CHAPTER V. RECALLED TO THE EAST COAST.
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CHAPTER V.
RECALLED TO THE EAST COAST.
I HAD in my force men who amounted to 350 all told, and recruits to a larger number were daily expected. There were also a few mounted men, but not enough to be used independently in action, though sufficient to meet requirements of postal communication. Unexpectedly I received a despatch from the Defence Minister. By it I was informed that the orders that it contained were imperative, and that they must be implicitly obeyed without remonstrance or delay, as circumstances had rendered them absolutely necessary. I was directed to fall back with all my force behind the Kai-iwi stream, and so dispose them as to hold that line of defence. No orders could have been more unwelcome. I was daily gaining strength both from increasing efficiency and the number of my force. The enemy, who had permitted me to hold my ground when so weak, could not now by attacking me have gained any advantage. The settlers were beginning to regain confidence, and the stock was still on their locations, and if these were not removed with me would be lost when I retired. But for the imperative expressions of the despatch
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I would have ridden to Wanganui to assure the Minister that I could hold my ground and, with reinforcements, resume the offensive. But reading between the lines of my orders, I felt sure that some misfortune unknown as yet to me had occurred, and that this retrograde movement was dictated by stern necessity. I therefore immediately and loyally obeyed the instructions, but I decided that these did not amount to requiring such haste as might oblige me to abandon any public or private property in my camp, or prevent my doing my best to remove the settlers' stock.
The news of our retreat was accordingly conveyed to all those settlers whom I could reach, and every cart or waggon was impounded for the settlers' baggage. The sheep and cattle first began to move, collected by the settlers aided by my mounted men, then the carts loaded to the top, and the guns and ammunition followed. Then the troops in the blinding rain fell in, and took the Wanganui road, halting behind each ridge. Lastly, the small cavalry force, insignificant in numbers, and therefore I hoped likely to provoke attack, spread over a large extent of country, as a covering rear-guard of skirmishers. The enemy showed outside his pah. But whether the rain or the prospects of a conflict in the open deterred him, I do not know. This was disappointing. In the open I believed we could fight and win against double our numbers, and would
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dearly have liked to have made ourselves felt before withdrawing. But it was not to be. The enemy would not follow us, though we moved slowly and halted often in that hope. Nor even did he molest our mounted skirmishers, who endeavoured to provoke and induce him to come on. We could therefore do nothing beyond retreating as we were ordered, except helping as much as possible the poor settlers whose stock was necessarily driven off to save it from the enemy. It was not a pleasant task. Settler after settler asked me, who was powerless, what he was to do with his stock when he drove it beyond the country to fresh pastures where it could not be grazed, and of course I could give them no assurance either of compensation or even of grazing ground. It was a sad day in my life, a continual recurrence of episodes most grievous to a soldier and a colonist. I needed all my convictions that so high-minded a soldier as Colonel Haultain must have had abundant reason or he would not have given so imperative an order. But my orders were carried out before nightfall, all public and private property in my camp and such stock as could be collected behind the new frontier line. Thus from the Waingongoro to the Kai-iwi the rebels had possession of a district recently settled and occupied by our fellow-colonists except where our flag still flew at Patea and Wairoa, which were strong enough to hold their own and protect as much ground as their
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rifles covered outside. I made the best disposition of the troops as I could in a hurried manner, and then, having accomplished my painful task, rode into Wanganui to ascertain if possible the reading of the riddle which without some light I could not decipher.
It was speedily afforded me. The district of Poverty Bay near Turanganui, now called Gisborne, had been surprised by Te Kooti in the night and the settlers, including Major Biggs, the R.M., and his young wife and child with many others of both sexes, had been murdered at their homes or in their beds, and a tragedy enacted which on so large a scale was without a parallel in the story of our struggles with the native tribes of New Zealand.
The Government, without a force except my own with the smallest pretence of discipline, was doing its best. It had engaged native allies, arming them and paying them for the protection of the settlement, and had given Mr. McLean, their agent at Napier, where he was also Superintendent, the fullest powers to take all steps he might deem necessary for the public safety. Mr. Stafford gave him his carte blanche, which was all he could give. He had no men, and had already exhausted every effort to raise even the small force with me. It was evident that till the East Coast was in safety we could not attempt any risk on the West. To advance with half the
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numerical force of Titokowaru and with untrained men was not, of course, a step any Government could have sanctioned. Mr. McLean was sanguine that with the native allies alone he could recover our prestige and restore tranquillity to Poverty Bay. And while he made the attempt, I was to contract my defence to within the limit of the Kai-iwi stream, and erect blockhouses on which the settlers could retreat if Titokowaru's men made raids towards us. Recruits continued to join me, and the defensive line was clearly defined in front of Woodall's redoubt, and between that point and the sea. The Defence Minister at length explained to me a further dilemma of the Government, caused by a despatch from Mr. McLean pressing the sending at least of 200 European troops. These were not as yet enrolled in New Zealand, unless by weakening my force, and yet if Poverty Bay was to be saved no one better than Mr. McLean knew that undisciplined natives would never accomplish it. Meanwhile, every obstacle had been placed in the way of the Government, and the local press had informed the Colony that a massacre had occurred through laches of the Stafford Ministry. Mr. McLean was the trusted and confidential agent, but he never once accepted the true responsibility of the disaster, every ounce of which should have been borne by him unless he sheltered himself under that of a subordinate officer, Major Biggs, who no longer lived to tell the world
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what, if any, orders he had received from the Government agent. I know the facts pretty well, as I knew all the actors in the foregoing, and I limit my accusations of Mr. McLean to absolute and stolid apathetic indifference. I honestly believe he gave no thought to Major Biggs, or Poverty Bay, and that he did not share Mr. Richmond's terrible anxiety any more than he did his political responsibility. I received from Major Biggs, some days after his death, an explanation which I thoroughly believe. He knew Te Kooti was advancing. He knew, he told me, every detail of his force and its numbers, and knew that Poverty Bay was its destination. He said he knew the settlers must be called in, but, feeling what it must entail upon them, he had hesitated to expose them to such sacrifices till the last moment; now, however, he must do so, and next day he would. Alas, poor fellow! --one of the bravest and gentlest men in the Colony, he and his wife of a year and their newly-born infant all perished that night, and Mr. McLean used their fate as a means of exciting the public and political opinion against the Government, which had treated and trusted him with a magnanimity he hardly deserved or was able to appreciate. Meanwhile, I had laid before Government a memorandum offering to go myself with all the men who were really trustworthy, and to leave the district in the interior fully defended. This memorandum the Government considered for
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some days, and they finally adopted my suggestions.
I asked for two or three days, and, at the end of that time, undertook to embark my most reliable European troops, after having placed Wairoa and Patea in a position of safety, and disposed my remaining troops on the Kai-iwi frontier line so as to protect Wanganui. I might mention here that while a few infantry scattered along the river might have deterred the enemy from crossing, and given some feeling of confidence to our settlers, it was impossible to ensure absolute safety to all the scattered homesteads and stock more inland and easily approached through the bush by unperceived foraging parties of the enemy moving early in the morning or at night. One single Maori might probably, if sufficiently well acquainted with the country, have done immense harm with one box of matches and then escaped unseen and unharmed into the recesses of the bush. It will therefore be understood what value in protecting the district, now the last remaining, I placed upon the two corps of cavalry volunteers which had enrolled themselves. The larger one was composed of young men, chiefly active, energetic young fellows, good riders, and having a considerable knowledge of the whole country. The corps, wearing a gay uniform, and with a great deal of the tone and aspirations of the dragoon, was commanded by Captain Finnimore, and among its members was Mr. John Ballance, subsequently
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distinguished in another arena. The remaining corps was almost exclusively composed of actual country yeoman settlers, men to whom the saddle was their accustomed resting-place, and who knew every nook and corner of the district. Hardly a farm holding but was represented in their ranks, and they were under the command of Lieutenant John Bryce, an officer who possessed all their confidence, and who for many years almost continuously represented them in Parliament. Oddly enough, he and Mr. Ballance both distinguished themselves in politics, and held the same portfolios in the Cabinet subsequent to the dark times which I have described, having been opposed in politics, though with a very thin line of difference in the intention of their native policy, albeit, seeking to attain their objects by different methods. It was, to a large extent, upon the devotion and energy of these highly competent mounted corps that I relied for the defence of the settlements in those parts of the district, especially those which were beyond reach of our outposts to our right. Nor was I mistaken in my anticipations, Mr. Bryce's corps, though not so showy as Captain Finnimore's, was, for all the duties of frontier mounted infantry, absolutely perfect, and by continually moving about patrolling and scouting they preserved, in my opinion, the whole of the homesteads to our right flank and right rear from being burnt and
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plundered by adventurous raiders from Titokowaru's camp. The two main roads leading north from Wanganui could therefore be protected by the force remaining after I had selected those to go to Poverty Bay. My numbers were increasing daily, and the recruits could be easily trained at the outposts' camp. I knew also that considerable reinforcements might soon be expected from Australia, where a certain number were being enrolled, and I decided that if Patea and Wairoa were sufficiently manned and supplied for a month or more they could hold out well. A little inquiry convinced me that as regarded supplies Patea, which was accessible by sea, was not in danger. Wairoa had been usually provisioned from time to time from Patea, and this might be an embarrassment during my absence. I therefore resolved to move forward and throw supplies into Wairoa, and acquaint the garrison of the intention to withdraw to the East Coast the fully trained Division No. 1 at Patea, and replace it with younger soldiers, who would be nearly as useful on the defensive. These plans were all made, and the necessary steps were taken next morning, when a foraging party of the enemy came to the Kai-iwi, opposite to Woodall's redoubt, then my headquarters, and set fire to Mr. Moore's house on the other side. It was very provoking, and so meant, no doubt. But it was clearly not an attack in force that was in-
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tended, and I was compelled, for fear of losing valuable time, to refrain from advancing my troops, or in any way committing my force to operations at this point. Next day, November 22nd, I took my first steps towards carrying out the plans approved by the Government, by ordering all the available cavalry to communicate with Wairoa, and ascertain exactly the state of that post, and the condition and quantity of its provisions. Captain Newland, of the A. C., commanded; but a volunteer officer of the Patea light horse, with a few men, and Lieutenant John Bryce, with his Kai-iwi cavalry, were with Captain Newland. As the operation has become one to which great public attention has been drawn by a Mr. Rusden, whose libellous attack upon Mr. Bryce has been decided distinctly in favour of the latter by the highest Court of the realm, I might here quote the despatch sent to me by Captain Newland on his return to camp:-- "I must acknowledge the assistance rendered to me by Captain O'Halloran, of the Patea yeomanry cavalry, and Lieutenant Bryce, commanding Kai-iwi and Wanganui cavalry. These gentlemen were prominent in this affair, and set their men a gallant example."
The surprise of Titokowaru's stragglers was complete, though apparently but few were overtaken. The moral effect of the demonstration, as showing that we were not unprepared to move, was valuable, and
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the reports from Wairoa were highly satisfactory. Captain Hawes and his garrison, who were all bona fide country settlers, were in good heart, and resolved to hold their post, which was strongly fortified, commanded a considerable space of open ground, and was well supplied with ammunition, biscuits, and groceries. The meat supplies were deficient, and if these were increased Captain Hawes, who was informed of our intentions, felt he could hold his own. On the 29th, therefore, I ordered Colonel Gorton at Wanganui to direct seventy-two recruits to escort drays for Wairoa with sheep and supplies to the mouth of the Kai-iwi River, and Colonel Noake to call out 100 militia to proceed to Stewart's redoubt, and to cover the erection of a blockhouse while he was to send on Captain Finnimore's cavalry, so as to reach Kai-iwi mouth before nightfall. I resigned myself to do without Lieutenant Bryce's corps, because that officer had reported that he had reason to believe the enemy's foragers would attempt to plunder and destroy some of the homesteads to my right, and I had therefore given him open orders the previous day to patrol and reconnoitre in that direction.
On the 30th I moved off with the bulk of my force, crossing the country to the sea-coast road, and meeting the drays and column some small distance short of Nukumaru.
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I felt sure the enemy's foragers on my right would speedily retire when they heard of my advance, and was confident that Mr. Bryce's corps, if they discovered them, would hasten their retreat and inflict some punishment upon them. All this occurred, and Lieutenant Bryce was enabled to protect, at all events, one homestead (Dr. Mussen's) from destruction; and if another (late Mr. Hewitt's) was burned it was the sole one injured, and burned apparently in revenge by the retreating foragers, who had probably suffered losses from Mr. Bryce's cavalry.
On December 2nd I embarked on board the steamers Sturt and Ladybird 212 men of the armed constabulary, with whom I sailed for Poverty Bay. No better proof could be given of the progress of discipline in the force than the circumstance that not a single man was absent, although some of them had marched the day before in a blinding dust-storm from Patea. I left behind me 230 of the armed constabulary, besides some sixty more recruits who had taken the place of No. 1 Division, at Patea; and in all 392 men, more or less disciplined, together with some country militia on pay and protecting the blockhouses. There were, it is true, 700 militia of the first and second class besides, including those who lived immediately beyond the river; so that, in all, there were 1200 men of all ranks to defend the town, besides two
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companies of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, who were restricted by their orders from taking part in offensive operations. I accordingly arrived on December 4th at Poverty Bay, where I found the Hon. Mr. J. C. Richmond, who informed me that I should have no trouble with the natives as Mr. McLean had written to them urging them to preserve discipline and obey my orders. Long afterwards Mr. Richmond stated in Parliament what the text of these letters was. He said (on June 18th, 1869):-- "When I went to Napier and told my hon. friend (Mr. McLean) that Colonel Whitmore was coming he repeated his protests that the arrival of Colonel Whitmore would be the signal for the dispersion of the native troops. I said it was too late to prevent his coming... I also told the hon. member the country required that he should use his efforts to prevent that dispersion... My hon. friend did not promptly respond to that duty, but, after a little hesitation, gave me letters to the chiefs urging them not to return upon Colonel Whitmore's arrival. The hon. member had the candour to give them to me open, and I thought it no breach of confidence, under the circumstances, to read them. I mention it here to show the spirit in which my hon. friend was carrying out the wishes of the Government. I will read one of his letters:--
To Ropata and Hotene Te Ngatiporo. Friends,
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salutations! Listen you two. It is not of my doing that Colonel Whitmore is going thither to do the work which has been so nearly finished by you. But now he has got there, you must unite in attacking the Hau-Haus....
"Mr. Richmond will be there to give directions in case of any troubles arising out of Colonel Whitmore's management.
"'Your friend, McLean.'"
This quotation is quite sufficient to show the spirit in which the Government agent seconded the efforts of the Government.
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