CHAPTER VI.
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From the previous chapter it will be observed that the attack upon Pokaikai took place in August 1866, and the Commission of inquiry did not meet until March, 1868. The immediate result of the attack, as has been proved in evidence, was, that those people who had so long resisted the powers of persuasion, came in and unconditionally surrendered.
Let those Honorable members of the House of Representatives who are of opinion that "the Civil and not the military power should direct the character of operations," under the circumstances in which I was then placed, observe the position in which a vigorous policy had then placed me, and the position in which I was placed by the civil authorities placed over me. The report of the Commissioners not only exonerates myself and my men, but also explicitly states that "the results of the attack upon Pokaikai, were the almost immediate surrender of the Tangahoe and Pokaikai hapus of
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the Ngatiruanui tribe, and the subsequent peace and order which prevailed for almost two years, until Titoko Waru, of the Ngaruahine hapu, of the Ngatiruanui tribe, commenced disturbances almost immediately after the close of this inquiry."
Let those who have accused me of being the cause of provoking hostilities observe that, whilst Titoko Waru and other chiefs believed me to be free and unfettered he did not dare to commence hostilities. He, however, saw me placed upon my trial before Commissioners appointed to investigate my conduct, and believing, as was the case, that my hands were tied, readily persuaded those who had submitted to join his standard.
Before the Commissioners had closed their proceedings, a settler, named Bayley, residing on his own purchased land was ordered off, timber he had prepared to build a house was destroyed, but he escaped with his life. Thus commenced outrages which became of almost daily occurrence, whilst I had to attend the sittings of the Commission at Wanganui. Thus, whilst my prestige was being lowered in the eyes of the natives, that of Titoko Waru was in the ascendant.
Whilst the district was in this unsettled state, and before the Commissioners had left Wanganui, I was ordered to proceed to Hokotiki, on the West Coast of the Middle Island, to quell a Fenian rising there. This astonished the Natives, who again asked if I was the only fighting man the Government had, and the fact that I was now going to fight against Europeans had a very bad effect.
On the 31st March I embarked at Wanganui, on the Government steamer St. Kilda, with seventy-seven men of the Armed Constabulary, Inspector Cummin, and Sub-Inspector George McDonnell. At Hokitika we were received very kindly by all classes of the community, and remained until ordered to return to my own district.
I was in Hokitika about six weeks, and on my return to Patea found that the natives had been very troublesome; they had been committing petty thefts, such as stealing settler's horses, &c., and Mr. Booth had been arresting the wrong persons, and then releasing them again; this aggravated the natives and complicated matters very considerably.
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Shortly after my return Mr. Booth ordered me to arrest Toi, Hahuwhenua, and Ihaka, three Hau-hau chiefs who had been concerned in stealing horses belonging to him, Mr Booth, Edward McDonnell, a Hawke's Bay Settler, who was then on a visit in the district, and a Mr. Smith. I refused to arrest them without a warrant, which he at once granted. I then collected a small force of constabulary and settlers, and went to the Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, where those men were with their tribes. I marched by night, intending to make my capture early next morning, but my plan was frustrated by the desertion of one of my guides, who left me and gave the alarm to the men whom I intended to arrest, and who of course, immediately made off to a place of safety. The other inmates of the pa however, invited us in, and provided us with sleeping accommodation and food. Next morning, I had a talk with the natives, and told them I was exceedingly sorry to hear of all these petty thefts and ingratitude on their part; that I had received a warrant to arrest the three men named in it, but they had been forewarned, and consequently got away. That I did not wish to punish the innocent for the guilty, but insisted upon one of them accompanying me to Waihi, to confer with the magistrate, and talk over matters to see if this state of things could not be put a stop to. I guaranteed that no harm should happen to this man, even if he was one of the thieves, but that in that case, I would let him return and then hunt him up afterwards. The result was that, Tauke, a chief, and also a lad to attend him, returned with me to Waihi. On my return, Mr. Booth told me that he was quite satisfied with what had taken place, but afterwards expressed himself in very different terms to several of my officers, and said that he could capture the thieves with a dozen men.
Next day, the chief Natanahira, on being told by Mr. Booth that he was going with a few men to get the horses, and capture the thieves, strongly advised him not to do anything of the kind, but offered to go himself and try what he could do. He went, and returned with a mare and foal belonging to Mr. Smith, and a mare of Mr. Edward McDonnell's, but not with Mr. Booth's horse. Mr. Booth then determined to go himself, with, a few mounted men, recover his horse and capture the thieves. I tried to dissuade him from
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going, but of course said that I must give him the men if he insisted on it. At the same time, I determined to follow him up with another force rather than allow the lives of my men to be placed in jeopardy, as I was certain bloodshed would ensue from the manner in which he was proceeding. I also insisted on his taking with him the native chief Tauke, who had come with me, as if he (Booth) went to the village without Tauke, my word would be broken, and his (Booth's) life would be in danger. He faithfully promised to take him and provide him with a horse. He then left for the Ngutu-o-te-manu, accompanied, by Inspector Hunter, and Inspector Cummin, (my adjutant.) Shortly after their departure, I followed with my men, and to my surprise found the chief Tauke on the road on foot, making the best of his way to the Ngutu-o-te-manu. He said that Mr. Booth had deceived him in respect of the horse, and had left him behind. I at once dismounted, gave him my horse, and desired him to ride on quickly and prevent mischief, which I feared would arise should Booth's party resort to violence, and to tell his people that I was on the road in support. He started off and we followed up with all despatch. Mr. Davis Canning 1, who had accompanied Mr. Booth's party, as a volunteer, now galloped back to me, crying out "For God's sake come on quickly, the natives have taken to their arms, and Booth and his party will be killed." I hurried up, but before I got to the Ngutu-o-te-manu, met our people in full retreat with three prisoners they had taken, and a horse (not Mr. Booth's after all.) Inspector Cummin informed me that just before they reached the village, Tauke, to whom I had given my horse to push forward, joined their party, they entered the village, the natives collected together and Mr. Booth immediately ordered Kokiri, one of their principal and most influential chiefs, to be arrested. He was roughly laid hold of, but resisted and called his people to his assistance and rescue. A regular row now took place, the natives rushed to their arms, and it is impossible to say what the result would have been had not Tauke, and Katene, a native who had accompanied Booth's party, cried out, "Take care what you are about, McDonnell is is close by with a large force." Booth's party then managed to get
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away with their prisoners, and Tauke gave one of the troopers my horse to return to me Mr. Booth, on meeting me, wished me to release the men he had taken, as he said they had had nothing to do with the thefts!! I thought it more prudent to keep them, as my party was not sufficiently strong to resist successfully the number of men Inspectors Hunter and Cumming told me were in the pa, if they should follow and attack us before we got out of the bush. On reaching Waihi, I had them placed in the guard tent, when Katene told me that one of them was the man Ihaka, named in the warrant I had received from Mr. Booth; he (Mr. Booth) was not aware of this circumstance until I informed him. I advised him to have this man removed to a safer place of keeping, as I felt convinced, from my knowledge of the natives, that they would seek revenge for the manner in which Kokiri and other chiefs had been handled by his orders. The two other natives whom he had apprehended, having nothing brought against them were released.
I then left for Wanganui, but before doing so cautioned Mr Booth and Inspector Hunter about Ihaka, but a day or two afterwards he made his escape, and, two days after that, (on the 9th June) Cahill, Squires, and Clarke, three settlers, were murdered by Hauwhenua, Ihaka, and others; two days later, trooper Smith was tomahawked close to the redoubt, cooked and eaten!
I immediately went to Wellington, to represent this state of affairs to the Government, and to ask for reinforcements. On the day I arrived, in Wellington I had an interview with the Hons. Messrs. Stafford, Haultain, and Hall. I told them how it had come about, and begged Mr. Stafford to reinforce me to enable me to proceed against the murderers. Mr. Stafford said, in rather an unpleasant manner, "I won't give you a man; you must abandon all your posts in advance of the Patea redoubt, and concentrate your force there." I was astonished and pointed out to him that such a step would be virtually to abandon the whole of the Patea district to the enemy; that the settlers would at once be obliged to leave their houses, farms, horses, cattle, and sheep, and in fact, that they would be ruined. Further, that all the natives in the district now friendly, would have no alternative but to join the enemy, whose ranks would thus be swelled, that the ruin of the district between
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Patea and Wanganui would necessarily follow, and the disaffection spread to other districts. Mr. Stafford said, "The sooner the better; I don't care, the Assembly would not vote the money," I became indignant, and told him that rather than abandon the outposts I would throw up my commission and return to the Patea district as a settler; that I would then, in conjunction with my fellow-settlers, take the law into our own hands, and we could hold our own. It was arranged that I should call the following day. I did so, and saw Colonel Haultain, who told me I could increase my force to four hundred men, and enlist them for three months. I declined to have anything to do with this arrangement, and said I should require at least four hundred men in addition to the force then in the district, and that it was no use enlisting men for three months as I could not guarantee that the natives would be subdued in three or twelve months. Colonel Haultain pressed the point and said that I was "placing the Government in a fix," they had no money, and if I would only try my best for three months, they would increase the force if necessary, and extend the time of enlistment. Finding that I could get no better terms, I agreed to this arrangement, but insisted on having the sole control, and not to be interfered with and kept under the control of Mr. Booth as I hitherto had been. Colonel Haultain promised me carte blanche, which promise as usual, was not carried out.
I at once, commenced to carry out my arrangements, and with the assistance of Captain Page, a very intelligent and excellent officer, enlisted the next day in Wellington, 80 men, whom we selected out of scores who came forward, rejecting numbers of drunken useless vagabonds. I then returned to Wanganui, but after my departure from Wellington the Government enlisted about 100 more, many of whom were the men whom I had rejected, and that motley group were sent after me. They also reinforced me with a division of Constabulary under Major Von Tempskey, from the Waikato, and recruits from Nelson, Hokitika, and from Taranaki. With regard to Major Von Tempsky's men they were fine fellows, and almost the only men of the reinforcements upon whom I could depend.
Whilst getting my force collected in the district the enemy was not idle. They repeatedly attacked our escorts, and eventually
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(on the 22th July, whilst I was at Patea) attacked the Turo-turo Mokai redoubt, killed Captain Ross and eight of his men, but a few of our brave fellows held the redoubt, and after a desperate conflict, during which the gallant Von Tempskey rushed to their assistance from Waihi, they drove off the enemy with a loss to them of several killed and wounded.
I now prepared to attack the enemy in his stronghold at Ngutu-o-te-manu, and on the 1st August, with 300 men and the able Von Tempskey, second in command, determined to take them right in front in broad daylight. My plan succeeded, and the pa which was then only partially fortified, we captured, driving the enemy from his position with considerable loss. I burnt the "Beak of the Bird," and destroyed the pa, but on my return march, the enemy who had received reinforcements, rallied and harrassed us, and many of the men of the new levies were "unsteady." This was noticed by many of my officers, but more especially by Major Von Tempskey and Captain Buck, and after consulting with them I determined not to attack the natives in the bush again, until the force could be trained to work together, but to lay ambuscades and make false attacks, so as to draw them out and harrass them in other ways. Somehow or other Captain Hirst, whom I had previously struck off pay, reported privately to Major Atkinson, misrepresenting my actions and movements, thereby constituting himself a spy, as he had done before at Pipiriki. Reports appear to have reached the Government of "want of energy," "inaction," unnecessary loss of time on my part.
On the 29th August, Colonel Haultain wrote to say that--"Mutterings of inaction, are beginning to be heard from those who are ready to attack the Government on any weak point. * * * Colonel Whitmore's expedition also makes people impatient; the hardships he endured, for want of sufficient food and shelter for several days, makes them fancy that such exertions may be made under all circumstances." As Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu was the only position in which the enemy was in force, and as we had decided not to attack him there but harass and draw him out, I wrote to the Defence Minister a letter, dated 5th September 1868, from which the following is an extract.--
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[EXTRACT]
"Camp Waihi, September 5th, 1868.
* * * In a forest like the one round Mount Egmont, pursuit of a broken foe is no easy work, as, if the enemy is disheartened, he will scatter in all directions and little good can be done. In many districts (say Hawke's Bay, or Tauranga for instance) an enemy must retire in a body, he cannot scatter, and pursuit there might be of service. Here, only from suceession of unexpected blows can any good be expected to result from operations carried on over ground unmatched for difficulties to the assailant, and advantages to the defendant; and to hunt natives down in a bush like the one before us, and with which they are thoroughly acquainted, requires men who have been trained for the purpose. This country has never permitted any officer to have a number of men embodied for more than a trifling period for this very difficult mode of warfare. An officer, therefore, must shape bis tactics according to the material he has. I need not say that men of a few months training as mine are, cannot perform more than they have done (and we had no natives with us.) The inherent courage of my men and their willingness alone can be counted upon. Thus, scattered operations through a bush, cannot be engaged in with positive and certain hopes of success; and such are required for a relentless pursuit. Much must be risked and left to Providence, in any military operations, however well grounded on correct principles--but to overate the capabilities of the men under one's command and underrate the capabilities of the enemy is the worst mistake any commanding officer can commit, in my opinion.
There is one suggestion I would beg respectfully to offer, which, if approved of by the Government, would enable me to fight the rebels at much less disadvantage. I would propose making roads into the bush in the direction of the enemy's stronghold and clearings--the bush to be done by contract: the track felled ten chains wide and logged, and the workmen to be protected by strong covering parties. In this way we could steadily, but surely push our way into the forest and force the enemy to retire or fight us, and I feel confident, effectively subdue Titoko Waru or any other tribes in the district, without fear of further molestation from them, and with much less bloodshed than by going on by their own almost impregnable tracks. The numbers of the force could also be reduced, for though a new post would have to be taken up on the Waingongoro river, from which to supply the covering parties, still the attention of the enemy would principally be directed to the bush road, and the strength of the other posts could be considerably reduced, If you think this suggestion will meet the approval of the Government you can make use of this letter as an official document.
I am, &c.,
(Signed) THOS. McDONNELL.
The Hon. Colonel Haultain.
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After my first successful attack upon Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, knowing that Titoko Waru had commenced exerting all his powers to render that position impregnable, and having decided upon not being led into his trap, but to draw him out, I commenced to burn down and destroy his villages, from the Ketemarae, clearing to the extremity of the bush. On one occasion we burnt a village so near to Te Ngutu-o-te-manu that the Hau-haus inside yelled and called for us to come on, but would not come out to attack us.
Whilst carrying out my own plans which I knew would eventually succeed, I was again urged by the Defence Minister to make a decisive blow. Irritated at repeated accusations of inaction, I wrote to say--"I intend to make an attack in a day or two, after which should God spare my life, I trust the Government will allow me to retire from the command of the Patea Field Force, &c." I then held a meeting with the whole of my officers, Europeans and Natives, at which we decided upon a plan of attack. Thus, I was forced into another attack on the Ngutu-o-te-manu much against my own wish, and the judgment of many of my officers, who, however, at the above meeting fully agreed with me as to the necessity for going in again after Colonel Haultain's last letter had been received, and especially as Colonel Whitmore, who had just then sustained a severe defeat on the East Coast, was held up as an example for me to copy. I left nothing undone that I could think of to ensure a victory, but a reverse unfortunately took place; the Ngutu-o-te-manu had been placed in a strong position of defence, and owing to this and the unsteadiness of many of the men, to say nothing of ninety who bolted into camp almost without firing a shot, after a well-directed attack, we could not take it.
I then made arrangements for a retreat; we were at the rear of the pa which we had reached after a long detour through the bush, I saw the best way to retreat would be to get round the left flank of the pa, into the main broad track leading from it. I got the men as well as it was possible, under cover, and putting the wounded on stretchers, formed a strong advanced guard in the centre of which I placed them. I then directed Major Von Tempskey, who had got his men under cover also, to follow on as I moved off, thus forming a rear guard. With him I left my brother, Captain McDonnell,
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and about a dozen picked natives. I directed the Native Contingent, who were in our rear heavily engaged with Toi's and Hauwhenua's people who had hurried up from the village (I think Ruaamuru) back in the bush, to move off in a line parallel to us on our left flank; of this order I myself informed Major Von Tempskey and Captain Buck.
Having made these arrangements, I gave the word to move off, placing myself with the advance, to find the way round into the broad track, leading out to which we had to cut our way. Whilst doing this, the enemy's fire increased, and our casualties increased also. I had to contend with the enemy in my front and right flank, whilst the Native Contingent on my left were engaged with them on their left, and I presumed Major Von Tempskey was following in our rear, when some of his men rushed up crying out that he and the other officers, including Captain McDonnell were all killed. I was proceeding to the rear with Inspector Hunter to ascertain the truth of this, but when a short distance on we met Captain McDonnell and the few natives I had left with him. He informed me that when in the act of moving off, Major Von Tempskey was shot dead, and then Captain Buck; that Inspector Roberts had moved off with the greater part of the men, and that he (Captain McDonnell) had then followed on our track with what men he could collect. I would have gone further back to see if I could do any good, but the enemy still attacked our rear. I had ninety men, was carrying thirteen wounded, and might any moment expect more, and I knew that we should have as much as we, could do to get out of the bush before night. I accordingly pushed on, and we fought our way out, leaving one man who was shot dead, but carrying our thirteen wounded, including Dr. Best, with us, and reached camp an hour after the natives who had got back without any loss. Inspector Roberts and his party, who fortunately did not follow our track escaped the enemy, camped in the bush for the night, and reached Waihi the next morning without any casualty after he had commenced to march off. The men who had bolted into camp were for the most part drunk when I arrived; a few of them did not stop till they got to Rangitikei and Manawatu, and these being missing, I returned as killed. Those at Waihi before us reported that my-
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self and the remainder of the force had been cut to pieces. Our actual loss was seventeen killed and two who afterwards died of their wounds in hospital.
The drunkenness which demoralised some men of my force after the defeat at Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, and for which I was censured, arose out of the recklessness of the men who had "bolted" and the action of the Taranaki Provincial Government. To raise a revenue they had passed a "Bottle Bill" under which every storekeeper in that province, on paying the license fee, could sell liquor by the bottle. Almost every shop and store in the Patea district at once became a "groggery," and when the men's money was spent gave them credit, sometimes receiving orders for their forthcoming pay. I wrote to the Defence Minister for power to close those grog-shops, seize the liquor, and place it in safety. Ministers refused to grant me that power, as each storekeeper had paid for his licence. Thus I was powerless, as the greatest punishment I could inflict on the militia portion of my force was seven days hard labour and no cells to put them into. One Government opened the floodgates of intemperance, the other refused me the power to shut them, and all held me responsible for the result.
I sent in my report of the action, and proposed cutting a broad track or way into the bush, in such a manner as to force the rebels to fight us on more equal terms. The Defence Minister came up and told me he had come to carry out the very plan I had proposed, and that he had brought up material in the p.s. Sturt, such as axes, &c., to commence operations. He also informed me that Colonel Whitmore had volunteered to come up and serve under me, and that I now had the power to seize all the grog in the district. This I ordered Colonel Whitmore to see done directly he arrived at Patea. When I found that Colonel Whitmore had offered to serve under me I very much doubted whether it was not a deep laid plan to oust me out of my district, and subsequent events have shown that I was correct.
A few days after Colonel Haultain had told me that he had come up to carry out my plans, and that he had not the slightest intention to abandon the outposts, I was suddenly ordered to abandon
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every outpost north of Manawapo! Who advised him, or what induced him so suddenly to alter his mind? My interview with Mr. Stafford at once flashed across my mind, and I felt convinced that a retreat had commenced which could only end at Kai Iwi. Directly afterwards, all the posts north of Patea were abandoned, the settlers obliged to flee; their homes burned down; flocks, herds, everything--even Government property, left to the mercy of the enemy!! As a last effort I asked to be allowed, to take the Pokaikai prisoners but the Government would not consent to that, and in utter disgust I sent in my resignation, in which I said that which in a previous letter I had told the Defence Minister, that I could not see how I could be of any further service unless the management of affairs were left entirely in my own hands, and then added--"Those were my words, and that has been my opinion for a long time past. Hoping that I could prevail upon the Government to adopt a course that would at once and for ever put an end to rebellion in the Patea district, I did, more than once, say that I would resign if not allowed to do so. That, the Government refused to do, therefore I now leave them to assume the responsibility.
"At my request about 400 Wanganui Natives are again under arms; we have nearly completed a strong redoubt here (at Weraroa) this being the key to the whole of the Waitotara on to Wanganui. It now, Sir, remains with my successor to carry out the plans which I have matured. Under no circumstances will I again serve under the present Government. Anxiously awaiting the arrival of my successor, &c. THOS. McDONNELL."
As the Government did not wish to accept my resignation, although my successor was appointed, and after a long and tiresome correspondence I consented to withdraw it and accept two months leave of absence.
Thus Colonel Whitmore stepped into my shoes; I leave others to say how they fitted him. Out of more than twenty engagements I never lost but one, which I was urged to fight against may own better judgment. I wish for the sake of my fellow colonists, that my successor could say the same.
Whilst on leave at Wanganui, Colonel Whitmore fought a battle at Moturoa, near Okotuku, where our losses amounted to twenty-
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three killed, fourteen left on the field, and nine who died of their wounds. Part of the burned bones of those left on the field were some months afterwards collected by Colonel Whitmore's orders and buried at the Wairoa.
Retreat after retreat followed, until the Head Quarters were within nine miles of Wanganui, Titoko Waru in possession of the Waitotara, the settlers driven in, their houses burned, and the town of Wanganui in danger.
I could stand that no longer, threw up my leave, and placed my services "unreservedly" at the disposal of the Government. I could then have mustered some hundreds of the loyal Wanganui Natives, who, without the aid of Europeans, with the exception of a few officers of their own choosing, would single handed, have attacked Titoko Waru. But it was not to be done in that way. I was only allowed to raise about a hundred Kupapas for the defence of the outskirts of the town, and for scouring the country round Kai Iwi, and for these services they were to have no pay.
It is useless to pursue the subject, Finding myself placed in a humiliating position where I could be of no service to my fellow-colonists, I once more resigned.
I attribute the disasters on the West Coast to the following causes:--
1st. To the mistaken economy of the Government (perhaps through being misinformed by the civil authorities) in keeping such a small force in that district which had never been thoroughly subjected to our rule.
2nd. To the Pokaikai Commission, and the influence and conduct of Messrs. Parris and Booth.
3rd. To the summary dismissal of the best men in my force; breaking faith with them, and afterwards replacing them by raw levies picked up off the streets of some of our large towns.
4th. To the Hon. the Defence Minister in urging me to a second attack upon Te Ngutu-o-te-manu, contrary to my own opinions, and the opinions of my best officers.
5th. To the suicidal course which the Government adopted in abandoning the Patea district, instead of holding it at all hazards.
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Politicians may, perhaps, discover other reasons, but as my object is simply to defend my own reputation (more dear to me than life,) and to state facts which may benefit my fellow colonists, and not to discuss the political side of the question, or by any means impute improper motives, I now beg to offer an opinion based upon a thorough knowledge of the Maori race; long experience in colonial warfare and a full belief in what our native allies could and would do if judiciously made use of by our Colonial Government.
My opinion is, that it is only "throwing away men's lives, and spending money for naught," to continue a system of warfare under which in Maori phraseology, we fight the shadow, and evade the substance; and lopp off the branches whilst the trunk of the tree is not only left untouched, but actually nourished by absurd laws, under which it grows, flourishes, and expands.
There is but one effectual course open to us now, and that is, to put the East and West Coasts in a state of defence; then muster our European forces and Native allies and strike vigorously at the Ngatimaniapoto country, seizing Kawhia, and making it a basis of operations on the one side, and sending a strong force on the other side from Maketu and Tauranga through Patetere, advancing at the same time on the present Waikato frontier. Thus we would devastate the Ngatimaniapoto country, locate a force at Taupo, permanently cutting off the enemy's communications; and then, we could finish off upon the East and West Coasts.
When these and other vigorous measures are undertaken under a determined and resolute Administration, and a judicious change in the laws which now protect rebel natives is effected, then, and not until then may we hope to see this conflict finally ended, and the settlers all over this Island enjoying peace and prosperity.
