CHAPTER II. THE RESULT OF A TEMPORISING POLICY.
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CHAPTER II.
THE RESULT OF A TEMPORISING POLICY.
From my experience and knowledge of native character, I always have been, and ever will be of opinion that in dealing with the Maori race we must compel them to respect us as their superiors physically, before they submit to what they cannot understand--our philanthropy and system of coaxing and bribing them into submission. Acting upon my own personal knowledge and practical experience of the deeprooted prejudices of the enemy with whom I had to deal, and knowing that the most merciful course I could pursue in dealing with them was to demand "unconditional surrender," and show them by a few short, sharp, but severe proofs of my determination, that I was resolved to enforce it, and had enforced it, in spite of an interference which compelled me on the 31st July, 1866, to address a letter to the Hon. the Defence Minister, from which the following is an extract:--
"Since my arrival in these districts I have had considerable difficulty in dealing with the rebel natives in consequence of Mr. Parris. He has been, and still is, in communication with the rebel chiefs, asking them to come down and make peace through him. I am convinced that if this is allowed to continue, it will inevitably prolong the present state of affairs, and upset my arrangements.
"I therefore beg to request that you will cause Mr. Parris to be communicated with, and instructed to cease to communicate with the rebel natives, at least for the present."
In reply to that, I received a letter dated 8th August, enclosing copy of a letter addressed to Mr. Parris, and ordering me to attend to any instructions that I might receive from him with reference to the discontinuance of hostile operations, and also instructing me to render Mr. Parris every assistance in communicating with the natives, and endeavouring to induce them to "return to their allegiance," a thing which, by the way, those men never professed to owe to our government.
On the 12th of August--before that letter had reached me--I was obliged, to write to inform the Government that on the morning
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of the previous day, myself and a small party whilst proceeding in the direction of Ketemarae, were fired upon by an ambuscade laid by Ahitana, in a rifle-pitted position which they tried to induce us to attack, but, having only a few men with me, I reserved for a more convenient opportunity, the punishment of his treacherous and cowardly conduct.
A few days afterwards I received from Mr. Parris the following letter:--
"I have just received a proposal from the insurgent natives of this district to meet me in a day or so. I therefore beg to request that you will not attack any of the natives in the Ngatiruanui district until you hear from me again."
In reply to Mr. Parris, I, of course, intimated that I would obey his instructions, but concluded my short letter thus:--
"The Ketemarae natives fired upon some of our men on Monday last, and yesterday they fired upon the survey party who returned to camp."
Having frustrated my designs, and encouraged the rebels to commit depredations which they knew I dare not punish them for, Mr. Parris continued, his negotiations with them until the 30th August, when he wrote me as follows:--
"SIR--The Warea natives have refused to surrender to the terms offered to them, and as there is no chance of the Ngaruahine section of Ngatiruanuis giving in without them, I intend to return to New Plymouth at once, as I consider I have done all I can do."
On receipt of that letter I at once determined, if possible, to undo the mischief that Mr. Parris had done, and for that purpose started the same evening with a party from Hawera to the bush at Ketemarae, laid an ambuscade for the enemy into which he fell, and thus resumed operations.
On the 4th September, Captain Newland returned from Wellington with the answer of the Defence Minister to the Memorial of the Patea Rangers when, as already stated, the whole of the company with the exception of nine men claimed their discharge. My force was thus reduced to:--
85 European Infantry.
35 European Cavalry, and
80 Native Infantry.
With this diminished force it was absolutely necessary that I should throw up a redoubt near the bush at Ketemarae, garrison two redoubts in close proximity to the enemy, find covering parties
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for the surveyors, and escorts for the conveyance of supplies from Patea. Trusting that the Government would shortly reinforce me, I moved a part of my force to an old Maori pa nine hundred yards from the old native position of Ketemarae (destroyed by General Chute the previous January) and commenced the erection of a redoubt. On the 7th September, I detached twenty men to Kakaramea, which position was vacated by the Imperial troops on that day. I now occupied three positions: Ketemarae (Waihi,) with 130 men; Hawera, 50; and Kakaramea, 20. It will be seen from this that in addition to convoys, and the usual guards and fatigues those detachments, unless reinforced, could do little more than hold the positions they occupied, protect the surveyors at their work, and watch the enemy.
Owing, however, to the close proximity of my position to the enemy at Ketemarae (Waihi,) skirmishes were of daily occurrence, and emboldened by my comparative inaction, the Hau-haus advanced into the open, attacked our escort, and fired into the camp. Determined to punish their audacity, and show them that we could do more than hold our own, I collected a small force of 125 men, being all I could spare after providing for the safety of the redoubts, started on a night march, and at daylight made a sudden attack upon the village of Pungarehu, where we killed twenty-three of the enemy, took nine prisoners, and captured a quantity of guns and ammunition. Whilst burning the village we were surrounded and attacked by a numerically superior force, but we cut our way out with our prisoners and wounded. The loss on our side was three killed and five wounded.
On my return to Waihi I was delighted to find that on the evening before we attacked Pungarehu, a company of T.M.S. consisting of seventy-five men under Captain Morrison, had arrived at Patea. That reinforcement gave additional confidence to the small force under my command, and enabled me with a little more confidence to once more demand unconditional surrender or fight it out.
The result of the attack upon Pungarehu was that the enemy sued for peace. I at once accepted their overtures, and gave them to a certain date to come in and surrender. Before that date, however, Toi, one of their principal chiefs, came in and requested
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me to meet them on the other side of the river at Ahipaipa. Whilst he was speaking to me upon this subject, a messenger arrived with, a native letter from Tukino, one of the chiefs who had surrendered at Ohangai, informing me that I was to be asked to a meeting where a trap was laid for the purpose of taking my life, and begging of me not to go. I at once, read the letter to Toi, and charged him with treachery, upon which he changed colour and remained silent. I then ordered him to go back to his people; and tell them that if they did not come in by the date named by me, I would haul down the white flag and re-commence fighting. He left, and, before that date several came in, tendered their submission, and I located them near our redoubt at Waihi.
The others who did not surrender I determined to attack, and therefore took a small force, and, guided by Katene, (who afterwards turned traitor,) attacked and burnt the village of Te Umu.
The next night I sent out another party under Captain Newland to burn the village of Popoia. The rebels being on the alert, discovered him before he reached the village and attacked him. A smart skirmish ensued in which the enemy lost one man shot dead, and had some wounded. On our side, my brother, Captain McDonnell, was severely wounded from the effects of which he has not since recovered.
Thus, notwithstanding the paucity of my force, I not only kept the enemy in check, but from time to time severely punished him, and compelled him to keep at a respectful distance in his villages, whilst we pushed on the surveys.
In this manner the survey was completed from Patea to Waingongoro, the promised large blocks of land given to those tribes who had surrendered, and the military settlers commenced to select their land.
I also selected my land in the district, and to set a good example to my force, as well as to encourage them in remaining in, and settling the district, as well as to convince the natives of the reality of the confiscation and settlement scheme, I purchased implements of husbandry, stock of sheep, some cattle and horses, and employed men who had been struck off pay to saw timber for a house, and
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entered into an agreement for its erection; ploughing and sowing my land and otherwise of permanently settling down.
