CHAPTER VII. RESUMPTION OP HOSTILITIES ON THE WEST COAST.
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CHAPTER VII.
RESUMPTION OP HOSTILITIES ON THE WEST COAST.
NGATAPA fell on January 5th, 1869. No time was wasted in retiring the troops and returning to the West Coast. My force, reinforced by No. 8 (Arawa) Division of selected enrolled Maories, was at once sent on by Government steamers to Wanganui. I, following in the ordinary passenger steamer, arrived on the 18th, when I received reports from Colonel Lyon and Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell of expeditions each had made to the front. Colonel Lyon had fired some twelve rounds into the pah at Taurangahika, and proceeded to Patea, where he found the garrison in good heart. From thence he moved up to Ketemarae and Taiporohenui, where he burnt the village, and returning by Mokoia and Manutahi passed through Patea on his return. In this expedition some horses and cattle were captured, but being claimed by Patea settlers were handed over to them. Returning from Patea, Colonel Lyon was fired upon by the enemy, but as his object was confined to a reconnaissance he did not delay or bring about an engagement. Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell, with a force principally of mounted natives, had
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pushed on to Waihi and revisited Ngutu-o-te-manu. Both officers reported that in the district beyond the Patea River there were no apparent signs of the enemy, and that therefore in all probability his whole force was concentrated near Nukumaru.
On the 20th I moved forward to the ford of the Kai-iwi on the inland road. My force was now considerable. No. 4 Division A. C. had joined me from the Waikato. I had, when all should arrive, the Ngatapa force except the garrison of sixty men left at what is now Gisborne, and I had a number of recruits from Australia, who were being trained in camp. Kemp, with a corps of selected natives sworn in and dressed in uniform, had joined, and the force, if efficient, was therefore ample to engage the enemy. But much required to be done before the newly joined troops could be regarded as reliable. They had been, up to this, accustomed to sleep in a single large redoubt, and were hardly prepared to camp without artificial protection. It was obviously my first duty to make my men efficient, and I decided to begin by making them learn to camp by divisions, permitting them to throw up a parapet round their tents.
On the 21st I pushed on Colonel Lyon beyond the bush in front of Woodall's redoubt, where they entrenched themselves. I then began to repair the road and bridge. On the 22nd I further reinforced Colonel Lyon by No. 6 Division A. C. and the native force. On the 23rd all available men
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were employed on the road, and a party of the enemy advancing in our direction, apparently to forage, was met by Lieutenant Bryce and his cavalry, who, however, by my orders, withdrew to allow the infantry (A. C.) under Captain G. McDonnell to engage them, but they declined to stand, and retreated too precipitately to be intercepted even by a second party under Colonel Lyon, which hurried up by a shorter path.
The Arawa division (No. 8 A. C.) had meanwhile come up, and Captain Finnimore's cavalry, but we could not get an opportunity to use our force. That night the advance consisted of the volunteer cavalry, Kemp's natives, with Nos. 1, 4, and 7 and 8 A. C. We now abandoned Westmere, and the advance movement began. The next day, 24th, being Sunday, we halted in our positions. On the 25th we completed the Kai-iwi bridge, and my whole force was moved beyond the stream.
At daylight next morning my small corps of guides, under Sergeant Maling, pushing on in advance, discovered the enemy and was fired upon. The guides behaved with great gallantry, and compelled the enemy to disclose an ambuscade on the road through the bush which he had evidently prepared for my march; but as they were few in number they were compelled to retire with the loss of one of their men who, being wounded in the leg, was overtaken and tomahawked. I heard the firing while I was moving my headquarters to
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join the advance, and, hurrying up, pushed on Colonel Lyon with his force and the Arawas, supported by No. 1 Division, by the bush road. I followed myself, taking Nos. 1 and 8 Divisions, just in time to save the Okehu bridge, which the enemy had set on fire, from being burnt. Kemp, who had preceded me by a different route, now reported the enemy in full retreat, and further pursuit ceased. Final arrangements were now completed for a definite forward movement. Fifty-five recruits were sent back by Wanganui to replace No. 4 A. C. in Waikato, our last Poverty Bay detachment rejoined with Lieut.-Colonel St. John, and all our baggage and carts were brought across the Kai-iwi by the new line of communications.
I moved for the next few days in a very leisurely manner by the inland road on purpose to familiarize my men with camp life. Many in all the divisions were strange to the country, unused to arms, and to some extent influenced by the silly camp gossip of the enemy's atrocities to the wounded and mutilation or worse of the dead. Every hour gained was important. The men were learning not only how to bear themselves before the enemy, but, finding nothing very tremendous to undergo in the way of fatigue, or any danger which they could not easily face, were in a fair way to become soldiers. But I knew that all rested on a very fragile foundation, and while I crept on a few miles a day I carefully avoided leaving any
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opening for Titokowaru to take my raw troops at a disadvantage.
By the 1st I had reached, or nearly reached, Nukumaru, and was ready to assail Titokowaru's camp. My information was not perfect as to his fortifications, and I was compelled to avoid exposing my force to the smallest risk. Consequently, next day, when we moved forward I pushed on the cavalry in advance and brought up the infantry under cover of the bush. The pah proved to be a most elaborate structure, well flanked, provided with a sort of machieouli protection at the entrance and completely hidden from us by the bush. I went myself to reconnoitre the position from a spot not far distant from the jungle; then closed in upon two sides with my infantry. To prevent casualties, I entrenched the men in their positions, which towards evening were only about seventy yards from the work. Unluckily, the Armstrong guns came up just before dark, and without orders opened fire. I had not intended this, as I wished to reserve all my means of offence till next morning. Meanwhile I got my Cohorn mortars up to the infantry positions with orders to throw shells into the pah at daybreak, when I meant to complete the investment.
Our casualties were next to nothing. There had been some firing, but our men were not exposed. The volunteer cavalry had searched the whole of the open or lightly timbered country round the pah,
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without loss, and apparently the enemy had no intention of fighting outside his fortifications. The troops remained in their positions, taking post myself with the guns. The night passed without any occurrence of importance, and just as day was breaking I began to move my men round the two unattached sides of the pah. The Cohorns fired to get the range, and our men moved on. The Armstrong guns opened, too, and in a few minutes we should have surrounded the enemy. Just now, however, a few daring spirits forestalled the movement, and pushing forward to the pah, discovered that it was deserted. Directly this was reported to me I pushed on the cavalry to Weraroa, where it engaged the enemy, and on to Wairoa, beyond the Waitotara, and detaching two columns, one by the direct road to the Karaka flat, and one beyond that and Weraroa, made every effort to overtake the enemy. I was not sorry that Taurangahika had thus fallen without resistance. My object was to regain possession of the district, and if I could do this without loss, and without putting too heavy a strain on my raw troops, they would be encouraged, while an equal advantage would accrue to the country. I was resolved to push Titokowaru beyond the Waitotara, and consequently the pursuit was pushed on with great rapidity. Major Kemp, and Captain Porter of No. 8 A. C., moving in advance with his picked corps, before long over-
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took the rear-guard, and engaged it at once. Colonel Lyon, with some 200 men on the Karaka flat, also became engaged some distance to his right, and I from the Weraroa got a column ready to act if required as a support. Meanwhile I sent Mr. Bryce to Wairoa to communicate with the garrison and report, after searching the neighbourhood, whether there were any signs of the enemy in that direction. Titokowaru, however, continued his retreat inland from Karaka, only leaving a rearguard under the brow of the hill to delay our advance, while he crossed the Waitotara with all his force, women and baggage, at Papatupu. Kemp, having lost one man, and his small force having become dispersed in the bush, withdrew towards Weraroa, after extricating the leading men from an ambuscade they had fallen into. Lyon's men, in skirmishing order, wavered, and after three or four had been wounded, first hesitated and halted, and then retreated. Colonel Lyon, as brave an officer as any who ever served Her Majesty, scorned to retire, and remained with his wounded, walking erect from one to the other, a target for the enemy's rear-guard. I lost no time in bringing up supports and withdrawing the wounded, but the day was waning, the men had had no food, the enemy's rear-guard had disappeared, and nothing more could be undertaken that day. I therefore withdrew the troops for the night to Weraroa, where after inquiry I dismissed
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several of the men who had misbehaved with Lieut.-Colonel Lyon.
Next morning, as soon as it was day, I again moved across the valley to Karaka flat, and made the divisions which had misbehaved move in front. I followed with No. 1, and told the leading divisions I would fire into them if they hesitated again. They did not put me to the test, but moved steadily on, crossing the Karaka smartly, and then descending to the bed of the river at Papatupu, where Titokowaru had crossed. Here the closest search could not discover the direction of the retreat, but it was clear that the enemy had abandoned the Waitotara district. We found the mutilated corpse of Hori, Kemp's missing man, and buried it. His heart had been cut out by the enemy, which produced an extraordinary effect on his Comrades. Until I could find out whether the enemy had really retreated, we returned ourselves to our several positions on the Karaka, Weraroa, and Nukumaru after removing all the stock we could find. We were not likely to gain any information of the enemy except by search or guess work. At first I decided that the probabilities were that Titokowaru had made off to the north, with the intention of regaining his own district. Before me to the right front, front, and right rear, was an endless expanse of jungle and forest stretched as far as the eye could reach, all unoccupied country, from which no information could be hoped for. Such
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indications as smoke rising in the bush were watched for in every direction. Two settlers engaged in collecting horses to my right front did, however, fall in with the enemy, and only by dint of great presence of mind and resolute courage escaped to make their report. One was a Mr. Williams; I regret I did not ascertain the name of the other. On the 5th I had crossed from Weraroa to Wairoa and seen Captain Hawes, the energetic and gallant commander of the post, who informed me that though he had kept up continual patrols of reconnaissance, he had found no trace of the enemy in the direction of Patea or the open country from the bush to the sea. The Okotuku bush track he had not been able to examine, with so small a force, but every other known track had been carefully reconnoitred. The volunteer cavalry had patrolled the whole country under Lieutenant Bryce with similar results, and I therefore marched with a sufficient force next day to Moturoa and Okotuku to examine the only remaining exit from the Waitotara in the direction of Patea. We found the pah at Moturoa as it had been left by the enemy a day or two after my repulse. It was larger and stronger than it had been thought, and covered a space of more than half an acre. It was completely enclosed and, from the ditch dug under the inner palisades, the defenders had fired upon our men in perfect security. It was larger even than Taurengahika, and as it must have been constructed in so
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short a time, and consisted of two rows of young trees of twelve feet high at least out of the ground, the numbers employed may be imagined, though probably some were women. The outline of the pah was irregular, but the angles fairly flanked the work. We had here the melancholy satisfaction of collecting the remains of our poor comrades who had fallen, and some of whom had been partly eaten by Titokowaru's followers. All that could be found of their remains was too much burned to be recognizable. We carefully and reverently gathered all that could be collected, and removed them to Wairoa cemetery, where at least they received Christian burial. Pushing on from Moturoa up the hill, we examined Okotuku, and I was satisfied that no natives had visited the place for some months. I destroyed the Moturoa as I had the Taurangahika pah, burned the huts at Okotuku and the stores of potatoes collected there, and then, concluding that I had overrun the trail of the enemy's retreat, decided that I must, as hunting men say, "hark back." It was the principle of my operations to push the enemy steadily before me and leave no force which could endanger the settled districts behind. I had abandoned the old system of defending scattered settlements by means of central posts, and I had decided to maintain only my line of communication by the sea coast, while the field force operated on the so-called "inland" road close to the bush, as it was evident that the
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enemy would no longer, as in former times, come out into the open to fight. If we were to convince the rebels that their resistance was hopeless, we must be prepared to show them that even in their own formidable bush, and against even the ambuscades and surprises of their traditional warfare, we were able not only to hold our own, but to defeat them. The inland road from the Kai-iwi was not constructed beyond Weraroa, and was indeed only a mere track for the greater part of the way. I had bridged the Kai-iwi and saved the Okehu bridge, and there was no obstacle to my march with my supply wagons and guns up to the Weraroa, which overhung the largest of the coast rivers, the Waitotara. A very little examination showed me I must make a barrel-pier pontoon or bridge, at a still spot below the Weraroa, and construct a road from the redoubt to the stream, or else the inland line could not be utilized further north. This accordingly was my first step on recrossing from Wairoa, and I sent to collect the necessary material for the bridge or pontoon. I now distributed my troops, leaving a strong force on the brow of the Karaka plateau overlooking the bend of the river at Papatupu, and placed Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell, who had joined me, in command. I took the headquarters and the bulk of the impedimenta, guns, wagons, &c., with a portion of the force to Nukumaru which, being on the usual line of communi-
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cation, was easily supplied. Seeing that the operations would be mainly now in the bush, I released Major Finnimore's troop of volunteer cavalry, with thanks for their valuable services, and they returned to their homes. Lieutenant Bryce's troop, being composed of country settlers, I left to guard the district and to patrol the country, Colonel Lyon being placed at Kai-iwi in command with a portion of the force. Meanwhile, I had relaxed no effort to find the direction of Titokowaru retreat, Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell and Major Kemp having been energetic in making reconnaissances to the right with that object. These operations I will presently describe more in detail. On February 6th, I established my headquarters at Nukumaru, where I was visited by the commodore of the station who, with General Chute, had come to assist in the capture of Taurengahika, if the operation had, as anticipated, proved a difficult one. Finding, however, that the enemy had been dislodged, and that further operations must necessarily be of a character in which artillery or rocket fire could be of little service, and there could be no estimate formed of their duration, the commodore was unable to see any way in which he could usefully co-operate. Nevertheless, he was much disappointed, as indeed I was myself, as the intention was generous and in entire keeping with the high spirit which invariably distinguishes the noble service to which he belonged.
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Dr. Featherston, weak and suffering in health, but with that fiery spirit and iron nerve he had so often shown in the service of the country, now, though politically opposed to the Government, tendered me his assistance, than which none could be more influential with the native tribes, and offered to accompany me through the campaign to be at hand if I should require it to be exerted. The Hon. Dr. Grace, M.L.C., then in a leading practice at Wellington, knowing that New Zealand had sent her soldiers to fight her battles with next to no medical assistance, voluntarily left his practice and came to my camp while Taurengahika was being attacked, to lend his aid in the treatment of the wounded of our force. I especially note these two gentlemen because it impressed itself in my memory that, after all, there was at all events among the more high-minded and educated of our fellow-colonists still to be found that true spirit of nationality which sinks all minor questions, and flinches from no personal sacrifice when the public safety is endangered. And they were not the only instances of that encouragement and sympathy which none can appreciate so well as a soldier in the field. From all parts of New Zealand I received from leading men letters from some, offers of personal assistance from others, recognizing my difficulties, and wishing me well. There were, I am ashamed to say, among the leaders of the opposition in Parlia-
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ment notable exceptions and even instances of intriguing with my subordinate officers, sometimes brought to my knowledge by their showing me themselves the letters, and refusing to be drawn into a correspondence evidently intended to hamper me, and to be paid for by promotion when Mr. Stafford's government succumbed.
Dr. Grace told me how precarious Dr. Featherston's health had become, and that while he would certainly not be deterred from carrying out his offer by any thing short of my own declining it, his doing so would in all probability prove dangerous to his life. I need not say that, under these circumstances, I wrote to the Doctor to prevent his coming, but I acknowledged in the most grateful terms the generosity and unselfishness of his offer, and the very great value I attached to his influence. Often since I had wished he had been well enough to have come, for he was an unflinching lover of the truth, so shamelessly perverted by his own party in the subsequent debates of Parliament, and without regard to persons would have given his testimony truthfully, whatever the result.
I endeavoured to counteract the falsehoods of the press by directing that every correspondent who came to the field should be given rations, tentage, and forage, and furnished on application to the brigade major with any details he could safely publish. I was aware that several came to my camp,
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though only in one or two instances did I know them by appearance. I believe two or more were recalled and lost their employment because all their accounts contradicted what was wished to be confirmed, and had been so freely asserted, as to the operations in progress. In fact, the truth was not wanted, and as in spite of these punishments by way of examples, pour encourager les autres, it soon became evident that as regular correspondents could not be induced even by this means so far to falsify facts to oblige their employers, they were all before long withdrawn.
The position at Waitotara was unsatisfactory in the extreme. We watched the river from above the Karaka to the sea, and had reason to believe that the enemy had not attempted to return. We could only conclude that he was still encamped in the gorge of the Momahaki stream, an affluent of the Waitotara, which falls into it at the Papatupu bend from the ranges to the north and eastward of that river. All that area being covered with dense forest, extreme vigilance to prevent any sudden movement by the enemy was required. On February 16th I sent out a patrol of 180 men, chiefly volunteers, to endeavour to intercept any straggling parties from the enemy's camp towards Okotuku or Patea. On the 17th, Colonel McDonnell crossed the Waitotara and reconnoitred in an easterly direction. On the 18th, Kemp returned, having indeed found
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traces of straggling parties digging potatoes at Putahi, but without discovering anything reliable about the main body. On the same day a party of one sergeant and nine men from Colonel McDonnell's camp at Karaka crossed the Waitotara to forage for peaches in the groves of the opposite valley. They had scarcely reached the peach grove before they were fired upon from an ambuscade, and though they had their arms with them, were overpowered and tomahawked while attempting to make good their retreat to their canoe, only three escaping. The sergeant's body was mutilated and a portion of it carried away presumably to furnish a cannibal feast. Lieut. -Col. McDonnell turned out his division on hearing the firing, and hurried down to the spot where the men had crossed, but except to exchange a few volleys with the enemy's ambuscade party, estimated at seventy to a hundred natives, it was impossible to do anything.
On the 19th, having been rejoined by Major Swindley's column, which had been scouting in the direction of Okotuku, I sent No. 8, the Arawa Division, and Major Kemp's natives across the Waitotara near the peach grove, whence the enemy, who still seemed to be about, fired a volley or two and made off. Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell's Division moved across in support. I brought my headquarters to Weraroa, and pressed on the work of roadmaking to the place where the punt was being con-
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structed and to the pack road towards Papatupu required to ration the men. The Arawa Division during their day's skirmish had behaved well, and pressed on eagerly to close with the enemy, admirably supported by Lieut. -Col. McDonnell's men who were anxious to avenge their comrades. The rebel party, however, would not stand, and made off into the densest of the hush as quickly as possible.
I now resolved to hurry matters a little, and to endeavour to find the enemy in the bush, or failing this, to construct a track easy for our men to march by more quickly than they could move by the narrow crooked footpaths. I had, too, to train my men to be steady in the bush, for they seemed lamentably alarmed at its imaginary dangers. I therefore distributed the force along a line leading more or less in the direction of Okotuku, and cleared a way half a chain wide of brushwood and "supplejacks." I made the men sleep in small detachments along this line where they worked, and although the first night there was a great deal of wholly unnecessary firing, still they gradually got habituated to the bush, and ceased to feel the terror which it once inspired. Practically, I did not attach much importance to the road, but a great deal to rendering the men reliable in the bush, where I foresaw we should henceforward have to meet the enemy.
This work occupied the troops to the end of February, and as it was evidently not Titokowaru's
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intention to retreat at once, and he might prolong his stay in the ranges for some time, I took the opportunity of visiting Wellington to confer with the Government and press for a native Ngatiporo contingent to follow the enemy in the bush.
Meanwhile I had made every preparation to move on, with the utmost rapidity, directly Titokowaru was known not to have taken up any position in or near the settled country either in front or rear of my own. Unfortunately, a great flood in the Waitotara occurred at the end of February, necessitating the withdrawal of my detachments beyond it, and carrying away my barrel-punt. Much of the country was inundated both in the Momahaki valley and in that of the Waitotara. The rivers of the West Coast have so much fall and, though short, have such deep beds owing to the force of the current that they fill rapidly and overflow often in a few hours. The removal of the road-cutting detachments was therefore a necessity and achieved only just in time, as we found afterwards that the trees in the valley where the men had been working were marked with mud and debris up to the height of from four to ten feet. By the time I had returned, on March 4th, the flood was past, and the waters settled down in their old courses. Lieut.-Colonel Herrick had recovered the barrel-punt near the heads at the Waitotara mouth, and, having taken it to pieces, brought the materials back to
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Poronui, the crossing place below Weraroa, where my headquarters remained. Lieut.-Colonel Lyon had made every preparation for a forward movement with his portion of the force, and on the 5th all the troops resumed the positions they held before the flood, and cleared another mile of road to the front. We had, however, still to make rough bridges and culverts to cross the tributary creeks, which were still swollen and their banks covered with soft mud. Some eighty Wanganui natives had now joined Major Kemp's selected corps, and with the Arawa Division (No. 8 A. C.) under Captain Gundry and Captain Porter, as a second native column, I felt able to follow the enemy in the bush where Europeans could not be relied upon to find or keep a track. With the certainty of operations in the bush before me this was the best force I could use in this way, though neither the Wanganui nor the Arawa tribe are bushmen in the sense that North American Indians are said to be, nor have they the faculty of following or finding a trail which the "black-fellows" of Australia, or the natives of South Africa, possess to so eminent a degree. Among the Maories only two tribes approach the South Africans, the Uriwera and Ngatiporo. The former, though the most expert, were unavailable as they were in rebellion, and sheltering Te Kooti in their fastnesses. The Ngatiporo, however, under their veteran leader Ropata, had no military duty on hand, and I there-
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fore applied for a detachment of that tribe for this special duty. The Government approved my suggestion, and an officer had been sent up to select 100 to 150 men out of that numerous tribe. I must point out how my efforts to procure this reinforcement were obstructed, till too late to he of use, by Mr. McLean, who was on that account removed from the office which he held as Government agent. Meanwhile I had resolved to trust my force, composed as it now was chiefly of men who had had some weeks' experience of field and bush life and a Maori contingent.
