CHAPTER VIII. THE ENEMY RETREATS AND TROOPS MOVE FORWARD.
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CHAPTER VIII.
THE ENEMY RETREATS AND TROOPS MOVE FORWARD.
ON the 7th, therefore, I began my forward movement. The Arawas ascended the range to the right of the bush valley, provisioned for three days, and Captain Gundry in command of them had orders, if he struck Titokowaru trail, to follow and keep it, relying on me for support. Major Kemp took the left ridge, following the road as far as it went, and I accompanied the column. The European force remained at the road with the pack transport, for which they were to continue making the track passable. Kemp had started early, and pushed on so far that it became obvious to me that either the enemy had abandoned this part of the country, or that he was in position towards the line of Captain Gundry's march. I therefore directed Kemp to return to the Europeans, while taking Nos. 1 and 2 Divisions A. C. with us, we pushed on some miles in Captain Gundry's direction through the bush. At length we reached a native encampment and found traces of the Arawas, who must have passed that morning, and following their trail, which at this point turned to the left, we moved on to support
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him. On reaching the summit of the range we discovered that Gundry's trail turned towards the advanced camp of the day before, and I therefore left it and pushed forward myself to endeavour to obtain a better outlook. From a favourable position which was thus gained I was able to examine the whole valley, and, finding no smoke or other indication of the enemy's presence, I assumed that he had been compelled by the recent floods to evacuate this part of the country, and had in all probability retired to or beyond the Patea. I therefore sent back the Europeans and overtook the Arawas who had halted for me. They reported finding a dead Maori, evidently shot in one of the late skirmishes at a rebel camp, and Titokowaru trail in the direction of Okotuku. At this point I knew there was neither shelter nor food, so I assumed as certain he had moved back to the Patea district. This simplified matters, and enabled me to advance with a light heart. On the 8th, therefore, I reconnoitred to find a good line by Te-ori-ori to Wairoa, and sent Kemp with a strong native column to examine the Okotuku tracks, which resulted in proving the accuracy of the conclusions of the day before, inasmuch as the enemy's trail was soon found, and followed far enough to show that he had retreated beyond Okotuku towards Patea. I therefore directed Lieut.-Colonel Fraser to open out a clear track from the bush towards Wairoa, which would hereafter facili-
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tate movements from that place towards the Waitotara at Papatupu, should these ever be required, while I prepared to move my whole force, stores and material forward to Wairoa, and if possible to Patea. I had placed Lieut.-Colonel St. John in command at that place, and on my return to Weraroa I received a report from him to the effect that Titokowaru had reached the Patea River, and was in force at Putahi and New Taranaki. All doubt as to the expediency of resuming my advance being thus dissipated, and as the weather had broken and rain was descending in torrents, Lieut.-Colonel Fraser judiciously hurried his march, crossing a large swamp only just in time to avoid being stopped by its inundation, and arrived with his column at Wairoa. Major Kemp and Captain Gundry and his Arawas returned to Weraroa, and encamped at Perekama, where Lieut.-Colonel Lyon already was with his division and the barrel-punt. I myself went to Wairoa. On the 10th Nos. 1, 2, and 6 Divisions A. C. moved to Norman's Flat, near Wairoa, where before sunset the native column and No. 4 A. C. joined them, escorting the drays with the camp equipage and baggage from Weraroa. I had, however, to send the drays back for stores to Weraroa, and to rejoin me by the beach road, having only about half the number required for a movement of my whole force. Lieut.-Colonel Lyon was ordered to escort the stores next day and rejoin the force with his rear-guard.
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Lieut.-Colonel St. John, summoned by me from Patea, arrived at my headquarters at 5 p.m. on the 10th, and reported that some drays he had sent to join me had been attacked by a party of natives from Titokowaru force, which he believed to be encamped on high ground on the left bank of the Patea River. The attack proved of little importance, Lieutenant and Quartermaster Hunter having promptly extended his men, fired upon and charged the enemy, whom he drove off, taking one or two horses and some arms, and inflicting some loss upon him. The flooded state of the river had prevented the drays from crossing the Whenuakura River, but they were halted on the bank. On the 11th I therefore borrowed what drays I could from the Wairoa settlers, and taking the most necessary articles of my camp equipment, I moved to Patea, pitching the tents to seaward of the sandhills, and beyond the view of Titokowaru camp, which was plainly visible, commanding the whole country, and overlooking Patea. I had ordered all the boats procurable to be hauled across the piece of beach from the Patea to the Whenuakura River, and used them to bring across the men and horses, while, with the drays on the other side of the river, which were dragged through the stream by the men, I finished the removal of my baggage from Norman's Flat. It was a hard day's work, and the rear-guard did not reach Patea till 11 p.m. Meanwhile, the contem-
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plated removal of my reserve ammunition, hospital, and stores, had been interrupted by the weather. I had ordered the drays to proceed by the Waitotara mouth, so as to dispense with a strong escort, but on arriving at that point, they found themselves separated from me by the flooded state of the river, and therefore returned to Weraroa, where I had left a garrison in the redoubt. They were, therefore, unloaded there, and dragged down the hill by the men, their contents being packed down the hill, and were taken across in the barrel punt, as the road was not yet available for loaded drays.
Thus on March 11th we once more occupied our November positions, and the country from the Whenuakura to the Kai-iwi was again in our possession. I reported at this time to the Government that I now proposed to relieve myself of my baggage as soon as possible, and prepare to bring operations to a conclusion by closing, if possible, with the enemy. Titokowaru was almost in the identical position which he had held in October, when I took command, and before his march in the bush round my flank, only he was on the other side of the Patea River. He had uniformly concealed his movements in this manner, and displayed none of that confidence which in the former warfare of the coast had been evinced by the rebel tribes when the royal troops were opposed to them. At Nukumaru, in 1865, a body of Maories had penetrated a royal camp and
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almost reached the General's tent in broad daylight, though their numbers were not equal to our own, yet during all the months that had elapsed since Moturoa, though during the greater part of the time they had been far more numerous and better accustomed to war than our men, and far better armed than those opposed to H. M.'s troops, we could not induce them to attack us, or even to stand their ground in the open. It seemed, therefore, that Titokowaru was resolved not to be forced to fight, and to persist in retreating, as he had advanced, by the bush, in order to confine himself to the Maori traditional warfare of surprise or ambuscades. During such weather as we had lately experienced I knew he could not retreat easily in the bush encumbered with women and children in a district traversed by so many easily swollen rivers, which a few hours' rain converted into torrents. All therefore depended on the men and their confidence in themselves. The enemy, if he buried deeper and deeper in the jungle, must be resolutely followed and, even if we could not get to close quarters with him, must eventually be driven out of the district. The total impossibility of obtaining information was a serious difficulty and one which I could only partially remedy. A small picked body of guides under Sergeant Maling were daily becoming more and more useful, and did much good work in the way of scouting, manifesting both endurance and courage to no small degree. This
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little corps was limited to fifteen, but so many were the casualties that while I never had more than the fixed number available at one time, quite thirty were enrolled during the few months I held command. For any reconnoitring on a large scale I was dependent on Major Kemp, whose experience, devotion, and courage were from first to last remarkable. My chief danger lay in permitting my newly-raised force to become entangled in unknown and densely wooded spots, where Titokowaru might have prepared ambuscades, or even a pah, without our knowledge, from which a few unexpected volleys suddenly poured in might create a panic. The impossibility of flanking a march in a forest so full of undergrowth and supplejack, added much to our risks. All marches had to be conducted in Indian file, and therefore at no one spot was it possible to have any large force to reply to an ambuscade before the enemy retreated, while the care of the wounded in such a position was very embarrassing. But on the other hand my force was now greatly improved. Misbehaviour before the enemy was now generally accepted as disgraceful by the public opinion of the men. The ridiculous parapet round the encampments, without which when I took command the troops never could sleep, was a thing of the past. Already the men had practised bivouac life, and the bell tent was no longer indispensable, nor from this turning point of the operations did the men see much more of their
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tents. The terror of the bush had evaporated and, if our men were still inexpert in getting through it, and if, hampered as they were with blankets, haversacks, ammunition and clothes, they could make but moderate marching, I felt sure a very little experience would induce them to lighten their loads.
There was, however, one crime in the force which did much to destroy the comradeship of the men, and this, together with misbehaviour before the enemy, I considered the time opportune to grapple with. Undoubtedly among the recruits there were many dissipated men, whose conduct a large section of the press held up to constant abuse, and there were also a few blackguards. The men not having, as an English soldier would have, the feeling that his countrymen honoured those who fought their battles, considered that they served purely for money. The necessities of Government compelled them to receive their pay much in arrear, but when paid they received considerable sums. There was no way of spending money, so they had to carry it about their persons, and thus it happened that certain rascals were enabled to rob their comrades when asleep or compelled to leave their "swags," to cook or to perform duties. This crime had become so prevalent and was producing such bad effect among the men that I took steps to have a culprit caught and resolved to make an example. Sub-Inspector Foster, with considerable cleverness, caught a man red-handed,
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that is to say, with his plunder upon him, and I immediately ordered his trial by general court martial. At the same court I had another prisoner tried on a much graver charge. I have mentioned that Lieutenant Turner had gallantly repulsed an attack upon the escort of the wagons on the 10th inst. On that occasion, and directly the enemy opened fire, the sergeant seized a horse which was being led by one of the men and, mounting him, galloped away to Wanganui, where he reported himself as the sole survivor of the convoy. I got the leaflet published as an extra by a Wanganui paper that night, and I at once sent in a corporal and two mounted men to make the sergeant a prisoner, and bring him to my headquarters for trial on the capital charge of cowardice and shameful misbehaviour before the enemy.
The court martial sat accordingly, and the offences being proved, sentenced both prisoners to fifty lashes and two years' imprisonment. I sent back the proceedings of that upon the sergeant as being a wholly inadequate sentence, but the officers, perhaps fearing the responsibility of a death sentence, which is supposed to attach rather to the President and members than to the confirming officer, adhered to their decision. If the responsibility does really lie upon the officers composing such a court I presume that it will always be difficult, however necessary, to make an example
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even if the prisoner is caught in treasonable correspondence with an enemy. A commander, who must best know when such examples are absolutely required, would be unworthy of his position if he flinched from the responsibility, and I felt this just one of those moments when an example was required. Cowardice till very recently was regarded as a very venial offence in the force and men would even laugh at the most disgraceful behaviour. A change was now beginning to come over many of the men, and I thought that it was seasonable time to mark the gravity of the crime, and the punishment it involved. However, I could not, as it happened, bring about what I thought so necessary, and while glad in my heart to be absolved from the duty of taking a life, even though doing so might have the effect of preventing future disaster and sacrifice of many lives. I felt the necessity of emphasizing on parade the fact that the punishment awarded was wholly insufficient. I accordingly had the men fallen in and the thief flogged. The sergeant was tied up, but I only caused him to receive one stripe, as no flogging could make a man brave, nor the fear of it prevent others being cowardly. The one stripe sufficed to stamp his conduct as disgraceful, and I consequently had him then cast loose. In the case of the thief it was different; flogging might, and in fact did, deter the few rascals in the force from following his example,
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and the bad men were in time discovered and got rid of, in all probability, for other offences.
I warned the officers who formed the court martial that they had not acted in accordance with the Mutiny Act, which by their oath they had been bound to comply with, and that if they accepted service in which certain responsibilities devolved upon them they must bear them or retire; and I informed the men that if the officers did their duty in such cases, I might be relied upon to do mine. Practically I felt sure that after this court martial there would be no further instances of glaring misconduct. By this time the men had acquired a certain military feeling, and it was evident that cowardice was not now looked upon lightly, but with some contempt.
After the punishment parade I ordered rations to be served out, and the whole force to march that night at 8 p.m., with the intention of attacking Titokowaru in his camp.
It is a significant commentary on the effect of politics, that the sergeant tried and sentenced for misbehaviour of the most glaring and shameful kind, was subsequently released by the next Government, and restored to his former rank in the force.
I marched in two columns, one of 400, under my own command, by the proper left of the Patea River, to attack Titokowaru at Otautu, and the
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other 200 strong by the right bank, to intercept his retreat towards "Gentle Annie," under Lieut.-Colonel St. John. Night marches are always wearisome, but though a trifle sleepy, and more or less uncomfortable from being prevented from smoking, the men moved along well, and as the first signs of dawn showed themselves we surprised the Maori sentinel sound asleep under a bush. I had the Arawas in front, and the moment before had been with the advance, though I had halted just then to look back to see if the rear was keeping up. I always carried in my girdle a Maori tomahawk, a trophy from Ngatapa, and if I had been where I was a moment or two before the sentry would have been noiselessly killed. As it was the Arawas asked for a tomahawk, and in calling for one they woke the sentry, who sprang to his feet, and, dodging round the bush, escaped, though fired at and wounded, though he was able to give the alarm. There was a thick fog overhanging the hill top, to which probably the sentry owed his escape, which now told greatly against us. It is needless to say I extended and advanced my men at a run as we found evident signs of the proximity of the camp. Colonel Lyon I left with half the force a little behind in reserve till I could observe the position. The enemy now turned out and fired upon us, several men falling, but we could see nothing. The guides, Arawas and No. 1 A. C., and
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Kemp's men answered the fire, which they thought came from above, and crept up so near that the enemy's voices could be heard. In such a light neither side could take aim, so the firing, though very heavy, was not very effective, at least upon our men. Moreover, though there was a clearing we were surrounded by a dense bush, in which each side took cover. Our reserve, under Colonel Lyon, especially the native part, was becoming so excited that they could not be prevented firing at nothing in particular, and was therefore brought up to the front by the officer in command to lessen the risk of our men being shot by the reserve. In a thick jungle it is very difficult to control men when spread out in skirmishing order, without plenty of trained non-com. officers to supervise them. As we were beginning to lose some men, and could not see a yard away from us, I determined to reconnoitre myself in the bush to my front. Taking therefore a bugler and the chief Kemp and Major Swindley, my aide-de-camp, and my interpreter, Captain Preece, I struck out from our right front, and then turned to my left. I found myself descending a hill, and in a few moments at the edge of a clearing, in which men, women, and children were packing up their movables, and as each got loaded making off into the bush. Turning towards my own force I saw a few of the enemy's skirmishers, and as far as the
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knees of my men, quite close to them. It was clear that this dense fog was hanging only on the summit of the hill, and that we were in occupation of that summit. A very few feet lower down all was clear. I therefore sounded the advance and double, and the affair was practically at an end. The enemy retreated precipitately, leaving his incomplete bundles, and even in some cases his arms, and made off towards the river. I had expected this, and hoped Lieut.-Colonel St. John's force was in concealment ready to dispute the ford. To my great disappointment, however, I now heard volleys from a great distance, evidently from the summit of Gentle Annie, too far to be of the smallest use, but showing the enemy that his retreat was cut off in that direction. It was disappointing, as it compelled Titokowaru to strike inland at right angles to the coast line, and made the pursuit more difficult. Nevertheless, Major Kemp pushed on with his picked men and Arawas, and found some bodies and killed one or two fugitives on the line of their flight. After a lapse of a couple of hours, he returned, bringing in one or two women in order to obtain information. But he had been thrown out by the volleys from Gentle Annie, which had caused Titokowaru to scatter in all directions inland, while he had made his own way down towards the fords at which he had hoped to arrive before the enemy and, consequently, got a bad start. Titokowaru's camp had been occupied,
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we ascertained, by 400 "guns," but had suffered considerably from desertions. The rebel leader had been present in person, and our attack had been a complete surprise. It was satisfactory to find that whatever had been the case at the time of Moturoa, now at least for some time there had been no treasonable communication between them and the Wanganui natives, as they were ignorant of many things of importance to them. They were also suffering from the effects of the hardships undergone since they abandoned Taurangahika, and their early dispersion, through hapus dropping away one by one into the interior, seemed certain to follow if, while in depressed spirits, they were actively and resolutely pursued. There were some difficulties in the way of a pursuit directly inland, but I felt sure that Titokowaru would change his line of retreat as soon as our force barring his way was removed, and that he would attempt to keep the line of the coast a few miles within the bush. By this means he could supply himself with vegetables, pigs, and fruit at the several bush settlements, or even at those on the verge of the bush which were larger and better provisioned. Our casualties had amounted to three killed and twelve wounded. Of the latter I regret to say many proved to be mortally wounded, but we were ill-provided for a campaign as regards the hospital and medical department. The wounded I had conveyed to Patea by boat as being less likely
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to shake them than carriage in stretchers by bearers. The whole force then crossed the Patea, and moving by Manutahi outside the bush, got in front of Titokowaru's probable line of retreat. Meanwhile, on the 15th, Kemp explored the right bank of the Patea, but not finding traces of the enemy, I sent him and the Arawas across the stream again next day to ascertain in what direction Titokowaru was moving. They soon ascertained that he had actually crossed the river at some distance inland and, returning themselves, avoided the broken and difficult country of the Patea banks and re-entered the bush from the open country. On the 16th Lieut.-Colonel Lyon patrolled the country from Manutahi towards Taumaka, but found no traces of the enemy. I left the force under this officer on this day, and proceeded to Patea to report to Government and make final arrangements, as I did not contemplate returning to that post, where my stores of all kinds were kept, till the operations were over.
I had, however, arranged before leaving that Major Kemp's column should be made up to 350 men by bringing up the Wanganui natives, who were not in his own corps, from Patea, to which they had gone without orders after Otautu, and adding sixty European volunteers under Captains Northcroft and Watts. It was a great proof how the Maori chief Kemp had raised himself in the
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opinion of the force, that officers and men of the Europeans willingly volunteered to serve under his orders. There was now no difficulty in getting volunteers for that service, and in fact a selection had to be made so as to keep the numbers down to those I had fixed upon. I had not expected to hear from Kemp on this day at all, and did not intend to return to camp till next morning. But, as it happened, at 10 p.m., Lieut.-Colonel Lyon, commanding in my absence, received an urgent message from the chief to the effect that he had discovered the enemy in a pah at Whakamara, which had been built some time ago close to the kainga on an open space of half a square mile, some distance within the bush, not many miles from Mokoia. Lieut.-Colonel Lyon at once got his men, in all 250 to 300 in number, under arms, and proceeded to reinforce Kemp, using his messengers as guides. Before leaving his bivouac he sent a despatch to inform me of what had occurred and the steps he had taken, and that he had left a detachment of mounted men to escort me if I thought it best to proceed by the open country and make my way next morning to Whakamara by the shorter bush path leading from the Mokoia direction. Whakamara is situated on an open clearing within the bush, and, though a village which Europeans had rarely been allowed to visit, was nevertheless a well-known Maori settlement. Titokowaru choice of a position so much
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further to the north showed that he was retreating towards his own country as fast as he was able, and under such circumstances all uncivilized warriors lack the necessary bottom to make a sturdy fight, and become speedily demoralized. Colonel Lyon therefore acted most judiciously in at once marching, notwithstanding the hour and the difficulties of the bush, much enhanced as they proved to be by the steep chasms he was compelled to pass in the dark. These were the deep beds of streams running perpendicularly to the sea, torn out in times of flood, and were often sheer precipices of rocks on both sides. To get across the natives had made a sort of rough ladder firmly fixed at each end, by which they scrambled down or up the worst of these perpendicular banks. Colonel Lyon was of course much delayed by these crossings, but he obstinately continued his march through the night. I got back to the camp after midnight, and leaving the horses with a few of the men I found there, I hurried after Colonel Lyon by the line he had taken with a few dismounted men. I caught up the column about daylight entering the open land near Whakamara, having of course been able, by marching light with only a few men, to move much faster than the troops. I had hardly, however, reached the front by the narrow track through fern seven feet high, which shut out all view, when I saw towering above the fern and close by the column a native horseman
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mounted on a white animal to my left front. He had clearly ridden from the pah, which was not far off in the clearing we were traversing, though as yet invisible to us, and owing to the height of the fern he had failed to see our men. Something, however, attracted his attention about the same moment as I caught sight of him, for he stopped, turned, and fired the six shots of his revolver, not so much caring to hurt us, for he took no aim, as to give the alarm to his friends; then swiftly turning, he galloped away to our right. Our advance fired, but he escaped apparently unwounded. Kemp had meantime preceded the column and reached the bush at the further side of the clearing, and was making his way to get round the pah when this untoward occurrence took place. Colonel Lyon hurried on at once, as did Kemp, but Titokowaru would not fight, and beat a precipitate retreat. We judged from his getting away so quickly he must have been on the point of resuming his march, when he sent out his scout, whom we recognized as the well-known Katene, to see if our troops were moving in his direction. We soon reached the deserted pah, and Kemp followed as fast as he could in the direction in which the enemy had made off. But finding themselves pressed, Titokowaru's followers dispersed in all directions, and Kemp had a difficulty in overtaking even a few of the fugitives, whom he shot, as they would neither stop nor surrender.
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On the same day, the 18th, leaving Kemp's column to continue the pursuit, we marched back to Mokoia to breakfast. The baggage carts were then moved forward by Turuturu-mokai, and we pitched our camp at Taiporohenui, close to the bush, to await tidings from Kemp.
At Whakamara, Kemp had, before I arrived, distinctly heard a native tangi lamenting the losses at Otautu, and Titokowaru haranguing his people and complaining of desertions from his force. As soon as he had cooked, he continued the pursuit, which he had suspended when the enemy dispersed, and at sunset came up with the rear-guard. Titokowaru attempted to lay an ambuscade for him as he approached, but Kemp discovering it, attacked with so much rapidity and determination that the party could not hold its ground, and sprang away after delivering their fire, and dispersed in all directions. The emulation of the Europeans and natives caused the utmost exertion to be made to overtake them, but they escaped with the loss of one killed and, as we subsequently learned, another badly wounded, in the skirmish. Kemp, however, pressed on, and in spite of having to clamber up a precipice in the bush, once more overtook Titokowaru, who again fled precipitately, abandoning his camp and some of his baggage with his food which was actually being cooked for the evening meal. Throughout this trying night and day work the
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sixty A. C. European volunteers kept up, though encumbered with their heavy marching order equipment and rations, and at the first shot rushed each time to the front to encounter the enemy. Captain Northcroft, their commanding officer, the favourite hero of the A. C., who had personally distinguished himself in many an encounter, for which, had it then existed, he would have received the New Zealand Cross, won the admiration of Kemp and the native column both by his extraordinary activity and reckless daring. The high distinction of the Cross had been recently instituted at my instance, and being now available as a reward for individual and remarkable instances of gallantry and devotion, all the force hoped it would ere long decorate this officer's breast. In former years he had been so frequently conspicuous, and in this campaign was showing so much zeal and energy, that we looked upon him as certain to be one of the first selected for the decoration. Nevertheless, though he lost no chance of distinguishing himself either on this memorable expedition of Kemp's or on any other occasion, and although there was no possibility of any occasion which could be quoted as entitling him escaping notice as, from myself to the junior of the force, all desired him to get it, no opportunity actually presented itself of giving him the Cross. In fact, while always prominent, always ready to volunteer or to run any risk, fortune did
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not again favour him to the end of the campaign.
I record this here, because there are on the roll of the Order many who have not done half as much as Captain Northcroft during their service to deserve the proudest decoration open to a New Zealander, and we, who know him well and appreciate him so highly, feel that the Order would be honoured by counting him among its members.
It was the evening of the 20th when Kemp and his column emerged from the bush at my camp at Taiporohenui, and they were received with acclamation by the troops. The Europeans all seemed in high spirits after their hard work, and Kemp could not find words sufficiently flattering to apply to them. They had surprised the Maories in getting through the bush, they had tried hard to bring about a definite fight, and had shown that with little practice our race is quite able to hold its own even in the most difficult and longest marches, through a dense jungle absolutely unknown. The Maories had not been behindhand in carrying out the expedition, though Kemp's admirable plans and indomitable energy had not been rewarded as he hoped by a set engagement. Mile after mile they had managed to keep the trail, and constantly overtaking the enemy, had burst into his camp, only to be again disappointed by his headlong flight. Over and over again they thought themselves on the point of bringing him to action, but always
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found that he had flung away his impedimenta, blankets, food, and even arms, to lighten his force in making its escape. Some few they had overtaken and shot since leaving Whakamara, five men in all, and they brought in three women prisoners, from whom they hoped to obtain information for me. It is curious how willing prisoners so taken, of either sex, are to recount all that they know themselves. That Titokowaru was now making the most desperate exertion to extricate himself from that part of the country, and to regain his own, was evident. That he had lost his prestige, and that his force was panic-stricken and demoralized, we easily inferred from the accounts of the women. Desertion was rife, whole hapus were breaking away to perpetual alarms, during some of which they had left things behind in their camps essential to their safety and comfort, such as ammunition, blankets, and food. That they were reduced to great straits, living on the maggots of the matai trees and such vegetable products of the forest as are scarcely edible except when pressed by hunger--these and many other details of that painful retreat were narrated by the women, who appeared worn out with fatigue themselves. The most valuable intelligence, however, we obtained was that Titokowaru was making for the Ngaire, a swamp a long way in the bush beyond Tito-tiro-moana. On looking at the map of the district, I saw that to gain that point Titokowaru
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must make a considerable detour unless he came outside or near the edge of the bush. Kemp therefore advised our moving by the open to Keteonetea, and entering the bush beyond that point, so as to anticipate the enemy at the Ngaire. To do this successfully, I should have at once and by forced marches pushed on to this unknown Ngaire, which nobody yet that I could find had ever visited. But Kemp's column was exhausted, and I could get no further than Keteonetea next day, where I then pitched my camp.
I sent a despatch to New Plymouth about this time asking the officer in command to move up towards Ngaire to intercept the enemy's retreat, and I took this occasion to decorate certain men of the force with the ribbon of the newly-created distinction of the New Zealand Cross, which, as I informed them, had been instituted by the Queen to reward special acts of valour as a token of the recognition and gratitude of the Colony, and the honour in which it held those who were conspicuous in fighting its battles. It is foreign to this memoir to describe the difficulties which arose through Sir George Bowen's having created an Order of Chivalry without reference to the "Fountain of Honour." But in the end her Majesty was pleased to adopt the Order, and to recreate it as her own, ordaining that it should be granted on the recommendation of ministers in her name by her Governor in accordance with the
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statutes already published in the Colonial Gazette of March, 1869. She furthermore was pleased to declare that it should rank with and next after the Victoria Cross. This decoration I had recommended in order to raise the tone of the force, and to afford some higher inducement than that of mere pay to the officers and men engaged in the arduous duties of the campaign. Lieut.-Colonel Gorton, whom I had despatched to New Plymouth, was specially charged to make contracts for supplies throughout the northern part of the Taranaki district into which I foresaw that my operations must speedily bring my force, as the distance of my base at Patea must otherwise entail inconvenience and expense in land carriage.
All my force now petitioned for a little more time to rest before again entering upon laborious and active operations in the bush. But though I felt they had earned consideration, I recognized that much depended upon pressing the flying remnant of Titokowaru force. There was a probability of reaching the Ngaire before him, and almost a certainty of finding him there even if we could not reach that point the first. I felt sure he would be compelled to halt at the Ngaire to rest awhile, not only to recover from the fatigue his force had undergone, but because it was the last kainga at which he could rely on provisions for many days, if he meant to make for the Upper Waitara. These
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considerations compelled me to decide upon marching on the 22nd, and I therefore issued four days' provisions at Keteonetea, and moved off with the bulk of my force at 7 a.m. on that day. I left directions with Quartermaster Collins, the able officer in charge of my commissariat and transport, to be prepared to bring up further supplies of ammunition and provisions, if I sent for them, utilizing the pack saddles I had purposely provided myself with and carrying them on the backs of Mr. Quinlan's admirable cart horses. Our cart transport was a service which, though hurriedly created, nevertheless could not have been surpassed in the staunchness and quality of its draught animals, and I felt sure that Mr. Collins and Mr. Quinlan would prove quite equal to any demands I might have to make on their activity and zeal.
