CHAPTER III. OPENING OF THE WEST COAST CAMPAIGN.
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CHAPTER III.
OPENING OF THE WEST COAST CAMPAIGN.
MY share of the operations under Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell was of no importance, not worth mentioning in itself, but such as it was it tended to give that officer a moral and military support which he much needed at the time.
I had returned from Patea and had resumed my seat in the Legislative Council, and was doing what I could to support the Government in taking effectual steps to reinforce the troops, when one evening, early in October, I was unexpectedly sent for to his quarters by Colonel Haultain, the Defence Minister. I found Mr. Booth, the resident magistrate from Patea, with him, who was the bearer of the resignation of his command by Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell, on family grounds which were well understood and very sad. With his resignation he sent to the Ministry a suggestion that the command should be offered to me, and Colonel Haultain, in the name of the Cabinet, offered it to me accordingly. At that time I was a member of the Legislative Council, who, though professedly
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on the side of those who were opposed to the continuance of all the powers of the provinces, and therefore recognized Mr. Stafford in a general way as our leader, still had never taken any strong part on either side. I was also engaged in managing a considerable fern run, and in the serious struggle of reclaiming a large area of wilderness and making it suitable for sheep. Times were bad, and sheep farmers had much to do to keep afloat, with prices such as wool was producing. It had never occurred to me that I might be asked to serve continuously in the regular Colonial Force, or if it had I should have dismissed any such notion, as I could not afford to do so. But now, when affairs seemed so critical, I doubted if I had a right to refuse to serve, temporarily at least. I therefore asked for a day or so to consider. Colonel Haultain accorded this to me, and I consulted the late Sir J. Richardson and several old Imperial officers, of whom, in those days, there were many in Parliament. I placed myself unreservedly in their hands, in order to ascertain what seemed to them my duty. They all replied in the same sense, that unless it meant positive ruin to my affairs, I was bound to serve at least till the crisis was past. I had still a doubt whether I could assume the command, for I had no other relation in the country on whom I could rely in case of accident to myself, and my wife was in New Zealand. In such an event she would have
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been friendless or dependent upon strangers. I therefore resolved to consult her before accepting the risk, and left for Napier with this object. But though it was hard upon her, my wife recognized that I must not evade my duty, and admitted that those I had consulted had decided rightly. I therefore made what arrangements at short notice I could and returned to Wellington.
The fact of my acceptance of the command, or perhaps, more correctly, that of Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell's retirement, restored to Mr. Stafford enough of his erring partisans to secure a substantial majority to the end of the Session, which was therefore speedily brought to a close.
I reached Wanganui on October 20th, 1868, on my way to Patea, and endeavoured to ascertain the position of affairs. Very much to my surprise, Lieut.-Colonel McDonnell did not come to see me, or afford me the least assistance. But there were many who were well-informed and I soon got to know very fairly the position of affairs. It was a serious one. Titokowaru, flushed with success, had moved forward to a hill not far from and overlooking Patea, called "Gentle Annie." The last advanced post beyond Patea itself (Kakaramea) had been abandoned, and of open country round the township we held not a rood. The enemy, at the outbreak of hostilities but seventy strong, had, as he moved forward, been joined successively by the Tangahoe and Papakohe
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hapus, and by many restless spirits from the Taranaki and Waikato tribes. Secret negotiations were believed to be in progress with the Ngarauru or Waitotara hapu, the most numerous of the Ngatiruanui sub-tribes, which threatened a still more considerable accession to the numbers in rebellion. All these hapus were more or less, but the Ngarauru were very closely connected with the loyal Wanganuis, so that there was a danger of the whole of the West Coast tribes making common cause against the Government, and joining the standard of Titokowaru. To oppose the force openly in rebellion, and any further possible accessions to his ranks which seemed dangerously likely to follow before long, we had but a miserable excuse for a military force. At Patea we had, after the troops had fallen back upon it, in consequence of the defeat of Te Ngutu, the remnants of Nos. 2 and 3 divisions of A. C., and the intact division from Napier No. 1, about fifty strong. No. 5 (Von Tempsky's) division had mutinied, and were disbanded; so that there were but between seventy and eighty men fit for service in the whole three divisions at Patea, and of these some were occupied with the care of the wounded.
There were also the fragments of the hurriedly-raised, and for the most part, wholly untrained levies from Patea and Wellington, Taranaki, and Nelson. These were reduced by casualties and
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desertions, and their term of service was almost expired. The Taranaki and Nelson little corps were probably the most valuable of these, and might have been, or part might have been, induced to renew their period of service in the field. But the rest, the Wellington volunteers more especially, who had but a few days to serve, positively refused to remain a day longer than compelled by their engagement. There was no possibility of forcing these men to remain or continue to serve, and when they withdrew the force at Patea would be barely sufficient to hold the town and guard the hospital, magazines, and stores.
To supplement the field force a body of 400 of the Wanganui tribe, including the old, the young, the weak, and the cowardly, had been hastily ordered up, and had gradually collected at Weraroa, where there were a few recruits of the armed constabulary lately sent up to be trained. This post, a mile or two to the right of the line of communication at Nukumaru, was itself accessible to wheel traffic by a road along a ridge close to a dense bush, but the track went no further. It was situated on the south of the Waitotara river at a spot which overhung that stream. It was most undesirable to permit the congregation of Wanganuis at Weraroa. Their relationship to the Ngarauru, whose loyalty was more than suspected, made it imprudent to allow them to remain in the
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immediate vicinity of the villages of that hapu--but up to this all effort to induce them to move on to Patea had failed. Situated as the Colony then was, it would have been disastrous if a large section of the Wanganuis already much impressed by Titokowaru's successes had deserted with the arms and ammunition we had placed in their hands. Te Keepa--Kemp (as he is more commonly called)--and his immediate followers, comprising less than a quarter of the whole of this native multitude, alone could be absolutely depended upon.
The white population of Wanganui and the country districts adjacent had but two volunteer corps, both cavalry ones, under arms. One, and the larger one, was under Captain Finnimore, and had its headquarters in Wanganui itself, whilst a lesser, but very valuable one under Lieutenant Bryce, was composed of the actual residents of the neighbouring districts. There was no militia.
On taking command I had formally intimated to the ministers my entire want of confidence in the Wanganui native gathering, the little use I thought they would be to me, and the distrust I felt in their loyalty. To this could only be replied that I must do my best with them till the Government could procure more reliable troops. Having taken a day to consider such information as I could get, I resolved to proceed at once to Weraroa and endeavour to get these doubtful allies to move forward. On October
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31st, accordingly, I left Wanganui and rode to Weraroa with a small escort of the Wanganui cavalry, commanded as it happened by Corporal John Ballance, till recently a cornet in the corps.
The Defence Minister had summarily dismissed this gentleman and cancelled his commission on account of an article, more or less hostile to the Government, which had appeared in a newspaper of which he wasthe proprietor. I do not propose here to go into the merits of this case, but may mention that Mr. Ballance, who has since filled some space in the political history of the Colony, did not on account of the punishment inflicted upon him suffer himself to be behind-hand in the duty of defending his district, but re-enlisted in the ranks of his corps and continued to take part in its military duties, till its services were no longer required. An acquaintance thus formed ripened into a friendship of years. At Weraroa, with the able assistance of Mr. Booth, R.M., I was able to persuade the Wanganui's to march forward next day, and received satisfactory promises of good behaviour from all the chiefs. I then proceeded to Patea. In point of fact my command only extended northwards from the Whenuakura River, but being the senior officer Lieut.-Colonel Gorton who commanded at Wanganui, made no objection to my exercising control over Wairoa (now called Waverley) and Weraroa which were actually in his district, though held by my force.
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At Patea I found the whole population of the district and all the stock crammed into the small intervening space between the town, the river, and the sea. It appeared that all had lost heart, and their tone resembled that of men when in a shipwreck; all hope had been abandoned. In order therefore to make at least a show of more confidence, I lost no time in moving the whole force from the township and establishing my headquarters at Mr. Booth's house, three-quarters of a mile in advance. There I encamped, stretching a line of tents from the river to the sea sand-hills. This step had at least the advantage of giving elbow-room, and space for the stock. It also made a demonstration easily seen from the enemy's position, and it removed the men from the nightly orgies which of late had been too common in the town. The guard left that night in Patea nearly all got drunk, two of the men next morning were found to be seriously stabbed, and twenty-one prisoners, all of whom had been on duty, with several others were paraded at my headquarters next day. Such a state of things made strong measures unavoidable. Therefore I at once appointed a Provost Marshal with large powers of summary punishment, and told off a picquet of a few mounted troopers to prevent all intercourse between the township and camp. A canteen under strict regulations was opened, and under powers vested in me by recent legislation I closed the other
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public bouses for the sale of liquor. These steps secured sobriety in the force, and prevented a bad example being shown to the native auxiliaries hourly expected. These latter arrived in the evening, and at once made me feel how pitiable a position it was to be dependent to any extent upon them. The spot fixed for their camp did not suit them and they declined to encamp there. Native dissatisfaction is always rather loudly expressed, and this was my first attempt to manage Maori allies. The difficulty was, however, at last got over practically by giving in to their claim, and they settled down.
The repression of drunkenness, which had been rather neglected hitherto in the Patea force, was, however, but an essential preliminary to the task of making the men efficient and creating a military spirit among them. Discipline and training had not been sufficiently attended to before Te Ngutu, and after that disaster it had become difficult to find time to inculcate discipline or to train the men. Nevertheless, it did not admit of delay if the men were to fight, and I felt that I must act in some way at once or Titokowaru would neglect my force and invade the settled districts. I had already made a sort of demonstration by pitching tents to induce a belief that we had been reinforced, and I resolved to draw out the whole of the troops and the Wanganui natives, as a reconnaissance in force, to prove to the enemy that the tents were not unoccupied.
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One day I had to occupy in completing the camp arrangements at Patea, and erecting a central redoubt and open works on the flanks of my position, and then on Sunday the 25th, I marched with all my available force and the native contingent under their chiefs and Mr. Gudgeon as their staff officer. The Maories turned out readily enough, and from their scattered mode of marching made some display of numbers. We got to the ravine intervening between the open country and "Gentle Annie," Titokowaru's camp, which was pitched in deep jungle, and fired a few shells at some 200 to 250 of his men, who showed near the summit of the hill at a distance of about 1200 yards. Nothing more, however, could be done, nor had I intended to do more, as the bush ravine was both heavily wooded and precipitous, and to have gone round the head of it to attack the hill from the rear would have occupied more time than we could devote to the movement. We therefore returned before sunset to our lines.
Next day, the 26th, "Governor" Hunia, a chief with a considerable following, again gave trouble about his camping ground; not that he cared twopence where he encamped, but simply to assert his own importance, and enjoy the impotence of "the Pakeha." Hunia was talked over at last, the more easily that he really had nothing to complain about.
I now decided to pay off and dismiss the Wellington Rifles. I had no means of detaining them, their
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time was almost up: without a good deal of training they were of no use, and it seemed better to make a merit of necessity. They were therefore informed that they were free to go. I devoted the evening to an interview with the Maori chiefs, which though fairly satisfactory--inasmuch as they declared that they would fight while they remained--gave them an opportunity of telling me they would not long remain at the front, as they required to return home shortly to plant their crops.
On October 27th I received from the Government, despatches promising me recruits, approving my bringing up the Wanganui natives, and informing me that, though doing their best, it must be some time before the Maories could be replaced by reliable Europeans. I sent back the Wellington Rifles by the steamer that brought up my despatches, and ordered out our few mounted men with the natives to patrol the neighbourhood. This duty was cheerfully performed, and the village of Hukatere burned, as the inhabitants had joined Titokowaru.
On the 28th I sent an escort with four carts to supply Wairoa with a month's provisions to prevent the embarrassment of having to send, as hitherto, almost daily supplies. Sub-Inspector Col. McDonnell had now some twenty or thirty recruits at Weraroa to support the fifty Wanganui natives whom I had been compelled to leave there rather against my will. An escort of 200 natives had been ordered to reinforce
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the escort of the carts to Wairoa, but somehow they did not appear. This was their first actual instance of disobedience, and promised ill for the future. They endeavoured to put the blame on Mr. Gudgeon, their staff-officer, but it was clearly their own fault, not his. In the evening I had a further foretaste of what it was to have to rely upon so broken a reed as a tribal collection of Maories. I had reason to suspect that Titokowaru, if he had not yet moved round my flank by the bush inland, was likely to do so before long, and I therefore proposed at an evening meeting that the tribe should march in the night or early morning to Little Taranaki to reconnoitre. This village was one which the enemy would probably visit, even though not meaning to hold it, if he undertook the movement I expected. But many hours "korero" was wasted. Commands are of no use unless they can be enforced, and the Wanganuis knew well enough I was unable to compel their obedience. Each chief, each reputed soothsayer or wiseacre, had a volume of eloquence to vent in opposition to my plan. The moon was unfavourable, a peculiar star was unpropitious, and so on, and I had to put up with this rodomontade as well as I could. It would have been fatal to lose my temper I knew, because the Maories often act in this way for no other object than to "raise your dander," and if they fail it is easier to manage them afterwards. So I accepted the argument of the "star"
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and deferred the expedition. Next day I took the mounted men myself by Oika to Wairoa and endeavoured to obtain intelligence. Nothing, however, could be discovered of the enemy. Oika had not been burnt, though plundered by our natives, and our escort had not been molested in re-victualling Wairoa. Such as remained of the Patea temporary volunteers now agreed to serve a little longer, and were brought into our lines. The last of the cattle from Mr. Southwell's farm were brought in under escort of our mounted men to diminish the risks of loss from marauding parties of the enemy. Next day all except a gun detachment of the Nelson and Taranaki temporary volunteers and one or two who enlisted in the A. C., I dismissed to their homes by the steamer Sturt; and a clean sweep being then made of all the irregular troops, I wrote urgent despatches to Government pressing that in future all recruits should be enrolled in the A. C., and not as temporary volunteers.
On the 31st "Governor" Hunia intimated to me that his men could only stop one week longer, and Kemp, on being referred to, told me regretfully that his men wished to go and could not be relied upon to stop.
On November 1st Kemp and Hunia, with Mr. Gudgeon, moved out in the direction I had wished them to go before, and remained out all night.
On the 2nd, at daylight, a Mr. Kenrich, returning
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from Wanganui brought me alarming intelligence. He had crossed the Waitotara at its mouth, and there learned that Titokowaru's force had made its way to the river, the Europeans in occupation of native runs only escaping with their lives with difficulty, leaving their stock and effects behind them, and that the Ngarauru (Waitotara tribe) had risen, and joined the enemy. Soon afterwards the native force returned, and informed me that they had visited New Taranaki and Putatahi, and that the enemy on his march had visited those villages, and was probably now moving on Wanganui.
