civil and military purposes. Much importance was attached to keeping the men together in villages, not only to render their services promptly available when wanted, and with a view to defence, but also to make it easier to provide religious instruction and education, for the men and for their children. A school-house, which was

also to serve as a chapel, was to be erected in each village. At the end of seven years' service their cottages and land were to become the property of the men; in the meantime they were to have the use of them rent free, in consideration of their attending regularly for military exercise twelve days in each year, and mustering under arms on Sundays for Church parade. They were to receive pay, if called out for service, like the Pensioners in this Country.

These views, and the conditions on which the men were to be raised, were fully explained to the Governor 16, and they were sent to the Colony as soon as the necessary arrangements could be completed. The measure has entirely answered our expectations. The establishment of these men in the neighbourhood of Auckland has been successfully accomplished; they are doing so well, that a considerable number of them have already been able to buy a part of the land reserved for them, and others have purchased their discharge from the corps, by defraying the expense of bringing other Pensioners from England to take their place. Their presence has given quite the same feeling of security as that of an equal number of regular troops, while it has been clearly shown by the Governor that a very great saving to this Country has been effected by the substitution of a force of this description for an ordinary regiment of the same strength 17.

Though the original cost of settling these men on their land, and building their cottages, was much heavier than was found to be necessary when two more Companies were sent out at a later period, with the advantage of the experience that had been gained by the first attempt; this charge has already been much more than covered, by the saving in the pay to which regular troops would have been entitled. The advantage which the Colony has obtained from this increase of its population may be best judged of by the fact, that the Crown land in the hundreds in which these military settlements are situated, is now estimated to be worth upwards of £67,000, though at the time the settlements were commenced its value was not above £5000 or £6000, judging in both cases of the value from the prices which have been obtained for land sold at the time. No doubt a part of the increased value of this land is owing to the generally improved condition of the Colony, but it has been principally occasioned by the formation of these settlements. At a later period the Governor permitted eighty-one families of Natives to occupy some land adjoining the military villages rent-free, on condition of the men serving, armed at their own expense, under the command of the Officer of the Fencibles, whenever the latter may be called out for drill or military service. This arrangement, the Governor states, is intended, in the event of renewed disturbances, "to secure for each division of Pensioners the co-operation and assistance of a body of Natives ac-

customed to be drilled with them and attached to them from inhabiting the same locality and serving under the same officers, whose activity and knowledge of the country will in some degree compensate for the age and unfitness of the pensioners for rapid movements. In fact, the two combined ought to compose a force of a very useful description." 18

I must further observe as to this measure, that I regarded it as one of very great importance, not merely on account of its immediate results, but as an experiment on the practicability of combining the two objects, of providing for the military defence of the Colonies at a cheap rate, and increasing their British population and their supply of labour, by forming settlements of men under certain obligations of military service, but not retained constantly in pay or in the performance of military duty. If the experiment succeeded in New Zealand, I looked forward to the same principle being applied elsewhere, as it already has been to a certain extent in Canada, Van Diemen's Land, and Western Australia, but not yet by any means on the scale on which it is capable of being acted upon. It is not necessary that the men sent out as military settlers should be Pensioners; they might be soldiers of comparatively short service, still in the vigour of their age, and equal to any military duty they might be called upon to perform; nay, men

might be raised for the purpose, and after being thoroughly disciplined in this Country, might be settled in the Colonies on the same terms as the New Zealand Fencibles.

In the Australian Colonies, where an increase of the means of military protection is desired by the inhabitants, a portion of their large emigration funds might be spent in carrying out and establishing on land Settlers of this description, instead of ordinary emigrants, with the further advantage of being thus enabled to place bodies of labourers where they are most wanted, which, in the event of the construction of railways being undertaken, might be of no small use. In all our Colonies possessing temperate climates this plan might, with modifications according to their several circumstances, be acted upon; and even in some of the tropical Colonies there are situations in the mountains perfectly adapted to European constitutions, and where the establishment of a British population would both morally and politically be of inestimable advantage. Not to mention other Colonies, in Ceylon, Mauritius, and Jamaica there are undoubtedly to be found situations in the high grounds, where there is no reason to doubt that British military settlers, with their families, might expect to enjoy as good health, and to be as capable of labour, as at home.

But I am sensible that this subject, in which I have long taken great interest, has led me too far from that which is my immediate concern. To return

to New Zealand, I have shown that we gave to the Governor all the support he asked in the way of increased military force. We did so in the full confidence that he would not apply for more than was really required, and because we concurred with him in believing that, if a sufficient force were sent in the first instance, in four or five years' time, by the measures he contemplated, it would become safe to reduce it; but that it was to be feared, "if a sufficient force were not at once stationed in the country," to use his own words, "sanguinary and expensive yet petty wars may take place, which will entail on Great Britain a large and useless expenditure of blood and money, and retard the advancement of this country almost indefinitely; whilst, on the other hand, should a sufficient force be at once sent here, I feel satisfied that no further disturbance of any consequence will take place, and that in a few years the country will be able to defray the expense of its establishments 19." On this sagacious advice we acted, and the result was precisely what the Governor had anticipated; the large force placed at his disposal answered its purpose; so early as 1849 it became safe to commence its reduction, and before we left Office the military expenditure of this Country in New Zealand had been reduced within very moderate limits.

With regard to the civil expenditure of the Colony, the advice of the Governor was founded on the

same principle, and we followed it with the same good effect. He pointed out that he was called upon to govern, not only the European population, estimated at that time at 12,000 souls, but the much larger native population, which was supposed to be 120,000; and that New Zealand was not therefore in the ordinary position of a young country, the establishments of which could grow in extent in the same proportion as its population, revenue, and commerce. A large population rapidly becoming civilized, and capable of immediately affording a considerable commerce and revenue, already existed there; but no establishments had been formed for the protection of life, property, or commerce, or for the control and government of this large population, who, if their energies were not directed into proper channels, and if they were not kept under proper control, would certainly attempt to set up the government of various ambitious Chiefs, and would keep the country in a constant state of disturbance and war. He urged that it was "therefore absolutely necessary that a considerable annual expenditure in excess of revenue should be sanctioned for a few years by the British Parliament, to provide for the formation of the public buildings, roads, and establishments which are absolutely requisite for the assertion and preservation of British supremacy, for the control of the turbulent, the protection of life, property, and commerce, and the security of the revenue which the country can at once yield 20." He expressed

his strong confidence that, if the grants he considered requisite for these purposes were given, the revenue of the Colony would rapidly increase, and the demands upon the Imperial treasury would proportionally diminish, and in a very few years would cease altogether.

We concurred in these views, and therefore, though the demand we were compelled to make upon the liberality of Parliament was a very heavy one, we did not shrink from making it; nor did Parliament decline to accede to it. By means of the large grants which were voted upon these grounds for the service of New Zealand, the Governor was enabled to prosecute with vigour the various measures of improvement he had described as necessary; and among these there were none which both on civil and military grounds he considered so important as the construction of roads. With reference to these it is a remarkable circumstance which I hope there can be no objection to my mentioning, that at the very time when Sir George Grey was writing from New Zealand to represent the absolute necessity of roads with a view to military security, the great man whose recent loss the Nation has had to deplore was in this country expressing precisely the same opinion. The Duke of Wellington, who had of course been consulted on the military arrangements which were to be adopted in New Zealand, had strongly advised that one of the very first objects to be aimed at should be the construction of roads, so as to afford easy means of communication, and for the march of troops and artillery between the

most important points. These works were accordingly carried forward as rapidly as possible; and as early as October, 1847, the Governor was able to report, "that the great lines of communication which were absolutely requisite to connect the town and port of Wellington with the good country lying beyond the ranges of mountains covered with forests, which surround Wellington, are rapidly progressing, and will probably be quite completed in about eight months from the present date; after which time that town may be regarded as in a state of comparative security, and I think it will then advance rapidly in wealth and prosperity."

In addition to the utility of roads when completed, both for military and civil objects, a very important incidental advantage was obtained from their construction by the employment thus afforded to a large number of the Natives. They eagerly accepted this employment, on account of the wages they earned; and the occupation and the pay they received were very useful, in withdrawing them from the temptation to join those of their countrymen who were inclined to turbulence and plunder; the work at the same time was very valuable, from the industrial training it afforded, as the Governor has remarked in the Despatch which I have quoted. The instruction of the Natives, and the influence over them acquired by the officers who directed their labours, was by no means one of the least valuable results of these undertakings; and Captain Russell, under whose charge

they were carried on, deserves very great credit for the remarkable success with which he availed himself of the labour of the Natives, and for the pains he took in training and instructing them. His reports upon the progress of the work entrusted to his care, which will be found in the Parliamentary Papers, are very interesting; and it speaks highly in favour both of his intelligence and ability, and of the industrious disposition of the Natives, that he has been able to show that the roads he constructed with their help have been made at a very low cost, compared with that of roads in other countries. Major Marlow was equally successful in teaching a considerable number of Natives to work as masons and quarry-men; and he built by their assistance the enclosure-wall of the barracks at Auckland, as well as it would have been done by European labour 21, and much more cheaply. It was the Natives employed under him who made the offer I have mentioned, of their gratuitous labour in rebuilding the Government House.

The expenditure for this and the other objects pointed out by the Governor as being important, has completely answered the purposes for which it was incurred. He had, as I have shown, recommended this outlay, in the confident expectation (which we shared with him) that Parliament, by providing liberally for the wants of the Colony for a few years, would be adopting the course of truest economy, because it would thus be enabled the more speedily to diminish the

naval and military force employed there, and also soon to reduce, and before long to discontinue altogether, the annual grants for the charges of the Civil Government of New Zealand. We trusted that this would be rendered practicable by the secure establishment of peace, the rapid increase of the Colonial revenue, and the diminution of expenditure, as the public works most urgently wanted should be completed.

This anticipation has been amply verified by the result. The amount voted by Parliament in 1847 for the service of New Zealand was £57,000; in the three next years, including a vote for arrears in 1850, it averaged about £27,000 a year; in 1851, the vote was reduced to £20,000; in the present year to £10,000, and in the estimates of this year it is stated that the Governor is of opinion that if Parliament should next year make a final grant of £5000, New Zealand will afterwards be able to maintain its own civil establishment without any further assistance. The fact that it has been found possible to provide at so early a period for relieving the Mother-country from any charge on account of the Civil Government of the Colony, is the best justification of the large votes we proposed in the first years of your Administration.

We also deferred to the opinion of the Governor upon another subject of extreme importance: I refer to the question as to the proper time for establishing representative institutions in the Colony. On our appointment to Office, at so late a period of the Session of Parliament as the beginning of July, we had

but very little time to consider what measures of legislation were so immediately required as to render it expedient that they should be brought forward at once, instead of being deferred to another year. It was probably owing to our being compelled to come to a decision without an opportunity of full deliberation, that we were induced to adopt, what proved to have been a hasty and erroneous conclusion as to the propriety of giving a Representative Constitution at once to New Zealand.

There were not wanting what appeared to be very powerful reasons in favour of this course. The form of Government which existed in New Zealand had undoubtedly altogether failed in securing, for the last five or six years, a wise and vigorous administration of its affairs; on the contrary, there had been during that time a series of mistakes committed by the local Authorities, producing the worst effect on the interests of the Settlers, amongst whom a strong feeling of discontent with the whole system of government had thus been created, and an eager desire to take the management of their own concerns into their own hands. We were of opinion that there was so much substantial ground for these feelings, that we were extremely unwilling to defer till another Session obtaining from Parliament authority to make the desired change in the system of Government in New Zealand. We believed also, that the obvious difficulty of giving to a representative Legislature the power of legislating for the Natives, in the election of which

they could have no influence, might be obviated, by empowering the Crown to define districts within which the laws and customs of the Natives, so far as they are not repugnant to the general principles of humanity, should be maintained in force.

Influenced by these considerations, we proposed to Parliament a Bill, which was passed into a law, by which the Crown was empowered to establish representative institutions in the Colony. The leading principle of the measure was, that there were to be two Provinces having distinct Legislatures, with authority to make laws on most subjects, but restrained from doing so on some, which were to be reserved for the consideration of a general Legislature acting for both Provinces. Within those portions of the territory not occupied by Europeans, provision was made for the government of the aboriginal inhabitants of New Zealand by their own laws and customs. The Act which was passed, prescribed only what was to be the general nature of the new Constitution, and conferred upon the Crown exceedingly extensive powers for filling up the outline thus traced, and making all the regulations of detail that were required for bringing the proposed system of government into operation. In the exercise of these powers, a Charter under the Great Seal and instructions to the Governor under the Sign Manual were prepared. By these he was authorized to summon the representative Legislatures which were to take the place of the existing Legislative Council, and all the arrangements necessary for

that purpose were provided for. These instruments were transmitted to the Governor in an explanatory despatch, which bore date the 23rd of December, 1846 22.

When the above despatch reached the Colony, the Governor immediately wrote to represent in strong terms the danger which, in the then state of New Zealand, would have arisen from the discontent that would infallibly be excited among the Natives, by the proposed change in the form of government. He pointed out, that they were large contributors to the revenue, the disposal of which was to be entrusted to a Legislature in which they would be altogether unrepresented, – that they were quite intelligent enough clearly to perceive this, and the injustice to them of such an arrangement. Adverting to the disturbances which had just taken place, to the unsettled state of their minds, and the disposition to turbulence that still existed, he deprecated in the strongest terms the immediate introduction (at least into the Northern Province) of the proposed form of Government, which he said might probably, in a few years, be safely and with advantage established 23.

The Governor's despatches to this effect reached this Country in November, 1847, and we did not hesitate to act upon his advice. He was at once informed that we would propose to Parliament a Bill, to sus-

pend for five years the operation of so much of the Act of 1846 as related to the establishment of Representative Legislatures in New Zealand, and to enable Her Majesty for the same time to reconstitute the former Legislative Council. As it appeared however from his despatches to be desirable, that the proposed division of the Colony into two Provinces with distinct Legislatures should take place, while it seemed doubtful whether, in the Southern Province, that Legislature might not be in part of a representative character, we intended that the Bill to be submitted to Parliament should contain provisions by which the revived Legislative Council for the whole Colony should be empowered to establish Provincial Legislatures, of which it should be at liberty to determine the constitution 24.

A Bill to this effect was accordingly brought in and passed. The authority thus entrusted to the Governor has been used with great discretion and advantage; he established subordinate provincial Legislatures, and by passing various important and useful laws, in furtherance of that general system of policy which I have described, he removed all obstacles to the establishment of representative government in New Zealand, even before the five years for which it had been suspended had expired; and if the pressure of other business in the House of Commons had not rendered it impossible, we should have brought in a Bill for this purpose in the Session of 1851. In the

Session of this year it was one of the subjects recommended to the attention of Parliament in the Queen's Speech; and, after the change of Administration, a Bill was brought forward and passed by our successors, by which the intended grant of representative institutions to New Zealand has been accomplished, – not precisely in the manner I could have wished, but in one to which I see no material objection. The leading principle of the Act of 1846 – the division of authority between subordinate Provincial Legislatures, and a general Legislature for the whole Colony – has been adhered to.

I must not quit the subject of New Zealand, without saying a few words on the relations between the New Zealand Company and the Government. Whatever may have been the merits or demerits of the original scheme of that Company, it was universally acknowledged that its chances of success had been greatly diminished by the ill-judged measures of the local Authorities, who had thrown difficulties in the way of the enterprise from its very beginning to which it ought not to have been exposed. Hence it had been acknowledged by Lord Derby, that the Company had a fair right to expect from the Government assistance, which might in some degree make up for the disadvantages to which it had thus been exposed. Before he went out of Office, he had commenced an arrangement, which was confirmed and completed by his successor, Mr. Gladstone, bywhich a considerable sum of money was to be advanced to them with this view.

The Company however did not admit the sufficiency of this compensation; and, after much communication with them, it was agreed that a proposal should be submitted to Parliament, the principle of which was that a further advance of money, and very large powers of administering the Crown lands in the southern division of the Colony, should be entrusted to them; under an agreement that, if in three years they should fail in placing themselves in a situation to carry on with advantage their colonizing operations, they should be at liberty to resign their functions and all their claims to land into the hands of the Government. Should they decide on doing so, they were to receive in return for the surrender of their Charter and of all their other property and rights, a release from their obligation to repay the sums advanced to them, and a claim to have their original capital, which had been sunk in the colonization of New Zealand, repaid to them from the proceeds of the sales of land in the Colony.

A Bill to give effect to this arrangement was submitted to Parliament, and passed. I do not think it advisable, on this occasion, to enter into further particulars on this subject, partly because the transactions between the Government and the Company were so exceedingly complicated, (in consequence of proceedings which had taken place prior to our appointment to Office,) that an intelligible statement of what has taken place could not be made without protracting this Letter to a most tedious length, while the few

persons who would be likely to take an interest in the subject will find all I could say upon it in a speech which I made in the House of Lords in June last, on the second reading of the New Zealand Bill, and which is of course recorded in the Debates 25. But my chief reason for abstaining from giving any more detailed account of the transactions in question is, that I understand it to have been arranged that they are to be investigated by a Committee of the House of Commons as soon as possible, and that, in the anticipation of such an inquiry, it would be hardly proper for me in this form to state my own view of the case. Here therefore I will close my Letter on the subject of New Zealand.

November 20, 1852.

5 See Papers presented to Parliament, December 1847, p. 71.

6 See Papers presented to Parliament, February 1848, p. 12.

7 See Papers presented January 1850, p. 190.

8 Papers presented to Parliament, No. 52, April 20, 1849, page 134.

9 Papers presented to Parliament, – No. 106, Nov. 29, 1848, page 9; No. 4, Feb. 2, 1849, page 21; No. 23, March 15, 1849, page 56; No. 27, March 22, 1849, page 59.

10 October 10, 1851.

11 See Papers presented to Parliament, May 3, 1852.

12 See Papers presented in August 1851, and especially Mr. Kemp's Statistical Returns, in the Appendix.

13 As I have expressed so strongly the admiration I feel for Sir George Grey's services in New Zealand, I ought perhaps to say, that my opinion has not been influenced by any private feelings of partiality. Notwithstanding the name he bears, there is no relationship between Sir George Grey and myself, nor have I the advantage of any personal acquaintance with him. I never had the pleasure of seeing him, and know him only by his conduct and my correspondence with him in the public service.

14 See Papers presented to Parliament in July, 1849, p. 27; Papers of January, 1850, p. 66; of August, 1850, pp. 106, 109; of August, 1851, pp. 44, 49, 134-141, 142. I add two of the letters referred to.

Copies of two letters from bodies of New Zealanders to the Governor Sir George Grey, after the burning of the Government House on the 22rd of June, 1848.

Auckland, June the 24th, 1848.

FRIEND THE GOVERNOR,

Salutations to you. Great is our love and sympathy to yourself and Mrs. Grey because your dwelling has been destroyed by fire. Had we been awake at the commencement of the fire we should have come to your aid, but we reached the place when the fire was in full vigour. Our object was to save your property. There are forty of us working at the Barracks, and this is the love of us people at the Barracks for you, because you are the directing, upholding, controlling, etc., parent of all the people. Do you hearken! With yourself is the thought relative to our building a new house of stone for you, as we have been instructed in this good work, and we know how to perform it, as we have learnt the art of building. If you consent to this, will you write to us, and we will talk with the Chiefs about it.

From your loving children. Written by Te Taranu for the Workmen of the Barracks. Concluded to our Father the Governor.

(True translation, C. V. DAVIES.)

Second Letter.

Wakoia, June 24, 1848.

FRIEND THE GOVERNOR,

Salutations to you. Great is our love to you. We have heard of your distress (or loss) by fire. Friend, this is the love of the people of the quarry to you. Friend, we are here pleased with you. We are willing or anxious that the stones of the Quarry should be taken by you, so that a stone house may be built for you. It will not take many weeks to build it; perhaps one, perhaps two. This is our thought relative to the stones for you; but there must be no payment given us. This is a token of affection from the people of the Quarry to our Governor.

(True translation, C. V. DAVIES.)

15 See Despatch to Sir G. Grey, of November 24, 1846, in the Papers presented to Parliament by Command, January 1847, p. 81.

16 See page 19 of the Papers quoted above.

17 See the Governor's Despatch of February 8, 1851. Papers of August, 1851, p. 144.

18 See Sir George Grey's Despatch of the 22nd of June, 1849, p. 169 of New Zealand Papers, presented to both Houses of Parliament, in January 1850.

19 See the Governor's Despatch of May 14, 1846. (Parliamentary Papers of January, 1847, p. 16.)

20 See the Governor's Despatch of May 12, 1846, in the Papers presented January, 1847, p. 15.

21 See Papers of December, 1847, p. 51.

22 See Papers presented to Parliament in January, 1847, p. 64.

23 See his Despatches of the 3rd and 13th of May, 1847, in the Papers presented in December, 1847, pp. 42, 47.

24 See Despatch to the Governor, of November 30, 1847, p. 47.

25 I add in the Appendix an extract from the Report in Hansard's Debates of the speech in question. See Appendix (B) to this Volume.

Appendix B

declaration, because I do not agree in it, to a spirit of faction or resentment. Whatever may be the censure in which the late Council may have thought fit to indulge towards myself, I cannot be guilty of such injustice towards them. Amidst the deep satisfaction with which I have watched of late years the extraordinary progress of New South Wales, in nearly all that constitutes the social and material welfare of a community, I have never ceased to appreciate the manner in which its Legislature has contributed to that advance by the zealous and constant discharge of its duty to its constituents; and it is my sincere hope that the now separate Legislatures, using with their best abilities the powers which the Act now under discussion has conferred on them, will follow in that course of improvement which their predecessors have marked out for them.

"I have, etc.,

(Signed) "GREY."

B.

Extract from Speech of Earl Grey in the House of Lords, June, 1852, on Second Reading of New Zealand Bill.

"EARL GREY said, that before adverting to the important political questions arising out of the Bill now under their Lordships' consideration, he thought it right to notice what had fallen from the noble Duke on the clauses having reference to the claims of the New Zealand Company. He certainly regretted that it was necessary to lay upon this rising Colony a charge such as that which was proposed by this Bill; but at the same time it was right that Parliament should do justice to the parties by whose exertions

and personal sacrifices the Colony had been created – without whom, in fact, there would he no Colony of New Zealand at all. Persons now found great fault with the New Zealand Company, and though he had never been a great admirer of that body, he must say that he thought the run now made against that Company was not less unjust and unmerited than the exaggerated credit which had been given them in the first instance. He had no doubt that the Company had been actuated throughout by the best motives; and, as evidence of their good intentions, he would remind their Lordships that the Directors had sacrificed large sums of their own money in the establishment of the Colony, for the repayment of which they had only the remote and distant prospect that was afforded by the arrangement proposed by this Bill. The fault to be found with the New Zealand Company was not that they committed any of the offences which the noble Duke imputed to them.

"THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE: No, no!

"EARL GREY: The noble Duke disclaimed the intention of imputing any offence to them, but the statement of the noble Duke implied it. Their real fault was, that they had shown themselves deficient in worldly wisdom and prudence, in too readily adopting for their guide a very clever projector, whose talents could not be denied, but whose cleverness was not accompanied by other qualities quite as necessary to make him a safe and trustworthy guide. They did not display that judgement that might have been expected from them in conducting the great enterprise into which they had somewhat rashly entered. Perhaps that was the necessary consequence of the constitution of such a body; for unless some person took the lead, and became manager, he believed a company of which the affairs were conducted

by a Board of Directors without check or control was not likely to deal satisfactorily with matters of this kind. That the New Zealand Company had not succeeded was not very much to be wondered at, because the necessary expenses of founding new colonies in distant parts of the world were so great, that measures of this kind would never answer as a pecuniary speculation. Schemes of this kind had always been exceedingly attractive; but from the enterprises of the early adventurers who founded some of the present United States down to the present time, the result had invariably been the same; and however successful some of their attempts had been in creating flourishing colonies, they had uniformly proved ruinous as pecuniary speculations to the projectors. He was told that the Company with which his noble friend (Lord Lyttelton) near him was connected (the Canterbury Settlement), had within the last few days undergone the common lot of those schemes, and was obliged to acknowledge itself insolvent. Those who had attended to such matters must be well aware, that it was not one of the smallest difficulties of the Colonial Department to deal with the many proposals for the formation of new colonies. Sanguine projectors were continually putting forward schemes by which they confidently asserted that, without risk or expense to the public, valuable colonies might be established. Unfortunately the performance of such promises could not be ensured. Though projectors could found colonies, it was beyond their power to prevent their becoming a burden upon the country. In these days, if a body of Englishmen, sent out to a distant land, were exposed to the danger of starvation or destruction by savages, no Government or Parliament could allow such calamities to happen, or leave the settlers to their fate, because they had been sent out under an assurance that

the Colony would be self-supporting. Neither could the Government allow that a band of persons should place themselves on any piece of ground they selected, and without mercy shoot out of their way any of the native inhabitants that might oppose them. Hence it was absolutely necessary that the Government should exercise some control over the formation of new settlements, though there were many obvious reasons why this control should not be carried further than was absolutely required. He could best explain what he thought the proper course to be taken in such cases, by stating what had been done while he had the honour of holding the office of Secretary of State. When the establishment of the Canterbury Settlement was projected, he was told that a large sum of money would be provided by the projectors, and that they were ready to undertake the scheme at their own risk; and it was urged that the mere sanction of the Government, which was all that was asked, ought not to be withheld. He agreed that it ought not to be so. He did not fail very strongly to express his opinion to the projectors: he stated, that although the plan might possibly lead ultimately to the formation of a flourishing community, the result would greatly disappoint their expectations in a pecuniary point of view; that it was quite impossible that such a measure should go on with the large price they proposed to ask for land, making promises to the purchasers which they could not perform, and that they would involve themselves in losses, liabilities and difficulties without end. But he also stated at the time to the projectors, that, provided nothing was done which could in any way delude the public as to the real state of the case – if proper precautions were taken, and regulations were adopted to ensure the safety of the Colonists, and guard against abuse – if he were satisfied that

adequate securities were provided upon these points, and against any expense being brought upon the public – he should not consider it his duty on the part of the Government to make any objection to the scheme being undertaken at their own risk by that Company. This had appeared to him the proper course to be adopted, because though he felt convinced the scheme would disappoint the expectations of the founders, and that great individual losses might be sustained, still he had no doubt that a settlement would be formed which in the end would become a great and flourishing community, destined to spread the British name and the British language through a large extent of valuable territory; and he considered it no part of the duty of the Government, if these public advantages were to be obtained, to enforce on the projectors greater prudence in regard to their own individual interests. The result, it now seemed, had been precisely what he anticipated: a settlement which would, no doubt, become a very flourishing one had been founded, but great loss had, he understood, been sustained by the projectors; but no claim on the Government, by the Canterbury Association, was likely to arise from the failure of that project, for the relations between the Association and the Government were clearly defined in the first instance: they had not been allowed to enter upon the undertaking at all until they had satisfied the Government that the public interests at stake had been provided for; and care had been taken that, when they were allowed to proceed, no difficulty should be thrown in their way, so that they had not any grounds for saying that their failure – if failure it be – was in any way attributable to the conduct of Government or of Parliament, and therefore were entitled to ask for no pecuniary relief. If the same course had been taken with respect

to the New Zealand Company, and it were in the same position, the same remark would be applicable to them; but the circumstances were different, because in the first instance that Company had been permitted to enter upon its undertaking without the sanction of the Government, and without proper securities having been provided, and because afterwards having been permitted to send out the first settlers in a very irregular manner, their operations had been thwarted by the Government. Partly by measures adopted by the local authorities, partly by measures adopted by the Government at home, the Company was prevented from having such a chance of success as they otherwise would have had, – a fact that was clearly shown by the investigation of the Committee to whom the question had been referred. These circumstances were held to give a claim to the New Zealand Company, and though the project might have failed if they had never occurred, they undoubtedly left the projectors without the chance of success to which they were entitled, and it clearly appeared to him that it was the duty of the Government and of Parliament to place them in the situation they would have been in if they had no such grounds of complaint. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby), when Secretary of State for the Colonies, felt these claims so much, that before he left office he had made arrangements for in some degree assisting the New Zealand Company by means of a loan of money. When he (Earl Grey) came into office, he found the Company complaining that what had been done for them was very far from making up for the injury they had sustained by previous measures, and by the great delay they experienced in getting possession of the land. He felt that there was force in that complaint; that they were entitled to some further compensation, and that something

more should be done to enable them to try fairly the scheme to carry out which they were originally formed. Accordingly, the Government having settled what was the largest amount of money that Parliament should he recommended to advance, the matter was placed in the hands of his lamented friend the late Mr. Charles Buller, to consider what was the best arrangement, under existing circumstances, to enable the Company, with such assistance, fairly and fully to try whether their scheme was one capable of being successfully worked. A plan was accordingly prepared with great care by Mr. Buller, to whom, in concert with the New Zealand Company, it was entirely left to make what in his judgement was the best arrangement, subject only to two conditions, on which he (Earl Grey) specially guarded himself, namely, that the pecuniary assistance should not exceed a certain sum, and that the arrangement was to be a conclusive measure, and a discharge in full of all possible claims on the part of the New Zealand Company, whether it should succeed or fail. After much consideration, Mr. Charles Buller prepared the drafts of letters between the Colonial Office and the Directors of the Company, in which were embodied the terms of the arrangement he proposed. These terms were assented to by the Government and the Company: the letters on both sides were written from Mr. Buller's drafts. The Bill of 1847 was prepared to carry into effect the arrangement, and ultimately it received the assent of Parliament. Such had been the circumstances under which the grant of additional aid, and of very large powers to the New Zealand Company, had been recommended by the late Government, and sanctioned by Parliament. With regard to the manner in which the arrangement thus sanctioned had been carried into effect, it had appeared to him that there was one clear rule to be fol-

lowed, namely, that the Company should receive every possible support from the Government in working out the plan; and, it being part of the arrangement that a Commissioner should be appointed by the Government, to watch over the proceedings of the Company, his (Earl Grey's) instructions to that Commissioner were not to interfere further than was necessary for the strict protection of the public interests, and for the purpose of seeing that the British Treasury and the Colony were not involved in larger or heavier liabilities than intended when the Act passed. The Commissioner was directed by no means to exercise the power he possessed of putting a veto on any act of the Company, in every case in which their measures might appear to him injudicious; the principle of the Act of Parliament was to invest the Company with the power and the responsibility of conducting a great experiment in colonization; and the only way in which this experiment could be fairly tried was to leave them free and unfettered to act upon their own judgement, except in cases in which interference was clearly necessary for the protection of the public interest. At the end of the period named by the Company as that in which the experiment might be fairly tried, they found that, notwithstanding the large pecuniary assistance they had received, they could not go on; and they claimed under the terms agreed on, to be relieved from the debt due to the Government, and they claimed also a certain sum to be obtained from the sale of lands in New Zealand. He was astonished to hear the noble Duke draw a distinction between the legal and moral right of the New Zealand Company to the ultimate payment of the money due to them and charged on the land fund, and deny their moral claim to more than they could obtain under a strict technical construction of the Act of Parliament. It seemed to

him, that whatever might be the strict construction of the Act of Parliament, the Government and Parliament in dealing with the Company were bound to act in the same manner as one honourable man would deal with another in a transaction in private affairs, and ought to carry fairly into effect the obvious intention of the agreement. Looking at the subject in this light, he thought it was impossible to say that the New Zealand Company had no claim whatever. Their Lordships should recollect that the whole capital of the New Zealand Company had been applied in creating this colony, and giving value to those lands, the sale of which was to produce the fund which they calculated upon for the ultimate repayment of those advances, and he repeated that that was a claim which they could not honourably decline to recognize. It was true that the Act of Parliament pointed out no specific portion of the lands that was to be applied for the support of emigration, and therefore under the letter of the law the Crown might no doubt apply so large a proportion of the fund to emigration that the claim of the Company would be practically defeated; but this would be inconsistent with good faith; the proportion of the proceeds of the land sales applied to emigration had been left undetermined, and it was considered that it was the interest both of the Company and of the Colony, if the debt was ultimately to be paid, so to divide the whole receipts between the promotion of emigration and the payment of the Company as to leave as large a sum as possible for the former without neglecting the latter object, because by that means the demand for land would be increased, and the debt of the Company would be thereby extinguished. The Act of Parliament contemplated obviously the ultimate payment of the debt, and it was the interest of the Company and

of Parliament that it should be discharged as speedily as possible, by the best possible administration of the lands. The noble Duke said the Company asked for inquiry, and that, pending that inquiry, Parliament ought not to deal with the subject. If by passing the Bill now before the House without the clauses relating to the Company, their position would be unaltered, he should concur in the opinion that Parliament had better not at present deal with this part of the question; but as it was clear that to pass this Bill, omitting the clauses, would alter the position of the Company greatly to their injury, he thought the clauses ought to be retained, though he entirely agreed that inquiry into this matter was right and proper, and he trusted that in another Session the House of Commons would institute a searching investigation respecting it. It was his desire that the inquiry should be conducted on the strictest principles – that every letter, public and private, in connection with the case, should be laid before the Committee, so that the subject should be fairly investigated and reported on by a competent and impartial tribunal. Although he was far from being prepared to defend all the proceedings of the Company, for he would admit that they had frequently acted with imprudence, still he was happy to be able to state that, having investigated the entire case, he had come to the conclusion at which he anticipated the Committee also would arrive – that there had been throughout all these complicated transactions nothing to reflect on the honour, the probity, or the good faith of the gentlemen who had conducted the affairs of the Company. If there were to be an inquiry, it would be inexpedient to enter prematurely into a review of the entire question, in order to convince their Lordships that there was no ground for the charges that had been brought against the Company.

Indeed it would be impossible to do so without having the papers before them which were not yet on their Lordships' table. But without going into the whole case, there were two charges brought against the Company of so serious a nature, and which had been stated with so much confidence, that he must make some observations upon them, especially as an endeavour was made to implicate him in them. These clauses related, first, to an alleged misappropriation of the public funds; and, secondly, to the sending out of certain legal opinions. Now, he must say with regard to the first, that no misapplication of public money could possibly have taken place without the sanction of one or other of the gentlemen who had in succession held the office of the Crown Commissioner; and he had such perfect confidence in both those gentlemen, that he was no less convinced that no money could have been misapplied from the sums appropriated with their sanction, than he should have been had he been personally cognizant of the manner in which every shilling had been expended. The first Commissioner had become involved in disputes with the Company, which ended in his removal; and it was absurd to suppose that he could have allowed them to misappropriate the public money. He was succeeded by a gentleman in whose honour he (Earl Grey) felt no less confidence than in that of Mr. Cowell; while he had greater reliance on his judgement, his discretion, and temper. The instructions he had given to these gentlemen were, that they should not interfere in the application of public money except in cases of abuse, and that he believed to have been the right and proper mode of carrying into effect the arrangement sanctioned by Parliament, for the reason he had already explained. The second charge was, that the New Zealand Company having in a question between themselves and a body of their settlers

obtained two opinions from eminent counsel, one adverse and the other in favour of their own view of the subject, had transmitted the latter as if it were the only one to the Colony, and had thus unfairly obtained the assent of the settlers to an arrangement unfavourable to them. Now it would be manifestly absurd were he to enter into the entire history of the complicated transactions to which these opinions related; but he would merely say that in 1849 papers were laid before Parliament, were given to the world, and were sent to the Colonies, in which there was a despatch mentioning the fact that an opinion adverse to the Company had been given by an eminent counsel. It was therefore evident, that the circumstance of an opinion of that sort having been given had been known to all the world for three years, and yet during that time no attempt had been made to unsettle the arrangement made, and now insinuated to have been unduly influenced by the withholding of that opinion. The question raised was, whether the settlement between the New Zealand Company and the Nelson settlers was a fair one, and he believed it was a most advantageous conclusion of affairs for the settlers; and as the existence of the opinion had been publicly known for three years, he said, let the investigation take place by all means; let it be conducted on the most rigorous principles, but in the meantime let the bargain be adhered to, and in justice to the Company let the arrangements suggested by Her Majesty's Government be sanctioned by their Lordships. He would ask what had rendered the land of New Zealand more valuable than the land in New Guinea or other countries uninhabited by civilized men. It was because the Government, Parliament, and the New Zealand Company, had expended large sums in establishing settlers in the former – it was this, and this only, which had given value to the land

there; and therefore it was not unreasonable to say that the Company, having received no return for its expenditure during many years (and it was probable it would receive nothing for many more), should have a claim on the land of which the value had been thus enhanced by their means. He thought however that a clause should be inserted in the Bill, that any future claims under the Act of 1847 should be defrayed out of the Colonial funds by the Government of New Zealand, and that none should be in future paid by the Imperial Government. These claims should no longer be on the British Treasury and nation."

C.

Copy of a Despatch from Earl Grey to Governor Sir H. G. Smith, Bart., G. C. B.

"Downing-street, January 31, 1850.

"SIR,

"I have now to transmit to you the Report of the Committee of the Board of Trade and Plantations, to which Her Majesty has been pleased to refer the subject of the proposed establishment of a Representative Legislature in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

"This Report so clearly lays down the outlines of those institutions which it is proposed to establish in the Colony, and so fully points out the general reasons which have induced the Committee to adopt its conclusions, both in those instances in which they concur with, and those in which they differ from, the views so ably expressed in the several minutes and papers which I have received from

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